State Of Iowa Vs. John Feregrino, Jr.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 96 / 07–0236
Filed October 3, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JOHN FEREGRINO, JR.,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County,
Gary K. Anderson, Judge.
State seeks further review of court of appeals’ decision reversing
conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel. DECISION OF COURT
OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert Ranschau,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant
Attorney General, Matthew D. Wilber, County Attorney, and Kyle Jones
and Christine Shockey, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
2
APPEL, Justice.
In this case, a criminal defendant raises two constitutional
questions arising out of his conviction for driving a motor vehicle while
intoxicated. First, the defendant challenges the validity of an
investigatory stop based on a violation of a local noise ordinance which
he claims is unconstitutionally vague. Second, he challenges the validity
of his jury-trial waiver where he signed a written waiver explaining in
some detail the consequences of the waiver, but where the oral colloquy
before the court was conclusory in nature. On further review, we hold
that the defendant’s claims are without merit on the current record.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
At about four a.m. on July 4, 2006, Carter Lake Police Officer Ron
Hansen heard loud music emanating from a motor vehicle from an
approximate distance of one hundred feet. The officer activated his
emergency lights and pulled the vehicle over to the side of the road. The
officer advised the driver, John Feregrino, Jr., that he was stopped for
violation of a municipal noise ordinance.
During the stop, Hansen detected a strong odor of alcohol coming
from Feregrino. Hansen also noticed that Feregrino’s eyes were
bloodshot and watery and that his speech was slurred. Hansen
performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which indicated
intoxication. Although Feregrino consented to a preliminary breath test,
no result was obtained due to Feregrino’s inability or unwillingness to
exhale. Hansen placed Feregrino under arrest for operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). The results of a DataMaster test later
showed Feregrino’s blood-alcohol level to be 0.199.
3
Feregrino was subsequently charged with first offense OWI in
violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2005) and violation of the
municipal noise ordinance. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence of
his intoxication, claiming that the officer lacked probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to stop Feregrino’s vehicle because the noise
ordinance which allegedly justified the stop was unconstitutionally
vague. The district court rejected this contention.
Prior to trial on November 14, Feregrino signed a written waiver of
his right to a jury trial. The written waiver stated: (1) he had been fully
advised by his attorney that he had a right to be tried by a twelve person
jury under the state and federal constitutions and the Iowa Rules of
Criminal Procedure; (2) that by waiving a jury trial he would no longer be
able to help in the selection of a jury; (3) that unanimity of twelve
persons will no longer be required for conviction; and (4) that his case
would be decided by a single judge. For reasons not revealed in the
record, the written waiver was not filed until November 29. Feregrino
does not dispute, however, that he signed the waiver prior to his bench
trial.
Also prior to trial, the district court engaged in a short colloquy
with the defendant:
THE COURT: Mr. Feregrino, you’ve had a sufficient
amount of time to talk to [defense counsel] Mr. Heithoff?
THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh, yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you wish to waive a jury trial and
submit the case as indicated by Mr. Heithoff?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Very well.
4
The matter proceeded to trial before the district court. Feregrino
was convicted of first offense OWI. The district court dismissed the
charge of violating the noise ordinance because someone other than the
arresting officer had improperly amended the original citation.
Feregrino appealed his conviction, reasserting his vagueness
argument. Feregrino also asserted an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, arguing that his jury-trial waiver did not meet the standards this
court established in State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Iowa 2003).
Relying on Stallings, Feregrino further claimed that prejudice should be
presumed because of this structural defect.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of
appeals reversed Feregrino’s conviction, finding ineffective assistance of
counsel. We granted further review.
II. Standard of Review.
This court engages in de novo review of constitutional claims
arising from motions to suppress. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44
(Iowa 1998). The adequacy of a jury-trial waiver is a mixed question of
fact and law which we decide de novo. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 108. We
also consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Id.III. Discussion.
