State of Iowa v. Iowa District Court for Scott County

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 15–1255
Filed January 20, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SCOTT COUNTY,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
Christine Dalton, Judge.
The State seeks certiorari review of the denial of an order requiring
restitution of law enforcement response costs following the defendant’s
conviction for operating while intoxicated. WRIT ANNULLED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Trout, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael Walton, County Attorney, and Steve Berger,
Assistant County Attorney, for plaintiff.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant.
2
MANSFIELD, Justice.
This case requires us to interpret a special restitution law that
applies to operating while intoxicated (OWI) cases. This law provides that
the court “may order restitution paid to any public agency for the costs of
the emergency response resulting from the actions constituting a
violation of [the OWI statute].” Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(b) (2014). Here,
an officer on regular nighttime patrol stopped the defendant’s vehicle
after observing she was driving erratically and had run a red light. The
driver was arrested for and ultimately convicted of OWI, second offense.
See id. § 321J.2(1)(a), (2)(b). The State sought $54.50 in restitution for
the costs of this traffic stop and subsequent processing at the police
station. The district court denied the request, ruling “there was no
emergency in this case.”
On our review, we agree with the district court. The legislature has
defined “emergency response” as “any incident requiring response by fire
fighting, law enforcement, ambulance, medical, or other emergency
services.” Id. § 321J.2(13)(b). Contrary to the State, we do not read this
definition as authorizing recovery of the costs of any law enforcement
response, but only a response to something that meets the normal
definition of an emergency. Routine law enforcement activities do not
qualify. Therefore, we annul the writ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
According to the minutes of testimony, Davenport Police Officer
Jennifer Brewer was on overnight patrol in the early morning hours of
November 1, 2014. She observed a black Mercury Mountaineer speed up
and slow down several times as it drifted between lanes of traffic. Officer
Brewer then saw the vehicle slowly run a red light and almost collide
3
with another car. The officer activated the emergency lights on her
squad car and pulled over the vehicle.
Officer Brewer approached the vehicle to speak with its driver,
Esther Arriaga. The officer noticed Arriaga’s eyes were watery and
bloodshot and she was slurring her speech. Arriaga admitted she was
drunk and thanked Officer Brewer for stopping her vehicle. As Arriaga
exited the vehicle, Officer Brewer also detected the odor of an alcoholic
beverage coming from her. In addition, Arriaga was unsteady on her feet
and not wearing shoes.
Officer Brewer transported Arriaga to the Scott County Jail. There,
Arriaga failed both a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and a
preliminary breath test. After making several phone calls, Arriaga
refused to provide a breath sample for the chemical test. She was
arrested for OWI, second offense.
Arriaga later pled guilty to OWI second in violation of Iowa Code
section 321J.2(1)(a) and (2)(b). Before Arriaga’s sentencing, the State
submitted a form entitled “emergency response restitution” on behalf of
the Davenport Police Department pursuant to Iowa Code section
321J.2(13)(b). The form requested restitution for the costs of Officer
Brewer’s time and the time her squad car was in use during the traffic
stop, arrest, and processing of Arriaga at the jail. Arriaga resisted the
State’s request and disputed that Officer Brewer’s response was an
“emergency response” within the meaning of the statute. The court
scheduled a separate hearing on the State’s request for restitution.
At the restitution hearing, Officer Brewer testified that she initiated
the traffic stop on Arriaga’s vehicle at approximately 3:39 a.m. on
November 1. Brewer acknowledged Arriaga had not caused an accident,
but testified she made the stop “because [she] felt that [Arriaga] was
4
going to end up hurting someone.” Officer Brewer testified she had been
dispatched on another call prior to the stop, but ultimately ignored the
call in order to pull over Arriaga.
Officer Brewer explained that she left the jail approximately one
hour after the initial vehicle stop, having finished dealing with Arriaga.
Brewer then completed paperwork and reports related to the stop and
arrest. Brewer testified that her normal duties as a patrol officer
included initiating traffic stops, arresting individuals, and filling out
paperwork. The State’s restitution request on behalf of the city of
Davenport thus covered two-and-a-half hours of Officer Brewer’s time (at
an hourly rate of $19) and one hour for the use of the Brewer’s squad car
(at an hourly rate of $7) for a total of $54.50. 1
In a written ruling, the district court denied the State’s claim for
restitution. The court characterized the present case as “a typical OWI
traffic stop in every way. There was no accident necessitating extra
officers, fire or medic.” The court added that Officer Brewer “was not
responding to an emergency, she was investigating a crime.” The court
therefore concluded,
[T]he Iowa Legislature did not intend the routine arrest and
processing of a Defendant to be subject to an emergency
response restitution claim. If the legislature wanted to
include nonemergency routine traffic stop activity, it would
have said the cost of any response and not add the limiting
language of “emergency.” The legislature purposefully
defined “emergency response” broadly to capture the often
unique responses fire, medical, and law enforcement must
have to these incidents. Not every emergency involves an
accident, although that is typically the case. . . . The
broadness of the Iowa definition was merely a way to include
those weird, unique, case specific responses that happen
1The court also received testimony from a commander with the Davenport Police
Department supporting the department’s calculation of hourly rates for its officers and
squad cars.
