State of Iowa v. Jayel Antrone Coleman

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 15–0752
Filed February 10, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JAYEL ANTRONE COLEMAN,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
Christine Dalton Ploof, District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals conviction for driving while barred. DECISION
OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED.
Micki M. Meier of Meier Law Firm, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Robert C.
Bradfield and Steve Berger, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
2
APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether a law enforcement officer, after
making a valid traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion that an
offense may being committed, must terminate the stop when the
underlying reason for the stop is no longer present. For the reasons
expressed below, we hold that under the search and seizure provision of
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, the stop must end when
reasonable suspicion is no longer present.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
On the evening of August 18, 2014, Officer James Morris was
parked along Highway 61 in Eldridge, Iowa, conducting random
computer checks on the license plates of passing motorists to see if the
vehicle was reported stolen or if there were outstanding warrants
associated with the owner of the vehicle. His check of the license plate of
a vehicle that passed him revealed that the female registered owner,
Arvis Quinn, had a suspended driver’s license.
Because it was dark, Morris could not determine when the vehicle
passed him whether the driver was male or female. Morris pulled the
vehicle registered to Quinn over to investigate the possibility that Quinn
was driving the vehicle while her license was under suspension. As
Morris approached the vehicle, it was clear to Morris that the driver was
male, not female.
Morris did not terminate the stop upon determining that Quinn
was not the driver of the vehicle. Instead, Morris proceeded to ask the
driver of the vehicle, Jayel Coleman, for his license, registration, and
proof of insurance. Coleman did not produce a registration but did
produce “an Iowa ID.” Coleman stated that he was driving a vehicle he
had borrowed from his sister. At the time Morris made his requests,
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Morris no longer had reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense had been
committed.
Based on Coleman’s identification, Morris determined that
Coleman was driving while barred in violation of Iowa Code sections
321.555(1) and 321.561 (2013). He was so charged. Coleman filed a
pretrial motion to suppress with the district court. The district court
denied the motion. After a bench trial, Coleman was convicted of the
offense.
Coleman appealed. We transferred the case to the court of
appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Coleman sought
further review, which we granted. For the reasons expressed below, we
vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the judgment of
the district court.
II. Standard of Review.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress on
constitutional grounds de novo. State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 152
(Iowa 2015). In reviewing a search and seizure dispute under article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, we construe the provision “in a broad
and liberal spirit.” State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 657, 661, 91 N.W. 935,
937–38 (1902) (construing fundamental guarantees, like the right against
self-incrimination, broadly and liberally). We strongly favor the warrant
requirement, subject only to “jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.”
State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992); accord State v. Ochoa,
792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (Iowa 2010). In interpreting article I, section 8, we
may look to federal caselaw, the caselaw of other states, the dissenting
opinions of state and federal courts, and to secondary materials for their
persuasive power. State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 481 (Iowa 2014).
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III. Issue Preservation.
We must initially confront issue preservation. In the district court
proceedings, Coleman did not identify either the Iowa or the Federal
Constitution in support of his motion to suppress. Further, the district
court, in its ruling, simply stated that the motion to suppress was
denied.
On appeal, Coleman cites both article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. Coleman essentially makes
the same argument under both constitutional provisions—namely, that
the seizure of Coleman could not be constitutionally extended once the
underlying reason for the stop was resolved.
The State does not contest error preservation. In its briefing on
appeal, the State recognizes that Coleman has made claims under
article I, section 8 and the Fourth Amendment. Like Coleman, the State
makes the same argument under both constitutional provisions. The
State asserts that prolonging the stop to ask for a driver’s license,
registration, and proof of insurance is permissible.
We find the state constitutional issue is minimally preserved. We
have held that when a defendant in the trial court only identifies the
Fourth Amendment as the basis for a search and seizure claim, the state
constitutional claim has not been preserved at the district court. State v.
Prusha, 874 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Iowa 2016). 1
1As in Prusha, counsel here does not make a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. When trial counsel fails to preserve an issue below, appellate
counsel may, of course, on appeal assert a claim of ineffective assistance. State v.
Thorndike, 860 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 2015). When the ineffective-assistance claim
does not require further development of the factual record, we may decide the claim on
direct appeal even though the underlying issue was not preserved in the trial court. Id.
When the claim of ineffective assistance cannot be resolved on the record, however, we
will decline to rule on direct appeal and a party may file an action for postconviction
5
Here, however, the defendant did not identify either constitution in
the trial court although it was apparent that he was raising a search and
seizure claim. This raises a different preservation question than that
presented in Prusha. We have said that when a party brings a
constitutional claim but fails to identify whether the party is proceeding
under the Iowa or the Federal Constitution, claims under both the Iowa
and the Federal Constitutions are preserved. State v. Harrington, 805
N.W.2d 391, 393 n.3 (Iowa 2011); King v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 571
(Iowa 2011). The State impliedly recognized our prior caselaw by
declining to challenge issue preservation under the Iowa Constitution
and addressing both claims. We adhere to the approach in Harrington
and King.
On appeal, Coleman did not state the claim under the Iowa
Constitution should be evaluated under a standard different than that
employed by the United States Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment
cases. Nonetheless, he makes only one argument on appeal, namely,
that once reasonable suspicion for the original traffic stop was resolved,
the State could not extend the stop by asking for Coleman’s driver’s
license, registration, and insurance. It would elevate form over
substance to declare that Coleman’s argument actually cannot be
considered under the Iowa Constitution because he did not specifically
state that he was asking the court to depart from uncertain federal law.
In any event, we reserve the right to apply principles established in the
federal caselaw in a fashion different from prevailing federal law. See,
e.g., State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771–72 (Iowa 2011); State v.
___________________________
relief where the record can be more fully developed. State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237, 240
(Iowa 2006).
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Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009). Under these
circumstances, the argument Coleman specifically made and specifically
asks us to resolve is preserved under the Iowa Constitution.
IV. Discussion.
A. Introduction. The question of whether an automobile stop
may be extended to require production of documents may sound
mundane, and even petty, but it is not. Thousands of persons drive
upon the roadways daily. Further, the central purpose of constitutional
provisions regarding search and seizure is to structure and limit the
scope of police interference in the daily life of citizens. Generalized police
discretion to engage in search and seizure is antithetical to search and
seizure law. See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 287.
Further, as we have noted previously, unlimited discretion to stop
vehicles on the open road may give rise to allegations of racial
discrimination, characterized by the descriptive phrase “driving while
black.” See State v. Lyon, 862 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Iowa 2015); see also
State v. Harrison, 846 N.W.2d 362, 371–72 (Iowa 2014) (Appel, J.,
dissenting); Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 772 n.2; David A. Harris, “Driving While
Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual
Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544, 546–47 (1997).
As noted in Pals, traffic stops have emerged as a major issue in
search and seizure law. 805 N.W.2d at 772–73. The use of minor traffic
violations as a springboard into consent searches has prompted charges
of abuse and racial profiling. Id. at 772; see also Barbara C. Salken, The
General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution
to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 Temp. L. Rev.
221, 235–36 (1989).
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Indeed, the cases dealing with automobile stops sometimes have a
flavor of racial profiling. See State v. Diaz-Ruiz, 211 P.3d 836, 846 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2009) (questioning credibility of officer because facts
demonstrated trooper was motivated by a “desire to search the vehicle of
these two Hispanic men”). As we said in Pals, we approach these issues
with
due regard to the legitimate needs of law enforcement, but
with a recognition that our constitutional limitations on
searches and seizures by law enforcement protect
fundamental values of liberty and human dignity and are a
bulwark against arbitrary governmental intrusions into the
lives of citizens.
805 N.W.2d at 773.
B. Scope of Issues. The parties do not dispute that stopping an
automobile and detaining its occupants is a seizure under article I,
section 8 and the Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667 (1979). Further,
the parties do not dispute that Morris initially had sufficient reasonable
suspicion under both constitutions to initiate a traffic stop under the
facts and circumstances of this case. Further, the parties do not dispute
that once Morris determined that Coleman was a male, the reasonable
suspicion that triggered the stop was no longer present. The narrow
question here, which is strictly a legal question, is whether law
enforcement may extend the traffic stop by asking for a driver’s license,
vehicle registration, and proof of insurance.
C. Federal Caselaw Under the Fourth Amendment.
1. Analytic framework applicable to automobile stops. The United
States Supreme Court has developed a framework for the evaluation of
automobile stops under the Fourth Amendment. The foundation for
analysis of an automobile stop is provided in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
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88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). Although Terry did not involve
an automobile stop, the Supreme Court has considered a routine traffic
stop more analogous to a Terry stop than a formal arrest. See Knowles v.
Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 S. Ct. 484, 488, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492, 498
(1998); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150,
82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 334 (1984).
The United States Supreme Court applied Terry principles in the
context of an automobile stop in Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648, 99 S. Ct. at
1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 660. In Prouse, the Supreme Court considered the
question of whether a law enforcement officer may perform a random
traffic stop for the purpose of checking license and registration when
there is no probable cause or reasonable suspicion that any violation of
law is occurring. Id. at 650, 99 S. Ct. at 1394, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 665.
The Prouse Court held that such random stops violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 673. While
Prouse recognized the legitimacy of the state’s general interest in safety
as advanced by license and registration requirements, the Prouse Court
was “unconvinced that the incremental contribution to highway safety of
the random spot check justifies the practice under the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 658–59, 99 S. Ct. at 1398–99, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 670–
71. According to the Prouse Court,
[W]e cannot conceive of any legitimate basis upon which a
patrolman could decide that stopping a particular driver for
a spot check would be more productive than stopping any
other driver. This kind of standardless and unconstrained
discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in
previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the
official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.
Id. at 661, 99 S. Ct. at 1400, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 672.
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The United States Supreme Court refined the Prouse analysis in
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983).
In the plurality opinion in Royer, the Court emphasized that the scope of
an investigatory stop “must be carefully tailored to its underlying
justification” and “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.” Id. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 238.
In Royer, the Supreme Court plurality emphasized that a person “may
not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds
for doing so.” Id. at 498, 103 S. Ct. at 1324, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 236
(emphasis added).
The Supreme Court confronted another traffic-stop controversy in
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842
(2005). In Caballes, the Supreme Court considered whether a dog sniff
conducted during a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 406–07, 125 S. Ct. at 836–37, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 845–46. The
Caballes Court concluded that it did not. Id. at 409, 125 S. Ct. at 838,
160 L. Ed. 2d at 847. The Caballes Court viewed a dog sniff as
“sui generis”—unique, in other words—because it revealed only the
presence or absence of contraband and, therefore, was not a search. Id.
