State of Iowa v. Gowun Park

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 21–0756
Submitted November 16, 2022—Filed January 27, 2023
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
GOWUN PARK,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Brad McCall,
Judge.
The State seeks further review of a court of appeals decision affirming the
suppression of certain police interrogations of the defendant. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED
AND REMANDED.
Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which all participating
justices joined. Waterman and May, JJ., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant.
Tammy Gentry (argued) and Gina Messamer of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn
Gentry Brown Bergmann & Messamer, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellee.
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MANSFIELD, Justice.
I. Introduction.
Our legal system tolerates some deception by law enforcement. But when a
suspect is being questioned, law enforcement may not use deception that
overcomes the suspect’s free will and may not make deceptive promises that would
be likely to trigger a false confession. In this case, a man died of strangulation
after being zip-tied up in a chair in his apartment. His wife was the only other
person present. The wife claimed, improbably, that he had tied himself up. After
interviewing her at the apartment, police officers took her to the police station,
Mirandized her, and questioned her further about how the man came to be tied
up. Initially, the officers told the woman falsely that doctors were still working to
try to save the man’s life—a deception they corrected only about an hour and a
half into the interview. The detectives also made various reassurances and
suggestions: that nobody deserves to be abused; that “people would understand”
if she was a victim of domestic abuse; that if an accident had occurred, they
needed to know; and that they were there to “help” her. The wife continued to
claim that her husband had tied himself up. The wife was released but was
arrested several days later and charged with murdering her husband.
On our review, we find that the officers’ deception did not exceed what our
legal system tolerates. The lie about whether the man had been pronounced dead
didn’t affect the woman’s essentially knowing and voluntary waiver of her Miranda
rights. The officers’ blandishments and expressions of sympathy didn’t amount to
concrete promises of leniency—either express or implied—that would create a fair
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risk of a false confession. Accordingly, we vacate the court of appeals decision and
reverse the district court suppressing this interview and subsequent interviews.
We also affirm the court of appeals decision that reversed the district court and
found the immediate on-the-scene questioning following the woman’s 911 call to
be noncustodial and admissible.
II. Facts and Procedural History.
A. The Defendant’s 911 Call and the Arrival of Paramedics and Police.
Defendant Gowun Park has a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, and a Ph.D.
from universities in the United States. She was teaching economics at Simpson
College at the time of her husband Sung Woo Nam’s death. Park has lived in the
United States for the last twenty years. Although Korean is her native language,
she is fluent in English.
At 6:46 p.m. on Saturday, February 15, 2020, Park called 911 to report
that her husband Nam was not breathing. When paramedics and West Des
Moines police arrived at Park and Nam’s apartment, they found Nam face down
in the study room of the apartment, unconscious with no vital signs. Nam had
ligature marks on the front of his neck and throat as well as zip tie marks on his
wrists and ankles.
While the paramedics attended to Nam, two women police officers—Molly
Sweeden and Jordan Hinrichsen—took Park aside, made efforts to calm her
down, and asked her what had happened. Park was swooning and crying
hysterically. Park said she had been with her husband in the study an hour
before and had then moved to the living room, where she fell asleep while
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watching television. Park said that upon waking, she found Nam had tied himself
to a chair that was leaning forward onto the floor. She cut him loose. Park
indicated that her husband had been suicidal in the past, had attempted suicide
about two years before, and had talked about suicide that day.
The paramedics made efforts to revive Nam before transporting him to the
hospital. Park was allowed to see Nam briefly as he was being wheeled out of the
apartment. Officer Hinrichsen told Park that Nam was still not breathing. Park
asked repeatedly if she could go to the hospital to be with her husband. Officers
told her she would be able to go once they got the information they needed to
understand what happened. They told her she could then arrange a ride to the
hospital since she was not in an emotional condition to drive. Officer Sweeden
continued her efforts to calm Park.
Nam was later pronounced dead at the hospital.
B. February 15 Interview of the Defendant at the Apartment.
Meanwhile at the apartment, after about twenty minutes, Sergeant Matthew
McCarty joined the discussion which was now occurring in the living room.
Sergeant McCarty asked Park if she remembered where the ties had been and
specifically whether he had been tied around his neck. Park said she couldn’t
remember.
Park sought repeatedly to retrieve her cell phone from the study to call an
unnamed friend. After discussing the matter among themselves, the officers
explained that they could not give her access to her phone or anything else in
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the study. Park declined Sergeant McCarty’s offer to place the call for her and
other proposed alternatives that would allow her to contact the friend.
Once paramedics had transported Nam to the hospital, Park was generally
allowed to move freely around the apartment except for the study, where officers
remained gathering evidence. Officer Sweeden briefly escorted Park into her
bedroom and made her stay there so that Officer Hinrichsen could take
photographs in the living room.
About forty minutes after the paramedics and the police had first
appeared, a detective—Chris Morgan—arrived. He started reading notes to
update himself on the situation. Park asked Detective Morgan if she could get
her cell phone so she could go to the hospital. Detective Morgan responded,
“Okay, we’ve got to figure out what is going on because this is very weird. So I’m
sorry, but you’re going to have to bear with us a little bit.”
Detective Morgan asked Park to restate what had happened. Park
reiterated her claim that she had fallen asleep in the living room and then
awakened to find Nam tied up in the study and unresponsive. She again said
she couldn’t remember what part of Nam had been tied to the chair or if anything
was on Nam’s neck when she found him. She denied pulling a rope off Nam’s
neck. Again, Park sought access to her cell phone.
About twenty minutes after he had arrived, Detective Morgan explained,
Okay, so here’s the deal. . . . We don’t know what happened here in
the apartment, okay, and we need to figure that out, alright. So if
it’s just you and him in here or something else happened, we need
to know what happened here. For us to do that properly, we
probably need to take you down to the station so that we can come
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and take pictures and collect evidence and whatnot in here and
make sure we’re not missing anything.
Park asked why she couldn’t go to the hospital. Detective Morgan said she
couldn’t because she had been the only person in the apartment with Nam as
far as the police knew and was the only person who had information. Detective
Morgan said that even if she were at the hospital, she would not be able to see
Nam because they would be working on him.
The officers asked Park to accompany them to the West Des Moines police
station and explained that they would be sitting down and talking to her there.
