State Of Iowa Vs. Aaron Beuford Stohr

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 36 / 05-1107
Filed April 27, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
AARON BEUFORD STOHR,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, John S.
Mackey, Judge.
State sought discretionary review of district court order suppressing
evidence of breath test in OWI case. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
AFFIRMED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED; CASE
REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant
Attorney General, and Karen R. Kaufman Salic, County Attorney, for
appellant.
Richard A. Bartolomei of Bartolomei & Lange, P.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellee.
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LARSON, Justice.
Aaron Stohr was arrested and prosecuted for OWI as a third or
subsequent offender under Iowa Code section 321J.2(c) (2003). Stohr filed
a motion to suppress a breath test that had been administered using a
DataMaster cdm device (hereinafter referred to as DataMaster), and the
district court sustained the motion. We granted the State’s application for
discretionary review. The court of appeals reversed the ruling, and because
this testing device is in widespread use in Iowa, we granted further review to
provide guidance to the bench and bar. We affirm the decision of the court
of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand for
further proceedings.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
On July 2, 2004, a state trooper stopped a vehicle driven by Aaron
Stohr and detected an odor of alcohol. The officer observed a twelve-pack of
beer behind Stohr’s driver’s seat and noticed that Stohr’s eyes were
bloodshot and watery. Stohr failed field sobriety tests, and two preliminary
breath tests resulted in breath alcohol levels of .161 and .154. The trooper
transported Stohr to the sheriff’s office and administered a breath test on
the DataMaster device. The result of Stohr’s DataMaster breath test was
.114, well over the legal limit of .08. Stohr filed several motions, including a
motion to suppress on the ground the DataMaster test was not reliable and
accurate. The district court heard arguments on this motion and, by
agreement of the parties, admitted into the record the testimony of James
Bleskacek, a criminalist with the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation
Criminalistics Laboratory (DCI), that had been given at a hearing in another
case, State v. Koester. Koester was tried in another county, was appealed on
the same issue as is before the court in the present case, and was affirmed
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by the court of appeals in an unpublished opinion. 710 N.W.2d 257 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2005).
The district court in the present case concluded that the trooper who
administered the breath test did so in accordance with his training and all
applicable regulations and statutes. Further, the court concluded that the
DCI criminalist performed his prescribed duties in accordance with the
regulations governing certification and recertification of the DataMaster.
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the scientific reliability
standard of Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa
1999), was not met with respect to the operation of the DataMaster. This
conclusion was based on what the court perceived to be uncertain internal
standard and calibration methods, as well as the variable nature of the
breath sample blown into the machine by Stohr. The district court
concluded that the test results were, therefore, too unreliable to be admitted
and sustained the motion to suppress. The court of appeals disagreed with
this analysis, and so do we.
II. Standard of Review.
The parties disagree about the proper standard of our review. Stohr
contends that the court of appeals erred in reviewing the district court’s
ruling for correction of errors at law. Instead of characterizing the issue as
one of statutory interpretation, Stohr contends the issue involves an
evidentiary ruling and, as such, should be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Contrary to Stohr’s argument, our cases clearly have held that review
in such cases is not for abuse of discretion, but for correction of errors at
law. See, e.g., State v. Hornik, 672 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Iowa 2003) (review for
correction of errors at law when the result turns on the construction of Iowa
Code section 321J.11); State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Iowa 2001)
(review of ruling on hearsay objection for correction of errors at law, not for
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abuse of discretion); State v. Stoneking, 379 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Iowa 1985)
(review for correction of errors at law when “ ‘the operative facts and
inferences are not controverted,’ and the result will turn on the construction
of [a statute].” (quoting State v. Davis, 271 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1978)));
compare State v. Hershey, 348 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1984) (“Foundational
questions are to be determined by the court. Our review is for abuse of
discretion.” (Citation omitted.)).
III. Discussion.
Admissibility of Stohr’s breath-test results is expressly established by
statute. Iowa Code section 321J.15 provides:
Upon the trial of a civil or criminal action or proceeding
arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by a person
while operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2 or
321J.2A, evidence of the alcohol concentration . . . at the time
of the act alleged as shown by a chemical analysis of the
person’s blood, breath, or urine is admissible. If it is
established at trial that an analysis of a breath specimen was
performed by a certified operator using a device intended to
determine alcohol concentration and methods approved by the
commissioner of public safety, no further foundation is
necessary for introduction of the evidence.
(Emphasis added.)
Under section 321J.15, the State must establish three elements: (1)
the test was performed on a device intended to determine alcohol
concentration, (2) the test was performed by an operator certified to use the
device, and (3) the methods used to perform the test were approved by the
Commissioner of Public Safety. All three requirements were met in this
case. First, the DataMaster is a device intended to determine alcohol
concentration and has been approved by the commissioner. See Hornik,
672 N.W.2d at 841-42; see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 661-7.2(1). Stohr
apparently concedes this point. Second, the operator must be certified to
use the DataMaster device. The certificate indicating that the operator in
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this case was qualified to use the device was placed in evidence and,
although Stohr does not concede this point, we believe the operator’s
qualifications were clearly established. Third, the methods used by the
operator must have been approved by the commissioner. Hornik, 672
N.W.2d at 841-42. It is undisputed that the operator conducted Stohr’s
breath test in accordance with his training and the operational checklist
provided by the DCI. The commissioner authorized the DCI to establish
procedures for testing breath-alcohol concentration using the DataMaster
device, and the DCI did so. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 661-7.2(1). Further,
the DataMaster used in this case had been certified to be in proper working
order in accordance with the procedures issued by the DCI.
Despite the clear legislative procedure provided for administration of
alcohol-sensing devices, and the express language of the statute that “no
further foundation is necessary for introduction of the evidence,” Stohr
argues, and the district court held, that our general rule for admission of
scientific evidence must be superimposed on the statutory criteria of section
321J.15. In making this argument, Stohr relies on Leaf. This reliance is
misplaced. The holding of Leaf, with respect to scientific evidence, may be
summarized as (1) a rejection of the mandate that federal courts exercise a
“gatekeeping” function under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), in favor of a more
expansive approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence based on Iowa
Rule of Evidence 702 and our cases applying it; and (2) a recognition of the
district court’s broad discretion in weighing the reliability of proffered
scientific evidence. Leaf, 590 N.W.2d at 532-33.
Contrary to Stohr’s argument and the ruling of the district court,
nothing in Leaf suggests that its general rules for assessing admissibility of
scientific evidence should control when a specific statutory process governs
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the admission of evidence. If a defendant such as Stohr chooses to attack
the results of a breath test, the jury may consider his argument in
assessing the weight to give to the test results. We agree with the court of
appeals that the district court erred in suppressing Stohr’s breath-test
results.
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of
the district court, and remand for further proceedings.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; JUDGMENT OF
DISTRICT COURT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.