Even if a dog sniff is not a search, the Caballes Court recognized “[a]
seizure . . . can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete [the initial] mission.” Id. at 407, 125
S. Ct. at 837, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846. In Caballes, the Illinois Supreme
Court had determined, as a matter of fact, that the duration of the stop
was justified by the underlying traffic offense. Id. at 408, 125 S. Ct. at
837, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846–47. According to the Caballes Court, a dog
sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no
information other than the location of a substance that no individual has
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any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 410,
125 S. Ct. at 838, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 848.
Justices Souter and Ginsburg dissented. Justice Souter forcefully
argued that a dog sniff was, in fact, a search just like thermal imaging
equipment in Kyllo. Id. at 413, 125 S. Ct. at 840, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 850
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121
S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001)). Such a search ancillary to a traffic
stop, according to Justice Souter, must be supported by reasonable
suspicion. Id. at 415, 125 S. Ct. at 841, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 851. According
to Justice Souter, to search for evidence unrelated to the reason for the
detention amounts to an “open-sesame” for general searches that the
Fourth Amendment was designed to prohibit. Id.
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that in Terry-type
stops, the limitation related to the “scope” of the seizure was not limited
to duration, but also to the manner in which it is conducted. Id. at 418,
125 S. Ct. at 843–44, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 853–54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 1, 88 S. Ct. at 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 889).
Justice Ginsburg thus did not find it dispositive that the length of the
stop was not extended. Id. at 420, 125 S. Ct. at 844, 160 L. Ed. 2d at
854–55.
Shortly after Caballes, the Supreme Court returned to the general
topic of automobile seizures in Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129
S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009). In Johnson, the Supreme Court
confronted the question of whether passengers in a lawfully stopped
vehicle could be subject to a Terry-type pat-down. Id. at 326, 129 S. Ct.
at 784, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 700. The Supreme Court concluded that officers
who conduct routine traffic stops may engage in pat-downs of a driver
11
and any passenger upon reasonable suspicion that they are armed and
dangerous. Id. at 332, 129 S. Ct. at 787, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 703.
2. Federal caselaw applying Terry-Prouse-Royer principles to
extended automobile stops. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit has led the way in considering several traffic-stop cases in
which the stop was extended after the underlying purposes were
resolved. A frequently cited case in the field is United States v. McSwain,
29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994). In McSwain, the sole purpose of a traffic
stop was to verify the expiration date on a temporary registration sticker
on the rear window of the vehicle. Id. at 559–60. Once the officer
determined the temporary registration sticker remained valid, the court
held that “further detention of the vehicle to question [the defendant]
about his vehicle and travel itinerary and to request his license and
registration exceeded the scope of the stop’s underlying justification.” Id.
at 561.
McSwain thus drew a “sharp contrast” between a situation where a
traffic violation “has occurred or is occurring” and one where the
reasonable suspicion for the stop had been completely dispelled. Id.
(quoting United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Only in the later circumstance did the lawfulness of the seizure come to
an end. Id. at 562.
In the next case, United States v. Edgerton, the Tenth Circuit again
considered a case in which a vehicle was stopped because a temporary
registration tag could not be read because of darkness. 438 F.3d 1043,
1044 (10th Cir. 2006). The Tenth Circuit held, however, that once the
trooper was able to read the temporary tag, the trooper “as a matter of
courtesy, should have explained to [the] Defendant the reason for the
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initial stop and then allowed her to continue on her way without
requiring her to produce her license and registration.” Id. at 1051.
A third Tenth Circuit case is United States v. Pena-Montes, 589
F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009). In that case, the Pena-Montes court
confronted the familiar situation in which an officer pulled over a vehicle
believing it lacked a license plate, only to discover that the vehicle had a
proper “dealer tag.” Id. at 1049. In Pena-Montes, the officer did not end
the stop at that point, but continued his investigative activities,
questioning a passenger about his immigration status. Id. at 1051.
After canvassing the facts, the Pena-Montes court concluded that no
additional reasonable suspicion was present. Id. at 1058. In response to
the government’s argument that it is reasonable for officers to enquire
about dealer tags after a traffic stop even if they appeared lawful, the
Pena-Montes court declared, “We decline to sign this blank check.” Id.
Finally, in United States v. Trestyn, the Tenth Circuit considered a
similar case in which a vehicle was missing a front license plate, but
displayed a rear license plate. 646 F.3d 732, 736 (10th Cir. 2011). As in
the other cases, when approaching the vehicle, it became clear that the
rear license plate satisfied all statutory requirements. Id. at 744. At that
point, according to the Tenth Circuit, questions of the drivers about their
travel plans and a request for their licenses “exceeded the scope of the
stop’s underlying justification because . . . [the officer] no longer had an
objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation had
occurred or was still occurring.” Id.
Another frequently cited case involving extended automobile
searches is the Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d
395 (5th Cir. 2001). In Valadez, an officer who passed a motorist
traveling in the opposite direction believed the motorist was operating a
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vehicle with an expired vehicle registration and illegal window tinting and
initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 396. When the officer approached the
vehicle and spoke with the driver, Valadez, the registration issue was
quickly resolved, but the window tinting issue remained. Id. The officer
asked Valadez for his driver’s license and insurance card. Id. When he
returned to his patrol car, the officer requested a criminal history check
on Valadez. Id. While the background check was still in progress, the
officer returned to Valadez’s vehicle with a window-tint meter and
determined the windows were legal. Id.
But the officer did not terminate the encounter at this point. Id.
Although the purpose of the stop had been resolved, the officer proceeded
to ask Valadez if he had any weapons or drugs in the vehicle. Id.
Valadez responded that he had a loaded pistol in the front seat of the car
and a rifle in the trunk. Id. The officer removed the weapons from the
car to run a check to determine if they were stolen. Id. The results of his
background check indicated that Valadez had a criminal history but did
not apparently indicate whether it involved misdemeanors or felonies. Id.
The officer returned to Valadez’s vehicle and asked him whether he had a
felony conviction. Id. Valadez responded that he was not sure, but that
he might have a felony conviction. Id. After being transported to the
station, Valadez’s prior conviction was confirmed as a felony. Id. at 397.
He was subsequently charged with the crime and entered a conditional
guilty verdict allowing him to contest an unfavorable suppression ruling.
Id.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Valadez’s
motion to suppress. Id. at 399. The Fifth Circuit noted that Valadez did
not dispute the initial lawfulness of the stop. Id. at 398. But the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that once the officer determined that the registration
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was valid and the window tinting was lawful, at that point he had no
basis to continue the stop. Id. The Fifth Circuit emphasized the
detention was lawful up until the purposes of the stop were resolved, but
when those purposes were resolved, there was no lawful reason to detain
Valadez. Id.
The Sixth Circuit considered the validity of an extension of a traffic
stop in United States v. Jones, 479 F. App’x 705 (6th Cir. 2012). In
Jones, the Sixth Circuit held that a police officer exceeded the scope of a
traffic stop for failure to display proper license plates when he detained
the driver after he observed a lawful temporary tag in plain view. Id. at
712; see also United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995)
(“Once the purposes of the initial traffic stop were completed, there is no
doubt that the officer could not further detain the vehicle or its
occupants unless something that occurred during the traffic stop
generated the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify a further
detention.”).
The Second Circuit grappled with an automobile stop in United
States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006). In Jenkins, the officers
believed that the vehicle pulled over lacked appropriate license plates.
Id. at 209. After the stop, the officer became aware of a temporary plate
posed on the vehicle. Id. When the officers approached the vehicle to
speak to the driver, however, they smelled marijuana. Id. A subsequent
search turned up unlawfully possessed firearms. Id. at 210.
The fighting issue in Jenkins was whether the police acted lawfully
after their concern about unlawful licensure had been resolved. Id. at
212–13. The defendant claimed that once the officers observed the
temporary license plate they could proceed no further and were required
simply to waive the motorist on. Id. at 211. The state contended that
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the officers could reasonably approach the driver to explain the reason
for the stop. Id. The Second Circuit agreed, noting that in McSwain, the
Tenth Circuit suggested in dictum that such a courtesy was not
unlawful. Id. at 213.
A number of reported United States district court decisions follow
the general approach of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. In
United States v. Salinas, the United States district court considered a
case where a stop was initiated because of suspicion of a violation of the
Texas license plate display requirement. 665 F. Supp. 2d 717, 718–19
(W.D. Tex. 2009). The district court noted that the officers could have
determined even before they asked for the driver’s license and proof of
insurance that there was not a violation of the Texas license plate
requirement. Id. at 721. Because “[t]hey did not encounter reasonable
suspicion of an additional violation—driving without a license—until
after his traffic stop for failure to display a front license plate should have
ended,” the evidence should have been suppressed. Id.; see also United
States v. Castro, 929 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (D.N.M. 2013) (“[O]nce the
officer’s suspicion that a traffic violation occurred is dispelled, prolonging
the detention by retaining the defendant’s identification, questioning the
defendant further, or waiting for the outcome of a computer check, even
if the check is in progress, is improper and a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.”).
In United States v. Smith, the United States district court
considered whether a traffic stop could be extended in an obscured
license plate case. 37 F. Supp. 3d 806, 808 (M.D. La. 2014). The district
court determined that once the license plate issue was resolved, there
was no further basis to detain the driver. Id. at 813–14. In Smith, the
roadside officer had received statements from another officer that the
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motorist was believed to be a member of a motorcycle gang and
suspected drug dealer. Id. at 812–13. This alone, however, did not
justify prolonging the search. Id. at 813. While the state argued that
officer safety was involved, the court rejected the argument, noting
among other things that the officers did not act as if they were in fear of
their safety, did not conduct pat-downs of either occupant of the car
prior to their eventual arrest, and did not isolate them out of the car in
order to separate them from a potential weapon. Id.
Finally, a federal district court in Iowa considered a traffic-stop
issue similar to that raised in this case. In United States v. Wise, Chief
Judge Longstaff considered a prolonged detention after any potential
reason for the stop—a question about temporary tags—had been
resolved. 418 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1102 (S.D. Iowa 2006). Relying on
Edgerton, Judge Longstaff concluded that the deputy unlawfully detained
the defendants when they asked for identification and brought one of the
defendants back to the police car, because his investigation was no
longer related to the purpose of the stop. Id. at 1108.
The Eighth Circuit, however, has declined to follow the approach of
the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. For example, in United States v.
$404,905.00 of U.S. Currency, the Eighth Circuit held that additional
detention for thirty seconds to two minutes after the traffic stop was
complete was lawful. 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1999), abrogated by
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d
492 (2015). The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a two-minute canine sniff
was de minimus, noting, among other things the “strong interest in
interdicting the flow of drugs on the nation’s highways.” Id.
