DocketNumber: No. 43607.
Citation Numbers: 269 N.W. 449, 222 Iowa 488
Judges: Albert, Parsons, Hamilton, Richards, Donegan, Stiger, Kintzinger
Filed Date: 10/27/1936
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/9/2024
This case was tried on a stipulation, and the amount due the state, if it is entitled to recover herein, is stipulated as $4,235.25; and the penalty, if one is to attach, as $
The facts stipulated are that the defendant Woodbury county, between the dates of April 1, 1934, and February 25, 1936 (the date on which the stipulation was made), purchased from outside the state of Iowa and received within the state motor fuel, as that term is defined in Chapter 56 of the Acts of the Forty-fifth General Assembly, Extra Session; that said motor fuel was shipped from refineries located outside the state of Iowa, by railway tank cars into Woodbury county, billed to the said county and delivered to the said county at the town of Moville therein; that said motor vehicle fuel was purchased for and used by the defendant county in the construction and maintenance of its highways within its borders, and was purchased solely for and actually used in its trucks and power maintainers in said construction and maintenance work. It was further stipulated that neither the county nor its officers applied to the treasurer of state for a distributor's license under the provisions of the aforesaid act, and that neither the defendant county nor its officers have reported the amount of motor vehicle fuel purchased by or on behalf of the defendant county under the provisions of said chapter, and that neither the defendant county nor its officers have paid to the treasurer of state any of the motor vehicle fuel license fees as provided by statute.
Since the trial of this case in the district court, two opinions of this court have been filed which practically control the disposition *Page 490
to be made of this case, to wit, Scott v. State Board of Assessment and Review,
[1] The first question raised is as to the constitutionality of the aforesaid Chapter 56 of the Acts of the Forty-fifth General Assembly, Extra Session. The fact situation with reference to the passage of this bill, without going into detail, is that the bill originated in the House, where, after passing through the necessary steps, it was duly passed and adopted. It was then messaged to the Senate, where certain amendments were made, after which it was duly and legally passed by the Senate. It was then messaged back to the House, where the senate amendments were considered and, by the necessary majority, were concurred in by the House; and in due time the Senate was informed of the concurrence by the House in the Senate amendments. It was then duly enrolled, properly signed by the speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, was approved by the Governor, and published and lodged in the office of the Secretary of State. All proceedings in both the House and the Senate were properly recorded in their respective journals.
The appellees' assertion is that the record does not show a compliance with section 17 of Article III of the State Constitution. We so recently considered this question in the case of Scott v. State Board of Assessment and Review,
Appellees, however, insist that there is a conflict between the decision in the Scott case and the case of Smith v. Thompson,
[2] The next question raised is that the aforesaid Chapter 56 of the Acts of the Forty-fifth General Assembly, Extra Session, does not apply to counties in the purchase or use of gasoline for operating their power maintainers and trucks in the construction and maintenance of their roads and highways. There is not much raised in this discussion that is not disposed of in the aforesaid opinion of this court, State v. City of Des Moines,
It is true that North Carolina, Colorado, South Dakota, and California, under their particular statutes, have held otherwise; but our case of State v. City of Des Moines, supra, and the great weight of authority, adopt the contrary rule. We are the more readily led to this conclusion by the wording of section 2, subdivision j, of said act, defining a motor vehicle as "any mechanical contrivance propelled on the highways * * * including those contrivances used * * * for the purpose of constructing or repairing said highway."
It is our conclusion, therefore, that under our own holdings the plaintiffs were entitled to recover herein in the amount stipulated as above set out. As to the penalty, we think, under the circumstances of this case, that the conduct of the county was in good faith and that it ought not to be penalized for having defended this action to have the statute construed.
The case may be remanded for a decree in accordance with this holding, or, at the election of the state, decree may be entered herein accordingly. — Reversed.
PARSONS, C.J., and HAMILTON, RICHARDS, DONEGAN, STIGER, and KINTZINGER, JJ., concur.
City of Greenville v. Query , 166 S.C. 281 ( 1930 )
Smith v. Thompson , 219 Iowa 888 ( 1934 )
The People v. Deep Rock Oil Corp. , 343 Ill. 388 ( 1931 )
Scott v. State Board of Assessment & Review , 221 Iowa 1060 ( 1936 )
State v. City of Des Moines , 221 Iowa 642 ( 1936 )
State v. City of Monroe , 177 La. 983 ( 1933 )
Independent School District, Class A, No. 1 v. Pfost , 51 Idaho 240 ( 1931 )
City of Ardmore v. State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission , 168 Okla. 316 ( 1934 )
State v. City of Sioux Falls , 60 S.D. 330 ( 1932 )