Park agreed to this, but she asked to change her clothes first because she was in
nightclothes. Detective Morgan told her she could get a coat and shoes but she
couldn’t change clothes because “everything in here is potentially evidence.” He
added that a change of clothes could be brought for her to the station. Detective
Morgan explained, “We don’t know what’s important and what’s not.”
C. February 15–16 Nighttime Interview at the West Des Moines Police
Station. Park received Miranda warnings when she reached the West Des Moines
police station around 8:30 p.m. She did not sign the written Miranda waiver
though.1 The police by then knew that Nam had died, but they did not disclose
that to Park. Instead, Detective Morgan told Park that the doctors were “trying to
1Park clearly understood the Miranda warnings. Relatively early in the interview, she said,
“[S]hould I wait for that lawyer” Detective Morgan responded, “That’s up to you.” Later in the
interview she said, “You said I have a right to remain silent.” Detective Morgan responded, “Yes,
you do.” Park continued talking. Toward the end of the interview, Park reiterated, “You told me I
can remain silent,” and Morgan reiterated, “You have that option.”
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help him.” Detective Morgan and another detective, Jason Hatcher, questioned
Park well into the early morning of February 16.
Providing a lengthy narrative interrupted by occasional questions, Park
stood by her earlier story that Nam had tied himself up. Park was able to fill in
many details but still could not recall where she had found the ties on Nam.
About an hour into the interview, Park added something new. She said that
Nam had asked her to tie him up a few days before—but not on February 15—so
he wouldn’t hurt her. Park disclosed that she had a video of this on her cell
phone, but she reiterated she had not tied up Nam that evening.
About an hour and fifteen minutes into the interview, Detective Morgan
said,
It makes sense for him to say, “I don’t want to hurt you either. So if
I’m real upset, tie me up until I calm down because I don’t want to
hurt you,” alright. So we just want to make sure, you know, if, if
something happened today and then somehow he got hurt, that’s
okay, you know. If you didn’t mean for him to get hurt. If it was his
idea to get tied up and something happened, you know, that’s fine.
We just need to know.
Some ten minutes later, Detective Morgan revealed to Park that Nam had
in fact died. Park sobbed uncontrollably and could not answer questions for a
considerable time. The detectives declined Park’s request to go see Nam, stating
that evidence was still being gathered from his body.
At this point, the detectives confronted Park with their understanding of
the physical evidence. Detective Morgan stated, “He was tied up, and he has
marks on his neck like somebody strangled him.” Detective Hatcher explained
that the doctor reported that Nam “had died of strangulation,” and they were
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“trying to figure out . . . how he died of strangulation.” Detective Hatcher also
indicated that the officers were there to “help” Park and that Park was “safe in
here.” Detective Morgan suggested that what happened to Nam could have been
an “accident.”
Detective Morgan said that if Park had been strangled by Nam to the degree
she passed out (as she had earlier claimed), “Nobody deserves that. It’s not your
fault, you know, you didn’t deserve for him to treat you that way.”
As the night wore on, Park continued to insist that Nam had tied himself
up. The officers told Park repeatedly that this could have been a case of her
protecting herself from physical abuse at Nam’s hands. At one point, Detective
Hatcher bluffed Park, telling her that Nam had discussed what had happened to
him on the way to the hospital. The bluff didn’t elicit a response.
Changing course somewhat, the detectives expressed disbelief at Park’s
claim that Nam had previously allowed her to tie him down so he wouldn’t beat
her: “If he’s beating you, I don’t see him stopping to say, . . . tie me down so I
don’t beat you anymore. That . . . doesn’t make sense to me.” Park pushed back,
stating, “I feel like whatever I say, you want to blame me.”
As the questioning continued, Detective Morgan told Park that if she took
things into her own hands because she was getting abused, she should tell them
because “people would understand that.” Specifically:
A woman gets beaten, she’s getting abused by her husband,
something happens, she takes it into her own hands. She poisons
him. She does something to make it stop, to make it go away, and
people get that. They relate[] to it. They understand. Now if I was
getting treated like that, I would do something too. I would do
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something to make it stop. So if that’s the case, tell us that because
people would understand that.
Park continued to stand by her account. She also told the detectives that she
could not remember the passcode to her cell phone.
After a lengthy break that started around 12:30 a.m., the detectives
returned for further questioning at about 1:45 a.m. The detectives told Park that
they had been to the apartment and reiterated that “the information that you’re
telling us doesn’t match up with the information we’re finding at your house [or]
[t]he information on your husband’s body at the hospital.” After about fifteen more
minutes, Park asked for an attorney, and questioning ended. The officers informed
Park that they had a warrant to search Park’s cell phone and requested her again
to give the code or to do facial recognition. She repeated that she didn’t remember
the code. She covered her face so as not to cooperate with the facial recognition
feature of the phone.
At the close of the interview, Detective Morgan said, “We know you are lying
to us. And we will do our job to prove you are lying to us. You’re lying about
everything.” Detective Hatcher said, “Now it’s our job to put everything together,
and we’ll do that.” Detective Morgan added, “This is not going to be the last time
you’ll see us.”
D. February 16 Midday Interview at the Police Station. About eight
hours after her previous interview, Park returned to the police station
unannounced on her own. Detectives Hatcher and Morgan were summoned and
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again conducted the questioning. They Mirandized Park at the beginning of the
interview. This time, she signed the Miranda waiver.
Park was more composed than the night before. She gave the detectives the
code for her cell phone and said she was returning because she had not told the
police everything earlier. She recounted a new version of the previous day’s events.
Park claimed that Nam had been very upset while they were driving together
the day before and broke the mirror of his car. When the couple returned to the
apartment, Park claimed that Nam asked to be tied up so he wouldn’t break
something else or hurt himself. Park used zip ties and rope to restrain him. She
said she tied the rope around his neck after putting a towel on him.
According to Park, Nam also asked to have his mouth duct-taped so he
wouldn’t scream; Park did that as well. Park added that she put a sock in Nam’s
mouth so he wouldn’t bite himself. Park claimed to have covered Nam’s eyes with
a towel and duct tape because he had been banging his head on the table and
she didn’t want him to hurt himself.
