State Of Iowa Vs. Public Employment Relations Board

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 108/ 06–0430
Filed February 8, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD,
Appellant,
and
AFSCME IOWA COUNCIL 61,
Intervenor.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D.
Rosenberg, Judge.
State agency appeals district court’s ruling on judicial review
reversing agency’s order that required State to disclose information
requested by intervenor. AFFIRMED.
Jan V. Berry, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Robert K. Porter,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
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TERNUS, Chief Justice.
The appellant, Public Employment Relations Board (PERB),
ordered the State to produce documents requested by the intervenor
union, AFSCME Iowa Council 61, for use in several employee grievance
proceedings. The State sought judicial review, claiming PERB’s order
exceeded the authority granted to it under Iowa Code chapter 20 (2001)
because the State’s failure to disclose the documents was not a willful
violation of that statute. The district court agreed, ruling PERB could
not provide relief to the union unless PERB found a willful violation.
On appeal to this court, PERB contends it has statutory authority
to remedy nonwillful, as well as willful, violations of chapter 20. After
considering the arguments of the parties and relevant authorities, we
agree with the district court that PERB exceeded its authority. Therefore,
we affirm the district court’s reversal of PERB’s order.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This appeal had its genesis in the State’s discipline of bargaining
unit employees represented by the union. In the summer of 2002, these
employees were disciplined for inappropriate email usage. The
employees then pursued the grievance procedure outlined in the
collective bargaining agreement, which eventually led to binding
arbitration. In preparation for the arbitration hearings, the union asked
the State to produce records of discipline imposed on management
employees for similar misconduct. The State refused to produce these
records, claiming they were confidential.
Shortly thereafter, the union filed two prohibited practice
complaints with PERB. In these complaints, the union asserted the
State had violated Iowa Code section 20.10(2)(a), (b), and (f) in refusing to
produce the requested documents in the grievance process. An
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evidentiary hearing was held on these complaints before an
administrative law judge (ALJ).
While the parties were awaiting a decision from the ALJ, the union
served a subpoena duces tecum in one of the grievance proceedings,
requesting various documents regarding the investigation and discipline
of all State employees for email usage in July of 2002. The State filed a
motion to quash, which was sustained in part and overruled in part by
an arbitrator on September 8, 2003.
Shortly after the arbitrator quashed, in part, the union’s subpoena,
the ALJ issued a proposed decision on the union’s prohibited practice
complaints. The ALJ concluded the State’s refusal to produce the
requested documents violated its “statutory duty to bargain in good faith”
under section 20.9. Although not cited by the union in its complaints,
section 20.10(1) makes it a prohibited practice “to willfully refuse to
negotiate in good faith with respect to the scope of negotiations defined in
section 20.9.” Iowa Code § 20.10(1) (emphasis added). The ALJ stated
there was no evidence in the record that would establish the willfulness
of the State’s violation of section 20.9. Nonetheless, the ALJ held
“PERB’s remedial authority is not limited to only those situations where
prohibited practices have been established, but also extends to ‘ordinary’
violations.” Accordingly, the ALJ ordered the State to disclose the
requested information “for the limited purpose of preparing for and
litigating these specific grievances.” On appeal to the agency, the ALJ’s
proposed decision was adopted by PERB in spite of its knowledge of the
conflicting decision by the arbitrator.
The State sought judicial review in the district court. After
analyzing the statutory provisions, the district court held PERB did not
have the power to remedy “ordinary,” i.e., nonwillful, violations of section
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20.10. Therefore, the district court reversed PERB’s decision. PERB has
appealed.
II. Scope of Review.
The narrow issue before this court is whether Iowa Code chapter
20 provides for “ordinary” violations of section 20.10, and if so, whether
the statute gives PERB authority to remedy such violations.1 To resolve
this issue, we must interpret the statute. Generally, the interpretation of
a statute is a matter of law for this court. See Insituform Techs., Inc. v.
Employment Appeal Bd., 728 N.W.2d 781, 800 (Iowa 2007).
“Nevertheless, we are required to give appropriate deference to the
agency’s interpretation in certain situations.” Id. Under the Iowa
Administrative Procedure Act, we give deference to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute if interpretation of the statute “has clearly
been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Iowa
Code § 17A.19(10)(l) (providing for reversal under such circumstances
only if agency’s interpretation was “irrational, illogical, or wholly
unjustifiable”).