3. The United States Supreme Court’s most recent foray into
extended automobile stops: Rodriguez v. United States. The United
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States Supreme Court returned to the question of extended automobile
stops in Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d at
492. In that case, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether
the Fourth Amendment allows a dog sniff to be conducted after the
completion of a traffic stop. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614, 191 L. Ed. 2d
at 498.
The Rodriguez Court concluded that the dog sniff in that case may
have unlawfully extended the duration of the stop and ordered the issue
of independent justification for the dog sniff to be heard on remand. Id.
at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616–17, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 501. The Rodriguez Court
observed that when making a traffic stop, beyond determining whether to
issue a ticket, an officer may engage in ordinary inquiries incident to the
traffic stop, including “checking the driver’s license, determining whether
there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct.
at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499.
The Rodriguez Court, however, concluded that the stop may have
extended beyond the circumstances justifying the stop and would thus
be unlawful without additional reasonable suspicion. Id. at ___, 135
S. Ct. at 1616–17, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 501. Echoing Caballes, the
Rodriguez Court emphasized a traffic stop prolonged beyond the “time
reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission” is unlawful. Id. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S.
at 407, 125 S. Ct. at 837, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846). In Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court specifically declined to follow the reasoning of the Eighth
Circuit in $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615,
191 L. Ed. 2d at 499–501.
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D. State Caselaw.
1. Majority approach under Fourth Amendment to stops extended
after original purpose of stop resolved. A considerable number of states
have considered the question of the validity of extended automobile
stops. Most of them decide the issue under the Fourth Amendment, but
a few have considered the issue under state constitutional provisions.
Whether under the Fourth Amendment or under the state constitution,
the majority of the cases have held that once the underlying reason for a
traffic stop has been resolved, it cannot be lawfully extended.
For example, in State v. Diaz, the Florida Supreme Court
considered a case in which an officer pulled over a motorist because he
could not read the temporary tag on the top of the rear window. 850
So. 2d 435, 436 (Fla. 2003). Once the car was pulled over and the officer
approached it, the officer was able to read the tag and learned that
nothing was improper. Id. Nonetheless, the officer walked up to the
driver’s window and asked for the driver’s information. Id. The driver
could not produce a proper license and was ultimately convicted of felony
driving with a suspended license. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the seizure had been
unlawfully extended after the underlying purpose of the stop had been
resolved. Id. at 440. According to strong words of the Florida Supreme
Court:
It would be dangerous precedent to allow overzealous law
enforcement officers to place in peril the principles of a free
society by disregarding the protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment. To sanction further detention after an
officer has clearly and unarguably satisfied the stated
purpose for an initial stop would be to permit standardless,
unreasonable detentions and investigations.
Id. at 439.
 19
The Colorado Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in
People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81, 85–86 (Colo. 1995) (en banc). The
Redinger court confronted facts similar to those in Diaz. An officer
pulled over a vehicle after the officer could not see a license plate or
temporary sticker on the rear of the vehicle. Id. at 82. When
approaching the stopped car, however, the officer could plainly see a
valid temporary plate properly displayed on the rear window on the
driver’s side. Id. The officer then approached the driver’s window,
explained the reason for the stop, but then extended the stop by asking
for driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Id. When the
driver removed a wallet from his jacket pocket, a plastic bag containing a
white powdery substance fell onto his leg. Id. The officer then directed
the driver to step out of the car, seized the bag, and asked the driver to
identify the contents. Id. The driver identified the substance as
methamphetamine and was charged with a drug crime. Id.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the extended search
violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 86. According to the Colorado
Supreme Court, when “the purpose for which the investigatory stop was
instituted has been accomplished and no other reasonable suspicion
exists to support further investigation, there is no justification for
continued detention and interrogation of citizens.” Id. 85–86. State
appellate courts in Utah, Indiana, Kansas, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas,
Maryland, and Washington have come to similar conclusions to the
decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Diaz and the Colorado Supreme
Court in Redinger under the Fourth Amendment. See Holly v. State, 918
N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. 2009); Diaz-Ruiz, 211 P.3d at 836; Ferris v. State,
735 A.2d 491, 500 (Md. 1999); State v. Chatton, 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1240–
41 (Ohio 1984); State v. Pichardo, 623 S.E.2d 840, 852 (S.C. Ct. App.
20
2005); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245–46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en
banc); State v. Morris, 259 P.3d 116, 124 (Utah 2011); State v. DeArman,
774 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
2. Cases refusing to allow extended stops under both Fourth
Amendment and state constitutions. In some cases, however, state
supreme courts have invalidated extended searches under both state and
federal search and seizure constitutional provisions. In State v. Hayen,
the South Dakota Supreme Court considered yet another case in which
an officer stopped a motorist because he was unable to see the expiration
date on the bottom of the temporary thirty-day dealer’s license. 751
N.W.2d 306, 307 (S.D. 2008). A box in the new pick-up truck obstructed
the view of the bottom of the license when the officer followed the vehicle.
Id. The officer, however, did not bother to look at the temporary license,
but walked by and asked the motorist for driver’s license and proof of
insurance. Id. After this initial contact, the officer stepped back, saw the
expiration date on the license, and determined it to be valid. Id.
The officer continued the stop by returning to his patrol vehicle to
run a warrant and license check. Id. at 308. The warrant check revealed
an outstanding warrant for the driver’s arrest. Id. A search incident to
arrest then revealed methamphetamine residue and drug paraphernalia
in the driver’s coat pocket. Id. The state charged the driver with
possession of a controlled drug or substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia. Id. The defendant filed a motion to suppress. Id.
In Hayen, the South Dakota Supreme Court, citing McSwain, held
that the detention exceeded the lawful investigative stop and that the
fruits of prolonged detention were properly suppressed. Id. at 311.
Without any further articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the
21
extended detention violated Hayen’s federal and state constitutional
rights. Id.
A similar case is presented in McGaughey v. State, 37 P.3d 130
(Okla. Crim. App. 2001). In McGaughey, an officer observed a vehicle
pass by and believed that the taillights on the back of the truck were not
working. Id. at 132. The officer pulled the vehicle over. Id. When
approaching the vehicle, the officer could see that, in fact, the taillights
were functioning properly. Id.
Notwithstanding the officer’s awareness of the functioning of the
taillights, the officer asked the driver to step out of the car and asked for
his driver’s license. Id. at 132–33. The officer then continued to inspect
the vehicle, observing a pistol in the driver’s side door pouch. Id. at 133.
After determining the gun belonged to the driver and was loaded, the
officer asked if the driver would mind if he searched the vehicle, and the
driver responded “go ahead.” Id. The search revealed three bags of
amphetamine between the two front seats. Id. The driver was then
patted down and over $6000 in cash was seized and the driver arrested.
Id. A later inventory search revealed more drugs and cash. Id.
The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals held that the extended
stop was unlawful. Id. at 141. According to the Oklahoma court,
Although an officer effecting a valid traffic stop can
require a driver to exit his car, and produce his license, and
can check the validity of the inspections sticker on that
vehicle, an officer who realizes that his stop of a vehicle was
mistaken—and who has no other cause for reasonable
suspicion of the driver—has no authority to further detain
the driver or his vehicle. The seizure becomes illegal at the
point where its initial justification has ceased and no new
justification has arisen.
Id. 140–41. The Oklahoma court declared the search unlawful under
both the search and seizure provision of article II, section 30 of the
22
Oklahoma Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 140.
3. Distinction between extended stop where underlying problem is
resolved and ongoing investigation pursuant to valid stop. A number of
court decisions differentiate between a situation in which the original
purpose has been resolved and when the original purpose of the stop is a
valid and ongoing concern. See McSwain, 29 F.3d at 561. When the
purpose of the original stop remains valid, a number of courts have held
that a request for driver’s license, insurance, and registration is not
invalid as long as the stop is not unduly prolonged. See, e.g., Trestyn,
646 F.3d at 744; McGaughey, 37 P.3d at 140–41.
4. State court outliers. The state court cases, however, have not
been unanimous. Other states have allowed a driver’s license check
under circumstances similar to the facts presented here. As a general
matter, these states hold that if the traffic stop was initially supported by
reasonable suspicion, a request for driver’s license, registration, and
insurance papers is permitted even after the problem that led to the
initial stop has been resolved in favor of the driver. See, e.g., State v.
Gulick, 759 A.2d 1085, 1090 (Me. 2000); Hart v. State, 235 S.W.3d 858,
861 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Williams, 655 N.W.2d 462, 468 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2002).
5. Post-Rodriguez developments. After Rodriguez, it is noteworthy
that one state supreme court changed its course, at least under the
Fourth Amendment. In People v. Cummings, the Illinois Supreme Court
suppressed evidence resulting from an extended automobile stop. 6
N.E.3d 725, 733–34 (Ill. 2014). The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the
Illinois Supreme Court for consideration in light of Rodriguez. Illinois v.
23
Cummings, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1892, 1892, 191 L. Ed. 2d 760,
760 (2015) (mem.).
On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that in light of
Rodriguez, a driver’s license request of a lawfully stopped driver is
permissible irrespective of whether that request relates directly to the
purposes of the stop. People v. Cummings, 46 N.E.3d 248, 253 (Ill.
2016). As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s
suppression of the evidence. Id. Pointedly, the Illinois Supreme Court
noted that the defendant did not raise a parallel claim under article I,
section 6 of the Illinois Constitution. Id. at 250.
E. Iowa Caselaw.
1. The contours of State v. Jackson. In State v. Jackson, we
considered a case in which the defendant was stopped for lack of a
license plate. 315 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Iowa 1982). Upon approaching the
vehicle, the officer found the vehicle had a lawful properly displayed
department of transportation paper plate. Id. After making that
determination, the officer asked the driver if he had a valid driver’s
license. Id. The driver did not produce a license and admitted that he
was driving while his license was under suspension. Id.
The defendant was subsequently charged with driving while his
license was under suspension in violation of Iowa Code section 321A.32.
Id. The district court granted a motion to suppress on the ground that
there was no “articulate and specific reason to believe criminal activity
[was] afoot.” Id. The state appealed. Id.
On appeal, the state filed a short brief citing Prouse for the
proposition that there is no requirement of articulable and reasonable
suspicion to support a request for production of a driver’s license. See
Appellant’s Br. in Jackson at 4–5. The reference to Prouse implies that
24
the Fourth Amendment may have been in play. There is no mention at
all of the Iowa Constitution in the state’s Jackson brief. The pro se
defendant did not file a brief in the case and the state’s position was thus
unresisted.