A. Constitutionality of Noise Ordinance. Feregrino’s first claim
is that the evidence of intoxication introduced at trial was unlawfully
obtained. According to Feregrino, the underlying noise ordinance, which
was the basis of Officer Hansen’s stop, is so vague that it violates due
process of law. As a result, Feregrino argues that the evidence of
intoxication is fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded
at trial.
5
The ordinance in question, Carter Lake Municipal Ordinance
55.12(cc), provides:
The following circumstances are considered per se violations
as being loud, raucous, and disagreeable noises causing
disturbance to the general public and a violation of this
Chapter:
a. Noise emanating from a motor vehicle that can be
heard from a distance of one-hundred (100) feet or
more.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Iowa
Constitution prohibit enforcement of statutes that are so vague that they
do not provide citizens with fair warning of what conduct is prohibited
and encourage discriminatory law enforcement.1 Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 909 (1983);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2299–
300, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227–28 (1972); State v. Todd, 468 N.W.2d 462,
465 (Iowa 1991). In addition, where a vague statute abuts upon
sensitive areas protected by the First Amendment, care must be taken to
ensure that criminal statutes do not cause persons to steer far wider of
1While Feregrino cites both the Iowa and United States constitutional provisions
related to due process, he does not present any argument suggesting that the due
process clause under the Iowa Constitution should be interpreted differently than under
its counterpart in the United States Constitution. We zealously guard our ability to
interpret provisions of the Iowa Constitution differently than binding interpretations of
the United States Constitution. In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 n.1
(Iowa 2000). As a result, an interpretation of the United States Supreme Court, though
binding on this court with respect to the meaning of a provision of the United States
Constitution, does not provide controlling authority on the question of the proper
interpretation of a similar provision under the Iowa Constitution. If a party declines to
offer a different interpretation under the state constitution and the reasons in support
of that different interpretation, the issue of a potentially disparate approach to the state
constitutional provision may not be properly illuminated through the adversary process.
As a result, prudential concerns ordinarily mean that where an argument that the Iowa
Constitution should be construed differently than the United States Constitution is not
presented, we assume for the purposes of the case that the provisions should be
interpreted in an identical fashion. Id.6
the unlawful zone in order to avoid criminal prosecution. See Grayned,
408 U.S. at 109, 92 S. Ct. at 2229, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 228.
In this case, Feregrino does not claim that the ordinance impinges
upon his First Amendment rights. His only claim is that the ordinance is
so vague that it does not provide reasonable notice to him and
encourages arbitrary enforcement. As a result, we do not consider any
potential overbreadth challenge. We only consider whether the Carter
Lake noise ordinance was unduly vague as to him.
We reject the claim which Feregrino advances. Feregrino was
charged under the provision of the ordinance that per se prohibits
“[n]oise emanating from a motor vehicle that can be heard from a
distance of one-hundred (100) feet or more.” Carter Lake Mun. Code
§ 55.12(cc). There is nothing unconstitutionally vague about this
provision of the Carter Lake ordinance.
A person of ordinary understanding would know that cranking up
the car radio to extraordinarily loud levels will expose the operator to a
citation for violation of the ordinance. See Davis v. State, 537 S.E.2d
327, 329 (Ga. 2000); State v. Medel, 80 P.3d 1099, 1103 (Idaho Ct. App.
2003); Holland v. City of Tacoma, 954 P.2d 290, 295 (Wash. Ct. App.
1998). Turning up the volume in a car radio so that it can be heard one
hundred feet away is far louder than needed to be heard by car
occupants and cannot be confused with ordinary use.
It may not be easy to measure whether noise emanating from a
vehicle reaches one hundred feet, but this is not a problem of vagueness.
Indeed, if the one-hundred-foot requirement were stricken, the resulting
ordinance would give less notice, not more to the ordinary person. Moore
v. City of Montgomery, 720 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998)
(noting distance standards provide explicit guidelines to those charged
7
with enforcing a noise ordinance). What Feregrino raises is not a
question of vagueness, but a problem of proof that inheres in any
criminal statute that incorporates explicit measurements into its
substantive elements. Whether Officer Hansen could hear the vehicle at
a distance of one hundred feet presents a question of fact to be attacked
through cross-examination and the adversary process, not a legal issue
to be argued to the court.