Upon our review of chapter 20, we conclude PERB has not been
granted interpretive discretion with respect to that statute. In relevant
part, section 20.1 provides:
The general assembly declares that the purposes of the
public employment relations board established by this
chapter are to implement the provisions of this chapter and
adjudicate and conciliate employment-related cases involving
the state of Iowa and other public employers and employee
organizations.
1On judicial review and again on appeal, the State challenges PERB’s ruling that
the State violated section 20.9. Because we agree with the district court that PERB has
no authority to remedy a nonwillful violation of section 20.9, we need not determine
whether PERB correctly determined the State violated that provision of the statute.
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Id. § 20.1 (emphasis added). In addition, this section describes the
powers and duties of PERB to include determining appropriate
bargaining units, adjudicating prohibited practice complaints, fashioning
appropriate remedial relief for violations of chapter 20, acting as
arbitrators, providing mediators, collecting and disseminating
information, and assisting the attorney general in preparation of legal
briefs. See id. Section 20.6 provides further detail for the duties and
powers of PERB, requiring the board to administer the provisions of
chapter 20, collect data, establish minimum qualifications for arbitrators
and mediators and their compensation, hold hearings, and adopt rules
“to carry out the purposes of this chapter.” See id. § 20.6.
While it is obvious the legislature has afforded PERB extensive
powers to implement and administer the provisions of chapter 20, it is
not clear that the legislature intended to delegate interpretive powers to
PERB. See Waterloo Educ. Ass’n v. Iowa Pub. Employment Relations Bd.,
740 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Iowa 2007) (holding “whether a proposal is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, as defined by Iowa Code
section 20.9, has not been explicitly vested in PERB’s discretion”).
Compare Mosher v. Dep’t of Inspections & Appeals, 671 N.W.2d 501, 509
(Iowa 2003) (holding state agency’s general regulatory authority over
health care facilities did not qualify as a legislative delegation of
discretion to elaborate on the statutory definition of “dependent adult”),
with Iowa Ass’n of Sch. Bds. v. Iowa Dep’t of Educ., 739 N.W.2d 303, 307
(Iowa 2007) (noting statute provides the director of the department of
education with the duty to “[i]nterpret the school laws” and concluding
interpretive power had been clearly vested in department). Thus, our
review is for correction of errors of law under section 17A.19(10)(c). See
Waterloo Educ. Ass’n, 740 N.W.2d at 419.
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III. Guiding Principles of Statutory Interpretation.
When we interpret a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain the
legislature’s intent. State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 663 N.W.2d
413, 415 (Iowa 2003). To determine the legislature’s intent, we first
examine the language of the statute. Id. “If the statutory language is
plain and the meaning clear, we do not search for legislative intent
beyond the express terms of the statute.” Horsman v. Wahl, 551 N.W.2d
619, 620–21 (Iowa 1996). We seek a “reasonable interpretation that will
best effect the purpose of the statute and avoid an absurd result.” IBP,
Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001). Nonetheless, “[w]e will
not interpret a statute so as to render any part of it superfluous.” Am.
Legion v. Cedar Rapids Bd. of Review, 646 N.W.2d 433, 439 (Iowa 2002).
IV. Discussion.
The union filed the prohibited practice complaints commencing
this action pursuant to Iowa Code sections 20.10 and 20.11. Section
20.10 defines a “prohibited practice.” Three subsections of section 20.10
set forth conduct that can constitute a prohibited practice. Each
subsection requires that the party charged with the prohibited conduct
act “willfully.”2 Iowa Code § 20.10(1), (2), (3). Section 20.11 sets forth
the procedure that must be followed to charge a party with a “prohibited
practice violation.”
PERB acknowledges these sections do not encompass nonwillful or
ordinary violations. So, to sustain its position that it has the authority to
remedy such violations, PERB relies on the general statement of its
“powers and duties” set out in section 20.1. That section states PERB
2For example, subsection 20.10(2) begins with the following language: “It shall
be a prohibited practice for a public employer or the employer’s designated
representative willfully to . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Similar language is employed in
subsection (1) and subsection (3).
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has the power and duty to “[f]ashion[] appropriate remedial relief for
violations of this chapter, including but not limited to the reinstatement
of employees with or without back pay and benefits.” Id. § 20.1(3).
Because PERB found the State violated section 20.9, it believes it can
remedy this violation under the authority of section 20.1(3).