5
even when there is no accident as a result of the violation. It
is over reaching to include the routine traffic stop,
investigation, and processing in the definition of “emergency
response.”
Thereafter, the State filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this
court. 2 See Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(1). We granted the petition.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
“We review rulings on questions of statutory interpretation for
correction of errors at law.” State v. Olutunde, 878 N.W.2d 264, 266
(Iowa 2016) (quoting In re R.D., 876 N.W.2d 786, 791 (Iowa 2016)). We
also review restitution orders for correction of errors at law. State v.
Hagen, 840 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2013). “In reviewing a restitution
order ‘we determine whether the court’s findings lack substantial
evidentiary support, or whether the court has not properly applied the
law.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 2001)).
III. Analysis.
A. The Statute at Issue. Iowa Code section 321J.2(13)(b)
provides,
The court may order restitution paid to any public agency for
the costs of the emergency response resulting from the
actions constituting a violation of this section, not exceeding
five hundred dollars per public agency for each such
response. For the purposes of this paragraph, “emergency
response” means any incident requiring response by fire
fighting, law enforcement, ambulance, medical, or other
emergency services. A public agency seeking such
restitution shall consult with the county attorney regarding
the expenses incurred by the public agency, and the county
attorney may include the expenses in the statement of
pecuniary damages pursuant to section 910.3.
2The State filed a single petition that encompassed three separate Scott County
OWI cases. In each case, the district court had denied the State’s request for
emergency response restitution based on a similar interpretation of section
321J.2(13)(b). We later divided the matter into three separate appeals. We are deciding
the other two appeals today by unpublished per curiam opinions.
6
Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(b) (2014). The dispute here can be summarized
quickly. The State contends that “emergency response” as used in this
subsection is a term of art that encompasses any required response by
law enforcement. Arriaga maintains that “emergency response” is limited
to situations where an especially urgent response was required, as
opposed to a routine traffic stop.
We have not previously interpreted section 321J.2(13)(b). It was
enacted by the legislature in 1997. See 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 177, § 5 (now
codified at Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(b)). 3
This statute was part of a large omnibus bill aimed at reforming
Iowa’s OWI laws. See 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 177. Many provisions
increased the punishments for OWI offenses. For example, the
legislation raised minimum fines for first-offense OWI, made revocation of
the offender’s driver’s license mandatory, and imposed automatic
referrals to treatment programs. See id. § 4 (now codified at Iowa Code
§ 321J.2(3)). The legislation also prohibited deferred judgments, deferred
sentencing, or suspended sentences in a variety of circumstances,
including for second-time offenders and those who refused to consent to
testing required by section 321J.6. See id. (now codified at Iowa Code
§ 321J.2(3)(b)(2)). In addition, the legislature increased the punishment
for the offense of vehicular homicide while intoxicated from a class “C”
felony to a class “B” felony. Id. § 26.
Prior to the 1997 legislation, an offender convicted of OWI was
required to pay victim restitution “in an amount not to exceed two
thousand dollars.” Iowa Code § 321J.2(8) (1997). However, the
3Nor have we interpreted section 462A.14, which is identically worded and
applies to violations for boating while intoxicated. See Iowa Code § 462A.14(9)(b)
(2014).
7
legislation removed this cap on victim restitution, instead requiring
unlimited victim restitution “[i]n addition to any fine or penalty imposed
under [chapter 321J].” 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 177, § 5 (now codified at Iowa
Code § 321J.2(13)(a)).
Meanwhile, the same legislation authorized restitution to public
agencies but capped it at “five hundred dollars per public agency for each
such response.” Id. § 5 (now codified at Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(b)).
While restitution to victims remained mandatory, restitution to public
agencies was entrusted to the discretion of the district court. See id.
(“The court may order restitution paid to any public agency . . . .”
(Emphasis added.)).
B. Interpreting the Statute. Our first step when interpreting a
statute is to determine whether it is ambiguous. See Iowa Ins. Inst. v.
