State of Iowa v. Sayvon Andre Propps

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 15–0235
Filed May 25, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
SAYVON ANDRE PROPPS,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G.
Blane II, Judge.
A juvenile challenges his sentence as unconstitutional under the
Iowa Constitution. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED;
WRIT ANNULLED.
Amy Pellegrin (until withdrawal) and Gregory T. Racette of Hopkins
& Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
2
ZAGER, Justice.
A juvenile was sentenced to four consecutive, indeterminate
sentences of ten years in prison for four counts of willful injury causing
serious injury. No mandatory minimum sentence was imposed.
However, because the crime of willful injury causing serious injury is a
forcible felony, the sentencing judge was unable to consider a deferred
judgment or probation as a sentencing option. The juvenile now
challenges, by means of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the
forcible felony sentencing statute under the Iowa Constitution. He
argues that the mandatory nature of the prison sentence is
unconstitutional given the Iowa Constitution and our precedents in the
area of juvenile sentencing. For the reasons set forth below, we find that
Iowa Code section 907.3 is not unconstitutional under the Iowa
Constitution as applied to juvenile offenders. We vacate the decision of
the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On February 27, 2011, Derek Carr was standing outside his home
when Troy Lee Mure Jr. drove up in a vehicle in which Sayvon Propps
was a passenger. Propps exited the vehicle, fired four shots into Carr,
and got back in the vehicle. Mure immediately drove away from the
scene. Carr was hit in his back, buttocks, and leg. He was transported
to the hospital where he remained hospitalized for three weeks before he
was discharged. Propps was seventeen years of age at the time of the
crime.
On April 20, the State charged Propps with attempted murder in
violation of Iowa Code section 707.11 (2011). Propps entered into a plea
agreement with the State whereby he agreed to plead guilty to four
counts of the lesser charge of willful injury causing serious injury. The
3
State then amended the trial information to charge Propps with four
counts of willful injury causing serious injury in violation of Iowa Code
section 708.4(1). Because willful injury causing serious injury is a
forcible felony, probation is not an option under Iowa law. See Iowa Code
§ 702.11(1); id. § 907.3. 1
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the district court sentenced
Propps to indeterminate sentences not to exceed ten years on each of the
four counts. The district court ordered each of the sentences to run
consecutively to the others for a maximum sentence of forty years. There
were no mandatory minimum sentences of incarceration associated with
any charge, and no individualized sentencing hearing was conducted.
On July 31, 2014, Propps filed a motion to correct an illegal
sentence. Propps argued that, based on recent federal and state caselaw,
the sentence imposed constituted cruel and unusual punishment under
the Iowa Constitution. Further, Propps argued that the district court
was required to conduct an individualized sentencing hearing even
though his sentence contained no mandatory minimum period of
incarceration. Propps takes this position due to the evolution of our law
surrounding the sentencing of juveniles. The State resisted the motion,
claiming that Propps did not receive an illegal sentence in this case. The
district court denied the motion, reasoning,
As the State points out, the crime—Willful Injury—to which
the Defendant pled and was sentenced, does not implicate a
mandatory minimum sentence. Since the Defendant is
eligible for parole and may be released at any time, the
sentences, whether consecutive or concurrent, are not cruel
1In
pertinent part, section 901.5 provides the standards for when a district court
may impose a deferred judgment, deferred sentence, or suspended sentence. Iowa Code
§ 901.5. However, in the case of a forcible felony, the section does not apply. Id.
§ 907.3.
 4
and unusual, do not violate the federal or state
constitutions, are therefore not illegal and Defendant is not
entitled to a correction of his sentence or resentencing.
Propps appealed the decision of the district court, and we transferred the
case to the court of appeals.
On appeal, Propps argued that “all juveniles, especially those who
have been sentenced to a lengthy term of years, must undergo an
individualized sentencing hearing regardless of whether or not the
sentence has a mandatory term of years.” He asserted that
individualized sentencing applied because, as with mandatory
minimums, the district court had no choice but to sentence him to a
term of imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
denial of Propps’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. Propps appealed,
and we granted further review.
II. Jurisdictional Argument.
The State raises the issue of whether we have jurisdiction to hear
this appeal. Since the district court ruling is on a motion to correct an
illegal sentence, the State argues that Propps cannot appeal the denial of
his motion to correct an illegal sentence because the ruling denying such
a motion is not a “final judgment of sentence” under Iowa Code section
814.6(1). We requested supplemental briefing to address this
preliminary issue.
Subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is conferred either
constitutionally or statutorily. De Stefano v. Apts. Downtown, Inc., 879
N.W.2d 155, 164 (Iowa 2016). Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.103(1)
provides that “[a]ll final orders and judgments of the district court
involving the merits or materially affecting the final decision may be
appealed to the supreme court, except as provided in this rule, rule
5
6.105, and Iowa Code sections 814.5 and 814.6.” Iowa R. App.
P. 6.103(1). 2
Iowa Code section 814.6 contains the standards for subject-matter
jurisdiction for the review of a criminal defendant’s appeal. Iowa Code
§ 814.6. Pertinent to this case, a criminal defendant has the “right of
appeal” from “[a] final judgment of sentence.” Id. A previous version of
the statute provided that “[a]n appeal can only be taken from the final
judgment, and within sixty days thereafter.” Iowa Code § 793.2 (1954).
The statute was thereafter amended to include the clarifying language
“judgment of sentence.” Iowa Code § 814.6 (1983) (emphasis added).
This language continues today. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a) (2017).
This is consistent with the general rule that the “[f]inal judgment in
a criminal case means sentence.” Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d
591, 595 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156, 127
S. Ct. 793, 798 (2007)); see also State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 146
(Iowa 2003). “In criminal cases, as well as civil, the judgment is final for
the purpose of appeal ‘when it terminates the litigation between the
parties on the merits’ and ‘leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined.’ ” State v. Aumann, 236 N.W.2d
320, 321–22 (Iowa 1975) (quoting State v. Klinger, 259 Iowa 381, 383,
144 N.W.2d 150, 151 (1966)). In contrast, “decisions, opinions, findings,
or verdicts do not constitute a judgment or decree.” Iowa W. Racing
Ass’n v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Comm’n, 578 N.W.2d 663, 664 (Iowa
2Iowa Code section 814.5 provides the rules for the right of appeal when the
State is the appellant or applicant. Iowa Code § 814.5. Rule 6.105 provides the rules
for appeals tried as small claims actions. Iowa R. App. P. 6.105. Neither section is
pertinent to our analysis of this case, and we confine our discussion to section 814.6.
