Julie M. Boyle Vs. Alum-line, Inc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 07–0372
Filed August 28, 2009
JULIE M. BOYLE,
Appellant,
vs.
ALUM-LINE, INC.,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Howard County, John
Bauercamper, Judge.
Plaintiff seeks further review of court of appeals decision affirming a
district court ruling awarding her damages and attorney fees on her sexual-
discrimination and retaliatory-discharge claims under the federal and state
civil rights acts against her former employer. COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART
AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED.
Mark B. Anderson, Cresco, Karl G. Knudson, Decorah, and James P.
Moriarty, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Donald Gloe of Miller, Pearson, Gloe, Burns, Beatty & Cowie, P.L.C.,
Decorah, for appellee.
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PER CURIAM.
Julie Boyle seeks further review of a court of appeals decision
affirming a district court ruling awarding her damages and attorney fees on
her sexual-discrimination and retaliatory-discharge claims under the federal
and state civil rights acts against her former employer, Alum-Line, Inc. On
appeal, Boyle claimed the district court abused its discretion in its award of
back and front pay. She also claimed the court abused its discretion in its
award of attorney fees and in failing to allocate the award among the
attorneys. The court of appeals found there was sufficient evidence in the
record to support the district court’s award of back and front pay. It also
concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Boyle
$50,000 in attorney fees. We grant further review solely to address the
attorney-fee issue.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This appeal is the culmination of litigation spanning over five years. In
2003, Boyle filed a petition against her former employer, Alum-Line, under
the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
alleging sexual discrimination and retaliatory discharge. After losing at the
district court level, Boyle appealed to this court. We transferred the appeal
to the court of appeals. The court of appeals found the jury had received a
legally incorrect instruction requiring reversal of the jury’s determination
Boyle had failed to establish sexual discrimination based upon a hostile
work environment. The appellate court also found that Boyle had waived her
ICRA retaliatory-discharge claim. Upon our further review of the court of
appeals decision, we reversed and remanded to the district court for further
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on the existing trial record
as to Boyle’s ICRA retaliatory-discharge claim. Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 710
N.W.2d 741, 752 (Iowa 2006). We also directed the district court to enter an
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order granting judgment to Boyle on her ICRA and Title VII hostile work
environment claims and to determine damages based upon the existing
record. Id.On remand, the district court found Boyle was subjected to sexual
harassment by her coworkers and was discharged by Alum-Line in
retaliation for her sexual harassment complaints. The court awarded Boyle
$30,000 in back pay, $10,000 in past emotional distress, $5000 in front pay,
$5000 in future emotional distress, and $50,000 in punitive damages.
Boyle then filed an application for attorney fees in which she requested
$46,264.50 and $41,215.50, respectively, for her trial attorneys, Mark
Anderson and James P. Moriarty, and $98,793 for her appellate counsel,
Karl G. Knudsen, plus the attorneys’ expenses. Boyle also requested the
court to allocate the award of fees among her attorneys.
The compensation request for Anderson and Moriarty was based upon
342.7 and 286.4 hours, respectively, at $135 per hour. Compensation for
Knudsen was based upon 380.7 hours at $200 per hour for his appellate
work and 167.8 hours at $135 per hour for his district court work. The
application was supported by affidavits and itemized fee applications from
each attorney. In addition, affidavits from attorneys regarding local bar
charging rates along with an affidavit from a prominent Iowa appellate
attorney supporting Knudson’s hourly rate and overall claim for appellate
work were submitted.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court awarded Boyle $25,000
in trial attorney fees, based upon 227.27 hours at $110 per hour and
$25,000 in appellate attorney fees, based on 166.66 hours at $150 per hour.
The court also awarded to the plaintiff the expenses incurred by each
attorney throughout the proceedings.
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Boyle appealed. She asserted the district court failed to apply the
proper criteria in determining reasonable attorney fees and ordered fee
reductions without making specific findings of fact explaining the fee
reductions. She further claimed the court ordered fee reductions despite the
fact that Alum-Line failed to raise specific objections to the fee request.
Finally, Boyle contended the district court abused its discretion in failing to
allocate the attorney-fees award among counsel.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals
rejected all of Boyle’s claims. It found the district court applied the
appropriate factors and made sufficiently detailed factual findings to justify
its reduction of the plaintiff’s attorney-fees request. The court also found
that Alum-Line sufficiently rebutted the attorney-fees request. Finally, the
court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
allocate the attorney-fee award among each attorney. We granted further
review to address the attorney-fees issue.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review the court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.
Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.W.2d 891, 897 (Iowa 1990). “Reversal
is warranted only when the court rests its discretionary ruling on grounds
that are clearly unreasonable or untenable.” Gabelmann v. NFO, Inc., 606
N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 2000).
A successful plaintiff under the ICRA and Title VII is entitled to
reasonable attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006); Iowa Code
§ 216.15(8)(a)(8) (2003). The applicant for attorney fees bears the burden “to
prove both that the services were reasonably necessary and that the charges
were reasonable in amount.” Landals, 454 N.W.2d at 897. “[T]o ensure that
all necessary data is before the court, attorneys are generally required to
submit detailed affidavits which itemize their fee claims.” Grunin v. Int’l
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House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 127 (8th Cir. 1975); accord Dutcher v.
Randall Foods, 546 N.W.2d 889, 896 (Iowa 1996). “[T]he party opposing the
fee award then has the burden to challenge, by affidavit or brief with
sufficient specificity to give fee applicants notice, the reasonableness of the
requested fee.” Sherman v. Kasotakis, 314 F. Supp. 2d 843, 882 (N.D. Iowa
2004).
