Heidi Ann Anfinson Vs. State Of Iowa

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 141 / 06–0076
Filed October 17, 2008
HEIDI ANN ANFINSON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D.
Rosenberg, Judge.
Further review of court of appeals decision affirming denial of
postconviction relief. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED;
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Alfredo Parrish and Brandon Brown of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn
Boles Gribble Cook Parrish and Gentry, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Joe Weeg,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
2
HECHT, Justice.
Heidi Anfinson was convicted of second-degree murder for the
drowning death of her infant son. In this postconviction relief action, we
consider whether trial counsel rendered prejudicial ineffective assistance
in failing to sufficiently inquire into and present evidence of Anfinson’s
postpartum depression in furtherance of her defense theory that the
child’s death was accidental. We conclude Anfinson’s trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance that resulted in prejudice. Accordingly,
we reverse Anfinson’s conviction and remand this case to the district
court for a new trial.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
Heidi Anfinson gave birth to a son, Jacob, on September 5, 1998.
Fifteen days after his birth, Jacob went missing while in Anfinson’s care.
Jacob’s father contacted the police, who began searching for the child.
While officers were searching for Jacob, Anfinson and her husband were
transported to the police station. Anfinson told the officers that while
bathing Jacob, she left the room to use the telephone; and when she
returned, she discovered Jacob had drowned. Anfinson led police to
Saylorville Lake, where they discovered Jacob’s body submerged under
rocks in shallow water. During a later interview with police, Anfinson
stated she “freaked” when she found Jacob’s dead body in the bath
water, put it in the car, took it to the lake, and placed it in the water.
The State charged Anfinson with first-degree murder and child
endangerment. Iowa Code §§ 707.1, .2, 726.6(1), .6(2) (1997). Anfinson
pled not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. The first trial resulted in
a mistrial as the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision. In a
second trial involving the same charges, the jury convicted Anfinson of
second-degree murder. Id. § 707.3. On direct appeal, the court of
3
appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Anfinson, No. 00-0511 (Iowa Ct.
App. July 3, 2002).
Anfinson filed an application for postconviction relief alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. She presented evidence tending to
prove her trial counsel summarily dismissed the notion of raising
insanity or diminished capacity defenses despite evidence she was
suffering from severe postpartum depression at the time of Jacob’s
death. She also asserted trial counsel, who chose to present the defense
theory that Jacob died accidentally, was ineffective in failing to present
evidence of her postpartum depression in furtherance of that theory.
Anfinson further contended trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
object to the testimony of the investigating officers who described
Anfinson’s lack of emotion shown during the interview at the police
station when she denied knowledge of Jacob’s whereabouts.1
In a detailed ruling, the district court dismissed Anfinson’s
application. The court concluded trial counsel breached an essential
duty by failing to investigate Anfinson’s mental and physical condition,
but reasoned Anfinson was not entitled to relief because she failed to
prove the requisite prejudice resulting from the breach. The court also
found Anfinson failed to prove prejudice resulting from the admission of
the officers’ testimony describing Anfinson’s lack of emotion during
questioning. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petition,
and we granted further review.
1Before the district court and court of appeals Anfinson raised additional claims
of ineffectiveness. Our opinion on further review is confined in this case to the grounds
specifically asserted in her application for further review.
4
II. Scope of Review.
We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State
v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa 2008). To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, a claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence “(1) his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty,
and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice.” State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d
128, 133 (Iowa 2006); accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064–65, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698
(1984). We may affirm the district court’s rejection of an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim if either element is lacking. State v. Greene,
592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa 1999). To establish prejudice, a claimant must
demonstrate “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for the
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.’ ” State v. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 837, 845 (Iowa 2008)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
698). The probability of a different result must be “ ‘sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Id.
III. Discussion.
A. Failure to Investigate and Assert Defenses Based on
Postpartum Depression. On our de novo review, we find that trial
counsel was aware of the probability Anfinson suffered from postpartum
depression after Jacob’s birth and categorically rejected any suggestion
that this condition be explored in her defense. Anfinson’s sisters
observed Anfinson behaving strangely soon after Jacob was born on
September 5, 1998. While attending a baby shower, they observed
numerous “sores” on Anfinson’s legs and perceived her to be
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“exhausted,” “wooden,” and “unjoyful.”2 Anfinson appeared to be afraid
to handle Jacob.