Core Grp. of Iowa Ass’n for Justice, 867 N.W.2d 58, 71–72 (Iowa 2015).
“[W]here the language chosen by the legislature is unambiguous, we
enforce a statute as written.” Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 446
(Iowa 2016). On the other hand, “[a] statute is ambiguous if reasonable
minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of the statute.”
Iowa Ins. Inst., 867 N.W.2d at 72 (quoting Mall Real Estate, L.L.C. v. City
of Hamburg, 818 N.W.2d 190, 198 (Iowa 2012)). “[T]he determination of
whether a statute is ambiguous does not necessarily rest on a close
analysis of a handful of words or a phrase utilized by the legislature, but
involves consideration of the language in context.” Rhoades, 880 N.W.2d
at 446; see also Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 789
N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2010) (“Ambiguity may arise from specific
language used in a statute or when the provision at issue is considered
in the context of the entire statute or related statutes.” (quoting Midwest
Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2002))).
8
This case comes down to the meaning of “emergency response,” a
term that the legislature has defined for us. See Iowa Code
§ 321J.2(13)(b) (2014). It is a well-settled principle of statutory
interpretation that “[w]hen the legislature has defined words in a
statute—that is, when the legislature has opted to ‘act as its own
lexicographer’—those definitions bind us.” In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495,
500 (Iowa 2014) (quoting State v. Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Iowa
2010)); see Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Parr, 227 N.W.2d 486, 495
(Iowa 1975) (“It is . . . axiomatic the legislature may be its own
lexicographer.”). As a corollary to this principle, when a statute defines a
term, “the common law and dictionary definitions which may not
coincide with the legislative definition must yield to the language of the
legislature.” Sherwin-Williams, 789 N.W.2d at 425 (quoting Hornby v.
State, 559 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1997)).
Our task, one might say, is to determine which is the dog and
which is the tail. The legislature’s definition of emergency response
covers “any incident requiring response by fire fighting, law enforcement,
ambulance, medical, or other emergency services.” Iowa Code
§ 321J.2(13)(b) (emphasis added); see Roth v. Evangelical Lutheran Good
Samaritan Soc., 886 N.W.2d 601, 611 (Iowa 2016) (noting that the term
“any action for damages” in Iowa Code section 613.15 is broad). So one
possible interpretation of the statute, i.e., the one advanced by the State,
is that “law enforcement” services are per se included. In that event,
“other emergency services” would refer to other public services that are
not mentioned expressly in the list but that can be used in emergencies.
If the statute is so interpreted, “law enforcement” would be the dog and
“other emergency services” would be the tail.
9
However, an alternative interpretation is possible, namely, the one
put forward by Arriaga. Under this alternative, “law enforcement”
services would be reimbursable only if an actual emergency existed. In
other words, “emergency” would be the dog and “law enforcement” would
be the tail, because the former term would restrict the scope of the latter.
We think both interpretations are reasonable and, hence, the
statute is ambiguous. Therefore, we resort to our customary tools for
construing ambiguous statutes.
Two of our canons of construction are ejusdem generis and noscitur
a sociis. Usually, these two canons operate in the same direction. Here,
however, the State is relying on ejusdem generis whereas Arriaga is
relying on noscitur a sociis.
The State urges that the phrase “law enforcement” is clear and
specific and speaks for itself. According to the State, the catchall at the
end of the sentence—“other emergency services”—is general and should
be read in light of the entire list of preceding terms, including “law
enforcement.” See In re Estate of Sampson, 838 N.W.2d 663, 670 (Iowa
2013) (noting that “[u]nder the doctrine of ejusdem generis, general
words which follow specific words are tied to the meaning and purpose of
the specific words” (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Comprehensive
Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606
N.W.2d 376, 380 (Iowa 2000)).
Arriaga, on the other hand, maintains that “law enforcement”
should draw its meaning from the terms both before and after it. Thus,
in her view, it should be qualified and limited to emergency law
enforcement services, not routine patrol stops. See Mall Real Estate, 818
N.W.2d at 199 (recognizing the canon of noscitur a sociis, in which “the
10
meanings of particular words may be indicated or controlled by
associated words”).