6
1998) (quoting Wilson v. Corbin, 241 Iowa 226, 228, 40 N.W.2d 472, 474
(1950)).
The final sentencing order in this case was entered on August 16,
2011. Propps brought a motion to correct an illegal sentence on July 31,
2014, and the district court denied the motion on January 13, 2015. In
the ruling denying Propps’s motion, the district court neither disturbed
the underlying sentence nor entered a new judgment of sentence. An
appeal as of right under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a) on the grounds of
appealing a “final judgment of sentence” was improper in this case. The
final judgment of sentence occurred three years prior. However, this
does not resolve the jurisdictional issue here.
A criminal defendant may challenge an illegal sentence at any time
under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a);
see also State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009). A
defendant may appeal the denial of a motion to correct an illegal
sentence by applying for discretionary review under either Iowa Code
section 814.6(2)(e) or Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.106. Iowa Code
§ 814.6(2)(e) (allowing discretionary review of “[a]n order raising a
question of law important to the judiciary and the profession”); Iowa R.
App. P. 6.106 (“An application for discretionary review may be filed to
review certain orders specified by statute which are not subject to appeal
as a matter of right.”). A defendant may also appeal the denial of a
motion to correct an illegal sentence by petition for writ of certiorari
under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.107. Iowa R. App. P.
6.107(1)(a) (“Any party claiming a district court judge . . . exceeded the
judge’s jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally may commence an original
certiorari action in the supreme court by filing a petition for writ of
certiorari.”). Because section 814.6(1)(a) does not apply to a defendant’s
7
motion to correct an illegal sentence, one of these actions would have
been the proper method for bringing such a challenge.
However, a “court has inherent power to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings before it.” Klinge
v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Tigges v. City of
Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984)). Discretionary review is
available under section 814.6 to orders “raising a question of law
important to the judiciary and the profession.” Iowa Code § 814.6(2)(e).
Additionally, if a case is initiated by a notice of appeal, but another form
of review is proper, we may choose to proceed as though the proper form
of review was requested by the defendant rather than dismiss the action.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.108. Accordingly, we will treat Propps’s notice of
appeal and accompanying briefs as a petition for writ of certiorari, as we
conclude that appeals from a motion to correct an illegal sentence are
most appropriately fashioned in this manner. We grant the petition for
writ of certiorari.
III. Standard of Review.
An unconstitutional sentence is an illegal sentence, and therefore
may be corrected at any time. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Iowa
2014); see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a). While we ordinarily review
challenges to illegal sentences for correction of legal errors, our standard
of review for an allegation of an unconstitutional sentence is de novo.
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 382.
IV. Analysis.
A. Indeterminate Sentencing and Parole. A determinate
sentence imposes a specific number of years of imprisonment on a
defendant, while an indeterminate sentence is one in which the
legislature has set a range of the minimum and maximum amount of
8
years deemed appropriate for the crime. See, e.g., 6 Wayne R. LaFave et
al., Criminal Procedure § 26.1(c) (2016). Indeterminate sentences are
parole eligible, while determinate sentences are not. Id. In this case, the
district court sentenced Propps to four indeterminate sentences with no
mandatory minimum sentence, making Propps immediately eligible for
parole.
Once an incarcerated individual is eligible for parole, the Iowa
Board of Parole is required to hold yearly file reviews. Iowa Code
§ 906.5(1)(a); see also Iowa Board of Parole, FAQ/Information,
http://www.bop.state.ia.us/BoardFaq (last visited Mar. 20, 2017)
(stating the board of parole is required to hold yearly reviews for every
eligible offender) [hereinafter Iowa Board of Parole, FAQ/Information].
When the board of parole reviews a file, it may choose to give the
offender work release, deny release, or set up an interview. Iowa Code
§ 906.3, .5. If the board sets up an interview, it uses the interview to
determine whether the individual offender should be released to the
community under parole supervision for the remainder of the sentence.
Id. When making the decision to release an inmate on parole, the board
considers a number of factors, including
a. Previous criminal record;
b. Nature and circumstances of the offense;
c. Recidivism record;
d. Convictions or behavior indicating a propensity for
violence;
e. Participation in institutional programs, including
academic and vocational training;
f. Psychiatric and psychological evaluations;
g. Length of time served;
h. Evidence of serious or habitual institutional misconduct;
i. Success or failure while on probation;
j. Prior parole or work release history;
9
k. Prior refusal to accept parole or work release;
l. History of drug or alcohol use;
m. A parole plan formulated by the inmate;
n. General attitude and behavior while incarcerated;
o. Risk assessment.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 205—8.10.
This is consistent with the provisions of Iowa Code section
906.5(3), which provides that
the board shall consider all pertinent information regarding
the person, including the circumstances of the person’s
offense, any presentence report which is available, the
previous social history and criminal record of the person, the
person’s conduct, work, and attitude in prison, and the
reports of physical and mental examinations that have been
made.
Iowa Code § 906.5(3).
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Juvenile Sentencing.
Both the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution prohibit
cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Iowa Const.
art. I, § 17. In recent years, both the United States Supreme Court and
this court have addressed whether certain juvenile sentencing practices
violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned’ to both the offender and
the offense.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455,
2463, (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S. Ct.
1183, 1190, (2005)). Proportionality is key in an Eighth Amendment
analysis, and we view proportionality according to “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id.
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290 (1976)).
10
In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Roper that the sentence of
capital punishment when imposed upon a juvenile violates the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth
Amendment. 543 U.S. at 560, 126 S. Ct. 1190. In 2010, the Supreme
Court held in Graham v. Florida that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses. 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2030 (2010). Finally, in 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller
that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole when
imposed on juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. 567 U.S. at ___,
132 S. Ct. at 2475. Miller requires a sentencing court to make
individualized sentencing decisions that take into consideration an
offender’s age and age-related characteristics before imposing “the
harshest possible penalty for juveniles” of a life sentence without the
possibility of parole. Id.
Following the Miller decision, Governor Branstad commuted the
sentences of all juveniles in Iowa serving mandatory life-without-parole
sentences to sentences of sixty years without parole and with no credit
for earned time. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2013).
We then heard a trio of cases that considered both the Miller case and
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Iowa Constitution.
In Ragland, we held that Miller applied retroactively. Id. at 117.