On September 22, 1998, after trial counsel undertook Anfinson’s
defense, trial counsel and several of Anfinson’s family members were
present when Anfinson was released on bail. As they left the jail, an
unidentified woman approached. The woman disclosed she had
experienced postpartum depression, claimed she knew what Anfinson
was going through, and attempted to hand an envelope to one of
Anfinson’s family members. Trial counsel snatched the envelope and
proclaimed he “didn’t want to hear any talk of postpartum depression.”
He was quoted in a newspaper article published the next day, suggesting
postpartum depression was not a factor in the baby’s accidental death.3
Although Anfinson was hospitalized on September 26, 1998 and
medicated for depression, suicidal ideation, and panic attacks, trial
counsel failed to request or obtain copies of Anfinson’s medical records.4
He also failed to conduct an investigation which would have divulged
2Anfinson initially told her sisters the “sores” were caused by mosquito bites, but
later disclosed they were caused by self-mutilation as she plucked hairs from her legs
and pubic area.
3Counsel made this public pronouncement without the benefit of a reasonable
investigation of Anfinson’s mental health. He described himself in the postconviction
proceeding as a “media lawyer” and characterized his comments quoted in the
newspaper article as an effort to ethically “manage” and “balance” the news in
furtherance of Anfinson’s accidental death defense. Counsel testified he “didn’t want
the public to even think of postpartum depression, because postpartum depression
means you deliberately killed the baby.”
4The records disclose the hospital staff assigned to Anfinson a GAF (Global
Assessment Functioning) of ten at the time she was admitted to the hospital. Although
this rating is based on a medical professional’s subjective rating, it suggests Anfinson
was functioning at a very low level at the time of admission. Trial counsel explained he
did not request copies of the hospital records because Anfinson represented she was
bonded with the baby, claimed she was a good mother, and denied she was depressed.
He consulted no psychiatrist or psychologist on the subject of Anfinson’s mental state.
6
Anfinson experienced prior episodes of depression after she gave birth
and consented to the adoption of her first child in 1980, and again
following an abortion in 1985.
Additional evidence supports our finding trial counsel rejected from
the outset the notion evidence of Anfinson’s mental condition might be
relevant to her defense. After Anfinson’s discharge from the hospital, she
was treated by a grief counselor for several months. When the counselor
called to discuss Anfinson’s mental state, trial counsel was dismissive of
her opinion that Anfinson had exhibited symptoms consistent with
postpartum depression.
Members of Anfinson’s family also attempted on several occasions
to communicate to trial counsel their concerns about Anfinson’s mental
state. Anfinson’s father, who paid trial counsel’s fees and litigation
expenses, urged trial counsel to approve, and offered to pay for, a mental
evaluation of Anfinson at the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas.
Counsel rejected the idea, again affirming postpartum depression would
play no part in the defense.5 When Anfinson’s sister and husband
attempted to speak to trial counsel about their observations of Anfinson’s
mental state, he cautioned them against making comments to the press
about postpartum depression and reminded them the defenses of
insanity and diminished capacity would not be pursued.
Anfinson contends the evidence of her severe depression was
essential not only to prove potential insanity and diminished
responsibility defenses which were summarily and improvidently rejected
by her trial counsel, but also to support the accidental death defense
counsel presented unsuccessfully to the jury. The State contends trial
5Trial counsel told Anfinson’s family he opposed the request for a mental
evaluation on the ground it would be “fuel for the prosecution.”
7
counsel breached no duty in rejecting insanity and diminished capacity
defenses, and his assertion of the accidental death theory of defense was
based on reasonable strategic considerations.
Generally, “ineffective assistance is more likely to be established
when the alleged actions or inactions of counsel are attributed to a lack
of diligence as opposed to the exercise of judgment.” Ledezma v. State,
626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). “[M]ere mistakes in judgment
normally do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.
at 143.
[C]laims of ineffective assistance involving tactical or
strategic decisions of counsel must be examined in light of
all the circumstances to ascertain whether the actions were
a product of tactics or inattention to the responsibilities of
an attorney guaranteed a defendant under the Sixth
Amendment.
Id. However, not all tactical or strategic decisions shelter an attorney
from a claim of ineffectiveness. Id.
While strategic decisions made after “thorough investigation
of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable,” strategic decisions made after a “less than
complete investigation” must be based on reasonable
professional judgments which support the particular level of
investigation conducted.
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80
L. Ed. 2d at 695).
Moreover, reasonable strategic considerations may justify the
rejection of one theory of defense in favor of another theory reasonably
perceived by counsel to be in the accused’s best interest. See Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 268, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235,
244 (1973); State v. Wilkens, 346 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 1984) (counsel not
ineffective in making sound tactical decision to emphasize self defense
rather than diminished capacity, and staying that course in preparing
8
and presenting case to jury). The postconviction court must not “assume
the role of Monday morning quarterback in condemning counsel’s
judgment in choosing between what are frequently equally hazardous
options available to him.” State v. Newman, 326 N.W.2d 788, 795 (Iowa
1982). The real issue is not whether defense counsel’s actions were
successful, but whether they were “justifiable.” Pettes v. State, 418
N.W.2d 53, 56–57 (Iowa 1988).
