State Of Iowa, Ex Rel. Alicia Claypool Vs. Michael Evans, Mte Project Development, And Anderson-bogert Engineers & Surveyors, Inc. Vs. Michael Evans, And Mte Project Development

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 95 / 07–0158
Filed October 24, 2008
STATE OF IOWA, ex rel. ALICIA CLAYPOOL,
Appellant,
vs.
MICHAEL EVANS, MTE PROJECT
DEVELOPMENT, and ANDERSON-BOGERT
ENGINEERS & SURVEYORS, INC.,
Appellees.
-----------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF IOWA, ex rel. JEFF FRANK,
Appellant,
vs.
MICHAEL EVANS, and
MTE PROJECT DEVELOPMENT,
Appellees,
and
BLUE JAY RIDGE CONDOMINIUM
OWNERS ASSOCIATION,
Defendant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Amanda
Potterfield, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court decision granting the defendants’
motions for summary judgment on the grounds their claims are barred
by the statutes of limitations. AFFIRMED.
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Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Teresa Baustian,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Richard S. Fry, Theresa C. Davis, and Sarah J. Gayer of
Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees Evans and
MTE Project Development.
Webb L. Wassmer of Simmons Perrine PLC, Cedar Rapids, for
appellee Anderson-Bogert Engineers & Surveyors, Inc.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
In this case the plaintiffs claim the district court erred in finding
the statutes of limitations for unfair or discriminatory practices in
housing under the Iowa Civil Rights Act barred their claims. Because we
find the statutes of limitations apply to the plaintiffs, including the State,
and in one action the statutes of limitations begins to run on the date
when the unit was purchased, and in the other action the statutes of
limitations begins to run when the defendants sold the last unit, we
affirm the decision of the district court granting the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
We find the undisputed facts as follows. In August 1999, Jeff
Frank and his wife purchased a condominium at Blue Jay Ridge
Condominiums in Coralville from Michael T. Evans Construction, a
corporation registered as Chael Design and Development, Inc. Chael
designed, developed, constructed, and sold Blue Jay Ridge
Condominiums. Frank was the first purchaser of a unit in the
development. The development included seven buildings, each having
four units on the ground floor.
Frank suffers from osteoarthritis and progressive degeneration of
the joints in his hips and knees. This condition forces him to use a cane,
crutches, and a walker depending upon the current state of his
symptoms. The doctors have said Frank will likely need to use a
wheelchair in the future. The design and construction of the
condominium development included obstructed sidewalks that caused
Frank difficulty accessing his unit from the parking area. About two to
three months after moving in, Frank complained to Evans about the
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obstructed sidewalks, but Evans ignored the complaints, so Frank’s
accessibility problem continued for the duration of his occupancy.
On April 8, 2002, he filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights
Commission against West Winds Management Company, Wendell Miller,
an employee of West Winds Management Company, Blue Jay Ridge
Condominium Owners Association, and Michael Evans, alleging the
construction and design of the condominium development blocked
access to his unit in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. West Winds
managed the condominium development. On November 6, 2003, the
commission received a report describing Blue Jay Ridge as highly
inaccessible. In July 2003, prior to the time the commission received the
report, Frank moved out of the development.
Frank elected not to file his own lawsuit, but chose to have the
commission file a civil rights petition on his behalf under Iowa Code
section 216.17A(1)(a) (2003). On December 10, 2004, in a proceeding
separate from Frank’s, Alicia Claypool, the Iowa Civil Rights
Commissioner, filed a complaint on behalf of the commission pursuant to
Iowa Code section 216.15(1). She filed the complaint against Michael
Evans, MTE Project Development, and Anderson-Bogert Engineers &
Surveyors, Inc. alleging the condominium development was highly
inaccessible and violated the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Anderson-Bogert
provided design services for Blue Jay Ridge Condominiums. On June 2,
2005, the executive director of the commission filed a written request
with the attorney general asking him to file suit under Iowa Code section
216.17A(9) claiming the design and construction of the condominium
development led to a denial of housing rights that raised an issue of
general public importance.