The per se prong of the ordinance also is not so vague as to
encourage discriminatory enforcement. The prong under which
Feregrino was charged does not apply to particularly-defined types of
noise: it applies if a motor vehicle operator is blasting the music of
Beethoven or Rihanna, the latest from a Hawkeye, Cyclone, or Panther
athletic contest, or the details of a special deal on vinyl home siding. The
fact that the ordinance focuses on all loud noises rather than specific
loud noises, for vagueness purposes, is a strength rather than a
weakness. See Thelen v. State, 526 S.E.2d 60, 62 (Ga. 2000) (noting use
of vague and subjective terms such as “unnecessary,” “unusual,” and
“annoying” in noise ordinance renders ordinance unconstitutional).2 The
officer in this case only needs to determine the objective fact of whether
the volume of the noise is sufficient to be heard one hundred feet from
the vehicle, rather than exercising subjective judgment concerning the
type of noise involved. Davis, 537 S.E.2d at 329; Holland, 954 P.2d at
295.
2The
question of whether a defendant may be charged under the Carter Lake
ordinance for noise found to be “loud,” “raucous,” or “disagreeable,” but not subject to
the per se provision, is not before the court. We therefore express no opinion on this
issue.
8
For the above reasons, we conclude that the provision of the Carter
Lake noise ordinance under which Feregrino was stopped is not so vague
as to violate due process.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
The right to a jury trial is, of course, a distinguishing feature of the
American criminal justice system. The right to a jury trial allows a group
of ordinary citizens, and not a single judge, to determine the factual
question of guilt. The right to a jury trial thus has the potential of
holding the government in check and preventing government
overreaching or persecution. The right to a jury trial is widely accepted
as a fundamental constitutional right.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1) is designed to protect a
defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial. The rule provides that
criminal “[c]ases required to be tried to a jury shall be so tried unless the
defendant voluntarily and intelligently waives a jury trial in writing and
on the record. . . .” Two of our recent cases have explored the contours
of the requirements of this rule.
In Stallings, this court considered a case where the defendant did
not execute a written waiver of his right to a jury trial and the court did
not conduct an in-court colloquy with the defendant informing him of his
jury trial right. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 108. In Stallings, we noted that
rule 2.17(1) was based on practical considerations which suggested that
a written waiver as well as an in-court colloquy should be used to assure
a proper jury-trial waiver. Id. at 111. We further stated that a written
waiver alone is not sufficient to satisfy the dual criteria of the rule, noting
that the requirement of the rule that a defendant make a knowing and
intelligent waiver “on the record” was distinct from the requirement of a
written waiver. Id. at 110. We held in Stallings that a failure to assure
9
compliance with the rule constituted a breach of duty by trial counsel.
Id. at 112.
In Stallings, we also considered whether a defendant who
demonstrated a violation of rule 2.17(1) was required to show prejudice
to obtain reversal of a subsequent conviction by the court. Id. While
ordinarily a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must
show both a breach of duty and prejudice, Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984), we
held in Stallings that a violation of the rule amounted to “one of those
rare cases of a ‘structural’ defect in which prejudice is presumed.”
Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at 112.