Keeping these principles in mind, we consider whether Anfinson
met her burden to prove trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in
failing to investigate and present evidence of her mental condition in
furtherance of the potential defenses he rejected and the one defense he
actually presented.
1. Insanity. The legal standard for an insanity defense in Iowa
is codified at section 701.4 of the Iowa Code:
A person shall not be convicted of a crime if at the time the
crime is committed the person suffers from such a diseased
or deranged condition of the mind as to render the person
incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act the
person is committing or incapable of distinguishing between
right and wrong in relation to that act. Insanity need not
exist for any specific length of time before or after the
commission of the alleged criminal act. If the defense of
insanity is raised, the defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant at the time
of the crime suffered from such a deranged condition of the
mind as to render the defendant incapable of knowing the
nature and quality of the act the defendant was committing
or was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong
in relation to the act.
We concur with the district court that Anfinson has failed to
demonstrate a reasonable probability of the success, or even viability, of
an insanity defense based on postpartum depression. Based on her
responses to police questioning and a review of a report of a
psychological evaluation conducted days after Jacob’s death, the State’s
9
mental health expert testified in the postconviction trial that at the time
of Jacob’s death Anfinson was not suffering from a mental disease or
defect of the nature that would have supported an insanity defense.
Even the mental health expert retained by Anfinson in connection with
this postconviction action did not opine Anfinson was insane at the time
of the child’s death. We conclude Anfinson has failed to prove her trial
counsel breached a duty in failing to investigate or present an insanity
defense based on postpartum depression.
2. Diminished responsibility. In the alternative, Anfinson
contends evidence of her postpartum depression would have supported a
diminished responsibility defense. The doctrine of diminished
responsibility has been recognized in Iowa as a matter of common law.6
State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 138–42, 126 N.W.2d 285, 288–90
(1964). “[D]iminished responsibility may be offered as a defense where
an accused, because of a limited capacity to think, is unable to form a
necessary criminal intent.” State v. Collins, 305 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Iowa
1981). The diminished responsibility defense allows a defendant to
negate the specific intent element of a crime by demonstrating due to
some mental defect she did not have the capacity to form that specific
intent. Id. at 437.
Evidence of diminished responsibility may not, however, negate
general criminal intent, and is therefore not a defense to crimes which do
6We have alternatively described the common law concept of decreasing a legally
sane individual’s criminal liability on the basis of a mental defect as a defense of
“diminished capacity” and “diminished responsibility.” See, e.g., State v. Decker, 744
N.W.2d 346, 350 (Iowa 2008) (diminished capacity); State v. Duncan, 710 N.W.2d 34, 36
(Iowa 2006) (diminished responsibility). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(11)(b),
the defense notice requirement, refers to notice of intent to rely upon the defense of
diminished responsibility. In the interest of remaining consistent with our rules of
procedure, we will use the term “diminished responsibility” in this opinion.
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not require proof of specific intent. State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585,
586–87 (Iowa 1985) (evidence of mental unsoundness establishing lack of
capacity to form the requisite criminal intent was not relevant in
prosecution for theft perpetrated by exercising control over stolen
property, a general intent crime); Veverka v. Cash, 318 N.W.2d 447, 449
(Iowa 1982) (diminished capacity not a defense to felony murder
accomplished by arson); Gramenz, 256 Iowa at 142, 126 N.W.2d at 290
(evidence of diminished capacity not relevant to issues of malice
aforethought and general criminal intent). But see Hendershott v. People,
653 P.2d 385, 393–94 (Colo. 1982) (holding reliable and relevant
evidence of mental impairment may be presented to negate mens rea for
crimes not involving a specific intent element). In McVey, we concluded
the General Assembly, by statutorily recognizing the insanity defense,
has limited the legal relevance of evidence of mental impairment to
general intent crimes:
In formulating the insanity defense the legislature
defined limits upon the effect of evidence of mental disease
or defect relating to criminal culpability generally. This court
earlier drew the same line at common law in the Gramenz
case. It would undercut the legislative policy inherent in the
insanity defense for this court to extend the defense of
diminished responsibility.
