Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Edward F. Noyes

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–0499
Filed December 13, 2019
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Appellee,
vs.
EDWARD F. NOYES,
Appellant.
On appeal from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance
Commission.
In attorney disciplinary action, grievance commission recommends
suspension for multiple violations of ethical rules. LICENSE
SUSPENDED.
Edward F. Noyes, Fairfield, pro se.
Tara van Brederode and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for appellee.
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McDONALD, Justice.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a
complaint against attorney Edward F. Noyes after an audit of his client
trust account (CTA) revealed potential violations of the Iowa Rules of
Professional Conduct. A division of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance
Commission found Noyes violated the rules in four respects and
recommended this court suspend Noyes’s license to practice law in this
state for sixty days. We find and conclude Noyes violated the Iowa Rules
of Professional Conduct, but we disagree with the commission’s
recommended suspension. We suspend Noyes’s license to practice law in
Iowa for thirty days from the filing date of this opinion.
I.
“We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Mathahs, 918 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Iowa
2018). “The Board must prove ethical violations by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. A convincing preponderance of the
evidence lies between the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in a
civil case and the reasonable-doubt standard in a criminal case. Id. “We
may impose a greater or lesser sanction than what the commission has
recommended upon proof of an ethical violation.” Id.
II.
By way of background, Noyes obtained his license to practice law in
Iowa in 1985. Since obtaining his license, Noyes has been publicly
reprimanded on four separate occasions (1998, 2012, 2014, and 2016) for
violations of the rules of professional conduct. The 2014 public reprimand
arose out of Noyes’s failure to provide a client with a contemporaneous
written accounting of services performed in violation of Iowa Court Rule
45.7(4). See Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(4) (stating a lawyer must promptly provide a
3
client a full written accounting upon withdrawal of a fee or expense). The
2016 public reprimand arose out of Noyes’s failure to adequately supervise
a nonlawyer intern in violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct
32:5.3. Like his most recent reprimands, this disciplinary proceeding also
involves Noyes’s failure to manage his CTA and supervise a nonlawyer
employee.
In September 2015, an auditor for the Iowa Supreme Court Client
Security Commission audited Noyes’s CTA. The audit showed client funds
in the CTA were $12,898.03 lower than they should have been. The causes
of the deficiency were threefold. First, four clients had negative trust
account balances in the total amount of $4162.70. Client Patrick
Gunderson had a negative balance of $3000 since July 9, 2015.
Gunderson’s negative balance resulted from a series of advances Noyes
made to Gunderson. Client Craig Howard had a negative trust account
balance of $1102 since September 19, 2014. The negative balance in
Howard’s account resulted from Noyes over disbursing $1102 from the
account. Noyes billed Howard for the amount of the over disbursement,
but Howard did not pay the bill. Client Steve Knipfer had a negative
balance of $55.35 since December 8, 2014. Client Emilee Steinbach had
a negative balance of $5.35 since February 5, 2014. The last two negative
client account balances were the results of improperly accounted for
checks. Second, Noyes had not reimbursed the CTA for bank fees he paid
when he received client funds by credit card payment. The accumulated
credit card fees totaled $4900.88. Third, Noyes could not identify the
clients associated with several CTA disbursements in the total amount of
$3834.49.
Within five days of the audit results, Noyes reimbursed the CTA with
earned fees that were still in the CTA. No clients suffered personal loss.
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At the time of the audit, Noyes’s firm used QuickBooks accounting
software. Noyes admitted he was “personally responsible for the balancing
of the trust account.” He admitted that he had “no experience in
QuickBooks software and relied upon [his] office manager” and a
consultant. The office manager was Pam Breeding. She was responsible
for the firm’s accounting. The consultant was Paul Saipher. Saipher was
an accountant and Certified Advanced QuickBooks ProAdvisor. Noyes
hired Saipher to provide support with the installation of the software and
to provide ongoing tech support, training, and consulting. Noyes paid
Saipher approximately $7000 per year in consulting fees.