As before, Park informed the detectives that she had moved from the study
to the living room. Allegedly, when she later returned to check on Nam, the chair
had tipped forward onto the ground, Nam was leaning forward on the ground,
and he was not breathing.
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Park again said there was a video on her phone from the time earlier in
the week when she had tied up Nam at his behest.2 Park claimed it had been
Nam’s idea for her to restrain him during his outbursts so she could “control”
him; she advised Nam she didn’t want to do it because it “sounded like a crime.”
At the detectives’ request, Park physically demonstrated on Detective
Hatcher how she had tied up and bound Nam with the zip ties, rope, duct tape,
and socks.
The officers asked for additional specifics relating to Nam’s physical abuse
of Park, which Park provided. Detective Morgan said, “You’re a battered woman.”
But this time the officers did not mention that they were there to “help” Park.
After about one hour and forty minutes, Detective Morgan advised Park
that they were going to step out for a while and talk to their supervisor. Park
asked if she was going to be arrested that evening. The detectives responded that
they were going to discuss it.
The officers returned about forty-five minutes later. Detective Morgan told
Park that an autopsy on Nam was scheduled in two days—for Tuesday, February
18. He said the police also wanted to examine Park’s phone and computer, and
the person to do this would not be available until Tuesday. Detective Morgan
advised Park that the detectives would contact her late Tuesday. Park told the
2As it turned out, there was also a video on Park’s phone from 5:06 p.m. on February 15.
In that video, Nam appears to be in considerable distress and demanding to be untied. Park tried
to delete that video at 6:44 p.m., just two minutes before she called 911.
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detectives that she wouldn’t be leaving her apartment and that she didn’t
consider herself safe to drive.
E. February 18 Interview at the Apartment. As promised, Detectives
Hatcher and Morgan arrived at Park’s apartment late afternoon on February 18.
But they were there to conduct an additional interview. Detective Hatcher
explained that it was still “an active investigation,” so they needed to re-read Park
her Miranda rights to continue talking. Park signed the Miranda form. This
interview lasted approximately an hour.
The three remained in the living room for the majority of the questioning.
The detectives said that the autopsy had been performed, but they were waiting
on toxicology that would determine, for example, if Nam had any foreign
substances in his body at the time of death.
When the detectives started to inquire about Nam’s possible drug usage,
Park began to cry and rock back and forth. She kept repeating, “I feel really bad.”
Detective Morgan told Park to take her time because “some of this stuff is hard
to talk about.”
Park began describing Nam’s past drug and alcohol use; she said he used
to struggle with substance abuse including marijuana and cocaine in his college
years, but she hadn’t seen him use illegal drugs in the apartment. Park paused
to take a medication of her own, which she said was prescribed for a
stress-induced heart irregularity.
The detectives asked Park if she had ever sought medical treatment
because of Nam’s abuse. This questioning sparked a long series of responses
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from Park. She said she had sought treatment two previous times: once when
Nam allegedly threw a lamp at her, and another time when she suffered a broken
thumb. She provided the detectives with medical files that had been sitting on
her living room table.
Without prompting, Park next handed over what she characterized as a
notarized document signed by Nam explaining his abusive behavior. Park
interjected that her mom had been worried because Nam had threatened to kill
her. Detective Hatcher said that he found that abnormal, saying he’d never heard
of someone preparing and signing a notarized statement to explain their own
abuse.
This shifted the conversation back to Park’s cell phone video. Park told the
detectives that Nam had memory issues and would engage in “weird behavior,”
like falling asleep in a loud restaurant. She said she would video this behavior
per Nam’s request so she could show him later when he had a “clean mind.” The
videos were not meant to be shown to a third person.
Later, the detectives said they wanted to reenter the study to examine it
further. At first, they did not allow Park to follow them, though. Park joined the
detectives a few minutes later without objection and began pointing out items
around the apartment that Nam had allegedly broken. Park also provided a
notepad and other documentation where Nam had allegedly admitted abusing
Park.
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Park asked, “So, what’s going to happen now?” Detective Morgan reiterated
that the police were still waiting on toxicology information. He added that they
would be examining her cell phone, which they had not yet accessed.
The interview happened to take place on Park’s birthday. Detective
Hatcher said, “It’s a pretty crappy birthday, but you know what, you’re safe now.”
The detectives indicated that they would check back with Park in the next day
or two. The interview concluded with Park requesting help opening her car’s
trunk, which had been frozen shut. The detectives walked out of the building
with Park, assisted her with her car, and then departed.
F. February 19 Interview at the Police Station. The next morning at
around 9 a.m., Park appeared on her own at the police station. Detective Hatcher
greeted her and guided her to an interrogation room. Park was not read her
Miranda rights.
Detective Hatcher started the interview by asking, “What can I do for you?”
Park replied by pulling out a handwritten sheet of notes that she had prepared.
She explained that ever since Nam had died, she had been unable to sleep.
Referring to Nam’s death, she said, “I really want to know why.” Park stated that
she had used the nighttime to prepare notes.
As Park began taking Detective Hatcher through her notes, he summoned
Detective Morgan via text. Park stated that Nam would physically abuse her but
that she wouldn’t report it because Nam had threatened to end his life if anyone
found out. Park asserted that Nam would often calm down after assaulting her.
Detective Hatcher asked, “You’re saying you loved him so much you’re willing to
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take a beating so long as he’s getting better?” Park told Detective Hatcher, “I
know it sounds really crazy.” He replied, “It doesn’t.”
Detective Hatcher asked Park if Nam would ever slam her head against the
wall. Park said yes, and she demonstrated how Nam would allegedly lift her by
the neck and push her against a wall. She said that she occasionally passed out
from this abuse.
Forty-five minutes into the interview, Park gestured to her notes and
indicated that she had relayed what she intended to tell the detectives. Detective
Hatcher asked, “What’s your plan from here on out?” Park replied, “That’s what
I want to ask you. What’s going to happen?” Detective Hatcher answered that
they were still waiting on autopsy reports.