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On November 28, 2005, the attorney general filed separate actions
on behalf of Frank and Claypool. Both petitions alleged the defendants
discriminated in the sale or made housing unavailable under Iowa Code
section 216.8A(3)(a)(1), (c)(3), discriminated in terms, conditions or
privileges of sale and also in providing services or facilities according to
section 216.8A(3)(b)(1), (c)(3), and failed to design and construct the
dwelling in compliance with accessibility and adaptability features
according to section 216.8A(3)(c)(3). The State filed Frank’s action based
on the discriminatory sale of the unit to him, while the State filed
Claypool’s action based on the discriminatory sale of the condominium
units to the public.
Anderson-Bogert moved for summary judgment in the Claypool
case, stating the State’s claim was time-barred by the two-year statute of
limitations for civil rights actions, and the requirement that a civil rights
complaint be filed with the commission within 180 days of the
discriminatory practice. A few weeks later MTE and Evans also filed
motions for summary judgment against the State in both the Claypool
and the Frank cases. These motions for summary judgment stated the
claims were time-barred by the 180-day complaint period and the
applicable statute of limitations.
Frank purchased his unit more than 180 days prior to the filing of
his complaint with the commission and more than two years prior to the
attorney general filing the petition in the district court on his behalf. The
sale of the last unit in the condominium development occurred more
than 180 days prior to Claypool filing her complaint with the commission
and more than two years prior to the attorney general filing the Claypool
petition in the district court.
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The district court combined the cases for a hearing on the motions
for summary judgment. During the hearing, the parties agreed there was
essentially no dispute as to the facts in the case; thus, the dispute
concerned the application of the statutes of limitations to the facts. The
district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
The State dismissed, without prejudice, the remaining defendant that
had not filed a motion for summary judgment, Blue Jay Ridge
Condominium Owners Association. The State appeals.
II. Scope of Review.
The case is on appeal from a motion for summary judgment. The
district court enters summary judgment when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981; Robinson v. Fremont County, 744 N.W.2d
323, 325 (Iowa 2008). If no genuine issue of material fact exists, our job
is to determine whether the district court correctly applied the law.
Kragnes v. City of Des Moines, 714 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Iowa 2006).
Because no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the facts
surrounding the statutes of limitations, our decision will turn on the
construction of the statutes of limitations contained in the Iowa Civil
Rights Act. We review questions of statutory construction for correction
of errors at law. Estate of Ryan v. Heritage Trails Assocs., Inc., 745
N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 2008).
III. Statutory Framework.
Chapter 216 of the Code, The Iowa Civil Rights Act, defines a
“person” as “one or more individuals, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives, trustees, receivers, and the state of
Iowa and all political subdivisions and agencies thereof.” Iowa Code
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§ 216.2(11). The relevant parts of the Act define unfair or discriminatory
housing practices as follows:
3a. A person shall not discriminate in the sale or
rental or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to a
buyer or renter because of a disability of any of the following
persons:
(1) That buyer or renter.
...
b. A person shall not discriminate against another
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental
of a dwelling or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection with the dwelling because of a disability of any of
the following persons:
(1) That person.
...
c. For the purposes of this subsection only,
discrimination includes any of the following circumstances:
...
(3) In connection with the design and
construction of covered multifamily dwellings for first
occupancy after January 1, 1992, a failure to design
and construct those dwellings in a manner that meets
the following requirements:
(a) The public use and common use
portions of the dwellings are readily accessible to
and usable by persons with disabilities.
(b) All doors designed to allow passage
into and within all premises within the dwellings
are sufficiently wide to allow passage by persons
with disabilities in wheelchairs.
(c) All premises within the dwellings
contain the following features of adaptive design:
(i) An accessible route into and
through the dwelling.
(ii) Light switches, electrical outlets,
thermostats, and other environmental
controls in accessible locations.