In a brief two-page conclusory opinion, we held that the initial stop
was valid under Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648, 99 S. Ct. at 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d
at 660. Jackson, 315 N.W.2d at 767. Citing only Iowa Code section
321.27 and no other authority, we further stated that “there was nothing
illegal about the fact that, once he was stopped and exonerated, he was
asked to display his operator’s license.” Id. This conclusion is stated,
but perhaps because of the absence of a brief on behalf of the defendant,
no reasoning is provided. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Iowa
Constitution was mentioned in the opinion. See id.
Jackson was decided before the Supreme Court decided Royer. As
noted by the court of appeals in this case, Jackson does not specifically
address whether it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the
officer to prolong the detention of the motorist to demand his or her
driver’s license. In addition, there is certainly no holding under article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution in Jackson.
2. Reemergence of independent state constitutional law. As has
been thoroughly canvassed in some of our other opinions, the Iowa
Supreme Court has a long history of independent adjudication of state
constitutional issues. In recent decades, we have reemphasized that
independent constitutional tradition. In State v. Cline, we reexamined
filaments in our prior law noting the ability of state courts to engage in
independent constitutional analysis. 617 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Iowa 2000),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2
(Iowa 2001). In Cline, we specifically declined to follow the approach of
25
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
922, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3420, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 698 (1984). Id. at 293.
Subsequent to Cline, we have engaged in independent state
constitutional analysis in a number of search and seizure cases. See,
e.g., Short, 851 N.W.2d at 481; State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 790–91
(Iowa 2013); Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 775; Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 262; State v.
Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Iowa 2004).
3. Recent Iowa cases involving traffic stops. Since 2010, we have
considered the legality of automobile stops in five cases. The first case is
State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 2010). In Vance, we considered
whether law enforcement had reasonable suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment to stop a vehicle when the officers knew that the owner of
the vehicle had a suspended driver’s license and when the officers had no
evidence or circumstances indicating that the registered owner was not
the driver of the vehicle. Id. at 781. Joining a majority of jurisdictions,
we held that under these circumstances, the officers had reasonable
suspicion to make an initial stop. Id. at 781–83. In a footnote, however,
we noted that counsel for Vance failed to raise the question of whether
the basis for the stop continued to be valid upon the officer’s discovery
that the driver of the vehicle was not, in fact, the registered owner. Id. at
783 n.1. We also noted that counsel had failed to raise any claim that
the stop was invalid under the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 780.
In Vance, we then proceeded to consider an Iowa constitutional
claim that was preserved—namely, whether Vance’s counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the search of his
car under the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 786. In New York v. Belton, the
Supreme Court held under the Fourth Amendment that
26
when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of
that automobile [as well as] any containers found within the
passenger compartment.
453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L. Ed. 768, 775 (1981)
(footnotes omitted). In a 1981 case, State v. Sanders, we adopted Belton
as the proper analysis under the Iowa Constitution. 312 N.W.2d 534,
539 (Iowa 1981), overruled by State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa
2015).
After Sanders and by the time of Vance, Belton had come under
heavy attack as overbroad. As noted in Vance, academic commentators
sharply criticized the decision, eight states declined to follow it under
their state constitutions, and the Supreme Court itself began to question
broad readings of the case in its subsequent opinion. 790 N.W.2d at
787–90. Further, at the time Vance was pending, the United States
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Arizona v. Gant, 552 U.S. 1230,
128 S. Ct. 1443, 170 L. Ed. 2d 274 (2008) (mem.) (Certiorari granted to
answer the question: “Does the Fourth Amendment require law
enforcement officers to demonstrate a threat to their safety or a need to
preserve evidence related to a crime of arrest in order to justify a
warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the
vehicle’s recent occupants have been arrested and secured?”).
Under these circumstances, we stated in Vance that we would
ordinarily proceed to determine whether counsel violated professional
norms by failing to challenge Sanders and Belton under the Iowa
Constitution. 790 N.W.2d at 789–90. We stopped short of finding
counsel’s performance deficient on direct appeal, however, on the ground
that it was possible that trial counsel failed to raise a challenge to Belton
because trial counsel may have reasonably believed that there were other
27
exceptions to the warrant requirement that would allow admissibility. Id.
at 790. As a result, the matter was left for possible postconviction relief.
Id.
In Vance, we did not, then, expressly hold that counsel had been
ineffective for failing to challenge the search of the vehicle on Iowa
constitutional grounds. However, there would have been nothing to leave
for postconviction relief if Sanders and Belton remained good Iowa law.
Our next traffic-stop case is Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 767. The first
issue in Pals was whether an officer could validly stop a vehicle for an
ongoing civil infraction. Id. at 774. We concluded that such a stop was
lawful under both the Fourth Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. Id.
at 775. We next considered whether the scope of the search had
unlawfully expanded after the initial valid stop. Id. We concluded,
however, that the issue was not preserved in the district court and
declined to address it. Id. at 776–77.
Finally, we considered whether a consent to the search was
constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 777. We concluded that it was not. Id.
While we recognized that many states had abandoned the United States
Supreme Court’s “totality of circumstances” vegetable-blender approach
to consent in the search and seizure context found in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973), in
favor of the more rigorous knowing and voluntary approach of Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938), we
determined that it was not necessary to reach that issue. Pals, 805
N.W.2d at 779. Instead, we determined, for the purpose of the case
before us, to apply Schneckloth “with teeth” to invalidate the consent to
search because of its coercive features. Id.
28
Our next automobile-stop case is State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288
(Iowa 2013). In Tyler, we considered a case where an officer made a
traffic stop based on a mistake of law, namely, that a license plate cover
unduly obstructed his view of the plate and was unlawful. Id. at 290.
After making the initial stop, the officer detected the odor of alcohol on
the driver’s breath. Id. at 291.
In considering the issues in Tyler, we examined a videotape of the
stop which demonstrated that both the rear and front license plate
covers were clear rather than tinted. Id. at 290–91. The officer who
made the stop could plainly read the license plate as demonstrated by
his call to dispatch providing the information. Id. at 291. The only
claimed violation of law was a violation of Iowa Code section 321.37(3),
which provided that any frame around the registration plate must permit
full view of all numerals and letters printed on the plate. Id. at 294. We
held that the statute was not violated and the officer had made a mistake
of law in initiating the stop. Id. at 295–96. As a result, both the Fourth
Amendment and the Iowa Constitution, article I, section 8 were violated.2
Id. at 298.
We also noted there was evidence in the record indicating the
officer has specifically targeted Tyler’s vehicle for a stop for a reason
other than an obscure license plate. Id. at 297. A friend of Tyler’s with
identical license plate covers passed by the officer without incident
immediately prior to Tyler’s arrest. Id. We observed in a footnote that
2After Tyler, the United States Supreme Court determined that a reasonable
mistake of law could support reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Heien v. North
Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475, 486 (2014). Of
course, the ruling in Tyler under the Iowa Constitution is unaffected by Heien. Further,
the approach in Heien would be very difficult to square with our rejection of the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution in Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 293.
29
while Tyler—who was black—argued that he was victim of racial
profiling, we did not need to reach that particular issue in light of our
resolution of the case. Id. at 297 n.4. We made the commonsense
observation, however, that the possibility for racial profiling requires us
to carefully review the objective basis for asserted justifications behind
the traffic stops. Id.
The next case in our parade is Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 1. In
Gaskins, an officer made a routine traffic stop for an expired license
plate. Id. at 3. When the officer approached the vehicle, he smelled
marijuana and confiscated a blunt from the driver. Id. A search of the
passenger compartment of the vehicle revealed a small portable locked
safe. Id. Police opened the safe without a warrant and discovered drugs,
paraphernalia, and a gun. Id. We held that the search of the safe was
unlawful under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. In doing
so, we specifically overruled Sanders, noting that it was no longer good
law under the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 16.
The final case is In re Property Seized from Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384
(Iowa 2015). Pardee involved a traffic stop that was prolonged by efforts
to engage in a dog sniff for drugs. Id. at 385–86. In Pardee, we noted
under the Fourth Amendment an officer “ ‘may conduct certain unrelated
checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop’ but ‘may not do so in a
way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily
demanded to justify detaining an individual.’ ” 872 N.W.2d at 393
(emphasis added) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615,
191 L. Ed. 2d at 499).
F. Analysis. In developing the proper approach to the Iowa
Constitution, we may look to United States Supreme Court opinions,
dissents in those opinions, various federal precedents, state court
30
precedents, and any other persuasive authorities. See Short, 851 N.W.2d
at 481; Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 264–67. Indeed, there is a healthy body of
independent state constitutional law developing in the area of traffic
stops. See Margaret M. Lawton, State Responses to the Whren Decision,
66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1039, 1046–54 (2015) (citing cases from
Washington, New Mexico, and Alaska departing from the doctrine in
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89
(1996), in which the United States Supreme Court unanimously held
that traffic stops based on objective probable cause are reasonable
regardless of the officers actual motivation for the stop).
We think the federal and state cases have some common themes.
First, cabining official discretion to conduct searches is designed to
prevent arbitrary use of police power. Limiting both the scope and
duration of warrantless stops on the highway provides important means
of fulfilling the constitutional purpose behind article I section 8, namely,
ensuring that government power is exercised in a carefully limited
manner.
The caselaw repeatedly emphasizes that even de minimus
extensions of traffic stops are not acceptable. The fountainhead case of
the United States Supreme Court is Royer. It has been picked up in the
caselaw with some enthusiasm. See United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d
651, 663 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding six minutes measurably prolonged
traffic stop); United States v. Dolson, 673 F. Supp. 2d 842, 867 (D. Minn.
2009) (finding a delay of one minute and twenty-four seconds to call drug
task force to be an unlawful extension).
That said, it is possible that when there is a valid ongoing traffic
stop officers may properly seek driver’s identification, registration, and
31
insurance information. This distinction is well recognized in the caselaw.
Here, however, there was no ongoing valid traffic stop.
We, of course, are not obliged to follow Rodriguez in our
interpretation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. In any
event, nothing in Rodriguez is to the contrary. In dicta, Justice Ginsberg
indicates that obtaining driver’s license, registration, and insurance
information is a normal part of an ordinary traffic stop. Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499. But she was
referring to a valid, ongoing stop, not a traffic stop in which the
underlying reason for the stop has been satisfied. Early on, the McSwain
case recognized the critical distinction between a case in which there is a
violation or ongoing violation and one in which the basis for the stop has
dissipated. 29 F.3d at 561. Other cases prior to Rodriguez emphasized
the distinction as well. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 136 P.3d 579, 589
(N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (noting the state “ignore[d] the distinguishing fact in
each case cited to support [its position]—the initial stop in each case was
valid”); Hayen, 751 N.W.2d at 310 (distinguishing cases where actual
traffic violation was present). A leading commentator on the Fourth
Amendment emphasizes the distinction between a valid or ongoing
investigation and one that has been resolved for purposes of records
checks:
The importance of the violation of law to the authority
to run a check on a license and registration is illustrated by
those cases holding that if there is a stopping on either
reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a traffic violation
which is determined immediately after the stop not to have
been a violation at all, the officer may not continue the
detention for a license/registration check.