In State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805 (Iowa 2003), this court further
considered the phrase “on the record” as used in rule 2.17(1). We held
that the phrase required “some in-court colloquy or personal contact
between the court and the defendant, to ensure the defendant’s waiver is
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” 672 N.W.2d at 812. While the
Liddell court declined to provide a specific checklist for the content of the
court inquiry, we stated that the inquiry “may” involve informing the
defendant (1) that twelve members of the community compose a jury;
(2) that the defendant may take part in jury selection; (3) that jury
verdicts must be unanimous; (4) that the court alone decides guilt or
innocence if the defendant waives a jury trial; and (5) that neither the
court nor the prosecution will reward the defendant for waiving a jury
trial. Id. at 813–14. The five subject areas were not designated to create
“black letter rules,” but merely helpful tools to determine whether a
waiver was “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. at 814. Substantial
compliance was characterized as “acceptable.” Id.10
In this case, Feregrino signed a written waiver of his right to a jury
trial but engaged in a limited colloquy with the court. Feregrino argues
that the conclusory in-court colloquy in this case does not meet the
standards for a knowing and voluntary waiver on the record as required
in Liddell and, as a result, counsel breached his duty to ensure a valid
waiver of a jury trial. Feregrino further asserts that under this court’s
decision in Stallings, prejudice should be conclusively presumed because
of the structural defect.
The State in this appeal does not challenge Feregrino’s assertion
that his counsel breached his duty of care under Liddell by failing to
ensure that a detailed in-court colloquy was conducted on the record.
Instead, the State asserts that the holding in Stallings that prejudice
must be presumed in cases where there has been a violation of rule
2.17(1) should be overruled.
The State supports its position by questioning the analysis in
Stallings. The State argues the cases cited in Stallings for the proposition
that failure to conform with the requirements of rule 2.17(1) amounted to
a structural defect are distinguishable. In the first case cited by the
Stallings court, McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1998),
the defendant was not informed at all of his right to a jury trial either by
counsel or the trial court and, as a result, proceeded to trial by the court
without ever knowing of his constitutional right to a jury trial. In the
second case cited in Stallings, United States v. Raether, 82 F.3d 192, 193
(8th Cir. 1996), the defendant was in fact deprived of his right to a jury
trial, which he wanted, when the trial court failed to submit instructions
on an essential element of the crime. The State suggests that the
“structural” defect in McGurk and Raether, was that the defendants were
actually or functionally deprived of their right to a jury trial.
11
Unlike in McGurk and Raether, the State contends that the record
here does not reveal a structural deprivation of a constitutional right to a
jury trial, but merely failure to comply with the procedural requirements
of rule 2.17(1). The State argues that a nonconstitutional error or failure
to comply with the rule is simply not comparable to structural errors
found by the United States Supreme Court in cases involving complete
deprivation of the right to legal counsel or involving trial before a biased
trial judge. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792,
9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71
L. Ed. 749 (1927). Such “structural” errors involve defects “ ‘affecting the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error
in the trial process itself.’ ” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468,
117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 728 (1997) (quoting Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L. Ed. 2d
302, 331 (1991)).
In cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme
Court has held that prejudice may be presumed where: (1) counsel is
completely denied at a crucial stage of the proceeding; (2) where counsel
fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversary testing; or
(3) where surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of
ineffectiveness, for example, where counsel has an actual conflict of
interest in jointly representing multiple defendants. United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 668
(1984). The State argues that Cronic narrows rather than expands the
universe of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases where prejudice is to
be presumed. In support, the State directs our attention to a gallery of
federal appellate court cases where prejudice has not been presumed in
cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection
12
with jury-trial waivers, as well as to our own cases prior to Stallings that
adopted a similar approach. See, e.g., Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d
821, 836–38 (6th Cir. 2004); Parrish v. Fulcomer, 150 F.3d 326, 328 (3d
Cir. 1998); Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184–85 (9th Cir. 1995); State v.
Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994); Jasper v. State, 477 N.W.2d
852, 857 (Iowa 1991).
The State finally points out that the Stallings rule is inconsistent
with a recent ruling of this court involving acceptance of guilty pleas. In
State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 137–38 (Iowa 2006), this court refused
to accept a per se rule of prejudice where there is a deficiency in the
court colloquy and acceptance of a guilty plea. The State argues that the
holdings in Straw and Stallings on the issue of prejudice are
inconsistent. Under Straw, a defendant who pleads guilty waives all of
his constitutional trial rights, including his right to a jury trial. In the
Straw guilty plea setting, we have held that a defendant claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel based on a lack of a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial must show actual prejudice,
while in a Stallings setting, where trial to the court has actually occurred
after an apparent waiver of the right to jury trial, a showing of prejudice
is not required. Straw, 709 N.W.2d at 137–38; Stallings, 658 N.W.2d at
112.