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(iii) Reinforcements in bathroom
walls to allow later installation of grab
bars.
(iv) Usable kitchens and bathrooms
so that a person in a wheelchair can
maneuver about the space.
Id. § 216.8A(3).
The Act contains two statutes of limitations. The first statute of
limitations provides, “[a] claim under this chapter shall not be
maintained unless a complaint is filed with the commission within one
hundred eighty days after the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice
occurred.” Id. § 216.15(12). The Code defines the person that can file
the claim as “[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or
unfair practice . . . .” Id. § 216.15(1). The second statute of limitations
provides:
2. a. An aggrieved person may file a civil action in
district court not later than two years after the occurrence of
the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing or real
estate practice, or the breach of a mediation agreement
entered into under this chapter, whichever occurs last, to
obtain appropriate relief with respect to the discriminatory
housing or real estate practice or breach.
b. The two-year period does not include any time
during which an administrative hearing under this chapter
is pending with respect to a complaint or charge based on
the discriminatory housing or real estate practice.
Id. § 216.16A(2)(a), (b).
IV. Analysis.
Section 216.15(12) requires a person to file a complaint with the
commission “within one hundred eighty days after the alleged
discriminatory or unfair practice occurred.” Id. § 216.15(12). Section
216.16A(2) requires a person to file a civil action “not later than two
years after the occurrence of the termination of an alleged discriminatory
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housing or real estate practice.” Id. § 216.16A(2)(a). To determine
whether Frank and Claypool timely filed their complaints with the
commission under section 216.15(12), we must determine when the
alleged discriminatory housing or real estate practice occurred. To
determine whether Frank and Claypool timely filed their petitions in the
district court under section 216.16A(2), we must determine when the
termination of an alleged discriminatory housing or real estate practice
occurred.
In construing the statutes involved, we must determine legislative
intent. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa
2004). We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the
legislature, not what it should or might have said. State v. Dohlman, 725
N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa 2006). Under the guise of construction, we may
not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statute. Auen,
679 N.W.2d at 590.
The State and Claypool, acting on behalf of the commission,
contend the statutes of limitations do not apply to them. The Iowa Civil
Rights Act defines a “person” as an individual, the state of Iowa, and all
of its agencies. Iowa Code § 216.2(11). Therefore, the limitations of
actions contained in sections 216.15(12) and 216.16A(2) apply to the
Claypool complaint and petition.
Under sections 216.15(12) and 216.16A(2), we must first determine
the alleged discriminatory housing or real estate practice upon which
Frank and Claypool base their claims. They both claim the defendants
discriminated in the sale or made housing unavailable under Iowa Code
section 216.8A(3)(a)(1), (c)(3), discriminated in terms, conditions or
privileges of sale and in providing services or facilities according to
section 216.8A(3)(b)(1), (c)(3), and failed to design and construct the
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dwelling in compliance with accessibility and adaptability features
according to section 216.8A(3)(c)(3).
Section 216.8A(3) prohibits discrimination in the “sale” of a
dwelling. Iowa Code § 216.8A(3)(a), (b). Section 216.8A(3)(c) defines the
“discrimination” referred to in subsection (3) of section 216.8A as “the
design and construction” of an inaccessible dwelling. Id. § 216.8A(3)(c).
Therefore, the crux of these claims is that the defendants provided design
and construction services for the development that made it inaccessible
to a person with disabilities, then sold it to Frank and the other
residents. Because the alleged discriminatory practice complained of is
the sale of a housing unit designed and constructed to be inaccessible to
a person with disabilities, it is clear the alleged discriminatory housing or
real estate practice occurred and terminated at the time of the sale of the
relevant units. See Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 461–64 (9th Cir.
2008) (construing a similar federal statute of limitations in a similar
fashion).
Accordingly, Frank’s 180-day period for filing his complaint with
the commission and two-year period to file his petition with the district
court began in August of 1999 when he purchased his unit. He filed his
complaint in April of 2002 and his petition in November of 2005.