Insanity and mens rea are legal concepts without
psychiatric counterparts. As legal concepts they are used to
establish limits to legal culpability. The extent to which
evidence of mental impairment will be permitted to affect
criminal responsibility is therefore a legal question. The
argument that evidence of mental impairment should be
received because it bears on the mens rea of an offense
presupposes that the mens rea requirement has a legal
meaning which makes the evidence from the psychological
model relevant. See, e.g., 1 P. Robinson, Criminal Law
Defenses § 64(c) at 283 (1984) (“the issue . . . is a complex
one that is tied to one’s theory of the nature of the mens rea
requirements for criminal offenses”).
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. . . In practical terms a court’s refusal to recognize
the relevancy of evidence of mental impairment short of legal
insanity results from the court’s understanding of the
legislative intention concerning the blameworthiness of the
defendant’s conduct. To the extent evidence of mental
impairment that does not meet the legal insanity standard
permits an accused to avoid responsibility for otherwise
culpable conduct, the policy inherent in the insanity defense
is undermined. See W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook on
Criminal Law § 42 at 331-32 (1972).
McVey, 376 N.W.2d at 587–88. We therefore concluded the legislature
intended to preclude evidence of mental impairment which falls short of
insanity “in cases requiring proof only of guilty knowledge or general
criminal intent accompanying a prohibited act.” Id. at 588.
Although she was charged with first-degree murder, Anfinson was
ultimately convicted of second-degree murder. To convict Anfinson of
second-degree murder, the State was required to prove Anfinson
drowned Jacob with malice aforethought. See Iowa Code § 707.3. The
State was not required to prove Anfinson acted with a specific intent to
kill Jacob. Iowa Code § 707.3; State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531
(Iowa 2000). As we explained in Gramenz, malice aforethought is not a
specific intent mens rea:
While malice aforethought is the specific state of mind
necessary to convict of murder, it is far different from the
specific intent which is a necessary element of murder in the
first degree. It may be express or implied from the acts and
conduct of defendant.
...
It appears . . . that testimony sufficient to establish
defendant’s lack of mental capacity to have malice
aforethought would also be sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the right and wrong test and entitle
defendant to an acquittal on a plea of insanity rather than a
reduction of the sentence . . . .
Gramenz, 256 Iowa at 142, 126 N.W.2d at 290. Thus, in Iowa, a
defendant may only attempt to negate malice aforethought with evidence
12
of insanity. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d at 531 (“The defense[] of . . . diminished
capacity [is] not available to a defendant charged with second-degree
murder. This is because . . . diminished capacity [is] only [a] defense[] to
the specific intent element of a crime.” (Citations omitted.)). We
conclude Anfinson has failed to prove prejudice resulting from counsel’s
failure to present a diminished responsibility defense because she was
not convicted of first-degree murder and evidence supporting such a
defense was not relevant to any element of the second-degree murder
charge of which she was convicted.
3. Accidental death. Although the evidence of Anfinson’s
postpartum depression could not have constituted a defense to the
second-degree murder charge under our case law, Anfinson alternatively
contends her trial counsel was nonetheless ineffective in failing to offer
such evidence in furtherance of her accidental death defense. We
emphasize Anfinson’s contention here is not that counsel was ineffective
for failing to offer evidence of depression to respond to the State’s
evidence tending to prove criminal mens rea. As she did not give notice
of her intent to claim insanity or diminished capacity, evidence of
Anfinson’s compromised mental state was not admissible at trial to
support those defenses. She asserts, instead, her accidental death
defense was severely prejudiced by counsel’s failure to adduce and
present expert testimony diagnosing her depression and placing three
crucial and troublesome aspects of her conduct in a medical and
noncriminal context.
Anfinson claims evidence of her depression should have been
developed and offered in the criminal trial for three purposes which were
crucial to a successful outcome of the accidental death defense. If the
defense was to have any chance of success, it had to supply for the fact-
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finder a plausible explanation of (1) why Anfinson was so distracted and
inattentive on September 20, 1998 that she left her two-week-old baby
unattended in bath water; (2) why she behaved irrationally in
subsequently taking Jacob’s body to the lake, burying it under rocks,
returning to her home, and going to sleep; and (3) why her affect was flat
and emotionless later that same day when she was questioned by
investigators about the child’s disappearance. There was ample evidence
of Anfinson’s postpartum depression available to trial counsel if he had
chosen to undertake the most rudimentary inquiry. He chose instead to
rebuff all attempts made by Anfinson’s family members and her grief
counselor to educate him. He closed not only his ears, but also his eyes
as he neglected to obtain medical records evidencing Anfinson’s mental
state.