We agree with the State. As an analytical matter, we find the
reasoning in Stallings unconvincing. The fact that the requirements of
rule 2.17(1) have not been met does not necessarily mean that a violation
of the defendant’s right to a jury trial has in fact occurred.3 As noted
3Nothing in this opinion undercuts the salutary purpose of rule 2.17(1), which is
designed to ensure that a defendant is informed of his right to a jury trial and to create
a clear record with respect to any waiver. We hold only that a violation of rule 2.17(1)
13
recently by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a requirement of an oral
colloquy related to a jury-trial waiver is a procedural device, not a
constitutional end or a constitutional “right.” Commonwealth v. Mallory,
941 A.2d 686, 697 (Pa. 2008). The absence of an oral colloquy or a
written waiver does not necessarily prove that a defendant failed to
understand the nature of the right waived by proceeding to a non-jury
trial. Id. For example, a lawyer who is accused of a crime or a career
criminal might have considerable first-hand knowledge of the right to a
jury trial. Id.4
As a result, whether there has been such an alteration of the
fundamental trial framework in violation of the defendant’s right to a jury
trial depends on the resolution of an antecedent question, namely,
whether, notwithstanding the violation of the rule, the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. The antecedent
question of whether a defendant knowingly or voluntarily waived a jury
trial presents a question of historical fact. It does not require the court
to speculate on whether the outcome in the case would have changed if a
different fact-finding process, namely, trial to a jury, had occurred.
Resolution of the waiver issue is no more difficult than countless other
factual questions that are resolved by our courts every day. If as a
____________________________
does not, in and of itself, mean that there has been a deprivation of the constitutional
right to a jury trial.
4Although the facts in McGurk are distinguishable from those in this case, our
analysis in this opinion is inconsistent with McGurk. The appellate court opinions in
McGurk indicate that there was no written waiver, no in-court colloquy, and no
discussion between the defendant and his counsel with respect to the jury-trial wavier.
McGurk, 163 F.3d at 472; State v. McGurk, 532 N.W.2d 354, 359 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
The record as reported in the appellate cases does not, however, conclusively
demonstrate that the defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a
jury trial. The lack of a written waiver, in-court colloquy, and discussion with counsel
may be important evidence in a postconviction proceeding, but might not be sufficient
to carry the day if the evidence shows that the defendant was otherwise well-informed
about his right to a jury trial.
14
matter of fact the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily given, no
infringement of a constitutional right or structural defect is present.
The doctrine of stare decisis counsels caution before we overturn
prior precedent of this court. At the same time, we should not look away
from decisions that are analytically unsound and inconsistent with our
subsequent case law. We find it better to correct our error now rather
than ignore the problem. The holding in Stallings that prejudice is
presumed in cases involving a deficiency in a jury-trial waiver under rule
2.17(1) is overruled.
We next turn to the question of whether, on the present record, we
can determine whether Feregrino was actually prejudiced by his
counsel’s failure to obtain a jury-trial waiver that complied with the rule.
The record before us is inadequate to make this determination. State v.
Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 218 (Iowa 2006). We therefore preserve the
issue for postconviction relief.
IV. Conclusion.
We hold that the provision of the municipal ordinance noise under
which the defendant was stopped was not unconstitutionally vague.
Evidence obtained pursuant to the stop, therefore, was properly
admitted. We further hold that a defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to ensure compliance with
the jury-trial waiver provisions of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure
2.17(1) must show, not only that counsel breached an essential duty, but
must also show actual prejudice. On this point, Stallings is overruled.
Because the record on appeal is inadequate to resolve the issue of
prejudice, we preserve Feregrino’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
for postconviction relief.
15
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.