When another ten minutes had passed, Detective Morgan entered the
interrogation room. Detective Hatcher summarized the prior discussion for
Detective Morgan’s benefit. Detective Hatcher then re-asked Park, “What do you
have for us?” Park said she was shocked to hear about what the medical
examiner had said. She asked by way of clarification, “So, he passed away
because he couldn’t breathe, that’s it?” Detective Morgan replied, “We honestly
don’t know yet,” and said that they were still waiting on the toxicology and the
rest of the autopsy. Park asked, “After you get that [inaudible], what’s next?”
The direction of the interview changed dramatically when Detective
Hatcher asked Detective Morgan, “What do you want to do?” Detective Morgan
turned to Park and said, “Let me be honest with you.” He said that the
preliminary findings from the autopsy showed that Nam had died by ligature
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strangulation. As a result, the police did not believe that Nam killed himself. At
9:51 a.m., the detectives placed Park under arrest for murder and kidnapping.
G. Procedural History. On February 27, a trial information was filed in
the Dallas County District Court charging Park with first-degree murder and
first-degree kidnapping, both class “A” felonies. See Iowa Code § 707.2 (2020);
id. § 710.2.
On October 22, Park filed a motion to suppress her statements made at
the apartment and the police station from February 15 to February 19. Park
raised four issues: (1) whether she was in custody at her apartment on February
15, (2) whether she knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda
rights at her first interview at the police station on February 15–16, (3) whether
the detectives made impermissible promises of leniency at that first interview,
and (4) if there were promises of leniency, whether those statements tainted the
subsequent interviews.
The district court held a hearing on March 2, 2021. Officers Sweeden and
Hinrichsen and Detectives Morgan and Hatcher testified. The defense also called
Dr. Silvia Asay, who has a Ph.D. in community and human resources and
teaches at the University of Nebraska at Kearney. Dr. Asay testified that she has
edited a book entitled Family Violence from a Global Perspective that includes
chapters on domestic abuse in different cultures. She testified that Asian
cultures are more patriarchal and tend to keep the existence of abuse private.
She also testified that a Korean would be more likely to trust and give deference
to an American police officer.
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The district court later issued an order granting the motion to suppress in
full. Regarding the first interview at the apartment on February 15, 2020, the
court said,
Based upon the nature of the questioning of Park, the officers’
refusal to allow her to move about within the interior of the condo, the
repeated denial of her requests to go to the hospital or place calls on
her phone to arrange a ride to the hospital and the implication
something “weird” was going on, the Court concludes Park was “in
custody,” despite the fact she remained in her own condo. While she
was certainly not under arrest, there was significant restraint on her
freedom of movement. Because she was not read her Miranda rights
before questioning began, statements made by Park, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, must be suppressed.
(Footnote omitted.) Turning to the interview that night, the court
concluded,
Based on the totality of the circumstances existing at the time
of the initial station house interrogation, the Court concludes the
State has not met its burden. Based upon the nature and
circumstances of the questioning, the Court is unable to conclude
Park had a full awareness of both the nature of her Miranda rights
and the consequences of a decision to abandon them. Most telling
is her statement, “I’m not so sure,” when asked if she understood
her rights. Accordingly, Park’s statements to officers at the police
station on the night of the incident must be suppressed.
....
Viewing the statements made to Park under the common law
evidentiary test, the Court finds the assurances the officers gave her
during the extended interview at the police station amounted to
implied promises of leniency in exchange for her admissions. The
circumstances and declarations of the officers were calculated to
mislead Park as to her position and exert an improper influence over
her mind.
Lastly, as to the subsequent February 16, 18, and 19 interviews, the court
determined as follows:
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Having concluded Park’s statements during the initial station
house interrogation on February 15 & 16, 2020, were impermissibly
induced, it is necessary to determine whether the illegality carried
over to, and tainted, the subsequent interviews. Included in the
factors to be considered are “the time that passes between
confessions, the change in place of interrogations and the change in
identity of the interrogators.”
....
Based upon the repeated nature of the implied promises and
assurances the officers made to Park during their first station house
interview with her, combined with the fact Park clearly articulated
her desire to remain silent and to consult with counsel, the Court
concludes the taint from the initial interview clearly carried over to all
of the subsequent interviews conducted by the police officers.
(Footnote omitted.)
The State sought interlocutory review. We granted the application and
transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The court reversed the suppression ruling as to the
February 15 interview in the apartment, noting that Park had “initiated the
encounter by calling 911.” Additionally, the court reasoned that the officers
questioned Park in her own home, where she was largely allowed to move about,
and asked “open-ended questions [that] were not styled to elicit a confession,”
rather than confronting Park with evidence of guilt. In sum, the court said, “[A]
reasonable person in Park’s shoes would not have understood herself to be in
custody during the first in-home encounter.”
Yet the court of appeals upheld the district court’s suppression ruling as to
the remaining interviews. After a lengthy discussion, it concluded that Park did
not voluntarily waive her Miranda rights at the West Des Moines police station on
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the evening of February 15. Unlike the district court, which emphasized Park’s
decision not to sign the Miranda waiver and her perceived ambivalence in deciding
to answer questions, the court of appeals focused on the detectives’ deception
regarding Nam’s death as “the most salient factor in finding the Miranda waiver
involuntary.” The court of appeals also agreed with the district court that the
detectives made improper promises of leniency. Finally, it agreed with the district
court that the interviews on February 16, 18, and 19, should be suppressed under
a “taint” theory because “minimal” time had elapsed and “the effect of the earlier
promises had not dissipated.”
The State applied for further review, and we granted the application.
III. Standard of Review.
“When a defendant challenges a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or federal constitutional right,
our standard of review is de novo.” State v. Hauge, 973 N.W.2d 453, 458 (Iowa
2022) (quoting State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2019)). We review a
district court’s rulings on promises of leniency under the common law
evidentiary test for correction of errors at law. State v. Hillery, 956 N.W.2d 492,
498 (Iowa 2021).
IV. Legal Analysis.
A. Was Park in Custody During the First Interview at Her Apartment?
The admissibility of the first interview turns on whether Park was in custody at
her apartment on February 15, 2020. Law enforcement officers are required to
give Miranda warnings to individuals who are both in custody and subject to
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interrogation. State v. Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d 380, 395 (Iowa 2016), abrogated on
other grounds by State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189 (Iowa 2022); see also State v.
Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 171 (Iowa 2015) (discussing warnings police must give
based on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471, 478–79 (1966)). Custody means
there was “a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)
(per curiam) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)
(per curiam)); see also State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557–58 (Iowa 1997).