We then went on to hold that the governor’s commutation had the same
effect as a life sentence without the possibility of parole, and therefore
the Miller requirement of individualized sentencing applied. Id. at 119,
122. In determining that Miller applied to the commuted sentences, we
noted that
11
the original sentence imposed on Ragland by the district
court was a mandatory sentence. The sentencing court had
no other option but to impose the one sentence provided by
law. This result is important in the analysis because it goes
to the heart of Miller, which states that “children are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing,” and a mandatory life sentence without parole
imposed on juveniles means young offenders “die in prison
even if [the sentencing judge] would have thought that his
youth and its attendant characteristics . . . made a lesser
sentence . . . more appropriate.” Importantly, the mandatory
penalty component totally precludes the sentencing court
from taking the critical aspects of youth into account in the
imposition of a sentence.
Id. at 119 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2460, 2464).
The commutation did not cure the absence of an individualized
sentencing hearing because “Miller protects youth at the time of
sentencing.” Id.
In State v. Null, we considered the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the Iowa Constitution. 836 N.W.2d 41, 70 (Iowa 2013); see also
Iowa Const. art. I, § 17. We held that a lengthy term-of-years sentence—
in this case a 52.5 year sentence—triggered the protections of a Miller
individualized sentencing hearing. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71. We reasoned
that “geriatric release” after a lengthy term-of-years sentence does not
provide a juvenile a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their
maturity and rehabilitation. Id. Similarly, in State v. Pearson, we held
that a minimum sentence of thirty-five years triggered a Miller
individualized sentencing hearing. 836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013).
After the Ragland—Null—Pearson trio, we went on to consider
juvenile sentencing under the Iowa Constitution in a number of other
cases. In Lyle, we held that all mandatory minimum sentences of
imprisonment for juveniles are unconstitutional under article I, section
17 of the Iowa Constitution. 854 N.W.2d at 400. We also summarized
the background of change in the area of juvenile sentencing reform and
12
touched on the topic of parole briefly. Id. at 399–400. We noted that the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the opportunity for
parole lessens the severity of a sentence. Id. at 399; see also Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280–81, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1142–43 (1980)
(recognizing the opportunity for parole, “however slim,” mollifies the
severity of the sentence). We ultimately concluded that the “heart of the
constitutional infirmity with the punishment imposed in Miller was its
mandatory imposition, not the length of the sentence.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d
at 401. We confirmed that the Iowa Constitution applied to mandatory
sentences of prison without the opportunity for parole, regardless of the
length of the sentence. Id.
[I]f mandatory sentencing for the most serious crimes that
impose the most serious punishment of life in prison without
parole violates article I, section 17, so would mandatory
sentences for less serious crimes imposing the less serious
punishment of a minimum period of time in prison without
parole.
Id.
In State v. Louisell, we addressed the question of whether Louisell
truly had a “meaningful opportunity for parole” during resentencing or
whether her eligibility for parole was simply illusory. 865 N.W.2d 590,
601 (Iowa 2015). Louisell argued that, even with a sentence of life with
the possibility of parole, her parole eligibility was illusory because only
one of Iowa’s thirty-eight juvenile offenders originally sentenced to life
without parole had actually been granted parole by the time of her
resentencing. Id. This single inmate was granted parole on conditional
release to hospice care for cancer treatment, and the parole board
specifically reserved the right to reconsider its decision if her health
improved. Id. We declined to address the question of whether Louisell
had been wrongfully denied parole. Id. at 602. However, we did take the
13
opportunity to “reaffirm that under both the United States Constitution
and the Iowa Constitution, juveniles convicted of crimes must be afforded
a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation’—if a sentencing judge, exercising discretion,
determines parole should be available.” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at
75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030). We also noted that the factors utilized by the
parole board to determine parole eligibility do not “account for the
mitigating attributes of youth that are constitutionally required
sentencing considerations.” Id.
In State v. Seats, we expanded on our previous cases to clarify the
factors a district court should consider when faced with a case in which
it had the discretion to sentence a juvenile to life in prison without the
possibility of parole. 865 N.W.2d 545, 556–57 (Iowa 2015). Finally, we
recently categorically banned the imposition of life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles in State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa
2016). We noted that part of the justification for the categorical ban on
juvenile life-without-parole sentences is that the Miller individualized
sentencing hearing is insufficient in that context since “we are asking the
sentencer to do the impossible, namely, to determine whether the
offender is ‘irretrievably corrupt’ at a time when even trained
professionals with years of clinical experience would not attempt to make
such a determination.” Id. at 837. We found that it was the parole board
that was best situated to discern which offenders are irreparably corrupt
and which have benefited from opportunities for maturation and
rehabilitation. Id. at 839.
C. Application to the Present Case. Propps argues that Iowa’s
forcible felony sentencing provision is unconstitutional because it does
not allow the sentencing judge the option of probation and therefore,
14
mandates a prison sentence, however short, for juveniles. See Iowa Code
§ 907.3 (2011). 3 Although the sentencing statute allows for
indeterminate sentences, Propps argues that the sentencing structure
does not allow the sentencing judge to “consider the mitigating factors of
the offender, specifically a juvenile offender, upon conviction of this
crime.”
Propps seeks to expand Lyle to cases such as his, even though he
has no mandatory minimum period of incarceration and he is
immediately eligible for parole. We decline to do so. Completely
eliminating the mandatory imposition of a prison term, even when the
term is indeterminate and the individual is immediately eligible for
parole, would not serve the proportionality concept we have addressed in
our previous juvenile sentencing cases. In those cases, we sought to
eliminate the mandatory nature of mandatory minimums and sentences
that were the functional equivalent of life without parole because those
sentences did not offer juveniles a “meaningful opportunity” to
demonstrate their rehabilitation before the parole board. See, e.g., Lyle,
854 N.W.2d at 402–03; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 75; Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at
97; Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121. Our goal was not to excuse the
3In 2013, the legislature adopted the following provision:
14. Notwithstanding any provision in section 907.3 or any other
provision of law prescribing a mandatory minimum sentence for the
offense, if the defendant, other than a child being prosecuted as a
youthful offender, is guilty of a public offense other than a class “A”
felony, and was under the age of eighteen at the time the offense was
committed, the court may suspend the sentence in whole or in part,
including any mandatory minimum sentence, or with the consent of the
defendant, defer judgment or sentence, and place the defendant on
probation upon such conditions as the court may require.
