Hills & Dales Child Development Center v. Iowa Department of Education and Keystone Area Education Agency and Dubuque Community School District, Intervenors

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 21–0095
Submitted November 17, 2021—Filed December 30, 2021
HILLS & DALES CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Appellee,
and
KEYSTONE AREA EDUCATION AGENCY and DUBUQUE COMMUNITY
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Intervenors–Appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas A.
Bitter, Judge.
A service provider for individuals with disabilities challenges the Iowa
Department of Education’s declaratory order regarding excusing students from
school for private therapy under Iowa Code chapter 299 and the federal
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. AFFIRMED.
Appel, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
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Brian J. Kane (argued) of Kane, Norby & Reddick, P.C., Dubuque, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jordan G. Esbrook (argued),
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Dustin T. Zeschke of Swisher & Cohrt, P.L.C., Waterloo, for intervenor–
appellee Keystone Area Education Agency.
Jenny L. Weiss of Fuerste, Carew, Juergens & Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque,
for intervenor–appellee Dubuque Community School District.
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APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we consider a number of challenges to a declaratory order
related to the provision of services to children entered by the Iowa Department
of Education (Department) at the request of the Keystone Area Education Agency
(Keystone). The gist of the questions posed was whether public agencies are
required to release or excuse students to receive what is known as applied
behavioral analysis therapy (ABA therapy), and if so, under what circumstances.
A provider of ABA therapy services, Hills & Dales Child Development Center (Hills
& Dales), intervened and urged that the Department should declare that
students should be released from school for ABA therapy if so ordered by a
physician.
The Department’s declaratory order interpreted a number of relevant
statutes, including Iowa Code chapter 299 governing compulsory education in
Iowa and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. ch.
33. The Department’s declaratory order answered five questions posed by
Keystone. The Department determined, among other things, that the decision
whether to excuse an absence for ABA therapy is generally up to the school
district. The Department further determined that a public agency that does
excuse attendance for therapy may violate federal law if the absence leads to
students missing services provided by the student’s individual education plan
(IEP).
Hills & Dales appealed the Department’s declaratory order to the district
court pursuant to the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. Iowa Code
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§ 17A.20 (2021). The district court affirmed the Department’s order. Hills &
Dales appealed the decision of the district court. For the reasons expressed
below, we affirm the decision of the district court in all respects.
I. Facts and Procedural Background.
A. The Parties. We begin with a brief review of the parties in the
underlying action. Keystone is an area education agency under Iowa Code
section 273.2. Keystone is the agency responsible for identifying and serving
children who require special education in northeast Iowa, including the
Dubuque Community School District. Keystone sought a declaratory judgment
from the Department because of its concern that students eligible for special
education were missing school time to attend private therapy.
Hills & Dales is a nonprofit service provider for individuals with
disabilities. It is a licensed ICF/ID (intellectual disabilities) provider, but it is not
an accredited school. Among other services, Hills & Dales provides children with
ABA therapy. Hills & Dales intervened in Keystone’s declaratory proceeding, filed
an answer before the agency, and participated in the administrative process.
The Dubuque Community School District is a local school district in the
geographic area of Keystone and Hills & Dales. The school district also intervened
in the dispute before the agency. The legislature has authorized the board of
directors of school districts to “operate, control, and supervise all public schools”
located in the district and to exercise broad and implied powers “related to the
operation, control, and supervision of those public schools.” Id. § 274.3(1).
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The Iowa Department of Education is the state agency that oversees the
provision of public education in Iowa. The legislature established the Department
“to act in a policymaking and advisory capacity and to exercise general
supervision over the state system of education.” Id. § 256.1(1).
B. Proceedings Before the Department. Keystone’s petition for a
declaratory order contained five questions. Three related to the legal
responsibilities of public agencies regarding excusing students from school for
private therapy and whether doing so would violate its duty under the IDEA. The
last two questions related to the options for parents who do not elect competent
private instruction and yet wish to have their kids attend private therapy.
After briefing and a hearing, the Department issued its declaratory order.