We apply an objective test: a person is in custody if a reasonable person
in the defendant’s position were to believe they were in custody. Countryman,
572 N.W.2d at 558. The test is based on “objective circumstances, not the
subjective belief of the officers or the defendant.” State v. Bogan, 774 N.W.2d
676, 680 (Iowa 2009). We assess the totality of the circumstances using four
guiding factors in our determination: “(1) the language used to summon the
individual; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of interrogation; (3) the extent to
which the defendant is confronted with evidence of her guilt; and (4) whether the
defendant is free to leave the place of questioning.” Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at
558. We will consider each factor in turn.
We first consider the circumstances of how Park was summoned to the
interrogation. The State contends that this factor weighs against custody
because Park initiated the contact with the police, while Park counters that there
was no clear advisory she was free to leave the scene.
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“[W]hen the confrontation between the suspect and the criminal justice
system is instigated at the direction of law enforcement authorities, rather than
the suspect, custody is more likely to exist.” State v. Miranda, 672 N.W.2d 753,
759 (Iowa 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d
1343, 1351 (8th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Parker, 993 F.3d 595, 602
(8th Cir. 2021) (finding no custody where defendant called 911 for medical
assistance, as “it is reasonable to expect that officers would talk to individuals
at the apartment”); State v. Smith, 546 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Iowa 1996) (en banc)
(“Although coming to [the interview] voluntarily is not alone enough to negate a
finding of custody, it is indicative of the state of mind of a reasonable person in
the situation.”).
Park called 911 because she could not revive her husband. She was not
summoned by the police. It is reasonable to expect questioning by responders
arriving at a medical emergency. This factor weighs against custody.
We next consider the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation.
Generally, in-home interrogations are not custodial. State v. Evans, 495 N.W.2d
760, 763 (Iowa 1993) (en banc); see, e.g., State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 788
(Iowa 1989) (finding that a person who was interviewed in his home and not under
arrest was not in custody). But in State v. Miranda, we found that an individual
was in custody despite the interview taking place in his home. 672 N.W.2d at
760. Although police in that case questioned the defendant in his living room,
they did so while he was handcuffed. Id. Because “the usual comforts of home
22
were taken away from [the defendant],” we found that the “manner of the
questioning belied its location.” Id.For the manner of questioning, we look to “how long it lasted, ‘the number
of persons conducting the questioning, the number of breaks taken during the
questioning, the availability of restroom breaks or other breaks, and the type of
questioning in which those conducting the interview engage.’ ” Schlitter,
881 N.W.2d at 396 (quoting Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at 172–73).
The State argues that State v. Tyler is analogous to the present case as to
the purpose and manner of the officers’ questioning. In Tyler, the demeanor and
tone of the officers tipped the scale in favor of the defendant not being in custody.
867 N.W.2d at 173. There, a hotel employee had found the defendant’s deceased
child in a room; the police were sent to investigate the matter. Id. at 145–46. We
noted that the officers “conducted themselves in a calm, respectful manner.” Id.
at 173. Assessing the situation, one officer stated, “We don’t know what we got,”
and they repeatedly told the defendant they were only trying to gather
information. Id. Instead of seeking a confession, they were trying to figure out
what had happened. Id. Their intent “manifested in the manner of their
questioning.” Id. We found that, looking at the conduct and demeanor of the
officers, a reasonable person would not have understood themselves to be in
custody. Id.; see also Smith, 546 N.W.2d at 924 (examining whether a
“confrontational and aggressive style” was used in questioning, or whether it felt
“more relaxed and investigatory in nature”).
23
We agree that Tyler is analogous. Here, the questioning at Park’s
apartment focused on determining what had happened, not on getting Park to
confess to murder. The officers were calm, respectful, and sympathetic. At the
beginning of the interaction, the officers were trying to console Park in her
emotional state. At most points throughout the interaction, multiple officers were
present, but the questioning was intermittent and generally conducted by only
one officer at a time. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we find that
this factor weighs against custody.
Next, we turn to the extent to which Park was confronted with evidence of
her guilt. Park says this factor is neutral; at most, she points to Detective
Morgan’s comment of “this is very weird.” The court of appeals described this
statement as a “frank appraisal of the situation rather than a comment on Park’s
guilt.” See Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at 173 (“These questions were not accusatory in
nature, but rather intended to encourage [the defendant] to tell the truth.”). We
agree; this factor is neutral.
The final factor is whether the defendant was free to leave the place of
questioning. Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d at 397. “One element of this is the degree of
physical restriction placed on the individual.” Id. Courts look at exit paths,
whether police officers were blocking the exits, the use of handcuffs or other
physical restraints, whether officers tell the defendant they are free to leave, and
if the defendant ultimately did leave the questioning. See id. at 397–98; see also
Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at 174 (finding that the defendant was free to leave despite
being in the police station where the door was unlocked and unobstructed and
24
officers told the defendant she could leave if she wanted); Smith, 546 N.W.2d at
925 (“One obvious factor we must examine is the degree of physical restraint
imposed on the defendants during the interview process.”). But see Miranda,
672 N.W.2d at 760 (finding custody where the defendant was in his home but
was handcuffed to a chair, as “[t]o hold otherwise would wrongly suggest [the
defendant] was free to leave while securely anchored to police property”).
Park argues that because she was unable to enter the study or drive herself
to the hospital, she was not free to leave the place of questioning. It is true that
she could not enter the study. But this was to preserve the scene and any potential
evidence it contained. And while Park was not permitted to drive herself to the
hospital, this was because of her emotional state. The officers did not feel it was
safe to allow Park to drive herself. Park didn’t disagree. The officers presented
Park with several options for requesting a ride. Park provided various excuses
for why those proposals would not work. She insisted on getting access to her
own cell phone to call for a ride.
The district court concluded that the officers “took control of Park” upon
their arrival. Based on our independent review of the bodycam video, we would
not characterize the situation that way. Two women police officers immediately
attended to Park and tried to calm her down. They had no idea what had
happened and were just trying to engage in conversation with her away from the
frantic activity in the study, where paramedics were working on Nam and other
police were evaluating the situation.