Iowa Acts ch. 42, § 14 (codified at Iowa Code § 901.5(14) (2014)). Propps does not argue
that this provision applies to his resentencing.
15
behavior of juveniles, but rather to impose punishment in a way that was
consistent with the lesser culpability and greater capacity for change of
juvenile offenders. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 398, 402–03; Null, 836 N.W.2d at
75 (“[W]hile youth is a mitigating factor in sentencing, it is not an
excuse.”). We were concerned that offering “geriatric release” or the
geriatric opportunity for parole was not consistent with the concept of
proportionality. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71.
This is in stark contrast to the situation presented here. In this
case, Propps was immediately eligible for parole and able to demonstrate
by his own actions his maturation and rehabilitation. When a one-size-
fits-all mandatory minimum is imposed, an arbitrary amount of time
spent in prison dictates when a juvenile will be released. See, e.g.,
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 122. In contrast, when an indeterminate
sentence is given that contains no mandatory minimum sentence and
allows a juvenile to be immediately eligible for parole, the juvenile
defendant’s behavior in prison dictates when parole will be available—
with the potential for immediate parole if rehabilitation, maturity, and
reform have been demonstrated. See, e.g., Louisell, 865 N.W.2d at 601.
It is true that immediate eligibility for parole is not the same as
immediately coming before the parole board for review. See Iowa Code
§ 906.5(1). We require the board of parole to review the status of
individuals eligible for parole on an annual basis. Id. However, in our
juvenile sentencing cases, we have never required that release on parole
be immediate. See, e.g., Louisell, 865 N.W.2d at 602 (establishing that
the opportunity for parole need only be realistic and meaningful). We
have instead required that juvenile defendants must be given a realistic
and meaningful opportunity to demonstrate maturity and
rehabilitation—if a sentencing judge, exercising discretion, determines
16
parole should be available. Id. at 601. Propps’ immediate eligibility for
parole, upon the parameters outlined in section 906.5, is both realistic
and meaningful.
The analysis undertaken by the parole board for parole eligibility is
an individualized analysis that considers the juvenile’s past, in addition
to current psychiatric and psychological evaluations, the time already
served on the sentence, any reports of misconduct or good behavior, and
the inmate’s attitude and behavior while incarcerated. See Iowa Code
§ 906.5(3). We noted in Louisell that the factors utilized by the parole
board to determine parole eligibility may not “account for the mitigating
attributes of youth that are constitutionally required sentencing
considerations.” 865 N.W.2d at 602. However, more recently, we noted
that the Miller individualized sentencing hearings are insufficient in the
context of life-without-parole sentencing. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 837
(“[W]e are asking the sentencer to do the impossible, namely, to
determine whether the offender is ‘irretrievably corrupt’ at a time when
even trained professionals with years of clinical experience would not
attempt to make such a determination.”). In our most recent case,
Sweet, we found that the parole board was best situated to discern which
juvenile homicide offenders have benefited from opportunities for
maturation and rehabilitation. Id. at 839. The parole board has the
benefit of seeing the individual offender’s actual behavior, rather than
having to attempt to predict chances at maturity and rehabilitation
based on speculation.
Further, allowing a sentencing judge to grant a suspended
sentence for a forcible felony may not further the purpose of
rehabilitation. While juveniles may be more prone to reform and
rehabilitation because of their age and the attendant characteristics of
17
youth, they must also understand the severity of their actions. See Lyle,
854 N.W.2d at 398–99. Harm to a victim is not lessened because of the
young age of an offender, and “[t]he constitutional analysis is not about
excusing juvenile behavior, but imposing punishment in a way that is
consistent with our understanding of humanity today.” Id. at 398.
Allowing a sentence of merely probation for forcible felonies may excuse
the criminal behavior of the juvenile offender and disproportionately
weigh this equation to only consider the age and culpability of the
offender without the harm he or she caused to a victim. Because an
indeterminate sentence allows for immediate eligibility for parole, a
juvenile is able to demonstrate to the parole board whether he or she
appreciated the harm done and utilized the options available for reform.
If rehabilitation has not yet occurred, the parole board may make the
decision to continue incarceration until the juvenile has demonstrated
through his or her own actions the ability to appreciate the severity of
the crime. This is consistent with the approach of our prior holdings in
the area of juvenile sentencing, because it allows for a realistic and
meaningful opportunity for parole upon the juvenile’s demonstration of
maturity and rehabilitation. We find that there is no constitutional
infirmity in Iowa Code section 907.3. This provision does not violate the
Iowa Constitution under a cruel and unusual punishment analysis.
D. Gross Disproportionality. Having determined that the
sentence for willful injury survives a categorical challenge, we now turn
to Propps’s claim that the sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him,
which we analyze for gross disproportionality. See, e.g., State v. Oliver,
812 N.W.2d 636, 647 (Iowa 2012). In his brief in support of his motion
to correct an illegal sentence, Propps did not specifically distinguish
between the argument that his sentence was grossly disproportionate as
18
applied to him and the argument that the sentencing structure was
categorically unconstitutional. The district court decided the case on a
categorical basis and did not address the question of gross
disproportionality. On appeal, Propps argued his sentence was
unconstitutional as applied to him, and the court of appeals considered
and rejected the argument.
While we generally do not decide cases based on grounds not
raised in the district court, in Bruegger we allowed a defendant to
continue with an as-applied challenge when his brief did not clearly
distinguish between a categorical or as-applied attack on his sentence.
773 N.W.2d at 884. Because Propps’s brief was likewise unclear, we will
continue with the analysis under an as-applied framework.
When we determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate
to an offender’s crime, we utilize a three-step analysis. Oliver, 812
N.W.2d at 647. The first step in this analysis is a threshold question,
and if the first step is not satisfied, we need not proceed to steps two and
three. Id. Our first step is to determine whether Propps’s sentence leads
to the inference that it was grossly disproportionate. Id. “This
preliminary test involves a balancing of the gravity of the crime against
the severity of the sentence.” Id. (quoting Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873).
Step two requires an intrajurisdictional analysis in which we “compar[e]
the challenged sentence to sentences for other crimes within the
jurisdiction.” Id. Step three requires an interjurisdictional analysis, and
we “compar[e] sentences in other jurisdictions for the same or similar
crimes.” Id.