The questions posed by Keystone and the answers provided by the Department
are provided below:
[1]. Under Iowa Code chapter 299A, is a public agency
required to excuse a student for therapy, with or without a
physician’s excuse?
Answer: No. This decision is committed by statute to the
school district.
[2]. If a public agency is not required to excuse a student for
therapy, when can a public agency be found to have abused its
discretion?
Answer: Whether a public agency abuses its discretion will be
determined by the facts of each case, including the public agency’s
obligation to comply with applicable law.
[3]. If a public agency does excuse a student for therapy
pursuant to a physician’s order, can the public agency be found to
have denied that student a Free Appropriate Public Education
(“FAPE”)?
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Answer: A public agency that excuses a child for therapy may
violate the IDEA if the services required by a child’s IEP are not
provided because the child is being withheld from school for private
therapy.
[4]. For a parent who does not elect competent private
instruction (“CPI”), what options are available to the student if [the
parents do] not want their student enrolled full time with the public
agency?
Answer: The student, if compulsory attendance age, is subject
to Iowa Code chapter 299. If a parent does not elect CPI and does
not otherwise comply with compulsory attendance law, the school
may take any available action, including but not limited to action
under Iowa Code chapter 299 or action available under its district
attendance policies. If the source of the parent’s disagreement is
with an IEP Team decision, the parent has procedural safeguards
available under the IDEA.
[5]. For a student who does not qualify for CPI, which may
include students residentially placed in a medical facility, what
options are available to the student if the parents do not want their
student enrolled full time in the public agency?
Answer: The student, if compulsory attendance age, is subject
to Iowa Code chapter 299. If a parent is not able to elect CPI and
does not otherwise comply with compulsory attendance law, the
school may take any available action, including but not limited to
action under Iowa Code chapter 299 or action available under its
district attendance policies. If the source of the parent’s
disagreement is with an IEP Team decision, the parent has
procedural safeguards available under the IDEA.
C. District Court Proceedings. Hills & Dales appealed the declaratory
order to the district court. The district court held that the declaratory order was
a correct statement of law, was supported by substantial evidence, and was not
unjustifiable and illogical, or arbitrary and capricious.
II. Standard of Review.
A party adversely affected by a final agency action is entitled to judicial
review. Iowa Code § 17A.19(1). “Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) of the Iowa
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Administrative Procedure Act governs judicial review of administrative agency
decisions.” Banilla Games, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Inspections & Appeals, 919
N.W.2d 6, 11 (Iowa 2018). The court’s standard of review on the claim that the
Department erred in interpreting the law and acted beyond its authority in
issuing the declaratory order is for errors of law under Iowa Code section
17A.19(10)(b). Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of the Iowa Ass’n for Just., 867 N.W.2d
58, 64 (Iowa 2015).
III. Discussion.
A. Introduction. Although this case has its nooks and crannies, the
essential issue before the court is whether public entities (school districts and
area education agencies) must honor a physician’s order that a child be released
from school for ABA therapy. Or, whether the authority to balance the benefits
of mainstream school attendance against the benefits of ABA therapy rests
elsewhere.
The issue here is not whether ABA therapy is an effective therapy. Rather,
the central question in this case—a question of law—is who decides whether a
student can be excused from school for receiving private therapy. Specifically, is
a physician’s order determinative on the question of whether an absence is
excused? Or, do the applicable statutes require that the decision rest with public
agencies?
B. Statutory Framework. We begin by providing a brief overview of the
statutory framework.
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1. Iowa Code chapters 256 and 299. Iowa Code chapter 256 establishes
the Iowa Department of Education “to act in a policymaking and advisory
capacity and to exercise general supervision over the state system of education
including . . . [p]ublic elementary and secondary schools.” Iowa Code § 256.1.
Under Iowa Code section 256.9(16), the director of the Department is given the
authority to “[i]nterpret the school laws and rules relating to the school laws.”
The general statutory framework for school attendance is provided in Iowa
Code chapter 299. Under Iowa Code section 299.1A(1), the compulsory school
attendance age applies to children between the ages of six and sixteen. Under
Iowa Code section 299.1(2), school districts are empowered to “adopt a policy or
rules relating to the reasons considered to be valid or acceptable excuses for
absence from school.” A child who fails to attend school according to a school
board’s attendance policy is a truant under Iowa Code section 299.8.
2. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). State and local school
agencies must comply with the terms of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. ch. 33. The purpose
of the IDEA is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them
a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs.” Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The
core of the IDEA is “the cooperative process that it establishes between parents
and schools.” Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005).
The IDEA requires that states and schools provide disabled children with
a free and appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). FAPE
means special education and related services that include transportation and
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developmental, corrective, and other supportive services required to assist a
child with a disability to benefit from special education. Id. § 1401(9), (26). The
goal is to provide “services that enable a disabled child to remain in school
during the day,” Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 73
(1999), and to provide the student with “the meaningful access to education
that Congress envisioned,” Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891
(1984). While state and school authorities are required to provide “related
services,” they are not required to provide “medical services” outside of diagnostic
or evaluation purposes. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(5) (2006). If a service is considered
a related service under the IDEA, a public agency may be required to provide
such service as part of a FAPE.
With respect to each disabled student, a public agency must work with
parents, teachers, and experts to develop a tailored IEP. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(d)(1)(B). An IEP will include the FAPE required to meet the individual
needs of each child. Id. § 1401(9). If parents are not satisfied with the IEP, they
may pursue state law administrative remedies. E.g., Iowa Admin. Code r. 281—
41.506. After exhausting available state law administrative remedies, the IDEA
provides that a parent may bring an action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415; Iowa Admin. Code r. 281—41.516.
C. Discussion.
1. Authority of the Department to issue a declaratory order. Hills & Dales
argues that the Department lacked authority to issue the declaratory order in
this case. Specifically, Hills & Dales argues that the Department’s declaratory
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order adversely affected Hills & Dales’s patients and operations. Because of these
negative impacts, Hills & Dales asserts that the Department exceeded its
authority.
The Department responds that Hills & Dales did not preserve the issue
before the agency and thus cannot raise it on appeal. In any event, the
Department argues that it has interpretive authority to provide declaratory
orders under Iowa Code section 256.9(16) and Iowa Code section 17A.9(1).
We agree with the Department. Under Iowa law, the Department has
general authority to supervise the state public education system. Iowa Code
§ 256.1. Further, Iowa law expressly authorizes the Department to interpret
school laws and rules related to them. Id. § 256.9(16); Iowa Ass’n of Sch. Bds. v.
Iowa Dep’t of Educ., 739 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa 2007). The Department’s rules
provide that the Department may act in an advisory capacity to help area
education agencies comply with laws related to education. Iowa Admin. Code r.
281—1.4.
In the present case, Keystone requested the Department to interpret Iowa
Code chapter 299 regarding attendance requirements and to clarify its duty
under the IDEA to provide FAPE. Those questions are legal questions regarding
education provided in this state. In response to Keystone’s request, the
Department provided its interpretation of Iowa law based on statutes and
caselaw. We conclude that the Department was acting within its authority in
issuing the declaratory order in this case.
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It may be true that the Department’s order has impacts on third parties
not before the administrative agencies. That, of course, is true of any legal
precedent. See Iowa Ins. Inst., 867 N.W.2d at 66–67 (noting that a declaratory
order can affect and bind nonparties like “any contested case proceeding”). The
mere fact that a declaratory order may have impacts on third parties does not
oust jurisdiction from the agency to issue them. The district court is correct in
ruling that the Department acted within its authority in issuing the declaratory
order.
2. ABA therapy: A “related service” or “medical service.” Hills & Dales
argues that the Department erred by concluding that ABA therapy is a “related
service” and not a “medical service” under the IDEA. Related services include a
range of services necessary to help children with disabilities to benefit from
special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). Under the IDEA, schools are required
to provide eligible disabled children with classroom instruction and related
services, which do not include medical services outside of diagnostic or
evaluation purposes. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(5). If ABA therapy
is considered a related service, a public agency is obligated to provide the therapy
whenever an IEP team decides it is necessary for a FAPE.