25
The district court also pointed out that Park’s movement within the
apartment was “restricted.” But again, the restrictions related to the preservation
of evidence. Park’s highest priority seemed to be getting access to her cell phone,
which of course was a potentially critical piece of evidence that the police wanted
to preserve in its existing state. Although police temporarily denied Park access to
the living room, it was only while the officers were photographing there.
The district court further noted that Park was told repeatedly “she couldn’t
go to the hospital ‘now.’ ” But the reason given was that the officers still needed
to understand this unusual situation, including information that might help
Nam, and that she could go once they got that information. That was a logical
explanation under the circumstances.
Finally, the district court noted that when the officers determined after
about an hour that they were going to transport Park to the police station, they
“further restricted her ability to move about” and wouldn’t let her change her
clothes. We agree that when Detective Morgan announced, “Okay, so here’s the
deal,” things turned more custodial. And the State concedes that Park was in
custody once she was actually being taken to the police station a few minutes
later. Still, the State urges that Park wasn’t technically in custody until she
entered the patrol car because (1) she agreed to ride to the police station and
(2) there was a valid evidentiary reason for not letting her change her clothes.
We see no reason or need to cut such a fine line. We hold that statements made
prior to Detective Morgan announcing, “Okay, so here’s the deal,” should not be
suppressed.
26
B. Did Park Waive Her Miranda Rights at the Police Station on the
Evening of February 15–16? The next issue is whether Park validly waived her
Miranda rights after reaching the police station on February 15.
The detectives knew by this time that Nam had been pronounced dead at
the hospital. But they lied and told Park they didn’t know. Detective Morgan
orally recited the Miranda rights and then presented Park with a written
statement and waiver of those rights. Detective Hatcher added the following:
This is a legal document that we present you to make sure
that you understand your rights before you talk to us. Do we think
anything happened suspiciously? We don’t know. We have no idea
what has transpired between you calling 911, your husband going
to the hospital, or what happened before you called 911. We want to
find out. We are kind of in a crunch to try to figure out what has
happened. But we always bring something into this room
and . . . these are your rights. So we read you your rights. We want
to make sure you understand your rights. But we want to find out
what happened and made your husband be in that position where
you used scissors [to cut him free] and stuff like that.
Park asked if she could talk to the detectives later. Detective Morgan
responded that the detectives want to talk now. He added that it would be fine if
she didn’t want to talk now but she would remain at the station. Detective
Hatcher said that “we just want to figure out why Nam was in the position he
was in; why he had the marks around his wrists and neck.”
When asked, Park initially said she understood her rights. But when asked
to confirm this a second time, Park said she wasn’t so sure. Detective Morgan
said, “If you don’t want to sign that [form], that’s fine, but we still want to talk to
you.” Questioning proceeded in a slow and deliberate fashion.
27
Park not only is fluent in English, but she also has advanced degrees from
universities in the United States and has taught college-level classes in English
since 2013.3
For a person to validly waive their Miranda rights, the individual must do
so “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at 174. “The
inquiry into whether a waiver is valid ‘has two distinct dimensions.’ ” State v.
Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 421 (1986)). First, the waiver must have been knowing and intelligent,
which means that “the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of
both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.” State v. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d 244, 251 (Iowa 2009) (quoting
Moran, 475 U.S. at 421). Second, the waiver must have been voluntary, which
means that the waiver was “the product of the suspect’s free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id.To determine if Miranda rights were properly waived, we look at the
“totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Moran, 475 U.S.
at 421 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)); accord Ortiz,
766 N.W.2d at 251. We use an objective standard. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d at 453.
The State has the burden of proof to show the waiver was valid. Countryman,
572 N.W.2d at 559.
3The district court stated that “her fluency is limited.” Our independent review of the
recorded interviews indicates otherwise. In fact, Park states that she is “fluent” in English on her
resume, which she introduced as an exhibit.
28
While a written waiver “is not alone sufficient,” it is “usually strong proof.”
Id. At the same time, failure to sign a written waiver is not dispositive, either. In
State v. Davis, the defendant read the written Miranda waiver aloud and refused
to sign it, but the defendant then talked to the police anyway and ultimately
signed a statement. 304 N.W.2d 432, 433 (Iowa 1981). We held the defendant’s
statement admissible. Id. at 436. As we put it, “[W]e must examine this
defendant’s words and actions, after he was informed of his Miranda rights, to
determine if in fact a waiver occurred.” Id. at 435. “[W]aivers can be established
even absent formal or express statements of waiver that would be expected in,
say, a judicial hearing to determine if a guilty plea has been properly entered.”
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 383 (2010).
The district court found that Park had not knowingly and intelligently
waived her rights. The court of appeals concluded otherwise. On our review, we
agree with the court of appeals. Although Park gave one “I’m not so sure” answer
when asked if she understood her rights, the record indicates she understood
them. About thirty minutes into the interview, when she was asked to draw a
diagram showing how she found Nam before she called 911, Park interjected that
maybe she should “wait for that lawyer.” Detective Morgan said that was up to
her, and she continued. Somewhat later, after Detective Morgan commented that
“[w]e just want to know what happened,” Park reminded him that “[y]ou said I
have a right to remain silent.” Detective Morgan confirmed that she did have
29
such a right and, again, the interview continued. Once Park invoked her right to
counsel at around 2 a.m., the interview ended.4
We are not persuaded that Dr. Asay’s testimony has much relevance here.
She is not a psychologist.5 Her background is on family dynamics, not police
interrogation. Her dissertation was on “Family Strengths in Romania.” We are
not convinced Dr. Asay is an expert on South Korean attitudes toward police.
Even if she were qualified, we wonder about the value of generalizations that a
particular “culture” is “more likely to comply with requests from law
enforcement” and therefore courts should be more reluctant to find that a person
belonging to that culture has voluntarily and knowingly waived their Miranda
rights. Would we allow prosecutors to engage in these kinds of generalizations
on the other side? Clearly not.