We now turn to the threshold inquiry to determine whether
Propps’s sentence leads to an inference of gross disproportionality to his
crime. When we consider this first step, we have established a few
19
general principles to guide our analysis. Id. at 650. First, we give
substantial deference to the legislature when it establishes punishments
for certain crimes. Id. Second, “it is rare that a sentence will be so
grossly disproportionate to the crime as to satisfy the threshold inquiry
and warrant further review.” Id. Third, a recidivist offender is more
culpable than a first-time offender and therefore more deserving of a
longer sentence. Id. Last, a case can have unique feature that may
“converge to generate a high risk of potential gross disproportionality”
and so we must consider the unique facts of the case. Id. (quoting
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 884).
In this case, Propps’s challenge to his sentence is not the rare
sentence that survives the first step of our analysis. Propps was
sentenced to four indeterminate sentences not to exceed ten years each
for four counts of willful injury causing serious injury, and he was
immediately eligible for parole. The legislature has determined that there
are certain crimes that are so severe that a defendant should not be
eligible for a sentence of probation. See Iowa Code § 907.3. Forcible
felonies such as willful injury causing serious injury are among those
crimes the legislature has deemed severe. Id. § 702.11(1); id. § 708.4(1);
id. § 907.3. We give deference to the legislature’s determination that
these crimes are more deserving of sentences of incarceration rather
than probation. Additionally, the gravity of Propps’s crime was high.
Propps fired four shots at his victim and fled the scene. His actions
required a lengthy hospital stay for Carr. In contrast, his sentence was
not severe. Propps was sentenced to four indeterminate sentences,
making him immediately eligible for parole review. The gravity of
Propps’s crime was high, and the severity of his sentence was low. See,
e.g., Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 647. This was not the rare case that satisfies
20
our threshold inquiry and requires us to continue to steps two and three
of the analysis. We hold that Propps’s sentence was not unconstitutional
under a gross disproportionality analysis.
E. Miller Hearing. Because we determine that the sentence
Propps received is not categorically unconstitutional, and thus there is
no constitutional infirmity with the statute, we decline to extend the
requirement of a Miller individualized sentencing hearing to juvenile
defendants who are not subject to a mandatory minimum period of
incarceration. Propps is therefore not entitled to a Miller individualized
sentencing hearing. He has received a meaningful, reasonable, and
immediate opportunity for parole, which is all that is required under our
decision in Lyle and the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
V. Conclusion.
We hold that the forcible felony sentencing statute, Iowa Code
section 907.3, is not unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders.
Additionally, in considering a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the
district court is not required to conduct a Miller individualized sentencing
hearing. We therefore annul the writ.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; WRIT
ANNULLED.
Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., join this opinion. Cady, C.J., files a
concurring opinion in which Wiggins, J., joins. Appel, J., files a
dissenting opinion in which Hecht, J., joins.
21
#15–0235, State v. Propps
CADY, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the result reached by the majority.
We have taken important steps in recent years to recognize
constitutional protections in the sentencing of juvenile offenders. While
the nature of some criminal acts committed by juveniles can be
indistinguishable to those of adults and can challenge faith in humanity
just the same, the scientific understanding of the human brain has
evolved to give greater shape to the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 54
(Iowa 2013) (“[D]evelopments in social psychology and neuroscience have
reinforced traditional notions that juveniles and adults are, in fact, quite
different.”). This constitutional standard now sees juveniles as less
culpable than adults and recognizes their significantly greater capacity
for rehabilitation. Id. at 74–75. Juveniles are less culpable because they
lack maturity and a sense of responsibility, are more prone to impulsive
behavior, and are more vulnerable to negative influences. See State v.
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 393, 398 (Iowa 2014) (“[T]he time when a
seventeen-year-old could seriously be considered to have adult-like
culpability has passed.”). Personality traits of juveniles are less fixed
than adults, and this difference gives juvenile offenders a greater chance
for reform. See id. at 400 (“Given the juvenile’s greater capacity for
growth and reform, it is likely a juvenile can rehabilitate faster if given
the appropriate opportunity.”). With this understanding, the penological
justifications for a fixed mandatory sentence of imprisonment collapse
and our constitution demands that we judge juveniles by a different
sentencing process than adults.
22
If the sentencing protections we have recognized for juvenile
offenders under our Iowa Constitution were derived solely from their
diminished culpability, my view would be more aligned with the dissent
in this case. But scientific evidence of lesser culpability is not the single
driving force behind our new protections. The constitutional protections
we have recognized do not target mandatory incarceration of juvenile
offenders, but mandatory incarceration of juvenile offenders with no
opportunity during the period of incarceration to show the greater
likelihood of rehabilitation and reform has occurred. Id. at 403 (“A
statute that sends all juvenile offenders to prison for a minimum period of
time under all circumstances simply cannot satisfy the standards of
decency and fairness embedded in article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution.” (Emphasis added.)). The cruel and unusual punishment
that is mandatory minimum sentencing of juveniles lies in the total
failure to account for the underdeveloped brain of a juvenile. It lies in
treating a juvenile like an adult. But the brain development of a juvenile
is a process tied to the passage of time, often years. See State v. Sweet,
879 N.W.2d 811, 838 (Iowa 2016) (“Social science suggests reliable
answers to these questions come only with the benefit of time and
completion of brain development.”). Thus, the constitutional protection
plays out within the process of parole, not probation. It plays out in our
constitutional standard of cruel and unusual punishment, not only
because of juveniles’ diminished culpability, but also because of
personality changes that accompany their maturity with adulthood. The
constitutional standard relies on time for this rehabilitation to occur. It
requires only an opportunity for these changes to be considered as
directed by the advancements of science.
23
Our constitutional standards need to grow along with our greater
understanding, but no further.
Wiggins, J., joins this special concurrence.
24
#15–0235, State v. Propps
APPEL, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Iowa Code sections 702.11 and 907.3 (2011) mandate that a
district court impose prison time for all persons convicted of forcible
felonies, thereby precluding the possibility that a juvenile might be
placed on probation. The mandatory prison term is automatically
imposed on adults and juveniles alike. The question in this case is
whether these automatic, one-size-fits-all statutes may be applied
equally to adults and to juveniles notwithstanding the observations of the
United States Supreme Court and this court that because of their
reduced moral culpability, children are “constitutionally different from
adults for sentencing purposes” and this constitutional difference is not
“crime-specific.” State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 65 (Iowa 2013) (quoting
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–65 (2012)).
I. Recent Caselaw Related to the Application of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clauses of the United States and Iowa
Constitutions to Juvenile Offenders.