Hills & Dales admits that ABA therapy is not provided by a physician, but
argues that this fact is not dispositive of the issue of whether ABA therapy is a
related or medical service. In support of its argument, Hills & Dales cites a United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit case, Mary T. v. School District of
Philadelphia, 575 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2009). Hills & Dales argues that in Mary T.,
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the appellate court held whether certain activities were medical services hinged
on whether the services are within the traditional competence of a school,
regardless of the qualifications and background of the provider of the services.
Hills & Dales argues that ABA therapy is a medical service because it is not the
kind of service that can be provided by a school nurse or other trained personnel.
Relying on Mary T., Hills & Dales believes that because ABA therapy is prescribed
by a physician and performed by a board-certified practitioner, it should be
considered medical under the IDEA.
The Department responds that under the statutory definition, ABA therapy
is a related service and not a medical service. The Department further argues
that the bright-line rule in Garret F. should govern, which held that “medical
services” in the IDEA is for services that can only be provided by a physician.
526 U.S. at 73–74. As a result, the Department argues that ABA therapy, which
is provided by a nonphysician, is not a medical service.
We agree with the Department’s position. We first look at the definition of
“related services” under the statute:
The term “related services” means . . . such developmental,
corrective, and other supportive services (including speech-language
pathology and audiology services, . . . psychological services,
physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including
therapeutic recreation, social work services . . . counseling services,
including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility
services, and medical services, except that such medical services
shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be
required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special
education . . . .
20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A) (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court
interpreted “related services” to broadly encompass supportive services that
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“may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special
education.” Garret F., 526 U.S. at 73.
In Garret F., the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether providing
a wheelchair-bound student with one-on-one nursing care would fall within the
meaning of “related service” under the IDEA. Id. The Supreme Court held that
the IDEA sought to provide students with disabilities “services that enable a
disabled child to remain in school during the day.” Id. at 73. Such services
should help provide the student with “the meaningful access to education that
Congress envisioned.” Id. (quoting Tatro, 468 U.S. at 891). Affirming its decision
in Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, the Supreme Court concluded that “the term ‘medical
services’ referred only to services that must be performed by a physician, and not
to school health services.” Garret F., 526 U.S. at 73–74 (emphasis added).
The Garret F. Court further refused to follow a multifactor test suggested
by the lower court in the case, which included consideration of a number of
factors: whether the care is continuous or intermittent, whether existing school
health personnel can provide the service, the cost of the service, and the potential
consequences if the service is not properly performed. Id. at 75. Ultimately, the
Garret F. Court settled on a bright-line rule, noting that “a rule that limits the
medical services exemption to physician services is unquestionably a reasonable
and generally workable interpretation of the statute.” Id. at 76.
The Third Circuit in Mary T. was again charged with the interpretation of
“related services” under the IDEA. 575 F.3d 235. Mary T. was a student seeking
reimbursement for her placement in a residential healthcare facility. Id. at 239.
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The issue involved was whether allowing a stay in a long-term psychiatric
residential treatment facility was considered a related service under the IDEA.
Id. at 240–41. The Third Circuit held that it was not. Id. at 248–49. Specifically,
the Third Circuit noticed hospital services are excluded from related services
under Tatro and Garret F. Id. The Third Circuit believed that allowing a student
to stay long-term in such a treatment facility was “far beyond the range of
competence of any public school district or that of any school nurse.” Id.The Department finds Mary T. distinguishable and notes that Mary T. was
admitted to an acute-care ward of a psychiatric facility and that her treatment
plan did not include academic goals. The Department believes that the issue of
whether a school should be responsible for a child’s hospital stay when no
educational services were possible is different from whether such services are
necessary to provide FAPE.
We think the Department is correct in stating that ABA therapy is a related
service under the IDEA and Garret F. We first turn to the nature of the ABA
therapy. Although Hills & Dales does not clearly explain what ABA therapy
entails, the Department found in its declaratory order that ABA therapy includes
services to address receptive and expressive languages, improving behavior, and
play and social skills. The Department, on appeal, believes that ABA therapy can
be loosely described as physical therapy, counseling services, or psychological
services.