After the audit, Breeding revealed she did not fully understand how
to use QuickBooks but had been afraid to tell anyone at the firm about her
struggles with the program. Breeding admitted that several of the
problems discovered in the audit were a result of her accounting mistakes
and that she had not been properly conducting the monthly
reconciliations. Breeding reported, “Other than working with Paul
[Saipher] I had no training in QuickBooks or accounting and [became]
confused easily when errors were made.” Noyes does not deny that
Breeding may have stated this to the auditor.
The Board filed the instant complaint against Noyes. The Board
alleged Noyes provided financial assistance to a client, in violation of rule
32:1.8(e); commingled CTA and business funds and failed to keep proper
records of client funds, in violation of rule 32:1.15(a); failed to follow Iowa
Court Rules, chapter 45, in violation of rule 32:1.15(f); and failed to
properly supervise staff, in violation of rule 32:5.3. The commission found
the Board had proved the violations by a convincing preponderance of the
evidence.
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The commission recommended that Noyes’s license be suspended
for sixty days. Aggravating factors included Noyes’s thirty-plus years of
experience practicing law, his four previous public reprimands, and the
similarity between the prior violations that resulted in public reprimands
and the violations in this case. Mitigating factors included Noyes’s
cooperation during the disciplinary process, his willingness to adjust his
accounting processes to prevent future mishandling of client funds, and
the lack of client harm.
III.
This matter was submitted to the commission on a stipulated
record. See id. r. 36.16(1). The stipulation to facts “binds the parties, the
grievance commission, and the supreme court.” Id. r. 36.16(2). We
“interpret the stipulation of facts with reference to its subject matter and
in light of the surrounding circumstances and the whole record, including
the state of the pleadings, issues involved, and any additional evidence
elicited at a limited hearing.” Id. The parties did not stipulate to the
violations or sanctions, but even if they had, “[a] stipulation as to violations
or sanctions is not binding on the grievance commission or the supreme
court.” Id. r. 36.16(3); see Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Lubinus, 869 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Iowa 2015) (“Stipulations of fact are
controlling, but stipulations as to violations and appropriate sanctions do
not bind us.”). Based on the stipulated record, we make the following
findings and conclusions.
A.
We find Noyes violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.8(e)
when he advanced $3750 in funds to client Gunderson. The rule provides,
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in
connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except
that:
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(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of
litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the
outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay
court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
Noyes represented Gunderson in a workers’ compensation dispute.
On February 16, 2015, the parties mediated the dispute and reached a
settlement agreement, which Gunderson accepted on February 18. On
March 9, Noyes advanced $500 from the firm’s business account to
Gunderson. On March 19, Noyes advanced $500 from the CTA to
Gunderson. On April 7, the workers’ compensation commissioner filed an
order approving the settlement agreement. On April 23, Noyes advanced
$250 from the firm account to Gunderson, and on April 25, Noyes
advanced $2500 from the CTA to Gunderson. On May 7, Noyes deposited
the net settlement funds, $93,405.33, to the CTA.
Noyes does not dispute he provided financial assistance to
Gunderson. He does contend the financial assistance was not in violation
of rule 32:1.8(e) because there was no litigation pending at the time of the
advances. Specifically, Noyes contends the workers’ compensation matter
was settled on February 18 when the parties reached a settlement
agreement. We disagree. Noyes may be correct that the parties to the
workers’ compensation proceeding entered into an enforceable settlement
agreement on February 18. See Dillon v. City of Davenport, 366 N.W.2d
918, 926 (Iowa 1985) (holding in a workers’ compensation case that “an
oral agreement of settlement that is to be reduced to writing is enforceable
if the terms are settled”). But that fact is of no consequence. Although
the litigation may have been settled, the matter was still pending. The
lawyers involved in the case had to reduce the agreement to writing,
present the agreement to the workers’ compensation commissioner for
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approval, see Iowa Code § 85.35(1) (2015), and disburse the settlement
proceeds. We have previously noted that “the resolution of a client’s
pending lawsuit” includes “the administration of settlement funds.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wengert, 790 N.W.2d 94, 100 (Iowa
2010). Here, the disbursement of the settlement proceeds did not occur
until after Noyes advanced funds to Gunderson.