III. Reasonable Attorney Fees.
“A reasonable attorney fee is initially calculated by multiplying the
number of hours reasonably expended on the winning claims times a
reasonable hourly rate.” Dutcher, 546 N.W.2d at 896. This calculation,
known as the lodestar amount, “is presumed to be the reasonable attorney
fee envisioned by the relevant statutes.” Id. at 897. The reasonableness of
the hours expended and the hourly rate depends, of course, upon the facts
of each case. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–30, 103 S. Ct. 1933,
1937, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, 48 (1983). “The district court is considered an expert
in what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee . . . .” GreatAmerica Leasing
Corp. v. Cool Comfort Air Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc., 691 N.W.2d 730,
733 (Iowa 2005).
Factors normally considered in determining reasonable attorney fees
include:
“[T]he time necessarily spent, the nature and extent of the
service, the amount involved, the difficulty of handling and
importance of the issues, the responsibility assumed and results
obtained, the standing and experience of the attorney in the
profession, and the customary charges for similar service.”
Schaffer v. Frank Moyer Constr., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 11, 24 (Iowa 2001) (quoting
Landals, 454 N.W.2d at 897). “Reductions may be made, however, for such
things as partial success, duplicative hours or hours not reasonably
expended.” Sherman, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 881. “The district court must look
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at the whole picture and, using independent judgment with the benefit of
hindsight, decide on a total fee appropriate for handling the complete case.”
Landals, 454 N.W.2d at 897.
There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.
However, “[d]etailed findings of fact with regard to the factors considered
must accompany the attorney fee award.” Dutcher, 546 N.W.2d at 897; see
also U.S. ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032,
1048–49 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating “district court should make findings of fact
for the appellate record that will enable us to review the reasonableness of
the [attorney fee] award”).
IV. Analysis.
Boyle’s attorneys presented the court with documentation, including
affidavits and itemized billing records, in support of their attorney-fee claims.
In its opinion, the district court noted its familiarity with hourly fee rates for
trial attorneys with comparable experience. The district court also found no
evidence suggesting that any of the plaintiff’s attorneys had substantial,
prior experience in handling cases of this type, or possessed any recognized
expertise that would support a higher fee. The award of $110 per hour for
attorney services provided in trial court proceedings by all three attorneys
and $150 per hour for attorney services provided in appellate court
proceedings by all three attorneys was within the evidence submitted by the
plaintiff’s attorney and within the court’s expertise. See Dutcher, 546
N.W.2d at 896 (“The hourly rate is based on the ‘prevailing market rate in
the relevant community’ ” for counsel of comparable experience, skill and
reputation.) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S. Ct. 1541,
1547, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891, 900 (1984))). We conclude, therefore, that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in setting a reasonable attorney-fee
rate.
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We are troubled, however, by the district court’s determination of the
reasonable number of hours expended by the plaintiff’s attorneys. See id.(“A reasonable attorney fee is initially calculated by multiplying the number
of hours reasonably expended on the winning claims times a reasonable
hourly rate.”). Although the court specifically found the plaintiff’s attorneys
worked “long hours, zealously, diligently, and effectively, thereby securing a
very favorable result for their client,” it nevertheless reduced the requested
number of hours by approximately two-thirds. 1 The basis for this reduction
is not clearly evident from the court’s ruling.
In its resistance to Boyle’s application for attorney fees, Alum-Line
contended the affidavits “contain[ed] duplication on the part of trial counsel
that was unnecessary and itemizations for matters they should not be
entitled to recover fees for.” The court’s ruling does not specifically address
these assertions or provide any rationale for the court’s reduction in the
hours requested by the plaintiff.
While the court may arrive at a general conclusion that the hours
expended were excessive without specifying with exactness each hour that
was unreasonably spent, Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 464 N.W.2d 236, 240
(Iowa 1990), it still must provide “[d]etailed findings of fact with regard to the
factors considered [in its determination of] the attorney fee award.” Dutcher,
546 N.W.2d at 897. In this case, the court apparently concluded that the
plaintiff was entitled to $25,000 in trial court attorney fees and $25,000 in
appellate attorney fees. It then divided these amounts by the applicable
reasonable hourly rates for trial and appellate work to determine the
1Boyle’s attorneys asserted they spent 1177.6 hours trying and appealing her case.
The district court awarded attorney fees for 393.93 hours.
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reasonable number of hours. 2 While the court in its expertise may have
been justified in reducing the plaintiff’s attorneys’ hours, under the
methodology used by the court, we cannot afford effective appellate review.
See Gen. Elec., 41 F.3d at 1048–49 (“district court should make findings of
fact for the appellate record that will enable us to review the reasonableness
of the [attorney-fee] award”). Therefore, we remand this case to the district
court for detailed findings of fact utilizing the factors enunciated in Dutcher
to determine the reasonableness of the hours claimed by Boyle’s attorneys.
We do not find, however, that it is necessary for the district court to further
apportion the attorney-fee award beyond trial court proceedings and
appellate court proceedings. Upon the court’s determination of a reasonable
fee pursuant to the Dutcher factors, the plaintiff is advised that division of
the awarded fees amongst the attorneys should be consistent with the Iowa
Rules of Professional Conduct. See generally Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(e)
(providing for division of fees between attorneys who are not in the same
firm).
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
This opinion shall be published.
2We reach this conclusion based upon the fact the trial court’s finding of the
reasonable number of hours is determined to the hundredth of an hour, an amount not
typically found in legal billing practice.