We find the Department’s reasoning persuasive. Looking at the ABA
treatment information provided by Hills & Dales, the treatment includes therapy
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in receptive and expressive language, play and social skills, functional routines,
and cognitive skill development. Those treatments can be described as
“developmental, corrective, and other supportive services,” falling within the
realm of “related services” under the statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). In fact,
ABA therapy falls within the purview of “services that enable a disabled child to
remain in school during the day” that Garret F. identified. 526 U.S. at 73.
Further, Hills & Dales concedes that ABA therapy is performed by certified
practitioners, not a physician. Under Garret F., to constitute as a medical service,
such service must be performed by a physician. Id. at 74. ABA therapy, a
treatment not necessarily carried out by a physician, therefore is a “related
service,” and not a “medical service.” Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on federal law are binding on this court. State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811,
832 (Iowa 2016). Hills & Dales fails to argue why this court should depart from
the Supreme Court precedent on federal statutes and adopt the Third Circuit’s
reasoning. Therefore, the district court is correct in holding that ABA therapy is
considered a related service under the IDEA.
3. Challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. Hills & Dales asserts that the
Department’s declaratory order was not supported by substantial evidence
regarding the impact of ABA therapy on school attendance. Hills & Dales claims
that Keystone stated, without substantial evidentiary support, that ABA
treatment “effectively removes a child from school for half of every day.” In
support of its argument, Hills & Dales points out that only some of its student
patients who reside in Hills & Dales had attendance issues. It also argues that
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the duration of the therapy would decrease over time. According to Hills & Dales,
the Department’s concern over students missing school time was exaggerated
and that the Department was incorrect in relying upon attendance issues in its
declaratory ruling. The Department responds by asserting that the declaratory
order does not rely on specific facts or evidence, but instead is mainly a
statement of law.
We agree with the Department that the declaratory ruling addresses
questions of law, not facts. In its petition, Keystone asked if a public agency is
required by law to allow excuses from school solely based on physicians’ notes.
This is purely a question of law. The declaratory order merely states that the
discretion of determining good cause for nonattendance lies with school
authorities on a case-by-case basis. As a result, the district court was correct in
rejecting Hills & Dales’s argument that the Department’s legal conclusions in its
declaratory order was not supported by substantial evidence.
4. Challenge to the Department’s interpretation of the IDEA. Hills & Dales
challenges the Department’s declaratory order as an unjustifiable and illogical
interpretation of law. In particular, Hills & Dales believes the Department erred
by holding that a public agency can violate the IDEA if excusing absence for
private therapy would lead to noncompliance with the IEP prescribed for each
student. Hills & Dales presses the argument, declaring that the purpose of the
IDEA was to ensure that students with disabilities receive education tailored to
their specific needs. In its view, ABA therapy is beneficial to children with autism
and should be allowed so long as a doctor prescribes it.
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Hills & Dales further asserts that by giving a public agency discretion to
excuse an absence and by holding that a public agency can violate the law by
allowing absence for therapy in noncompliance with an IEP, the Department’s
interpretation runs afoul of the spirit of the IDEA. According to Hills & Dales, the
agency action is thus irrational, illogical, and wholly unjustifiable in light of the
adverse effects it may have on these individuals.
The Department responds that Hills & Dales’s emphasis on the
effectiveness of ABA therapy is misplaced. The Department argues that the real
question is not whether ABA therapy is beneficial or effective, but instead is who
has the legal responsibility to decide when to excuse an absence for private ABA
therapy. The Department believes the law requires a public agency to make the
call and claims that a physician’s prescription for therapy alone does not suffice.
We agree with the Department. Neither the Department nor Keystone
disputes the effectiveness of ABA therapy. Rather, the issue here is to determine
who has the authority to decide if a student can miss school for private therapy:
a public agency, or physicians associated with Hills & Dales. Hills & Dales tells
us that the Department’s interpretation of law fails to “prioritize” the right of the
individual students. But the law provides that the school has the discretion to
decide its attendance policies. Iowa Code section 299.1(2) states:
The board of directors of a public school district or the governing
body of an accredited nonpublic school shall set the number of days
or hours of required attendance for the schools under its control.