Consequently, Frank’s complaint and petition were untimely, and the
statutes of limitations bar his action.
In Claypool’s action, the undisputed facts are that the sale of the
last unit in the condominium development occurred more than 180 days
prior to the filing of the Claypool complaint, and more than two years
prior to the filing of the Claypool petition. Thus, Claypool’s complaint
and petition were also untimely, and the statutes of limitations bar her
action.
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Claypool and Frank suggest an interpretation known as the
encounter theory should apply to this case. Under the encounter theory,
“a disabled homeseeker’s cause of action does not become complete until
he personally encounters the defendant’s inaccessible building.” Robert
G. Schwemm, Barriers to Accessible Housing: Enforcement Issues in
“Design and Construction” Cases under the Fair Housing Act, 40 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 753, 850 (2006). The plain language of the Iowa statute is not
consistent with such a reading. The plain language of the statute defines
the discriminatory practice as the sale of a housing unit designed and
constructed to be inaccessible to a person with disabilities. Therefore,
the statutes of limitations begin to run on the sale of the unit as to
Frank, and on the last sale of the units as to Claypool. The encounter
theory is more consistent with a tort theory, whereas Frank and Claypool
have brought statutory claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Tort law
cannot “trump statutory provisions that deal expressly with the statute
of limitations.” Garcia, 526 F.3d at 464.
Finally, Frank and Claypool argue that the alleged discriminatory
practice continued after the sale of the units; therefore, under a
continuing violation theory the statutes of limitations did not run. The
Supreme Court defines a continuing violation as one in which the
plaintiff “challenges not just one incident of conduct violative of the Act,
but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period.”
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 381, 102 S. Ct. 1114,
1125, 71 L. Ed. 2d 214, 230 (1982). However, we must distinguish the
continuing violation theory from the continuing ill effects suffered from
the original violation.
A recent Supreme Court decision focused on the issue of
continuing violation versus continuing effect. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
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& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, ______, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2167–69, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 982, 990–93 (2007). There the plaintiff made a Title VII pay
discrimination claim. Id. at ____, 127 S. Ct. at 2165, 167 L. Ed. 2d at
988. The issue decided by the Court was when the discriminatory act
occurred. Id. The plaintiff claimed the discriminatory act occurred when
she received lower pay. Id. at ____, 127 S. Ct. at 2166, 167 L. Ed. 2d at
988. The employer claimed the discriminatory act occurred at the time
the plaintiff received low performance scores, the cause for her receiving
lower pay. Id. at ____, 127 S. Ct. at 2166, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 989. The
Supreme Court found that the giving of low performance scores was the
discriminatory act, and the lower pay she received as a result of those
low scores was a continuing effect of those low scores. Id. at _____, 127
S. Ct. at 2169, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 992–93. In Ledbetter, the Court noted it
is necessary for a court to identify the specific discriminatory practice at
issue when applying a statute of limitations. Id. at _____, 127 S. Ct. at
2167, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 989. Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated the
“charging period ran from the time when the discrete act of alleged
intentional discrimination occurred, not from the date when the effects of
this practice were felt.” Id. at ____, 127 S. Ct. at 2168, 167 L. Ed. 2d at
992.
In this case the specific discriminatory practice was the sale of a
housing unit designed and constructed to be inaccessible to a person
with disabilities. This discriminatory practice was complete upon the
sale. The lack of accessibility of the non-compliant development was a
continuing effect of the discriminatory practice rather than a continuing
violation. Garcia, 526 F.3d at 462–63; Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202
F. Supp. 2d 492, 507 (E.D. Va. 2002). Had the legislature wanted
developers and designers of the unit to be liable after the sale, it could
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have expressly provided for continuing liability in the Iowa Civil Rights
Act.
V. Disposition.
Because Frank’s and Claypool’s actions are barred by the statutes
of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the district court granting the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.