A. Overview of Recent United States Supreme Court Cases. In
a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has considered the
application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the United
States Constitution to sentencing children convicted of crimes committed
while under the age of eighteen. See Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct.
2455; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). In the now familiar
trilogy of Roper, Graham, and Miller, the United States Supreme Court
outlined a number of features of youth, concluding that children are
“constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing” and
25
that these differences were not “crime-specific.” Miller, 567 U.S. at ___,
132 S. Ct. at 2464–65; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S. Ct. at
2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
The United States Supreme Court based its determination that
children are “constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing” because of the characteristics of youth. Miller, 567 U.S. at
___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. Among other things, the United States Supreme
Court noted that youth have less developed judgment, that children do
not manifest the same level of responsibility or maturity as adults, that
they are more susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures—
including peer pressure, and that the character and personality of a child
are not developed to the same extent as an adult. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___,
132 S. Ct. at 2464; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper,
543 U.S. at 569–70, 125 S. Ct. at 1195–96. As a result, juvenile
offenders generally have less moral culpability for their crimes than adult
offenders. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65. The United
States Supreme Court emphasized that its observations about the
diminished culpability of youth were not “crime-specific” but are
generally applicable. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
Applying the above principles, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the United States
Constitution (1) categorically prohibited the imposition of the death
penalty on juvenile criminal offenders, Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79, 125
S. Ct. at 1200; (2) categorically prohibited the imposition of life without
the possibility of parole to juveniles for nonhomicide offenses, Graham,
560 U.S. at 82, 130 S. Ct. at 2034; and (3) prohibited the imposition of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for homicide offenses
unless a court determined, after an evidentiary hearing, that the juvenile
26
was one of those uncommon juveniles who demonstrated irretrievable
depravity, Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
In reaching these conclusions, the Roper–Graham–Miller trilogy
relied, at least in part, on neuroscientific developments, indicating a
willingness to consider the scientific developments in evaluating
constitutional issues. 4 Further, in Miller particularly, the Supreme Court
moved away from its reliance on societal consensus in evaluating claims
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment and toward reliance on the Court’s own independent
judgment. 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2473; see John F. Stinneford,
Youth Matters: Miller v. Alabama and the Future of Juvenile Sentencing,
11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 1, 4–5 (2013). The United States Supreme Court
also cited international norms, noting, for instance, that the United
States was the only country in the world to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, 125 S. Ct. at 1198. 5
A fundamental question after Miller has been whether the
principles announced therein should be given a broad or narrow gloss.
Initially, the battle lines were drawn over the question of whether the
4For a summary of the scientific developments, see Elizabeth Scott, et al.,
Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 675, 684–
87 (2016).
5Aside from sentencing, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the
differences between juveniles and adults in other criminal justice contexts. On two
occasions, the Supreme Court has barred the use of confessions obtained under
circumstances that would have led to a different result if the suspect were an adult.
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 1213 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, 601, 68 S. Ct. 302, 304 (1948). Further, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the
Supreme Court held that a determination of whether a minor is in custody should take
into account the age of the suspect. 564 U.S. 261, 265, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011);
see generally Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-
Appropriate Sentencing, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 457, 488–89 (2012) (noting that
J.D.B. “mark[ed] a return to special protections for youth that characterized the Court’s
confession suppression caselaw more than half a century ago”).
27
holding in Miller was merely procedural or substantive. The question
was important, as procedural caselaw developments are generally not
given retroactive effect, while substantive changes are generally applied
retroactively.
Some courts took a narrow view of Miller, suggesting that it was
only a procedural decision and therefore the decision was not retroactive.
The general notion espoused by these courts was that Miller required
only a hearing, but that the substance of the law changed little. See,
e.g., People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 825 (Mich. 2014), vacated sub nom.
Davis v. Michigan, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1356 (2016); Chambers v.
State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328–31 (Minn. 2013), overruled by Jackson v.
State, 883 N.W.2d 272, 279 (Minn. 2016). We joined other courts in
viewing Miller broadly as substantive in nature. See State v. Ragland,
836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013); see also People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709,
722 (Ill. 2014); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y, 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013).
The United States Supreme Court settled this particular question
in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). In
Montgomery, the Supreme Court held that Miller was substantive and
should be given retroactive effect. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 736. In
particular, the Court in Montgomery emphasized that the decision in
Miller was not just a matter of process, but a matter of substance,
namely, that because of the distinctive characteristics and the lessened
culpability of youth, only in extremely rare cases could children be
subject to life sentences without the possibility of parole even in cases
involving homicide. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34. The Montgomery
Court suggested that states could meet the constitutional requirement of
Miller by simply enacting statutes that eliminated juvenile life sentences
without the possibility of parole. See id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
28
After Montgomery, however, the battle lines moved but the fight
continues. Some seek to find ways to limit the scope of Roper, Graham,
and Miller by asserting, for instance, that the principles apply only in the
death penalty or life-without-the-possibility-of-parole contexts and do not
apply to aggregate sentences that may add up to lengthy prison terms.
Proponents of a narrow reading of Roper, Graham, and Miller tend
to minimize the statement in Miller that children are “constitutionally
different” and the declaration that the principles enunciated in Roper and
Graham are not “crime-specific.” See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 124, 130
S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the Court’s opinion
affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the
possibility of parole.”); United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 214 (2d
Cir. 2013) (“Much less does a five-year sentence equate to one of ‘the
law’s most serious punishments’ so as to raise the constitutional
concerns identified in Miller v. Alabama about the mandatory application
of life without parole to all juveniles.” (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132
S. Ct. at 2471)); Silva v. McDonald, 891 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1131 (C.D.
Cal. 2012) (“Notwithstanding the holdings in Roper, Graham, or Miller,
this Court is not aware of any controlling Supreme Court precedent
which holds, or could be construed to hold, that the sentence at issue
here of 40-years-to-life with the possibility of parole, for a juvenile . . .
violates the Eighth Amendment.”).
Proponents of a broad view believe the principles of Roper, Graham,
and Miller apply outside the factual confines of the cases. For instance,
in Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, the Connecticut Supreme
Court applied the Roper–Graham–Miller trilogy to a fifty-year sentence
without the possibility of parole, a term of years, even though Roper,
Graham, and Miller involved only death or life-without-the-possibility-of-
29
parole sentences. 115 A.3d 1031, 1045, 1048 (Conn. 2015). A number
of commentators have stressed the general applicability of the Roper,
Graham, and Miller principles to criminal justice settings involving
juveniles. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 Iowa L.