The board of directors of a public school district . . . may, by
resolution, require attendance for the entire time . . . and adopt a
policy or rules relating to the reasons considered to be valid or
acceptable excuses for absence from school.
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The statute thus gives school districts the authority to decide when to excuse a
student from school for ABA private therapy.
While a public agency has broad authority regarding school attendance,
this broad authority does not relieve the school district of its responsibility under
the IDEA to provide a FAPE. If a student misses school time to an extent that it
prevents the student from receiving the educational benefits outlined in the
student’s IEP, a public agency could be held liable under the IDEA.
A student, of course, may seek to have ABA therapy on school time
included in the IEP as part of the student’s FAPE. In such a case, an IEP team—
with input from parents, teachers, and experts—should decide whether such
therapy should be a part of a FAPE. It is worth noting that the Department
acknowledges that a physician’s recommendation “is entitled to great weight” in
deciding whether school absence to receive ABA therapy should be part of the
IEP. In any event, it is the school and the public agency that makes the decision;
a physician’s assessment alone would not be sufficient. A parent that disagrees
with an IEP team’s assessment may appeal the decision under the IDEA. 20
U.S.C. § 1415.
Indeed, the Department’s declaratory order did not reject the possibility of
including ABA therapy as a FAPE; quite the contrary, it encouraged it. It noted
that “ABA [t]herapy is beyond any question . . . [a] support and related service
that schools may be required to provide as a part of a FAPE.” It is important to
understand that the Department’s declaratory order as well as our decision today
should in no way be understood as questioning the value of ABA therapy
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generally or in individual cases specifically. What the Department decided in its
declaratory order, and what we affirm today, is that any request for private ABA
therapy, and the ability to miss school for it, must be decided by the public
agencies after assessing the totality of an individual’s circumstances, through
the IEP process.
5. Failure to consider letters from physicians and county attorney as
“arbitrary and capricious.” Hills & Dales asserts that agency action is “arbitrary”
or “capricious” if taken without regard to the law or the facts of the case. Iowa
Code § 17A.19(10)(n); Dico, Inc. v. Iowa Emp. Appeal Bd., 576 N.W.2d 352, 355
(Iowa 1998). Specifically, Hills & Dales claims that the Department failed to give
proper consideration to two letters made part of the record: a letter from
physicians and a letter from a county attorney.
The letter from Dubuque physicians called ABA therapy “the gold
standard” for children with autism spectrum disorder. The physicians’ letter
further asserts that “[a]utistic students who received ABA therapy are better
suited to reach their fullest potential both when attending school and in their
general lives. ABA therapy’s critical value to a child with autism would qualify
the treatment as reason for an excused absence from school.”
The letter from the Dubuque County Attorney stated that “a reasonable
person under most circumstances would consider physician-prescribed
treatment as a reasonable excuse to be absent from a day of instruction.” The
county attorney offered his opinion that “physician-prescribed treatment which
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causes . . . absence from a day of instruction to be a reasonable excuse for
absence.”
As a result of these letters, Hills & Dales suggests that a child absent from
instruction for ABA therapy cannot be considered truant under Iowa Code
section 299.8 (“Any child of compulsory attendance age who fails to attend school
. . . without reasonable excuse for the absence, shall be deemed to be a truant.”).
Hills & Dales argues that the Department’s declaratory order is arbitrary and
capricious because it unreasonably fails to defer to the physicians and the
Dubuque county attorney’s opinions.
The Department responds that the agency gave appropriate consideration
to the letters. According to Department, a physician order is entitled to great
weight but is not determinative on the legal question of who is responsible for
decision-making.
We agree with the Department. Hills & Dales does not provide a solid legal
argument as to why the state agency, charged by state law with interpreting
school law and supervising the Iowa state system of public education, should
defer to these authorities. Iowa Code section 256.9(16) provides that the
Department, and not physicians or the county attorney, is charged with the
proper interpretation of school laws. The Department did not err by exercising
its authority provided by statute and declining to transfer that authority to
unauthorized private actors or other public authorities.
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IV. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s holding is affirmed in all
aspects.
AFFIRMED.