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 9.3(c), at 510 n.162 (5th ed. 2012). Thus, the language
32
used by Justice Ginsberg in Rodriguez does not suggest a different result
is required in this case.
And even if it did, we would not be deterred from pursuing our own
independent path under the Iowa Constitution. Although this case
raises distinctive issues, our recent traffic-stop cases have evinced an
awareness of the potential for arbitrary government action on the state’s
roads and highways. In Vance, we severely questioned the rationale of
our older precedent regarding searches of closed containers pursuant to
an automobile stop in Sanders—a case we ultimately explicitly overruled
in Gaskins. See Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 16; Vance, 790 N.W.2d at 787;
Sanders, 312 N.W.2d at 539. In Pals, we put traffic stops in the larger
context of concerns surrounding racial profiling. 805 N.W.2d at 772 n.2.
That theme was continued in Tyler where we noted the stop involved an
African-American driver in which a previous driver with similar features
on the license plate was not stopped. 830 N.W.2d at 297 & n.4. These
recent cases all have a common feature of demanding compliance with
Iowa constitutional commands in the traffic-stop context.
We recognize, however, that officer safety is a legitimate and
weighty interest in the context of traffic stops. See Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336–37
(1977) (per curiam). Yet, as the Supreme Court stated in Knowles, the
safety concerns arising out of a potential traffic citation are “a good deal
less than in the case of a custodial arrest.” 525 U.S. at 117, 119 S. Ct.
at 487, 142 L. Ed. 2d at 498. Nonetheless, in Mimms, the Supreme
Court held that an officer can direct a driver to get out of the car to
ensure the officer’s safety. 434 U.S. at 110–11, 98 S. Ct. at 333, 54
L. Ed. 2d at 337.
33
Yet, for a more intrusive Terry-type stop, reasonable suspicion is
constitutionally required before the officers may engage in a pat-down
search. United States v. Clark, 24 F.3d 299, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United
States v. Coley, 974 F. Supp. 41, 44 (D.C. Dist. 1997). There is no
categorical approach to pat-down searches. The validity of a pat-down
search, an important part of ensuring officer safety, depends upon the
facts of each case. See Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012,
1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting Terry-type pat-down based on “conclusory
references to ‘officer safety’ ”).
The same is true in the context of extending the duration of an
automobile stop when the underlying problem has been resolved. While
in most extended traffic-stop cases an officer safety claim has not been
asserted, in cases where officer safety has been raised, the courts have
repeatedly rejected generalized, unsubstantiated claims related to officer
safety as a basis for extending a traffic stop. See, e.g., United States v.
Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2006) (conclusory argument of
officer safety not based on facts insufficient); Smith, 37 F. Supp. 3d at
812–13 (insufficient evidence of threat to safety to justify extended stop);
State v. McCaulley, 831 N.E.2d 474, 476–77 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (no
safety reasons for detention of driver in back seat of squad car). Here,
there is no indication in the record that the officer feared for his safety.
Indeed, the officer allowed the unhandcuffed driver to accompany him
back to the vehicle when the officer conducted the search.
Further, our holding does not increase the risks of harm to
officers, but in fact lessens it. Under the result in this case, the officer is
required to allow the driver to go on his or her way after the resolution of
the reason for the stop. This can be accomplished by a brief gesture, an
announcement from the back of the vehicle, or a brief conversation at the
34
driver’s window. In this case, it would have simply only required the
officer to say “good-bye” to the driver and allow him to return to the car.
In fact, any increased officer danger arises from continuing the detention
of the driver while the license and warrant checks are conducted. Thus,
the very outcome sought by the State in this case would increase danger
to officers, not lessen it. Officer safety might be a valid concern when
tethered to a suspect’s continuing detention, but not when the suspect is
free to go. The State is not entitled to relief from an exigency of its own
creation.
As indicated above, it is not clear whether Jackson was a Fourth
Amendment or article I, section 8 case. In any event, to the extent that
Jackson is inconsistent with our holding today, we overrule it. We
conclude that when the reason for a traffic stop is resolved and there is
no other basis for reasonable suspicion, article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution requires that the driver must be allowed to go his or her
way without further ado.
V. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, we conclude that the motion to suppress
should have been granted. We therefore vacate the decision of the court
of appeals and reverse the judgment of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED.
All justices concur except Waterman, Mansfield, and Zager, JJ.,
who dissent.
35
#15–0752, State v. Coleman
WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court ruling
denying Coleman’s motion to suppress, as did the court of appeals. Until
today, a police officer who lawfully stopped a motorist could ask to see
his or her driver’s license, especially when the officer knew the driver was
not the car’s registered owner. Almost all Iowans, I believe, would find
this activity completely unobjectionable and, indeed, mundane. But not
the majority. Instead, our court has determined that this act of routine
traffic enforcement violates the search and seizure provision of the Iowa
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court reached the opposite
conclusion under the Fourth Amendment in 2015. See Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d
492, 499 (2015).
To get to its result, the majority overrules another one of our
established search and seizure precedents. In State v. Jackson, we
correctly decided a quarter century ago that the constitution does not
require an officer who lawfully stops a vehicle to “treat the [driver] as if
he had never seen him.” 315 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Iowa 1982). Rather,
after dispelling the original purpose for the stop, the officer could perform
the minimally intrusive step of checking the driver’s license, which Iowa
drivers are required by statute to carry and display upon an officer’s
request. Id.; see also Iowa Code § 321.174(3) (2013) (“A licensee shall
have the licensee’s driver’s license in immediate possession at all times
when operating a motor vehicle and shall display the same upon demand
of a . . . peace officer . . . .”). I would affirm Mr. Coleman’s conviction for
driving while barred by following our commonsense decision in Jackson
and United States Supreme Court precedent explicitly allowing officers to
36
check the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance as
part of the routine mission of any traffic stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499.
We recently followed Rodriguez in In re Property Seized from
Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 391–93 (Iowa 2015), and have no good reason
to depart from it here. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court within this
past year unanimously applied Rodriguez to uphold a license check
under the same facts presented. People v. Cummings, 46 N.E.3d 248,
252 (Ill. 2016).
Iowans who get pulled over expect to show their driver’s license to
the officer. This practice helps law enforcement get dangerous, illegal
drivers off the road. The majority fails to mention why Coleman had
been barred from driving. His criminal record includes four prior
convictions for driving while barred, two prior convictions for driving
while suspended, several narcotics convictions, and notably, a conviction
for second-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI) committed two days
before Officer Morris pulled him over. The majority gives Coleman a free
pass.
The majority goes out of its way to connect this case, at least
implicitly, to racial profiling. This is hardly the case to impugn motives
of Iowa law enforcement. It is undisputed Officer Morris could not see
the driver that night and did not know the driver’s gender or race. He
stopped the vehicle because its registered owner (a woman) had a
suspended driver’s license, and he reasonably assumed she was driving
her own car. There is no evidence or claim by Coleman that Officer
Morris pulled him over due to his race. See Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d
54, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“This is not an instance of an indefatigable
Inspector Javert mercilessly pursuing, harassing, and hounding his
37
quarry through Paris sewers or Kendall County highways by concocting
excuses to detain him.”). To the contrary, Coleman’s counsel expressly
rejected this possibility in response to a question from a member of this
court at oral argument. Officer Morris was entitled to ask for Coleman’s
driver’s license and to detain him upon discovering he was driving while
barred. After today, habitual offenders stopped under similar
circumstances will be able to simply drive away without an identity
check.
The majority flouts our error preservation rules to make another
end run around precedent by deciding this case under a sua sponte
interpretation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.3 Coleman
never raised the Iowa Constitution in district court and never argued on
appeal that it provided more restrictions on police than the Fourth
Amendment. I would hold Coleman waived any claim for greater
protection under the Iowa Constitution. I will now further develop the
reasons for my dissent, beginning with the threshold issue of waiver.
A. Error Preservation—the Iowa Constitution. Coleman’s
motion to suppress filed in district court did not mention the Fourth
3See State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 41 (Iowa 2015) (Waterman, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority opinion that diverged from settled federal precedent and “revers[ed]
the district court for failing to credit an argument the defendant never made at trial”);
State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 508 (Iowa 2014) (Waterman, J., dissenting) (“Today’s
majority . . . once again uses the Iowa Constitution to evade well-settled Fourth
Amendment precedent without setting forth any principled basis for construing Iowa’s
nearly identically worded search and seizure provision to require greater restrictions on
the law enforcement community and elected branches.”); State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d
785, 837 (Iowa 2013) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (noting majority had “venture[d] into
state constitutional issues that no one has briefed”); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 784
(Iowa 2011) (Waterman, J., dissenting) (“Although Pals[’s] appellate brief raised both the
federal and Iowa constitutional search and seizure provisions, he never argued our state
constitution provided broader protection.”).
38
Amendment or Iowa Constitution, 4 nor did he cite to either constitution
during the hearing on that motion. Just last term, in State v. Prusha, we
unanimously held the defendant failed to preserve a state constitutional
search and seizure claim when he mentioned only the Fourth
Amendment in district court. 874 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Iowa 2016). Now,
the majority finds error was preserved when trial counsel failed to
mention either the Fourth Amendment or the Iowa Constitution.
So less has become more. See State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 526
(Iowa 2014) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“[I]t almost seems as if a lawyer in
this court would be wiser not to develop an Iowa constitutional
argument.”). Constitutional jurisprudence should not be a race to the
bottom. Notwithstanding the State’s incorrect statement that error was
preserved, Coleman waived his belated claim for broader restrictions on
police under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 5
4Coleman’s motion to suppress stated in its entirety:
COMES NOW the Defendant by counsel and, pursuant to I.R.Cr.P.
2.11(2)(c) 2.12(1)(a), moves the Court for an order suppressing certain
evidence seized as a result of a traffic stop, on or about August 18, 2014,
on the ground that the stop was[sic] probable case: the registered owner
of the vehicle was not under suspension.
The transcript of the oral hearing on the motion to suppress indicates the district court
agreed with the State that our decision in Jackson controlled. Coleman obtained
different counsel for his appeal.