Rev. 1787, 1789 (2016) (characterizing Miller as “a revolutionary
decision” that “portends a tremendous shift in juvenile justice policy and
practice”); Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility,
Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson,
and the Youth Discount, 31 Law & Ineq. 263, 317 n.287 (2013)
(“[Adolescents’] crimes may be the same as those of adults, but these
offenders simply are not adults and should not be sentenced as if they
were.” (quoting ABA, The State of Criminal Justice 329 (2007)); Martin
Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate
Sentencing, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 457, 458 (2012) [hereinafter
Guggenheim] (arguing that, after Graham, “juveniles have a substantive
constitutional right to be sentenced as juveniles and that mandatory
sentencing schemes designed for adults may not be automatically
imposed on juveniles without courts first conducting a sentencing
hearing at which prosecutors must bear the burden of proving that the
juvenile deserves the sentence”); Elizabeth Scott et al., Juvenile
Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 675,
676 (2016) [hereinafter Scott] (“[M]any lawmakers have concluded that
the analysis and principles at the heart of the Supreme Court’s
constitutional framework have important implications for juvenile
sentencing and parole regulation beyond the death penalty and [life
without the possibility of parole].”).
Those viewing Miller as establishing broad principles of law draw
support from Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Miller. In his dissent, he
30
agreed with those who saw the larger application of Miller principles.
Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2481–82 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
According to Chief Justice Roberts, by emphasizing that children are
different, the majority in Miller announced a general principle of reduced
culpability that applies not only to the crimes at issue in the cases but
generally to the criminal conduct of young offenders. Id. at ___, 132
S. Ct. at 2481–82; see also Scott, 88 Temp. L. Rev. at 681. As will be
seen below, our cases agree with the Chief Justice’s assessment.
B. Overview of Recent Iowa Supreme Court Cases. We have
considered the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Roper,
Graham, and Miller in a series of juvenile cases in which challenges to
sentences were raised under the cruel and unusual punishment
provision of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. State v. Sweet,
879 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa 2016); State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa
2016); State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d
107; State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2013); Null, 836 N.W.2d 41.
These cases generally demonstrate a broad and consistent application of
the Roper–Graham–Miller principles under article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution.
We began our response to Roper, Graham, and Miller in Ragland,
836 N.W.2d 107. In Ragland, we held that a life-without-the-possibility-
of-parole sentence, even if commuted to a mandatory term of sixty years,
violated the Roper–Graham–Miller principles under article I, section 17 of
the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 122. In doing so, we explained that the
substantive nature of the Miller holding limited the ability of the state to
impose life without the possibility of parole without an individualized
hearing. Id. at 114–17.
 31
In Null, we modestly extended the approach in Ragland to a case in
which a juvenile was sentenced to a mandatory term of 52.5 years. 836
N.W.2d at 45. In Null, we recognized that his 52.5-year sentence might
not technically be life without the possibility of parole, but emphasized
the application of the principles of Roper, Graham, and Miller. Id. at 72–
73. Specifically, we stated “the notions in Roper, Graham, and Miller that
‘children are different’ and that they are categorically less culpable than
adult offenders apply as fully in this case as in any other.” Id. at 71.
We thus recognized that the teaching of Roper, Graham, and Miller
is not crime specific. Id. at 72–73. In Null, we held that the Roper–
Graham–Miller principles apply to lengthy prison terms imposed as a
result of consecutive sentencing. Id. at 74.
Similarly, in Pearson, a seventeen-year-old offender convicted of
two counts of first-degree robbery and two counts of first-degree burglary
received a total cumulative sentence of fifty years and was not eligible for
parole for thirty-five years. 836 N.W.2d at 91, 93, 96. As in Null, we
noted that because “ ‘children are constitutionally different from adults,’
they ordinarily cannot be held to the same standard of culpability as
adults in criminal sentencing.” Id. at 95 (quoting Null, 836 N.W.2d at
74). We concluded the Roper–Graham–Miller principles applied and that
it should be “rare or uncommon” for children to receive a lengthy prison
term without the possibility of parole for the crimes committed in the
case. Id. at 96. We remanded the matter to the district court for
resentencing. Id. at 97.
In Lyle, a seventeen-year-old offender convicted of robbery in the
second degree was sentenced to a ten-year prison sentence with a
mandatory minimum of seven years. 854 N.W.2d at 381. We held that
the Roper–Graham–Miller principles applied, vacated the sentence, and
32
remanded the case to the district court for a Miller-type hearing. Id. at
404. We concluded,
Miller is properly read to support a new sentencing
framework that reconsiders mandatory sentencing for all
children. Mandatory minimum sentencing results in cruel
and unusual punishment due to the differences between
children and adults. This rationale applies to all crimes, and
no principled basis exists to cabin the protection only for the
most serious crimes.
Id. at 402.
We further stated that “the sentencing of juveniles according to
statutorily required mandatory minimums does not adequately serve the
legitimate penological objectives in light of the child’s categorically
diminished culpability.” Id. at 398. We noted that individualized
sentencing requires the sentencer to “look[] behind the label of the crime
into the details of the particular offense and the individual circumstances
of the child.” Id. at 400–01. We again noted that the principles of Roper,
Graham, and Miller are not crime specific. Id. at 399.
Since Lyle, there have been two additional juvenile cruel and
unusual punishment cases under article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution. In Seats, we emphasized that in the context of a Miller-type
hearing the district court was to consider the features of youth outlined
in Roper, Graham, and Miller as mitigating factors, and we required
specific factual findings before a juvenile was sentenced to a mandatory
term. 865 N.W.2d at 555–58. In Sweet, we held that life without the
possibility of parole was categorically prohibited under article I, section
17 of the Iowa Constitution. 879 N.W.2d at 839.
All the above cases emphasize several common themes drawn from
Roper, Graham, and Miller. First, we have repeatedly stated that for
purposes of the cruel and unusual punishment provision of article I,
33
section 17, “children are different.” Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96; Null, 836
N.W.2d at 71. Second, we have repeatedly emphasized that the
differences between children and adults are not “crime specific.” Lyle,
854 N.W.2d at 401; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70.
We have thus not limited Roper, Graham, and Miller to their
specific factual context of life without the possibility of parole, as some
have urged, but have instead applied the principles to mandatory prison
terms of sixty years, 52.5 years, thirty years, and seven years. Further,
we have emphasized that youth is a mitigating factor and that district
courts should engage in detailed fact-finding before coming to the
conclusion that adult sentences may be appropriate for juvenile
offenders. Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 557–58; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70.