The defense of “accidents happen” chosen and presented by trial
counsel was highly unlikely to result in an acquittal if the three most
troublesome aspects of Anfinson’s conduct suggesting criminal
culpability were left unexplained. Expert and lay testimony presented by
Anfinson at the postconviction trial clearly suggests trial counsel could
have developed strong evidence detailing the nature and extent of
Anfinson’s depression and provided an explanation for her bizarre
behavior on the day of Jacob’s death.7
The State asserts trial counsel’s decision to eschew a defense
based on Anfinson’s mental state was a reasonable strategic choice. In
7Anfinson’s mental health expert testified that the bizarre and unusual
circumstances surrounding Jacob’s death “cried out” for a psychiatric evaluation. In
particular, the expert noted an evaluation is indicated “in a situation where somebody
for unexplained reasons is suspected of harming an infant.” Moreover, the expert
opined Anfinson’s mental state could have provided an explanation of why she exhibited
poor judgment, panicked, and put the child in the lake.
14
support of this proposition, we are reminded both trial counsel and the
State’s expert witness viewed defenses based on Anfinson’s compromised
mental state (insanity and diminished responsibility) as “defenses of last
resort” and inconsistent with the accidental death theory presented to
both juries. Even though insanity and diminished responsibility
defenses may have been incompatible with Anfinson’s accidental death
theory, evidence of the defendant’s mental state was not incompatible
with the notion that Jacob’s death was accidental and, in fact, would
have supported her claim that the drowning was due to her
inattentiveness. Even if we were to accept as sound for purposes of our
analysis trial counsel’s assessment that insanity and diminished
responsibility defenses are rarely successful, the decision to ignore
evidence of Anfinson’s compromised mental state was not a reasonable
professional judgment excusing an investigation of the extent to which
that mental state supported the defense theory of accidental death.
The State further contends trial counsel’s failure to investigate
Anfinson’s mental state and its relevance to the accidental death theory
was reasonable given Anfinson’s representation to counsel in November
1998 that she was experiencing “situational depression” or “something
like that.” Any failure to investigate whether Anfinson experienced
postpartum depression is further justified, the State claims, by
Anfinson’s failure to tell trial counsel she had lost weight late in the
pregnancy, and her failure to disclose the history of sleep disturbance
and self-mutilation. Indeed, trial counsel claims when he met with
Anfinson he found her to consistently exhibit appropriate judgment, the
ability to communicate, and the capacity to assist in her defense.
We conclude, as did the district court, that trial counsel’s strategic
decision to renounce evidence of his client’s compromised mental state
15
after a less than complete investigation was not based on reasonable
professional judgment. Furthermore, our confidence in the outcome of
Anfinson’s criminal trial is shaken by trial counsel’s failure to reasonably
investigate and prove his client’s mental condition in furtherance of the
accidental death defense. We find a reasonable probability that if a
reasonable investigation had been undertaken, evidence would have been
developed and presented at trial tending to establish Anfinson’s conduct
from the time of Jacob’s birth until his death was profoundly affected by
postpartum depression. We find a reasonable probability of a different
outcome if trial counsel had developed and presented expert testimony
diagnosing Anfinson’s severe postpartum depression and connecting it
with her bizarre behavior in furtherance of the accidental death defense.
We are mindful of the deference owed by postconviction courts to
counsel’s strategic choices. Deference for such choices is not unlimited,
however, and it will not be stretched to deny Anfinson a new trial under
the circumstances presented here.
We reject the State’s assertion evidence tending to prove Anfinson
suffered from postpartum depression on the day of Jacob’s death was not
admissible for any purpose because she chose not to assert either an
insanity or a diminished capacity defense. Although the State is correct
that the law precludes a defendant from asserting those defenses if she
fails to give timely notice of them consistent with Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.11(11)(b)(1), we are not persuaded evidence of the
defendant’s mental condition is inadmissible for the limited purpose
advanced by Anfinson. We conclude such a limited use of evidence of
Anfinson’s mental state will not undercut the proper limits of mental
defenses prescribed by the General Assembly and observed by this court
in McVey. A proper limiting instruction would suffice to clarify that
16
Anfinson’s purpose in offering such evidence is not in furtherance of a
claim she was insane or incapable of forming a specific intent at the time
of Jacob’s death, but rather to support her theory Jacob’s death was
accidental. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.105.
IV. Conclusion.
Anfinson has met her burden to prove trial counsel rendered
prejudicial ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present
evidence of Anfinson’s depression in furtherance of the accidental death
defense. As we conclude she is entitled to a new trial for this reason, we
need not address the other issues raised on appeal.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Wiggins and Baker, JJ., who take no
part.