5The State in its appellate briefing indicated it “does not contest error
preservation,” presumably because it assumed we would honor our precedent to apply
the federal standard when the defendant sought no different standard under the Iowa
Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 291–92 (Iowa 2013). “Where a
party raises both state and federal constitutional claims but does not argue that a
standard independent of the federal approach should be employed under the state
constitution, we ordinarily apply the substantive federal standards . . . .” Id. “[W]e
generally decline to consider an independent state constitutional standard based upon
mere citation to the applicable state constitutional provision.” State v. Lowe, 812
N.W.2d 554, 566 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Iowa 2009)
(Appel, J., concurring specially)). The State concluded, “Coleman cites both the state
and federal constitutions, but does not argue that one requires a different analysis or
result than the other. As such, the Court should treat the claims coextensively.” I
39
By surprising the State with a new interpretation of our state
constitution, the majority rewards trial counsel’s silence and gives all
defense counsel a perverse incentive to lay in the weeds in district court.
This approach deprives the State of the opportunity to address the state
constitutional claim at the trial level, perhaps by making a different
evidentiary record. It also deprives the district court of the opportunity
to rule on the state constitutional claim.
“Error preservation is important for two reasons: (1) affording the
district court an ‘opportunity to avoid or correct error’; and (2) providing
the appellate court ‘with an adequate record in reviewing errors
purportedly committed’ by the district court.” State v. Ambrose, 861
N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866,
869 (Iowa 2003)). We do not consider issues for the first time on appeal.
See Geisler v. City Council, 769 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Iowa 2009). Because
Coleman did not raise a claim under the Iowa Constitution in district
court, I would find he did not preserve it. See id.
“Our obligation on appeal is to decide the case within the
framework of the issues raised by the parties.” Feld v. Borkowski, 790
N.W.2d 72, 78 (Iowa 2010). We should “do no more and no less.” Id.
The majority in this case unnecessarily overturns existing law
sua sponte. In so doing, the majority violates the admonition so recently
reiterated in Feld:
[I]n the absence of the most cogent circumstances, we do not
create issues or unnecessarily overturn existing law
sua sponte when the parties have not advocated for such a
change. In this case, we are restrained to apply the
controlling law as advocated by the parties, and we do not
___________________________
agree, but going forward the State should no longer rely on our precedent treating state
and federal constitutional claims coextensively.
40
consider or forecast whether or not that controlling law
should be abandoned or changed . . . .
Id. at 78 n.4 (citations omitted). The restraint exercised by our court in
Feld should have been employed here.
Error preservation rules apply to the State and defendant alike.
DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002) (“Because error
preservation is based on fairness, we think both parties should be bound
by the rule.”). 6 We should not reverse the district court for failing to
credit an argument a party never made at trial. See id. (“Ordinarily, we
attempt to protect the district court from being ambushed by parties
raising issues on appeal that were not raised in the district court.”).
Judges cannot assume the role of a partisan advocate and do counsel’s
work. See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e will
not speculate on the arguments [the parties] might have made and then
search for legal authority and comb the record for facts to support such
arguments.”); see also State v. Hicks, 791 N.W.2d 89, 97–98 (Iowa 2010)
(declining to speculate as to argument not made at district court); Feld,
790 N.W.2d at 83 (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Judges are not advocates who reach out to decide questions the parties
themselves either deem unimportant or, for whatever reasons, fail to
raise. The job of the court is to decide concrete cases the parties bring to
it.”); In re S.P., 719 N.W.2d 535, 539–40 (Iowa 2006) (stating “the court is
prohibited from assuming the role of an advocate” and calling for “what
Edmund Burke described as the ‘cold neutrality of an impartial judge’ ”
(quoting State v. Glanton, 231 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Iowa 1975))); State v.
Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002) (noting the “constitutional right
6For example, in State v. Ochoa, we concluded the State waived several grounds
for upholding a warrantless search of a parolee’s motel room based on consent because
it failed to raise those grounds in district court. 792 N.W.2d 260, 291–92 (Iowa 2010).
41
to have a neutral and detached judge”); Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins.
Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974) (noting that we do not “assume a
partisan role and undertake [a party’s] research and advocacy”).
When Coleman belatedly raised the Iowa Constitution on appeal,
he never argued for a different standard than we apply under the Fourth
Amendment. Therefore, our court should have applied the federal
framework. See, e.g., Reilly v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 783 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa
2010) (“Because Reilly has not advanced a standard for interpreting the
due process clause under the Iowa Constitution different from its federal
constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general principles as
outlined by the United States Supreme Court.”); State v. Bruegger, 773
N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) (applying Federal Eighth Amendment
framework because defendant “has not advanced a standard for
interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment provision under the Iowa
Constitution differently”); In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 n.1
(Iowa 2000) (refusing to deviate from federal analysis in considering state
constitutional claim because appellant “ha[d] suggested no legal
deficiency in the federal principles . . . nor ha[d] he offered an alternative
test or guidelines”).
“The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do
not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but
essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the
parties before them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir.
1983). We should not break from precedent and plow new ground
without affording all parties the opportunity to address the issue in
district court and on appeal. The risk of unintended consequences
escalates when our court freelances. Constitutional errors cannot be
fixed legislatively.
42
B. The Search and Seizure Analysis. To me, this is an easy
case. As Judge McDonald observed in his special concurrence in this
case, “Jackson is rooted in long-standing Fourth Amendment principles
[that were] reaffirmed in Rodriquez and Pardee.” It is undisputed that
Officer Morris lawfully stopped Coleman. Officer Morris could not
identify who was driving the moving vehicle at night and its registered
owner had a suspended license. In State v. Vance, we determined
an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate an
investigatory stop of a vehicle to investigate whether the
driver has a valid driver’s license when the officer knows the
registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license, and
the officer is unaware of any evidence or circumstances
indicating the registered owner is not the driver of the
vehicle.
790 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Iowa 2010). Even when an officer is mistaken
about a driver’s identity, “[o]ur precedent is clear that a mistake of fact
may justify a traffic stop.” Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 294. Having lawfully
stopped Coleman, Officer Morris crossed no constitutional line by simply
asking to see Coleman’s driver’s license.
The majority gives short shrift to the dispositive caselaw and
reaches the wrong result through a meandering discussion of dissenting
opinions and out-of-date precedent. 7 In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court,
in a majority opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, delineated the
bounds of a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion. 575 U.S. at ___,
135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499. An officer stopped Dennys
Rodriguez for driving on a highway shoulder, a violation of Nebraska law.
Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 496. After attending to
7The majority first cites Rodriguez on page 16 after ten pages discussing earlier
Fourth Amendment decisions. The majority first cites Jackson on page 23, after five
additional pages discussing pre-Rodriguez cases from other states. In my view, a proper
analysis should begin with the controlling precedent.
43
everything related to the stop, including checking the driver’s license and
issuing a warning citation, the officer detained Rodriguez for another
seven to eight minutes to walk a drug-detection dog around the vehicle.
Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1612, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 497. The Court held this
seven- to eight-minute delay violated the Fourth Amendment if it was not
supported by independent reasonable suspicion and remanded the case
for determination of that issue. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616–17, 191
L. Ed. 2d at 500–01. “Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police
inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s
‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and
attend to related safety concerns.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614, 191
L. Ed. 2d at 498 (citation omitted). The Court concluded the officer’s
mission ended after the time reasonably required to issue the warning
citation. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500. The officer
could not prolong the stop by detaining the driver to wait for the drug
dog without independent reasonable suspicion. Id.
In so holding, the Court made clear that “[b]eyond determining
whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary
inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’ ” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615,
191 L. Ed. 2d at 499 (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 847 (2005)).
“Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license,
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver,
and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id.
The Court stated these actions serve the same “objective” as the traffic
code: “ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and
responsibly.” Id. Rather than an interest in criminal enforcement, the
44
Court noted, these actions “stem[] from the mission of the stop itself.” Id.
at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500.
The Court contrasted these “negligibly burdensome precautions”
with running a drug dog around the vehicle, which “is a measure aimed
at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’ ” Id. at ___, 135
S. Ct. at 1615–16, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499–500 (alteration in original)
(quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 121 S. Ct. 447,
454, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343 (2000)). “Lacking the same close connection
to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries,” the Court held unrelated
inquiries to search for other criminal wrongdoing could not prolong the
duration of the stop without reasonable suspicion. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct.
at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499.
Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito dissented on the validity of
the drug search, but all nine justices agreed the officer may obtain
license and registration information as an ordinary incident of any lawful
stop. See id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1624, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 509 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (noting the majority’s conclusion that asking for driver’s
license and completing a records check on driver was “properly part of
the traffic stop”). I would follow this unanimous contemporary decision
of our nation’s highest court.
We applied Rodriguez in Pardee, 872 N.W.2d at 391–93. A
highway patrolman on a drug interdiction mission began trailing a car
with California license plates and stopped the driver, John Saccento, for
a broken taillight and following a semitrailer too closely. Id. at 386.
Robert Pardee was a passenger in the car. Id. at 387. After twenty-five
minutes, the trooper told the occupants they were free to go, but when
they lingered, the officer resumed his questioning. Id. at 388. The
officer, based on responses he found suspicious, detained Pardee and the
45
driver to run a drug dog around the vehicle. Id. We concluded the officer
had unlawfully prolonged the duration of the stop without particularized
suspicion of wrongdoing and reversed the district court’s denial of
Pardee’s motion to suppress. Id. at 397. But we emphasized
[a] dog sniff, unlike matters such as “checking the driver’s
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s
registration and proof of insurance,” can only be undertaken
without individualized suspicion if it does not prolong the
traffic stop.
Id. at 393 (emphasis added) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct.
at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499). 8 Thus, both Rodriguez and Pardee
recognized that a license check is within the original mission of the traffic
stop. These checks do not require separate, articulable, individualized
suspicion because they fall within the scope of the stop.
Well before Rodriguez and Pardee, our precedent allowed an officer
to check a driver’s license once the driver had been stopped lawfully. In
Jackson, a deputy sheriff pulled over a car driven by Louis Jackson
because it had no license plate. 315 N.W.2d at 767. “Upon being alerted
to the reasons for the stop, defendant directed the officer’s attention to a
properly displayed department of transportation paper plate.” Id. At that
point, reasonable suspicion for the stop dissipated. Id. But Jackson was
unable to produce a driver’s license and admitted his license had been
suspended. Id. He was charged with driving under suspension. Id.
Jackson filed a motion to suppress, stating,
The request of the Defendant to see his license constituted a
search and was violative of the court, the Fourteen[th]
Amendment[] of the United States Constitution and the
8Two members of our court dissented, concluding the drug-dog search was lawful based
on reasonable suspicion raised during the stop. Pardee, 872 N.W.2d at 397–98 (Cady,
C.J. dissenting).