Noyes also contends he did not commit an ethical violation because
he did not violate the spirit of rule 32:1.8(e). He relies on comment 10 to
the rule:
Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative
proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including
making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living
expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue
lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because
such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the
litigation.
Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.8(e) cmt. [10]. Noyes argues his intent here
was not to encourage litigation but to provide support to his client until
the settlement proceeds were distributed.
We disagree that Noyes’s charitable intent excuses his
noncompliance with rule 32:1.8(e). The rule prohibits financial assistance
to a client except in two limited circumstances not applicable here. See
id. r. 32:1.8(e)(1)–(2). Providing financial assistance to a client outside the
purview of these two narrow exceptions, even for charitable reasons,
violates the rule. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Shinkle, 698 N.W.2d 316, 322, 325 (Iowa 2005) (issuing a public
reprimand where attorney advanced funds to be used by the client for
living expenses); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Humphreys, 524
N.W.2d 396, 398 (Iowa 1994) (holding that a client’s serious financial
needs do not affect whether an advance is a violation); Comm. on Prof’l
8
Ethics & Conduct v. Harris, 524 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Iowa 1994)
(“[M]isconduct cannot be justified on the mere basis of lack of personal
gain.”); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Bitter, 279 N.W.2d 521, 523
(Iowa 1979) (stating there is no exception “for charitable and humanitarian
reasons” even if a client is “in extremely dire financial need”).
We thus find and conclude a convincing preponderance of the
evidence shows Noyes violated rule 32:1.8(e).
B.
We find Noyes violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a)
and (f) when he comingled CTA funds and business account funds and
failed to keep adequate account records.
Rule 32:1.15(a) states,
A lawyer shall hold property of clients . . . in connection with
a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property.
Funds shall be kept in a separate account. . . . Complete
records of such account funds . . . shall be kept by the lawyer
and shall be preserved for a period of six years after
termination of the representation.
Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(a). The rule requires lawyers handle client
funds with the level of care “required of a professional fiduciary.” Id.
r. 32:1.15 cmt. [1]. Pursuant to the rule, a lawyer may not comingle client
funds with business funds. See, e.g., id. r. 32:1.15 cmt. [2] (stating
“normally it is impermissible to commingle the lawyer’s own funds with
client funds”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 799
N.W.2d 524, 532 (Iowa 2011) (stating the rule prohibits comingling).
Furthermore, “[a] lawyer should maintain on a current basis books and
records in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice and
comply with any recordkeeping rules established by law or court order.”
Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15 cmt. [1].
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Rule 32:1.15(f) states that “[a]ll client trust accounts shall be
governed by chapter 45 of the Iowa Court Rules.” Id. r. 32:1.15(f). Chapter
45 “directs an attorney on how to properly maintain a client trust account.”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cross, 861 N.W.2d 211, 218
(Iowa 2015); see Iowa Ct. R. 45.1. As relevant here, rule 45.2(3) provides,
a. A lawyer who practices in this jurisdiction must
maintain current financial records as provided in these rules
and required by Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15
and must retain the following records for a period of six years
after termination of the representation:
(1) Receipt and disbursement journals containing a
record of deposits to and withdrawals from client trust
accounts, specifically identifying the date, source, and
description of each item deposited, as well as the date, payee,
and purpose of each disbursement.
(2) Ledger records for all client trust accounts showing,
for each separate trust client or beneficiary, the source of all
funds deposited, the names of all persons for whom the funds
are or were held, the amount of such funds, the descriptions
and amounts of charges or withdrawals, and the names of all
persons or entities to whom such funds were disbursed.
