Harold Johnson, Vs. Iowa District Court For Story County

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 101 / 06–1856
Filed October 10, 2008
HAROLD JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR STORY COUNTY,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Story County, Carl D.
Baker, Judge.
Plaintiff challenges the district court’s denial of his request for a
final hearing at his annual review. WRIT SUSTAINED, AND CASE
REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Steven L. Addington
and Michael H. Adams, Assistant Public Defender, for plaintiff.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General and Linda J. Hines and Becky
Goettsch, Assistant Attorneys General, for defendant.
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STREIT, Justice.
By petition for writ of certiorari, Harold Johnson, a civilly
committed sexual predator, challenges a district court judgment denying
his request for a final hearing to determine whether he is eligible for
release. He claims the district court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted
illegally when it weighed conflicting expert opinions at his annual review
to determine he was not entitled to a final hearing. We conclude the
controlling statute does not require the committed person prove at the
annual review a likelihood of winning at his final hearing. The statute
governing annual reviews requires the committed person show there is
admissible evidence that could lead a fact finder to find reasonable doubt
on the issue of whether his mental abnormality has changed. We
therefore sustain the writ.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Johnson was civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under
the Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, Iowa Code chapter
229A in July 2001. According to the stipulated facts, Johnson was
convicted of lascivious acts with a child in 1994 and assault with intent
to commit sexual abuse in 1985. Prior to commitment, Johnson was
diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder that predisposes him to
commit future sexually violent offenses. Since his 2001 commitment,
Johnson has had five annual reviews, and in each one, the court has
denied Johnson’s request for a final hearing. At his October 2006
annual review, the State submitted evidence that, although Johnson was
making progress, he was not ready for release and remained more likely
than not to commit sexually violent offenses if not confined in a secure
facility. Further, the State submitted Johnson’s current progress
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assessment, which included a transcript from a clinical interview in
which Johnson admitted he was not ready to be released. Johnson
submitted a report by Dr. Richard Wollert that concluded Johnson no
longer suffers from a mental abnormality, or at the very least, he is not
likely to commit sexually violent offenses if released. Wollert’s conclusion
was based primarily on actuarial data indicating the risk of recidivism
declines with age, and Johnson’s risk of reoffending, given his age of
sixty, was ten percent. The district court weighed the evidence presented
by both parties and determined Johnson had not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence he was entitled to a final hearing.
Johnson filed an application for writ of certiorari with this court,
claiming the district court exceeded its jurisdiction when it weighed
evidence to determine he was not entitled to a final hearing.
II. Scope of Review.
In a certiorari case, we review the district court’s action for
corrections of errors at law. Weissenburger v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 740 N.W.2d
431, 434 (Iowa 2007). We may examine “only the jurisdiction of the
district court and the legality of its actions.” Christiensen v. Iowa Dist.
Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998). An “illegality exists when the
court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the court
has not properly applied the law.” Id. We accept as true the district
court’s factual findings, if well supported. State Pub. Defender v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 644 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 2002).
III. Merits.
Iowa Code chapter 229A allows for the commitment of sexually
violent predators in order “to protect the public, to respect the needs of
the victims of sexually violent offenses, and to encourage full, meaningful
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participation of sexually violent predators in treatment programs.” Iowa
Code § 229A.1 (2007). The United States Supreme Court has upheld
civil commitments as constitutional so long as the commitment statute
does not violate the Due Process Clause. To civilly commit an individual,
the State is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the two statutory
preconditions to commitment: that the person sought to be
committed is mentally ill and that he requires [commitment]
for his own welfare and protection of others.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75–76, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1783, 118 L.
Ed. 2d 437, 445 (1992). Once the individual no longer suffers from the
mental abnormality or is no longer dangerous, the civil commitment
must end. Id. at 77, 112 S. Ct. at 1784, 118 L. Ed. 2d at 446.
This case concerns the procedures afforded to the committed
person after commitment. Although the statute was enacted for the
long-term treatment of sexually violent predators, section 229A.8 sets
forth procedural due process safeguards permitting the committed
person to challenge his commitment each year. Under section 229A.8,
the committed person is entitled to an annual review in which he may
request a final hearing to determine whether he is eligible for release or
transitional release. This statute provides in part:
1. Upon civil commitment . . . , a rebuttable
presumption exists that the commitment should continue.
The presumption may be rebutted when facts exist to
warrant a hearing to determine whether a committed person
no longer suffers from a mental abnormality which makes
the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting
sexually violent offenses if discharged, or the committed
person is suitable for placement in a transitional release
program.