46
Constitution of the State of Iowa as being conducted without
probabl[e] cause.”
Def.’s Mot. to Suppress in Jackson, at 2. The district court granted the
motion to suppress. Jackson, 315 N.W.2d at 767. We reversed the
district court. Id. We held the officer was authorized to ask for the
driver’s license:
The stop of defendant’s vehicle was not a random or
selective stop. His vehicle did not have license plates
displayed. This failure would ordinarily be a violation of
section 321.37, [t]he Code. When the department of
transportation paper plates were pointed out to the officer
there arose no requirement that he treat the defendant as if
he had never seen him. Section 321.174, [t]he Code,
requires all persons operating a motor vehicle upon a
highway in the state to have immediate possession of a valid
operator’s license, and to display the same upon the demand
of a peace officer. Notwithstanding the fact that a mistake
concerning the license plates led to the defendant’s stop
there was nothing illegal about the fact that, once he was
stopped and exonerated, he was asked to display his
operator’s license.
Id. I would follow Jackson.
The majority inaccurately suggests Jackson was undermined by
Florida v. Royer, a 1983 decision correctly stating that investigatory stops
should “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.” 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238
(1983). The majority overlooks two subsequent Iowa decisions that belie
its conclusion. First, in 2004, we upheld the arrest of a passenger on an
outstanding warrant, unanimously holding that the officer did not violate
the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights by checking his identification
after the conclusion of a traffic stop. State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 542,
547–48 (Iowa 2004) (“The entire episode lasted but a minute; it was no
more intrusive to check Smith’s identification than to ask him a few
47
questions.”). Here, Coleman voluntarily produced his identification to
Officer Morris and makes no claim that encounter took over a minute.
Second, in 2005, we expressly reaffirmed Jackson in State v. Lloyd, when
the officer initiated a traffic stop on a mistaken belief that a vehicle had
no license plate but a temporary plate actually was in the rear window.
701 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Iowa 2005) (per curiam). The driver was charged
and convicted of OWI, with a blood alcohol level over twice the legal limit.
Id. at 679. We held the stop was valid and “there was nothing illegal
about the fact that . . . [Lloyd] was asked to display his operator’s
license.” Id. at 681 (quoting Jackson, 315 N.W.2d at 767). We cited with
approval post-Royer Eighth Circuit precedent that allowed the officer to
check the driver’s identification after stopping the vehicle on the
mistaken belief it failed to display a required license plate. Id. (citing
United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming
conviction for felony possession of firearm discovered after check of
identification showed driver was under suspension and a suspect in a
recent shooting). Under the majority’s new regime, after noticing the
validly displayed plate, the officer could only wave on the driver,
permitting someone like Lloyd to drive away drunk, and Smart, the
shooting suspect and felon, to depart the scene armed.
It has long been settled in Iowa, well after Royer, that when an
officer lawfully stops a vehicle based on a reasonable mistake of fact, the
officer, after resolving that reason for the stop, could proceed to check
the driver’s license. 9 See id. Other jurisdictions, like Iowa, have
9InVance, in dicta, we suggested (without citing Jackson or Lloyd) that the issue
of whether an officer could request a driver’s license from a detained motorist was
debatable. See 790 N.W.2d at 783 n.1 (“Vance’s counsel failed to raise in the district
court or on appeal whether the stop continued to be valid upon the stopping officer’s
discovery that the driver of the vehicle was, in fact, not the registered owner. . . .
48
recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit asking a driver
for identification after the reasonable suspicion that prompted the stop
has dissipated. 10
The majority relies on contrary state appellate decisions decided
before Rodriguez. Those now outdated decisions concluded if an officer
initiated a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion from a mistaken
observation, the officer could only inform the driver of the mistake and
allow him or her to drive away. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 259 P.3d 116,
124 (Utah 2011). Such decisions are unpersuasive after Rodriguez.
Decisions applying Rodriguez consistently hold that an officer may
request identification from a driver lawfully stopped even if reasonable
suspicion for the stop has dissipated. 11 See United States v. Reidy, No.
CR 13-71-BLG-DWM, 2016 WL 6208398, at *3 & n.3 (D. Mont. Oct. 24,
___________________________
Accordingly, we express no opinion on the merits of this issue because it has not been
preserved for our appellate review.”). Vance did not decide the issue and did not have
the guidance of Rodriguez, which was decided five years later.
10See e.g., United States v. Elmore, 304 F.3d 557, 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002)
(concluding no Fourth Amendment violation resulted when officer approached driver to
request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing
temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police
officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after
making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth
amendment.”); State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (determining after valid stop
for mistaken traffic violation, asking for license was minimal intrusion and did not
violate Fourth Amendment); Hart v. State, 235 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007)
(“[W]here the initial traffic stop is valid, a license check of the driver, even if conducted
after the officer has determined the motorist is not guilty of the violation for which he or
she was originally stopped, is not unreasonable so long as it does not unduly prolong
the motorist’s detention.”); State v. Williams, 655 N.W.2d 462, 469 & n.4 (Wis. Ct. App.
2002) (concluding that officer could have lawfully checked license after pulling over
driver who was not registered owner with a suspended license).
11Severalcourts have continued to refer to the majority rule without addressing
the impact of Rodriguez. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 120 F. Supp. 3d 669, 681–82,
685 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (citing Rodriguez without analysis); State v. Hollister, No.
112,983, 2016 WL 197742, *8 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2016) (per curiam) (no citation to
Rodriguez).
49
2016) (ruling that deputy who pulled over driver on suspicion that
license plate was inadequately illuminated could check driver’s license
first); State v. Allen, 779 S.E.2d 248, 251, 254–55 (Ga. 2015) (holding
that Rodriguez permitted officer to check identification of a passenger as
“part of the authorized mission of the traffic stop”); Cummings, 46 N.E.3d
at 252; State v. Cotter, No. 2015AP1916-CR, 2016 WL 4468406 (Wis. Ct.
App. Aug. 25, 2016) (per curiam) (“Consistent with Rodriguez, as well as
with Wisconsin precedent . . . , [the officer], after determining that he
could not issue a ticket on the basis for which the stop was initiated, was
permitted to continue the stop for purposes of completing routine
matters such as gathering Craig Tomlinson’s license information . . . .”).
The Illinois Supreme Court twice addressed the issue, before and
after Rodriguez, in a factually analogous case, People v. Cummings,
6 N.E.3d 725, 727 (Ill. 2014) (Cummings I), cert. granted, judgment
vacated sub nom. Illinois v. Cummings, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1892, 191
L. Ed. 2d 760 (2015) (mem.), decision after remand, 46 N.E.3d 248 (Ill.
2016) (Cummings II). Derrick Cummings was driving a van owned by a
woman named Pearlene Chattic. Cummings I, 6 N.E.3d at 727. A police
officer initiated a traffic stop because Chattic had a warrant for her
arrest. Id. The officer knew Chattic was a woman. Id. at 728. After
stopping the vehicle, the officer saw the driver was a male. Id. The
officer nevertheless asked for his license and registration. Id. Cummings
had no license and was arrested. Id. The trial court granted
Cummings’s motion to suppress, and the Illinois Supreme Court initially
affirmed, holding that reasonable suspicion “disappeared when [the
officer] saw that the defendant was not a woman and, therefore, could
not be Chattic.” Id. at 731. The court concluded that requesting
50
Cumming’s license “impermissibly prolonged the stop.” Id. at 731, 734.
Two justices dissented, stating,
The majority’s rule, while narrow in this case, casts a
wider shadow—that officers need an independent basis for
requesting a driver’s license in a lawful traffic stop. This
result protects a driver from an objectively and subjectively
minimal intrusion, at the expense of complicating law
enforcement in a situation “especially fraught with danger to
police officers.”
Id. at 738 (Garmin, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1047, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1218 (1983)).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated
the judgment, remanding to the Illinois Supreme Court “for further
consideration in light of Rodriguez v. United States.” Illinois v. Cummings,
___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1892, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 760. On remand,
the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the officer’s actions. Cummings II, 46
N.E.3d at 251. The Illinois Supreme Court observed that Rodriguez
established
[t]he seizure’s mission consists of the purpose of the stop—in
Rodriguez, traffic enforcement—and “related safety
concerns.” Those related safety concerns include “ordinary
inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop,” and typically “involve
checking the driver’s license . . . .”
Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614–15, 191
L. Ed. 2d at 498–99). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reached the same
conclusion applying Rodriguez under nearly identical facts. Cotter, 2016
WL 4468406, at *5. I find the Cummings II court’s analysis of Rodriguez
persuasive.
“Ordinary inquiries within the traffic stop’s mission clearly do not
offend the fourth amendment.” Cummings II, 46 N.E.3d at 251. In
rejecting the defendant’s argument that a license check must relate to
the initial purpose of the stop, the Illinois Supreme court reasoned,
51
Rodriguez makes clear that unrelated inquiries
impermissibly prolong the stop beyond its original mission
when those inquiries are not precipitated by reasonable
suspicion. Ordinary inquiries incident to the stop do not
prolong the stop beyond its original mission, because those
inquiries are a part of that mission. Indeed, defendant’s view
would collapse the two parts of the mission—the initial
purpose of the stop and ordinary inquiries of the stop—into
just the purpose of the stop. Nothing in Rodriguez suggests
that license requests might be withdrawn from the list of
ordinary inquiries for a nontraffic enforcement stop.
Id. at 252 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion
may dissipate when the officer fulfills one part of the mission of the
stop—to address the perceived traffic violation. However, the officer can
still proceed to fulfill the other part of the mission by attending to related
safety concerns, such as checking the driver’s license. See Rodriguez,
575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 498.
“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is
always ‘the reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09, 98 S. Ct. 330, 332, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 335
(1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889, 904 (1968)). We must weigh the “balance between the
public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers.” Id. at 109, 98 S. Ct. at 332, 54
L. Ed. 2d at 336 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 614–15 (1975)); see also
State v. DeWitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 468 (Iowa 2012) (“[T]he test for
reasonableness of police conduct ‘requires a careful balancing of “the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests” against the countervailing governmental interests
52
at stake.’ ” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct.
1865, 1871, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 455 (1989))).
Checking a driver’s license is within a traffic stop’s original mission
and is minimally intrusive. The balancing of interests easily favors the
State, given the importance of ensuring that drivers who are lawfully
stopped are in fact authorized to drive on Iowa roads. These “negligibly
burdensome precautions” an officer takes to “complete his mission
safely” are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500. I reach the same
conclusion under the Iowa Constitution.
States have a “vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to
do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 658, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1398, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 670 (1979).