As the court of appeals indicated, whether Park voluntarily waived her
Miranda rights is a closer question. “For a waiver to be made voluntarily, the
relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary, meaning it was the product
of the suspect’s free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception.” Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 251. Whether a waiver is voluntary does not
depend on “moral and psychological pressures to confess.” Oregon v. Elstad,
4Park argues that she invoked her rights to remain silent and to counsel earlier. We
believe the record belies these assertions. Park sought confirmation that she had these rights
and demonstrated her understanding of them; she did not invoke them. See State v. Hicks,
791 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Iowa 2010) (noting that United States Supreme Court precedent “requires
the suspect to make an unequivocal or unambiguous request for counsel to invoke his Sixth
Amendment right”).
5Dr. Asay did not offer a forensic opinion and testified she was not qualified to do so.
30
470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985). Rather, “voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has
always depended on the absence of police overreaching.” Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986). “ ‘[V]oluntariness’ for . . . due process purposes and
Miranda purposes are identical.” Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 559. “The ultimate
test is whether, under the totality of circumstances, the statements were the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, made by the subject at a
time when that person’s will was not overborne or the capacity for
self-determination critically impaired.” State v. Bowers, 656 N.W.2d 349, 353
(Iowa 2002).
The court of appeals determined that Park’s waiver, while knowing and
intelligent, was not voluntary because the detectives “used trickery to get Park
to talk.” Yet in State v. Cooper, an assistant county attorney used the same
trickery, telling the defendant that he did not know the victim’s condition when
he in fact knew the victim had died. 217 N.W.2d 589, 597 (Iowa 1974). We
nonetheless decided that the defendant’s confession was admissible. Id. We
noted that the basic question was not whether the defendant had been tricked,
but whether he had been “tricked into waiver of his constitutional rights.” Id. at
595. Deception was only a factor to be considered in the totality of the
circumstances. Id. at 596–97.
Here, the court of appeals distinguished Cooper on the ground that “[t]he
detectives wove their false assertions about the condition of Park’s husband into
their reading of Park’s Miranda rights, and they repeatedly underscored the
urgency of speaking to them in order to facilitate his treatment.” This is a
31
significant point, but we ultimately believe it does not demonstrate that Park’s
statements on the night of February 15–16 were involuntary. While the detectives
used deception about Nam’s condition, they used no deception about exactly
what they were looking for: information on how Nam ended up with ligature
marks on his wrist and neck.
Crucially, we disagree with the court of appeals that the detectives’ trickery
“g[ot] Park to talk.” Park was willing to talk about how Nam ended up bound and
tied to a chair from the get-go. Her answers in that regard didn’t change until
midday February 16, when she returned for the third interview, well after she
knew that Nam had died. “[A] Miranda waiver is involuntary only when it is
shown to be the product of police misconduct or overreaching.” Tyler, 867 N.W.2d
at 174 (emphasis added) (quoting Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 559). “The
relinquishment of the right must be voluntary, that is it was not given as a result
of intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 559(emphasis added).
The detectives’ deception may have been distasteful, but it didn’t cause
Park’s waiver of her Miranda rights. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 422–23 (“Once it is
determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced,
that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he
was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction,
the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.”).
Likewise, the officers’ reassurances didn’t bend Park either. Park stuck to
her story during the night of February 15–16 even as the detectives told her they
32
were there to “help” her; that people would understand her taking matters into
her own hands if she was getting abused; that accidents happen; that if Nam got
hurt, and she didn’t mean for him to get hurt, that’s fine; and that she was “safe”
at the police station.
We also do not find the questioning of Park to be overbearing given her
physical and emotional state. It is true that Park was kept at the police station
until the early morning hours of February 16. Overall, she was subjected to
about three and a half hours of questioning. She became extremely distraught
and cried uncontrollably and repeatedly upon being told of Nam’s death around
10:15 p.m., but she recovered and continued to answer questions. She was given
water and there were breaks in the questioning.
On our de novo review, we conclude that Park knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived her Miranda rights at the West Des Moines police station on
the evening of February 15–16.
C. Did the Detectives Make Impermissible Promises of Leniency
During the Interview at the Police Station on February 15–16? Our court’s
approach toward deceptive promises of leniency is generally stricter than its
approach toward deception. With promises of leniency, we apply a “per se
exclusionary rule”; with other forms of deception, we examine the totality of the
circumstances as part of the voluntariness inquiry. State v. Madsen, 813 N.W.2d
714, 724–26 (Iowa 2012). Federal courts, by contrast, apply the same totality-of-
the-circumstances test in both instances. See id. at 724. Thus, our court, instead
of considering whether the promise of leniency induced the confession, looks at
33
whether the language itself would be “likely” to cause a false confession. Hillery,
956 N.W.2d at 499; State v. Howard, 825 N.W.2d 32, 40 (Iowa 2012). We ask,
“Will the statements by the interrogating officer likely cause the subject to make
a false confession?” State v. Mullin, 85 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Iowa 1957). Otherwise
stated, is the promise such as would create a “fair risk of a false confession”?
Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at 725 (quoting Mullin, 85 N.W.2d at 601).
Despite repeated attempts by the State to get us to abandon this common
law evidentiary test, we have adhered to it. See Hillery, 956 N.W.2d at 499;
Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at 724–26; State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 27 (Iowa 2005).
We therefore apply it here.
We found improper promissory leniency in State v. Madsen. 813 N.W.2d at
722. There, a detective—while questioning the defendant about sexual
misconduct with certain boys—indicated through his questioning that the matter
would “go away,” “be done with,” and not be in the local newspaper if he “[came]
clean on everything.” Id. at 718–19. About twenty minutes after the comment
about appearing in the local newspaper, the defendant admitted to additional
acts of sexual misconduct with the boys who would visit his apartment. Id. at
719. Applying the evidentiary rule, we found that the detective’s statements
implicitly conveyed the message that the defendant could avoid public charges
against him by confessing. Id. at 722. Accordingly, we found that the statements
made after the promises of leniency should have been suppressed had the
defendant’s counsel properly raised the issue before trial. Id. at 727.
34
In State v. Howard, we also found a detective’s line of questioning crossed
the line into an improper promise of leniency. 825 N.W.2d at 34. The defendant
there was suspected of sexually abusing his toddler son. Id. at 35. In the interview,
the defendant initially reported that he did not know what caused the child’s
injuries, but he suspected it was caused by a hard stool. Id. As the interview
continued, the detective discussed the proper punishment for someone who
abuses a child. Id. at 36. The detective first got the defendant to say, hypothetically,
someone who was sick and sexually abused a small child because they couldn’t
control themselves should be hospitalized until they complete treatment. Id. He
then asked the defendant, “How do we get the help, get you the help you need?”