....
5. The following provisions apply to an annual review:
....
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e. The burden is on the committed person to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is competent
evidence which would lead a reasonable person to believe a
final hearing should be held to determine either of the
following:
(1) The mental abnormality of the committed person
has so changed that the person is not likely to engage in
predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if
discharged.
(2) The committed person is suitable for placement in a
transitional release program pursuant to section 229A.8A.
If the committed person shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that a final hearing should be held on either
determination under subparagraph (1) or (2), or both, the
court shall set a final hearing within sixty days of the
determination that a final hearing be held.
Iowa Code § 229A.8(1), (5)(e) (emphasis added). The statute places the
burden of proof on the committed person to show by a “preponderance of
the evidence” there is “competent evidence which would lead a
reasonable person to believe a final hearing should be held.” Id.
The previous version of this statute provided a final hearing should
be granted
if the court at the hearing determines that probable cause
exists to believe that the person’s mental abnormality has so
changed that the person is safe to be at large and will not
engage in predatory acts or sexually violent offenses if
discharged.
Iowa Code § 229A.8(4) (2001) (emphasis added). In a 2002 amendment,
the legislature added the “rebuttable presumption . . . that the
commitment should continue” and provided that at the annual review,
“the burden is on the committed person to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that there is competent evidence which would lead a
reasonable person to believe a final hearing should be held.” Iowa Code §
229A.8(1), (5)(e) (2007). Today, we interpret the current version of
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section 229A.8(5)(e) to determine exactly what the committed person
needs to demonstrate in order to be granted a final hearing.
Less than half of states allow for the civil commitment of sexually
violent predators,1 and most of those states use a probable cause
standard at the annual review hearing. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code §
71.09.090(2)(c) (2008). Cases from those states interpreting their civil
commitment statutes make it clear the probable cause standard does not
permit the court to weigh evidence, and the burden on the committed
person is quite low to be granted a final hearing on the issue of release.2
See, e.g., In the Matter of the Detention of Elmore, 168 P.3d 1285, 1288
(Wash. 2007); In re Commitment of Allen, 927 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006). In contrast, Iowa and Missouri require a higher evidentiary
burden—preponderance of the evidence—to be granted a final hearing at
an annual review. The Missouri statute requires the committed person
to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence he no longer suffers
1States that allow for civil commitment of sexually violent predators include
Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36–3701 (2008); California, Cal. W&I Code § 6600
(2008); Florida, Fla. St. § 394.910 (2008); Illinois, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 207/1
(2008); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59–29a01 (2007); Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. Ch. 123A, § 1 (2008); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.01 (2008); Missouri,
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.480 (2008); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71–1201 (2007); New
Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. §30:4–27.24 (2008); North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code. § 25–03.3–
01 (2008); South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 44–48–10 (2008); Texas, Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 841.001 (2008); Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 37.2–900 (2008);
Washington, Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.010 (2008); and Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. §
980.01 (2008).
2In interpreting Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, the Washington
Supreme Court explained “a court may not weigh the evidence in determining whether
probable cause exists; rather, it must merely decide whether the facts, if believed,
establish that the person is no longer a [sexually violent predator] or may otherwise be
conditionally released.” In the Matter of the Detention of Elmore, 168 P.3d 1285, 1288
(Wash. 2007); see also In re Commitment of Allen, 927 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (“[I]f the committed person presents evidence supporting release at a limited
probable cause hearing, the trial court considers only that evidence to determine
probable cause; it does not weigh the evidence against [it].”).
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from a mental abnormality. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.498(4) (2004).
Functioning as a “ ‘gatekeeper’ to ensure that only those who make a
legitimate claim can obtain a jury trial,” the district court is permitted to
weigh evidence from both parties in order to determine whether the
committed person has met his burden. In re Care & Treatment of
Coffman, 225 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. 2007). Although both the Iowa and
Missouri statutes use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the
Missouri statute is different from the Iowa statute in what must be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The Missouri statute
requires the committed person prove he no longer suffers from a mental
abnormality, whereas the Iowa statute requires the committed person
prove only that there is competent evidence that would lead a reasonable
person to grant him a final hearing. Compare Mo. Rev. Stat. §
632.498(4), with Iowa Code § 229A.8(5). Thus, Iowa’s statute is unique,
and consequently, interpretations of statutes from other states are of
only limited value.