....
(6) Copies of records showing disbursements on behalf
of clients.
....
[b.](2) Receipts must be deposited intact and records of
deposit should be sufficiently detailed to identify each item.
Iowa Ct. R. 45.2(3). The rule “dictates that financial records including
ledger records, bank statements, check registers, copies of monthly trial
balances, and monthly reconciliations of the client trust accounts, must
be maintained by an attorney.” Cross, 861 N.W.2d at 218.
Noyes violated rule 32:1.15(a) when he commingled business
account funds with CTA funds. In handling Gunderson’s workers’
compensation matter, Noyes advanced money to Gunderson out of the CTA
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and Noyes’s business account and then transferred money between the
accounts to try and reconcile them. The audit also showed Noyes failed to
transfer earned fees from his CTA into the firm’s business account.
Earned fees are personal funds. Depositing earned fees into the CTA or
allowing earned fees to remain in the CTA, as is the case here, are in
violation of the rule. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Smith,
885 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Iowa 2016) (“Some funds are inappropriate for
deposit in a trust account, even if they are related to a lawyer’s practice.
For example, Smith deposited earned fees from court-appointed work—
which she had earned by the time the state paid them and which were
therefore personal funds—into the trust account.”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd.
of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sunleaf, 588 N.W.2d 126, 126–27 (Iowa 1999)
(concluding an attorney violated the precursor to rule 32:1.15(b) when he
“used his trust account for the deposit of earned fees”); Humphreys, 524
N.W.2d at 398 (“We have held that commingling of clients’ funds is an
absolute offense, one that does not lend itself to the defense that the
lawyer’s employees were responsible.”).
In addition, a convincing preponderance of the evidence shows
Noyes failed to keep complete records for the CTA. As discussed above,
the audit showed several client accounts with negative balances. The
audit also showed $3834.49 in disbursements from the CTA for which
Noyes could not account and for which Noyes had no records.
Noyes largely concedes he failed to maintain his CTA and records of
his CTA in accord with the rules, but he argues he should not be held
responsible for office manager Breeding’s accounting errors. See Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d 466, 481 (Iowa
2014) (“[A]n attorney does not violate . . . rule [32:5.3] when a nonlawyer
makes a mistake that is not a direct consequence of the attorney’s
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inattentive supervision or instruction.”); Dunahoo, 799 N.W.2d at 534 (“It
seems plausible the subordinate simply made a mistake that was not a
direct consequence of inattentive instruction or supervision by
Dunahoo.”). We disagree. Noyes is responsible for Breeding’s conduct
under Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:5.3(c)(2). The rule provides “a
lawyer shall be responsible for conduct” of a nonlawyer when “the lawyer
is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm” and
“knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or
mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.” Iowa R. Prof’l
Conduct 32:5.3(c)(2).
Here, Noyes admitted he had managerial authority in the law firm
and had direct supervisory authority over Breeding. While Noyes did hire
Saipher to provide consulting services to the firm, Noyes cannot delegate
management and supervision responsibilities to a third person and then
wash his hands of any rule violations. Instead, Noyes was obligated to
ensure the services provided were in accord with Noyes’s ethical
obligations. See id. cmt. [3] (“When using such services outside the firm,
a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the services are
provided in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer’s ethical
obligations.”).
As the managing partner in his firm, Noyes failed to take reasonable
remedial action despite these accounting issues. Noyes stated he did not
understand his own accounting system. Nonetheless, he placed in charge
a person who admitted she had no accounting training or specific training
in QuickBooks. Noyes hired Saipher to assist with training Breeding.