Id. Although the defendant continued to deny that he had abused the child, as the
interview proceeded, the detective repeatedly referred to the “help” available for
people who sexually abuse children. Id. at 36–37. The detective said that there
were doctors and nurses who can help treat people with this sickness and that
people go to a treatment center “like people go to treatment centers for drug
addictions.” Id. at 37. He asked the defendant about his future, and “how do we
get from here to there?” Id. The detective then promised,
You know that no matter what you tell me today, I’ll give you a ride
home, drop you off, wherever you want to go as long as we can
promise that [the child’s mother] and [the child] can [be] safe . . .
and you’re not going to contact them until we know that [they] are
going to be safe and you get the help you need, okay. I’ll give you a
ride wherever you want to go, okay? . . . So what happened?
Id. at 38 (third alteration and first omission in original). The defendant thereupon
confessed to sexual abuse. Id. Soon after, the defendant was charged with
35
second-degree sexual abuse and child endangerment causing bodily injury. Id.On our review, we held that the defendant’s confession was inadmissible. Id. at
41.
Also, in State v. Polk, we held that the police officer had crossed the line.
812 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Iowa 2012). There, after the jailed defendant had refused
to answer further questions and asked to go back to his pod, the officer told the
defendant that “if somebody cooperates with us, on down the road the county
attorney is more likely to work with them.” Id. at 675. The officer reinforced this
message repeatedly and then added the message that the defendant would get
to spend more time with his children if he confessed. Id. at 675–76. The
defendant then admitted he had taken his gun to the scene and fired it at the
defendant. Id. at 676. We held this promise of reduced time in return for a
confession rendered the confession inadmissible. Id.Park analogizes her case to cases like these. We see a difference, though.
In Madsen, Howard, and Polk, the officers misled the defendants as to the future
disposition of their cases in a specific, concrete way: promising either no
incarceration, treatment in lieu of incarceration, or reduced incarceration. We
think it is appropriate to zero in on the actual statements alleged to be promises
of leniency.6
6The district court acknowledged,
This is not a case where the police interrogators made an express promise
of leniency. At no time did the police specifically tell Park that she would receive
some preferential treatment if she talked to them. The officers did not specify any
advantage to be gained from making a confession.
36
Detective Morgan told Park that if she was abused, “It’s not your fault, you
know, you didn’t deserve for him to treat you that way.” That is a true statement.
It is not the victim’s fault when they are abused by a domestic partner.
Detective Hatcher told Park that she was “safe” with them at the police
station. That is also a true statement.
Detective Morgan told Park that if a woman is abused and does something
to make it stop “people get that . . . [;] [t]hey understand.” At the level of
generality at which it was made, this statement is true. It does not imply a
specific legal outcome. In any event, in a recent case, the State conceded that
evidence of battered woman’s syndrome (BWS) would likely have been admissible
at a criminal trial where the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for
shooting her domestic partner. Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 752 (Iowa 2019).
In that same case, we noted, “Every jurisdiction accepts expert BWS testimony
to support claims of self-defense.” Id. at 748. So jurors potentially would consider
Nam’s prior physical abuse of Park at trial, if such abuse occurred.
Detective Morgan added that if he “was getting treated like that [i.e.,
physically abused], [he] would do something, too.” But he didn’t say that he
would kill his partner or that the killing would go without legal consequence.
Detective Morgan also repeatedly asked Park if it was an “accident.” He
said the officers needed to know if she tied up Nam and if something happened
“accidentally” to cause his death. In context, we do not see any promise of
leniency even if it was an accident. The inquiry strikes us as a legitimate one.
Park had not given any explanation for Nam’s strangulation on the night of
37
February 15–16 other than the improbable story that he had tied himself up.
Maybe it was an accident.
Lastly, Detective Hatcher told Park several times that the officers were
there to “help” Park. That statement was probably not true. The detectives were
not there to help Park, any more than the detectives were truly interested in
wishing Park a happy birthday three days later. But such a general statement
falls far short of a promise of leniency that might extract a false confession.
Thus, we conclude the statements made by the detectives were not likely to
cause a false confession and did not cross the line into improper promissory
leniency. Under the common law evidentiary test, when “there is no dispute as to
the words used” or their meaning under circumstances, the court determines the
issue as a matter of law. Polk, 812 N.W.2d at 674 (quoting Mullin, 85 N.W.2d at
601). Here the statements in question were captured on video, which allows us to
review both what was said and the context. Because the State has shown that
Park knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights, and
because the detectives’ statements did not amount to improper promissory
leniency, we hold that the February 15–16 interview should not have been
suppressed.
D. Should the February 16, 18, and 19 Interviews Be Suppressed as
Tainted by the February 15–16 Interview at the Police Station? The district
court and the court of appeals both concluded that the taint from the improper
interrogation on February 15–16 required the subsequent interviews to be
suppressed. See State v. Kase, 344 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1984). Because we do
38
not find that the February 15–16 interview should be suppressed, and because
no independent objection was raised to those interviews, we reverse this
determination.
***
We have discussed the details of Park’s interviews, but we also think it is
appropriate to add some observations on the big picture. Park comes across on the
videos as an intelligent person who, although clearly distraught, realized that she
might be in legal jeopardy and who sought to control the narrative from the time
she called 911. Two of her five interviews, in fact, took place after Park showed up
at the police station on her own and unannounced. The detectives may have been
deceptive as to how they felt about Park, but they were quite open with Park that
aspects of her story didn’t make sense to them. Meanwhile, Park’s explanations
seemed to evolve, not in response to what the detectives told her, but as Park
became increasingly aware that law enforcement would be able to obtain
potentially incriminating evidence from her cell phone. Unlike the district court
and the court of appeals, we find no legal thresholds were crossed here. In the end,
our reaction is that the police’s questioning was prolonged and somewhat
improvised given the odd circumstances of Nam’s death, but that it was not
unduly overpowering or impermissibly misleading.
V. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals.
We reverse the district court judgment suppressing Park’s statements, and we
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
39
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Waterman and May, JJ., who take no part.