In addition to these dueling canons, other principles of statutory
construction are potentially relevant. The object of a law matters. See
Iowa Code § 4.6(1) (providing that the court in determining legislative
intent may consider “[t]he object sought to be attained”). In this regard,
“[w]e . . . construe chapter 321J ‘liberally or reasonably’ to protect the
public by reducing ‘the hazard of prohibited operation of a motor vehicle
to a minimum.’ ” Bearinger v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 844 N.W.2d 104,
108 (Iowa 2014) (quoting State v. Comried, 693 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Iowa
2005)). We have long recognized that “[t]he main purpose of chapter
321J is to promote public safety by removing dangerous drivers from the
highways.” Id. at 107 (quoting State v. Vogel, 548 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Iowa
1996)); see also Iowa Code § 321J.23(2) (“The general assembly finds and
declares . . . [p]rompt intervention is needed to protect society, including
drivers, from death or serious long-term injury.”). A liberal construction
of Iowa Code section 321J.2(13)(b) might tend to support the State’s
position.
Yet we also have a rule of lenity in the criminal law. See State v.
Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Iowa 2015). We have said this applies to
criminal restitution. See Hagen, 840 N.W.2d at 146 (stating in a
restitution case while ultimately ruling against the defendant that “[w]e
adhere to the rule of lenity, which guides us to resolve ambiguous
criminal statutes in favor of the accused”).
Another rule of construction is that we look at statutes as a whole.
See Iowa Ins. Inst., 867 N.W.2d at 72 (“[W]e read statutes as a whole
rather than looking at words and phrases in isolation.”). Other parts of
Iowa Code section 321J.13(b) may give us clues as to the extent to which
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law enforcement costs are recoverable. In fact, under Iowa Code section
321J.2(13)(b), restitution cannot exceed $500 per agency and is at the
discretion of the court. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(b). This might imply
that the legislature intended the restitution to be used for extraordinary
expenses, such as would be incurred in a true emergency, rather than
the costs of typical law enforcement.
Practicality is also important. Generally, we try to interpret
statutes so they are reasonable and workable. Jacobs v. Iowa Dep’t of
Transp., 887 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Iowa 2016) (recognizing that we “interpret
our statutes . . . so they effectuate just and reasonable results, not
arbitrary ones”); see also Iowa Code § 4.4(3) (setting forth a presumption
that “[i]n enacting a statute . . . [a] just and reasonable result is
intended”); id. § 4.6(5) (providing that the court may consider “[t]he
consequences of a particular construction” of an ambiguous statute). If
the legislature had wanted law enforcement expense to be recoverable in
virtually every OWI case, it would have made more sense to fix a
standard restitution amount. It strikes us as inefficient to be regularly
litigating in district court amounts as small as or even smaller than
$54.50. 4 The value of the time devoted to the litigation can easily exceed
the sum for which recovery is sought. This consideration appears to
favor Arriaga.
As the foregoing shows, each side has presented plausible
arguments in favor of its construction of Iowa Code section 321J.2(13)(b).
Ultimately, though, we are swayed by the legislature’s use of the word
4The restitution came to $54.50 only because the Davenport Police Department
included Officer Brewer’s processing and paperwork time. Arriaga raises a separate
argument, which we do not address, that such time should not be recoverable even if
the department could get restitution for the roadside stop itself.
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“emergency” both in the term to be defined—i.e., “emergency response”—
and in the definition—i.e., “other emergency services.” This tells us that
“emergency” is the dog and “law enforcement” is the tail.
Because the general assembly has baked into the statute a
definition of “emergency response,” that definition would prevail even if it
varied from a traditional meaning of the term. However, the legislature
has also employed the phrase “other emergency services” within its own
definition. In our view, by putting the word “emergency” on both sides of
the equation, the legislature intended to make the point that all the
services in the list are covered only when they have been provided in an
emergency as commonly defined. To put it another way, if the
legislature’s definition of a term is partially circular, in that it repeats a
word to be defined within the definition itself, we need to look outside the
definition to ascertain the meaning of that word. See SZ Enters., LLC v.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441, 475 (Iowa 2014) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
“We presume statutes or rules do not contain superfluous words.”
State v. McKinley, 860 N.W.2d 874, 882 (Iowa 2015); see also Iowa Code
§ 4.4(2) (setting forth the presumption that “[t]he entire statute is
intended to be effective”). Under the State’s interpretation, at least one of
the two uses of “emergency” is rendered superfluous. If the legislature
had wanted all law enforcement responses to OWI incidents to be
covered, it would have been more logical to omit “emergency” either from
the phrase “emergency response” or from the phrase “other emergency
services.”
Notably, Illinois and California appellate courts also have confined
OWI-related public agency restitution to bona fide emergencies. Both
states by law authorize restitution for the costs of an “emergency
13
response,” although their statutes are worded somewhat differently from
Iowa’s.