However, Noyes did not conduct sufficient inquiry to ensure the training
was effective and Breeding was performing adequately in the position. The
audit showed she was not. Breeding made errors related to reconciling
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accounts, processing credit card fees, accounting for refused checks,
maintaining separate accounts, and keeping account records. The
deficiencies in the CTA were readily discoverable. The audit showed there
were longstanding overdrawn CTAs at the time of the audit. One of the
accounts had been overdrawn since February 2014 and three of the
accounts had been overdrawn since December 2014. If Noyes had
conducted even a cursory review of the accounts following monthly
reconciliation, see Iowa Ct. R. 45.2(3)(a)(9), he should have had notice
there were deficiencies and failures in his firm’s accounting practices. An
attorney does not escape his or her ethical duties “by entrusting the trust
account’s management to an unqualified person.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd.
of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Herrera, 560 N.W.2d 592, 594 (Iowa 1997).
Blaming an office manager for trust account violations is “view[ed]
with unbounded skepticism, and never with admiration.” Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Postma, 430 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Iowa 1988). “[W]e have
a strong negative reaction to a lawyer’s attempt to blame professional
shortcomings on an employee.” Herrera, 560 N.W.2d at 595. “Nothing
commands our attention more quickly than when a lawyer mishandles a
client’s money. Our cases are clear that an attorney who does so will not
be excused . . . by blaming the mishandling on an employee.” Id. at 593.
C.
Finally, we conclude Noyes violated Iowa Rule of Professional
Conduct 32:5.3(a). The rule provides a lawyer “shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyer.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:5.3(a). For the same
reasons set forth in the prior section, we find and conclude Noyes violated
this rule. He failed to put in place measures sufficient to ensure his CTAs
13
were managed in accord with the rules of professional conduct, and the
absence of such measures actually resulted in violations of the rules of
professional conduct.
IV.
Having concluded the Board proved Noyes violated the rules of
professional conduct, we now turn to the question of sanctions.
We apply no standard sanction for any particular type
of misconduct. Though we look to prior cases for guidance,
we fashion sanctions based on the specific circumstances of
each case.
In determining the appropriate discipline, we
consider the nature of the alleged violations, the
need for deterrence, protection of the public,
maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a
whole, and the respondent’s fitness to continue in
the practice of law, as well as any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 831 N.W.2d 194, 200–01
(Iowa 2013) (citations omitted) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Cannon, 821 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Iowa 2012)). “Our primary purpose
for imposing sanctions is not to punish the lawyer but to protect the
public.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d
528, 542 (Iowa 2013). While caselaw guides our decision, “no two attorney
disciplinary cases are identical.” Lubinus, 869 N.W.2d at 553. We use our
caselaw to calibrate the appropriate sanction in light of the relevant
mitigating and aggravating factors. See id. at 550.
When an attorney advances funds to a client in violation of rule
32:1.8(e), the typical sanction is a public reprimand. See Shinkle, 698
N.W.2d. at 324–25 (stating advancing funds to a client is not a serious
infraction and ordering a public reprimand).
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Violations of rule 32:1.15(a) and (f) are generally subject to a wider
range of sanctions, depending on the circumstances of the case.
Sanctions for trust account and accounting violations span
from “a public reprimand when the attorney, in an isolated
instance, failed to deposit funds into his trust account
because he believed the fees to be earned” to “suspensions of
several months where the violations were compounded by
severe neglect, misrepresentation, or failure to cooperate.” In
cases warranting more serious discipline, additional
violations or aggravating circumstances were present.
Cross, 861 N.W.2d at 225 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 442 (Iowa 2012)).
In Herrera, the attorney received a public reprimand for
commingling funds and failing to keep proper trust account records. 560
N.W.2d at 595. The mitigating factors were the attorney’s cooperation
during the disciplinary process and the changes he made to his
bookkeeping system to prevent future violations. Id. (“Herrera’s honesty,
his forthright responses, and his move to correct his operation all weigh in
his favor.”). While we did not give it strong consideration, we noted an
additional mitigating factor was the attorney did not convert any client
funds for his own use. See id. (“He converted no client’s money to his
personal use. But this is scarcely a ground for leniency because such a
conversion would invite almost sure license revocation.”). But see Harris,
524 N.W.2d at 181 (giving stronger consideration to a lack of personal gain,
stating that while “misconduct cannot be justified on the mere basis of
lack of personal gain[,] . . . this fact mitigates in favor of a lighter sanction”
(citation omitted)).