To support this interpretation of section 20.1(3), PERB asserts
that, if the legislature had meant to restrict its power to provide remedial
relief to prohibited practice violations, it would have referred in section
20.1(3) to “prohibited practices as defined in section 20.10,” not
“violations of this chapter.” In addition, PERB argues that nonwillful
violations of chapter 20 are just as likely to undermine the purposes of
chapter 20 as willful violations. Consequently, PERB reasons, it makes
sense that the legislature would give it the power to remedy nonwillful
violations of chapter 20. We are not persuaded by PERB’s arguments.
In outlining the procedure for pursuing a prohibited practice
complaint, section 20.11 refers to such a practice as a “violation” several
times. Id. § 20.11 (stating, for example, a complaint must be filed
“within ninety days of the alleged violation,” “the board may conduct a
preliminary investigation of the alleged violation,” and the hearing shall
be set “in the county where the alleged violation occurred”).
Consequently, the legislature’s reference in section 20.1(3) to “violations
of this chapter” does not necessarily reference anything more than
prohibited practice violations.
But regardless of whether the legislature had in mind violations of
chapter 20 other than prohibited practice violations when it adopted
section 20.1(3), we are convinced it did not have in mind nonwillful
violations of section 20.10. To interpret section 20.1(3) as authority for
PERB to remedy nonwillful violations otherwise falling within the purview
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of section 20.10 would render sections 20.10 and 20.11 largely
superfluous. There would be no need for a party to pursue relief under
these sections, which require a showing of willfulness, if the same relief
could be obtained without such proof. Even if, as asserted by PERB,
PERB might choose a different remedy for nonwillful violations than for
willful violations, there is nothing in chapter 20 that would restrict the
available remedies when a violation is nonwillful. In fact, the remedy
granted by PERB in this case—production of the requested documents—
is no different than the remedy that would have been available had the
union proved willfulness. In short, the union failed to prove a prohibited
practice, yet was accorded the remedy it sought. We conclude the
practical effect of the interpretation adopted by PERB is to render the
requirement of “willfulness” in section 20.10 superfluous. We cannot
adopt an interpretation of section 20.1(3) that is inconsistent with the
plain language of section 20.10(1).
PERB argues strenuously that its inability to remedy nonwillful
violations of section 20.9 would undermine the purpose of chapter 20.
Even if there are instances when PERB intervention would further the
legislative goals underlying chapter 20, the present circumstances are
not one of those instances. Arbitration is valued as an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism because it provides a speedy and efficient
remedy. See generally Wesley Ret. Servs., Inc. v. Hansen Lind Meyer, Inc.,
594 N.W.2d 22, 27 (Iowa 1999) (interpreting arbitration statute to
promote speed and efficiency of process); Modern Piping, Inc. v.
Blackhawk Automatic Sprinklers, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Iowa 1998)
(noting purpose of arbitration is “to obtain a speedy, inexpensive and
final resolution of disputes”), overruled on other grounds by Wesley Ret.
Servs., Inc., 594 N.W.2d at 29. Furthermore, this court has observed
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that “[a] refined quality of justice is not the goal in arbitration matters.
Indeed such a goal is deliberately sacrificed in favor of a sure and speedy
resolution.” LCI, Inc. v. Chipman, 572 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa 1997). If
parties involved in the grievance process could take every dispute to
PERB for resolution, the goals of speed and efficiency in the arbitration
process would be lost or at least diminished. Here, there is the
additional problem of inconsistent decisions. Even if the arbitrator
incorrectly decided that the State was not required to produce the
requested information, PERB’s refined sense of justice must give way to
the speedy resolution of the parties’ dispute.
In summary, we agree with the State that section 20.10(1) is the
enforcement mechanism for a violation of section 20.9. Because section
20.10(1) requires willfulness, PERB has no authority to remedy a
nonwillful violation of section 20.9.
V. Conclusion and Disposition.
Iowa Code section 20.1(3) does not authorize PERB to remedy a
violation of chapter 20 that would fall within the definition of “prohibited
practice” had the violation been committed willfully. Under PERB’s
decision, the State’s conduct violated section 20.9 and would have
constituted a prohibited practice under section 20.10(1) but for the fact
the State did not act willfully. Consequently, PERB had no authority to
remedy the State’s nonwillful violation of section 20.9.
The district court correctly held PERB exceeded its authority when,
having ruled the union failed to establish a prohibited practice under
section 20.10(1), it nonetheless ordered the State to produce the
documents requested by the union. Therefore, we affirm the district
court’s reversal of PERB’s decision.
AFFIRMED.