Illinois law requires emergency response restitution from any
person convicted of OWI “whose operation of a motor vehicle while in
violation of that Section proximately caused any incident resulting in an
appropriate emergency response.” 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-
501.01(c) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-920 of 2016 Reg. Sess.). The
statute further defines “emergency response” as “any incident requiring a
response by a police officer, a firefighter carried on the rolls of a regularly
constituted fire department, or an ambulance.” Id. § 11-501.01(i).
In People v. Korzenewski, the Illinois Appellate Court held that a
traffic stop for speeding did not provide a basis for restitution. 970
N.E.2d 90, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). The court explained, “While
defendant was driving 19 miles per hour over the speed limit, [the officer]
conducted a routine traffic stop—he was not responding to an emergency
that required an urgent response.” Id. Significantly, the Illinois court
reached this conclusion even though “emergency response” under the
Illinois statute includes “any incident requiring response by a police
officer,” without adding the phrase “or other emergency services.” See
625 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-501.01(i). The Illinois court elaborated,
To interpret the emergency response statute as the State
wants us to would result in a finding that any person who is
pulled over by a police officer for the violation of any traffic
law and is ultimately charged with driving under the
influence could be required to make restitution to the police
department that initiated the traffic stop. This result was
clearly not intended by the legislature.
Korzenewski, 970 N.E.2d at 100.
Another Illinois Appellate Court decision has reached the same
destination, but by a somewhat different path. In People v. Allen, the
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court ruled that the phrase “proximately caused any incident” meant the
OWI violation had to be separate from the “incident.” See 977 N.E.2d
1286, 1289–90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). The appellate court rejected the
State’s argument that mere traffic violations—such as the defendant’s
running a stop sign and failing to stay within the lane markers on the
road—could form a discrete “incident” under the statute, thereby
enabling the State to recover the costs of an OWI traffic stop. Id. at
1290–91. The court concluded, “As there was no distinct injurious
incident, the restitution was improperly imposed.” Id. at 1291. Iowa’s
statute, we should note, uses the same word “incident” in the second
sentence, although not in the first. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(b).
California has a similar OWI restitution scheme to that of Illinois.
The restitution obligation is triggered when a person’s OWI “proximately
causes any incident resulting in an appropriate emergency response.”
Cal. Gov’t Code § 53150 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess., Ch. 8
of 2015-2016 2d Ex. Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot).
Focusing on this language, the California Court of Appeal has
determined that the impaired driving and the “incident” must be distinct
events in order to authorize restitution. Cal. Highway Patrol v. Superior
Ct., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 16, 23 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Any other reading would
render the word ‘incident’ superfluous . . . .”). The court in that case
rejected the State’s argument that an arrest following a traffic stop, by
itself, could qualify as an “incident.” Id. The court reasoned that if the
California legislature had intended such a result “it could have provided
simply that a person is liable for costs incurred by a public agency
responding to that person’s operating of a vehicle while intoxicated.” Id.
An “emergency” is commonly defined as “an unforeseen
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for
15
immediate action,” or “an urgent need for assistance or relief.”
Emergency, Merriam–Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2002). For
law enforcement costs to be recoverable as restitution from a convicted
OWI defendant in Iowa, the response must have been to that kind of
emergency. One example would be an automobile accident that involved
actual or potential injuries or that blocked a road.
In contrast, a routine stop for traffic violations is not generally
considered an emergency. In Stych v. City of Muscatine, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa concluded as
much in the context of the “emergency response” immunity defense in
Iowa Code section 670.4. 655 F. Supp. 2d 928, 938 (S.D. Iowa 2009);
see Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(k) (providing immunity to a municipality for any
claim “based upon or arising out of an act or omission in connection with
an emergency response”). While the court in that case did not “discount
the potential hazards that could arise” from traffic violations, the court
reasoned that “[i]f routine traffic violations . . . are deemed emergencies,
there is little doubt that the emergency response exception would swallow
the rule.” Stych, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 936, 938. We take a similar view as
to section 321J.2(13)(b).
C. Applying the Interpretation to This Case. We must now
apply our construction of Iowa Code section 321J.2(13)(b) to the facts of
this case. We find there was no emergency response by law enforcement
within the meaning of the statute. No accident had occurred, and no one
had made a 911 call. Officer Brewer was on routine patrol, and she
stopped Arriaga’s vehicle after witnessing her violate a traffic law and
engage in erratic driving. We certainly make no criticism of Officer
Brewer’s actions. The stop was proper, indeed commendable, because it
16
removed a drunk driver from the highways. But this is not the type of
case for which public agency restitution is statutorily authorized.
IV. Conclusion.
For the reasons stated, we annul the writ.
WRIT ANNULLED.