Finally, we have repeatedly emphasized that the fact that a youth is
approaching eighteen years of age does not defeat application of the
Roper–Graham–Miller principles. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 831; Null, 836
N.W.2d at 55.
II. Application of Principles Under Article I, Section 17 of the
Iowa Constitution.
In this case, the offender has been convicted of offenses involving a
forcible felony. The legislature has determined that these offenses tend
to be more serious than nonforcible offenses and, as a result, a
mandatory prison term is required for all offenders, including juvenile
offenders.
The problem, however, is that under these statutes, juveniles and
adults are treated the same. There is no recognition that juveniles are
“constitutionally different” from adults and there is no recognition that
this difference is not “crime specific.” Thus, two of the bedrock principles
of Roper, Graham, and Miller, as applied in our cases, are offended by the
34
undiscriminating nature of the statutes. See, e.g., Pearson, 836 N.W.2d
at 96; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71–72.
Further, the application of the statutes, in this and every case,
amounts to a de facto mandatory minimum prison term. Under these
statutes, a juvenile offender will serve what amounts to a mandatory
prison term of some length. Although formally eligible for parole from
day one, it is clear, as a practical matter, that no action will be taken
until the offender has been incarcerated for some period of time. It
amounts to a de facto mandatory minimum sentence of undetermined
length.
It is, of course, true that the offender is eligible for parole from day
one. But this is form over substance. We have crossed the form over
substance bridge before. In Ragland, the argument was made that a
sixty-year mandatory prison term was not life without the possibility of
parole and thus was outside the Roper–Graham–Miller principles. 836
N.W.2d at 121. We rejected the claim, noting that the reasoning in
Graham applies to life without the possibility of parole and to terms that
are its practical equivalent. Id.
A mandatory minimum prison term of six months applied
indiscriminately to juveniles and adults would certainly violate Lyle
principles. An indefinite mandatory prison term applied to both juveniles
and adults suffers from the same kind of infirmity. Under the
circumstances, we think the better approach is to allow a juvenile
offender the opportunity to demonstrate why he or she should be treated
differently than an adult.
Under the teaching of Roper, Graham, and Miller as implemented in
the Ragland–Null–Pearson–Lyle–Seats–Sweet line of cases, the features of
youth—namely, the impetuousness, the recklessness, the susceptibility
35
to peer pressure, the lack of judgment—are not crime specific. They are
applicable to all crimes. In Lyle, we declared application of these
principles prevents the legislature from categorically imposing a
mandatory minimum prison sentence that treats all juvenile offenders as
if they were adults and refuses to allow a court to recognize the
decreased culpability of youth. 854 N.W.2d at 402. Thus, in Lyle, we
held that a seven-year mandatory minimum sentence could not be
imposed without a hearing to consider the impact of the characteristics
of youth in lessening criminal culpability. Id.
The defect of the statutes in this case is that they mandatorily
apply to all juveniles and adults. They focus solely on the crime and
prohibit in all cases consideration of the diminished culpability of a
juvenile offender. See Guggenheim, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 490–91
(“When the only inquiry made by the sentencing court is to consult the
legislature’s mandatory punishment for the crime, without any further
inquiry into whether the punishment is appropriate for a juvenile, for no
other reason that it is appropriate for an adult, the Constitution requires
more.”). Juveniles generally have less culpability than adults, and if that
is true, they generally should receive lesser punishment for the same
crime.
Further, there may well be circumstances, for instance, in which a
juvenile offender is convicted of aiding and abetting under circumstances
in which the offense occurred but was not intended by the juvenile, the
juvenile had no direct involvement in the crime, and the Roper–Graham–
Miller factors weigh strongly in favor of diminished culpability. As we
noted in Lyle, “A forcible felony can be the product of inane juvenile
schoolyard conduct just as it can be the product of the cold and
36
calculated adult conduct most people typically associate with a forcible
felony . . . .” 854 N.W.2d at 401.
Could a mandatory prison term be automatically imposed on
Propps without an opportunity to show diminished culpability in a Miller-
type hearing? I think not. Under our cases, and particularly under Lyle,
a juvenile offender is entitled to a judicial determination that an
indefinite period of incarceration for the individual defendant is not so
disproportionate as to result in cruel and unusual punishment.
I recognize there are alternative theories that could affirm the
district court in this case. For instance, it could be argued that the only
automatic or mandatory result of the statutes is a relatively short period
of confinement before a juvenile is considered for parole and that, in the
case of forcible felonies, such a relatively brief period of mandatory
imprisonment is constitutional as applied to all juvenile offenders. This
rationale has some appeal. Yet, the mandatory nature of incarceration is
much more appropriate for adults than for children with categorically
diminished culpability. Further, some forcible felonies may be very
serious offenses, while others less so. Finally, the difference between
incarceration for a few months and potential probation is substantial and
more than just a mere matter of calendar time. A prison term even for a
relatively short period of time is crossing of a major Rubicon for the
juvenile offender. A trip to the big house, no matter how brief, is not a
de minimis event.
Another possibility would be to short circuit the Miller procedure in
this case because of the unattractive nature of the facts so far developed.
At the age of seventeen, Propps shot a person four times. No one would
argue that the conduct of Propps amounted to inane schoolyard
misconduct. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 401. These facts alone make him
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a strong candidate for incarceration as reflected in the district court’s
imposition of four consecutive ten-year sentences.
Yet, Propps is entitled to attempt to make his Miller case before the
district court. We do not deprive criminal defendants of procedural
rights merely because of their perceived lack of merit. Just as a
seemingly obviously guilty defendant is entitled to demand a fair trial, a
juvenile offender is entitled to attempt to show that his diminished
culpability recognized in Roper, Graham, and Miller requires that he or
she be treated differently than adults for sentencing purposes. In short,
we are confronted in this appeal with a question of law and procedure,
not a question focusing on the specific facts and circumstances of Propps
and his crimes.
I would thus remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings. Nothing in this opinion, of course, precludes an
appropriate prison sentence for Propps. What is precluded, under our
approach to the Roper–Graham–Miller principles, is a statutory scheme
imposing mandatory prison terms that categorically treat children the
same as adults without affording an opportunity to show the diminished
culpability of youth requires a different outcome. I would decide this
case on this narrow, but important point.
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent.
Hecht, J., joins this dissent.