In Lubinus, we ordered a thirty-day suspension for an attorney who
violated rule 32:1.15 by failing to reimburse his CTA and withdrawing
unearned funds from his CTA. 869 N.W.2d at 553–54. Mitigating factors
were the attorney’s cooperation throughout the disciplinary process, the
15
lack of harm to his clients, his “proactive corrective measures” to prevent
future violations, and his lack of experience being a solo practitioner. Id.
at 552–53. Aggravating factors were the attorney “committed more than a
single, isolated trust account violation” and that his accounting errors
were intentional. Id. at 554.
In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Morris, we
suspended an attorney’s license for six months. 847 N.W.2d 428, 437
(Iowa 2014). In Morris, the attorney’s trust account mismanagement was
severe and persistent over time. Id. at 436. Several aggravating factors
supported a longer suspension. Specifically, the attorney’s dishonesty on
his client security questionnaire, the pervasiveness of the violations, the
attorney’s significant experience practicing law, and three prior
suspensions. Id. at 436–37.
In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Kersenbrock,
we approved a thirty-day suspension of a lawyer’s license for pervasive
trust account violations. 821 N.W.2d 415, 422 (Iowa 2012). The attorney
in that case failed to deposit client retainers into a trust account, kept
inadequate trust account records, and misrepresented her trust account
practices on her client security questionnaire. Id. at 419–21. Mitigating
factors in that case militated against a longer suspension. Specifically, we
noted no clients were harmed, the attorney acknowledged the deficiencies
in her accounting practices, and she undertook efforts to address those
deficiencies. Id. at 422.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude Noyes’s license should be
suspended for thirty days. There are several aggravating circumstances
in this case. Noyes has been publicly reprimanded on four prior occasions.
His two most recent violations relate to violations in this case. See Marks,
831 N.W.2d at 201 (“Significant distinguishing factors in the imposition of
16
punishment center on the existence of multiple instances of neglect, past
disciplinary problems, and other companion violations.” (quoting Cannon,
821 N.W.2d at 880)). Additionally, Noyes is a seasoned attorney with over
thirty years of experience. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Jacobsma, 920 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Iowa 2018) (“Years of experience as an
attorney can be considered an aggravating factor.”).
Militating against a longer suspension are several mitigating factors.
Noyes was cooperative throughout the disciplinary process. As shown in
Herrera and Lubinus, while cooperation is expected, honesty and
responsiveness may be considered. See Lubinus, 869 N.W.2d at 553;
Herrera, 560 N.W.2d at 595. Second, no client suffered economic harm by
Noyes’s violations. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 467 (Iowa 2014) (citing lack of harm to the
client as a mitigating circumstance). Third, Noyes proactively changed his
bookkeeping system after the audit, which included hiring a new
bookkeeping employee and changing his accounting software. See Nelson,
838 N.W.2d at 543 (“[C]orrective measures, including improving billing
and accounting practices, investing in new technology, and employing
additional administrative help are mitigating factors.”). Finally, Noyes’s
misconduct was not motivated by personal gain.
We suspend Edward Noyes’s license to practice law for thirty days.
This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct.
R. 34.23(3). Noyes must comply with the notification requirements of rule
34.24. See id. r. 34.24. The costs of this proceeding are assessed against
Noyes pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 36.24(1). Unless the Board files an
objection, Noyes’s license will be automatically reinstated after the thirty-
day period of suspension on the condition that all costs have been paid.
See id. r. 34.23(2).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.