Licenses are issued “to evidence that the drivers holding them are
sufficiently familiar with the rules of the road and are physically qualified
to operate a motor vehicle.” Id. “[D]rivers without licenses are
presumably the less safe drivers whose propensities may well exhibit
themselves.” Id. at 659, 99 S. Ct. at 1399, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 671; see also
State v. Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Iowa 1993) (“The State has a valid
interest in the safety of its citizens on its roads and highways.”).
Coleman, a habitual offender, was driving while barred at the time he
was pulled over by Officer Morris.
Motorists whose careless or reckless driving is so serious as
to lead to license suspension constitute a genuine threat to
the safety of their fellow citizens, few of whom will appreciate
that today’s decision places them at greater risk of injury.
Holly v. State, 918 N.E.2d 323, 327 (Ind. 2009) (Shepard, C.J.,
dissenting). I share the concern that today’s decision will put the driving
public at greater risk.
53
If a motorist with a suspended license—who is detained but
allowed to drive away without being identified—later harms someone, it
“will be difficult ‘to explain to the family’ of an innocent injured party that
the police had a chance to prevent the injury but were powerless to act.”
Id. (quoting Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978, 978, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12, 175
L. Ed. 2d 322, 324 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari)). Coleman exemplifies the reason officers should be able to
check whether a driver they lawfully stop is barred from our roadways.
He was pulled over by Officer Morris two days after he was arrested for a
second-offense-drunk-driving charge, following at least six prior
convictions for driving while barred or suspended and multiple
convictions for possession of narcotics.
Iowa Code section 321.174 obligates drivers to possess a valid
license and have it in their possession at all times when driving.
Id. § 321.174(3). Drivers are required to display the license upon
demand by a peace officer. Id. “The statutory authority for police to
demand a driver’s license would mean little if the police could not check
the validity of the license.” State v. Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d 427, 430
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
The reason for allowing police to request a driver’s license on
demand is to deter persons from driving without a valid
license, since a license is a statement that the driver can be
expected to comply with the state’s requirements for safe
driving. Where it is reasonable for a police officer to ask for
a license, running a status check on the license is simply
carrying out this deterrent function of the law.
Id.; see also Godwin, 826 P.2d at 455 (same); People v. Redinger, 906
P.2d 81, 88 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (Vollack, C.J., dissenting) (“Because
motorists are required by state law to carry a driver’s license,
54
registration, and proof of insurance when operating a motor vehicle,
Officer Wise’s request for such documents was proper.”).
Officers may request proof of liability insurance during a lawful
traffic stop, even without an accident. See State v. Acevedo, 705 N.W.2d
1, 2 (Iowa 2005) (stating defendant was stopped for traffic offense and
arrested when operating without a license and without proof of
insurance). Iowa has a valid interest in enforcing laws requiring liability
insurance to protect accident victims. Allowing officers to request proof
of insurance deters uninsured drivers. In the same vein, checking
identification during a lawful stop deters barred motorists who may
wreak havoc on our roadways. The majority undermines these legislative
goals.
Asking a driver for a license also promotes “transparency in traffic
stops.” Cummings I, 6 N.E.3d at 739 (Garmin, C.J., dissenting) (citing
625 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-212 (West 2012) (requiring law
enforcement officers to gather statistical information on drivers stopped
or cited and department of transportation to analyze data and assess
practices that resemble racial profiling)). As the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals noted,
In many cases, police officers are required to make a written
report of contacts with citizens. An officer needs to know
whom he or she is assisting in the event a citizen later
complains about improper behavior on the part of the officer
or makes any kind of legal claim against the officer.
Ellenbecker, 464 N.W.2d at 430. “Requesting identification may also be
beneficial if the seemingly innocuous activity the officer observes later
turns out to be illegal—for instance, if the vehicle turns out to have been
stolen.” State v. Huck, No. 2014AP2120–CR, 2015 WL 423239, at *4
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2015); see also State v. Calzadas, No. 2015AP162–
55
CR, 2015 WL 5146526, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2015). Officer Morris
knew by his gender that Coleman was not the registered owner of the
car. 12 What if minutes after the officer had allowed the driver to depart
unidentified, the real owner reported the car stolen?
The safety of the officer is another reason to permit checks of the
driver’s identity. This safety interest “stems from the mission of the stop
itself.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at
500. “Traffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers.’ ”
Id. (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330, 129 S. Ct. 781, 786,
172 L. Ed. 2d 694, 702 (2009)). The Cummings II court recognized that
Rodriguez relies in part on United States v. Holt, which “approved
criminal record and warrant checks ‘even though the purpose of the stop
had nothing to do with such prior criminal history.’ ” Cummings II, 46
N.E.3d at 252 (quoting United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th
Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stewart, 473
F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2007)). These checks were justified because
“an officer will be better appri[s]ed of whether the detained motorist
might engage in violent activity during the stop.” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Holt, 264 F.3d at 1222). License checks were relevant
to officer safety regardless of the original purpose of the stop:
To the extent the ordinary inquiries are justified by the
officer safety interest, defendant’s view would also require a
conclusion that it is the type of stop, and not the occurrence
of the stop itself, that generates danger for officers. The
relevant authorities instead reveal it is the stop itself that
poses danger.
12In some cases, the officer may be unable to determine the driver is not the
registered owner until he or she checks the driver’s license. Some people appear older
or younger than their age; even race or gender may not be immediately apparent in a
darkened vehicle.
56
Id. (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at
500).
Traffic stops are inherently dangerous because they involve close
officer contact with unsecured individuals. 13 See Long, 463 U.S. at 1052,
103 S. Ct. at 3482, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1221–22; see also State v. Smith, 739
N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 2007) (noting defendant stopped for speeding
fired four shots at officer who was unaware vehicle stolen). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly acknowledged the weighty government interest in
officer safety during traffic stops. 14 “Knowledge of identity may inform an
officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of
violence or mental disorder.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S.
177, 186, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292, 303 (2004). Officers
13Statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicate that a traffic stop
poses the second-greatest risk of death for an officer, after investigation of a suspicious
person, and the third-greatest risk of assault. More officers have been killed during
traffic violation stops than in attempting an arrest for burglary, robbery, or drugs, or in
responding to domestic abuse violence calls. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI, Law
Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed & Assaulted Table,
https://UCR.fbi.gov/leoka/2014/home (follow “Overview” of officers feloniously killed
hyperlink; then follow “Table 21” hyperlink); Id. Table 79 (follow “Overview” of officers
assaulted hyperlink; then follow “Table 79” hyperlink). In 2005–2014, ninety-three
officers were killed during traffic stops. Id. Table 21.
14See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330–32, 129 S. Ct. at 786–87, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 702–
03 (holding officer authorized to perform pat-down on passenger because of safety
interest of officer); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885, 137
L. Ed. 2d 41, 47 (1997) (recognizing “traffic stops may be dangerous encounters” and
citing statistics of officers killed during traffic stops in 1994); Long, 463 U.S. at 1052,
103 S. Ct. at 3482, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1221–22 (“[W]e stress that a Terry investigation,
such as the one that occurred here, involves a police investigation ‘at close range’ when
the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has
not been effected, and the officer must make a ‘quick decision as to how to protect
himself and others from possible danger . . . .’ ” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 28, 88
S. Ct. at 1881, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 908, 910); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S. Ct. at
333, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 336 (stating government’s interest in safety is “both legitimate and
weighty” and “specifically recognize[ing] the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he
approaches a person seated in an automobile”); Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S. Ct. at 1881,
20 L. Ed. 2d at 906 (“Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers
take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.”).
57
initiating these stops “need to know who[] they are dealing with in order
to assess the situation [and] the threat to their own safety.” Id.
We should balance this weighty government interest against the
minimal intrusion on the defendant’s liberty interest. “[W]hen stopped
for a traffic violation, a motorist expects ‘to spend a short period of time
answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and
registration.’ ” Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 437, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3149, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 333 (1984)); see
also Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186, 124 S. Ct. at 2458, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 302
(“Our decisions make clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity
are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.”). Most Iowans will
be quite surprised to hear Officer Morris violated Coleman’s
constitutional rights by asking to see his driver’s license after lawfully
stopping the car he was driving.
In Mimms, the Supreme Court held that an officer can require a
driver to step out of a vehicle during a traffic stop based on officer safety
concerns. 434 U.S. at 111, 98 S. Ct. at 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 337. The
Court determined the intrusion requiring the driver to get out of the car
was “de minimis.” Id. “The police have already lawfully decided that the
driver shall be briefly detained; the only question is whether he shall
spend that period sitting in the driver’s seat of his car or standing
alongside it.” Id. In Wilson, the Court expanded this analysis to allow
officers to order passengers out of the vehicle. 519 U.S. at 413–14, 117
S. Ct. at 886, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 47. The Court reasoned,
On the personal liberty side of the balance, the case
for the passengers is in once sense stronger than that for the
driver. There is probable cause to believe the driver has
committed a minor vehicular offense, but there is no such
reason to stop or detain the passengers. But as a practical
matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the
58
stop of the vehicle. The only change in their circumstances
which will result from ordering them out of the car is that
they will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car.
Id. Indeed,
many people would find providing their identification to a
police officer for a computer records check far less intrusive
than being ordered out of the car to stand on the shoulder of
a busy highway or on the side of a street in their
neighborhood.
Allen, 779 S.E.2d at 256; see also United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492
F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007) (“If an officer may ‘as a matter of course’
and in the interest of personal safety order a passenger physically to exit
the vehicle, he may surely take the minimally intrusive step of requesting
passenger identification.” (Citation omitted)); cf. Smith, 683 N.W.2d at
547–48 (holding officer did not “seize” passenger by requesting
identification).
The Supreme Court has stressed the need to evaluate the initial
detention and scope of the stop to ensure traffic stops are not used as
“fishing expedition[s].” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41, 117 S. Ct.
417, 422, 136 L. Ed. 347, 356 (1996). “But the Supreme Court has
expressly rejected placing any rigid time limitations on Terry stops;
instead, the issue is ‘whether the police diligently pursued a means for
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly
. . . .’ ” Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 616 (1985)). A
traffic stop’s mission includes both “an investigation into the specific
suspected criminal activity and a routine check of the driver’s license,”
but “neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Supreme Court dictate that
an officer . . . must investigate the situation in a particular order.” Id. at
65.
 59
Here, there is no evidence—or even suggestion—that Officer Morris
failed to diligently pursue the mission of the traffic stop. Neither
Coleman nor the majority contend this traffic stop was unduly prolonged
by the request to see a driver’s license, which likely transpired in less
than a minute.
For these reasons, I do not join the majority’s conclusion that
Officer Morris violated Coleman’s rights under the Iowa Constitution.
Mansfield and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.