In the case before us, the parties disagree on what the committed
person needs to demonstrate in order to be granted a final hearing and
what role the district court plays in weighing evidence. The State argues
that by changing the burden of proof from probable cause to
preponderance of the evidence, the Iowa legislature intended to impose a
stricter burden of proof upon the committed person and to require the
court to weigh competing evidence. Relying on the Missouri statute and
case law, the State argues the preponderance of the evidence standard
allows the district court to weigh competing evidence in determining
whether the committed person is entitled to a final hearing. Under this
interpretation, in order to convince a reasonable person he should get a
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hearing, the committed person would essentially have to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence he no longer suffers from an abnormality
that would make him likely to engage in sexually violent offenses. In
effect, the State’s interpretation requires the committed person show a
likelihood of winning at the final hearing in order to be granted a final
hearing. Under this interpretation, everyone who is granted a final
hearing would essentially be pre-approved for release.
The flaw in this interpretation becomes apparent when one
compares an annual review with a final hearing. The burden of proof,
who bears that burden, and what needs to be demonstrated by the party
bearing the burden of proof are markedly different at the annual review
and the final hearing. At an annual review, the committed person bears
the burden of proof to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” there is
“competent evidence which would lead a reasonable person to believe a
final hearing should be held.” Iowa Code § 229A.8(5). At the final
hearing, the state bears the burden of proof to show “beyond a
reasonable doubt” the committed person’s mental abnormality has not
changed.3 Id. § 229A.8(6). The committed person has no burden to
3The provision on final hearings, section 229A.8(6), reads in part:
d. The burden of proof at the final hearing shall be upon the
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either of the following:
(1) The committed person’s mental abnormality remains such
that the person is likely to engage in predatory acts that constitute
sexually violent offenses if discharged.
(2) The committed person is not suitable for placement in a
transitional release program. . . .
Iowa Code § 229A.8(6)(d). The prerequisites for the transitional release program
include, among other things, that the committed person’s “mental abnormality is no
longer such that the person is a high risk to reoffend.” Id. § 229A.8A(2)(a).
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prove anything at the final hearing. Id. If, at the final hearing, the fact
finder determines there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the
committed person still suffers from a mental abnormality, the
commitment ends. Id.
It would be illogical and contrary to the legislature’s allocation of
the burden of proof to interpret section 229A.8(5)(e) to require the
committed person to disprove the state’s final-hearing case in order to
obtain a final hearing. Moreover, such an interpretation ignores the
statutory language, which does not require the committed person to
show there is a reasonable doubt as to whether he continues to suffer
from a mental abnormality, but only that there is “competent evidence
which would lead a reasonable person to believe a final hearing should
be held.” Id. § 229A.8(5) (emphasis added). “We assume the legislature
intends different meanings when it uses different terms in different
portions of a statute.” Miller v. Marshall County, 641 N.W.2d 742,
749 (Iowa 2002) (citing 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 46:06, at 194 (6th ed. 2000)). Focusing then on the
language used in section 229A.8(5)(e), we believe a reasonable person
would give the committed person a hearing when there is competent4
evidence that would allow a fact finder to find reasonable doubt on the
issue of whether his mental abnormality has changed. This
interpretation of the statute does not foreclose the district court from
evaluating the evidence presented by the committed person to determine
whether the evidence could support a reasonable doubt finding and
4Competent evidence means admissible evidence, not credible evidence. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed. 2004); see also State v. Decker, 744 N.W.2d 346,
356 (Iowa 2008).
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whether a reasonable person would conclude that this evidence, if
believed, could lead to release. It does not, however, permit the district
court to conduct a mini-hearing on the issue of whether the committed
person still suffers from a mental abnormality.
In determining whether the committed person is entitled to a final
hearing, the district court should apply the following standard: if the
committed person presents admissible evidence that could lead a fact
finder to find reasonable doubt on the issue of whether his mental
abnormality has changed such that he is unlikely to engage in sexually
violent offenses, then the committed person should be granted a final
hearing. Johnson has met this standard by submitting the report of Dr.
Wollert.
IV. Conclusion.
We interpret the statute governing annual reviews to require the
committed person show there is admissible evidence that could lead a
fact finder to find reasonable doubt on the issue of whether his mental
abnormality has changed. The writ of certiorari to this court is
sustained. The district court exceeded its jurisdiction when it denied
Johnson’s request for a final hearing.
WRIT SUSTAINED, AND CASE REMANDED.