State Of Iowa Vs. Joann Minnie Kamber

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 76 / 05-1868
Filed August 17, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JOANN MINNIE KAMBER,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________________
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, John D.
Lloyd, Judge.
Defendant seeks further review of court of appeals decision
affirming her sentence for theft in the second degree, claiming district
court erroneously failed to consider sentencing option of deferred
judgment. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. SENTENCE
VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Nan Jennisch and
Dennis D. Hendrickson, Assistant State Appellate Defenders, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and John H.
Judisch, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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TERNUS, Chief Justice.
The defendant, JoAnn Kamber, was sentenced to five years
imprisonment, suspended, with two years probation after pleading guilty
to theft in the second degree. Although the defendant had requested a
deferred judgment, the district court determined she was ineligible for
this sentencing option because she had been given deferred sentences for
two prior theft convictions. The defendant appeals, claiming the court
erred in concluding she was not eligible for a deferred judgment. We
agree the defendant’s prior deferred sentences do not render her
ineligible for a deferred judgment. Therefore, we vacate her sentence and
remand for resentencing.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On September 29, 2005, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to a
charge of theft in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections
714.1 and 714.2(2) (2005). At her subsequent sentencing, her counsel
asked the court to impose a deferred judgment. The State resisted this
request, pointing out the defendant had two prior deferred sentences for
theft. The State claimed these deferred sentences made the defendant
ineligible for a deferred judgment under Iowa Code section 907.3(1)(c),
which provides in relevant part:
1. With the consent of the defendant, the court may
defer judgment and may place the defendant on probation
upon conditions as it may require. . . .
However, this subsection shall not apply if any of the
following is true:
....
c. Prior to the commission of the offense the defendant
had been granted a deferred judgment or similar relief, two
or more times anywhere in the United States.
Iowa Code § 907.3(1)(c).
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The district court concluded deferred sentences were “similar
relief” to deferred judgments within the meaning of section 907.3(1)(c),
and therefore, the defendant was ineligible for a deferred judgment. The
district court then sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate term not
to exceed five years, suspended the sentence, and placed Kamber on
probation for two years. The defendant was also fined and ordered to
pay costs and fees.
Kamber appealed, asserting the district court erred in concluding
she was ineligible for a deferred judgment. Her appeal was transferred to
the court of appeals where the defendant’s sentence was affirmed. Like
the district court, the court of appeals concluded that a deferred
judgment and deferred sentence were “similar relief.” This court granted
the defendant’s application for further review.
II. Scope of Review.
This case poses a question of statutory interpretation. Therefore,
our review is for correction of errors of law. See State v. Wiederien, 709
N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 2006).
III. Discussion.
The issue before this court is what sentencing options the
legislature intended by its enactment of section 907.3(1)(c). We are
guided by well-established rules of statutory construction:
[L]egislative intent is expressed by what the legislature has
said, not [by] what it could or might have said. When a
statute’s language is clear, we look no further for meaning
than its express terms. Intent may be expressed by the
omission, as well as the inclusion, of statutory terms. Put
another way, the express mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of other things not specifically mentioned.
State v. Beach, 630 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted).
Another rule of statutory interpretation that is useful in this particular
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case is the principle that a statute is interpreted as an integrated whole.
See State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2003). In other words,
we consider the context of the provision at issue and interpret the
provision consistent with the entire statute of which it is a part. Id.
Finally, we keep in mind that the legislature may define the terms it
uses, and when it does, those definitions are the foundation of our
analysis. See State v. Durgin, 328 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Iowa 1983).
The parties focus the majority of their arguments on the
similarities and dissimilarities of deferred judgments and deferred
sentences. Clearly, these sentencing options are alike in some respects,
but they are not synonymous. In chapter 907, the legislature has
separately defined these terms:
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise
requires:
1. “Deferred judgment” means a sentencing option
whereby both the adjudication of guilt and the imposition of
a sentence are deferred by the court. . . .
2. “Deferred sentence” means a sentencing option
whereby the court enters an adjudication of guilt but does
not impose a sentence. . . .
Iowa Code § 907.1. While not conclusive, these distinct definitions signal
the legislature’s intent that a deferred judgment is something different
than a deferred sentence. At the same time, these sentencing options are
somewhat similar in that they both allow a defendant to avoid the
imposition of a sentence.
We turn, then, to the specific statutory provision we must interpret
and examine the context within which the language at issue appears.
The statute in which the subject language is found, section 907.3(1), has
several paragraphs that limit a defendant’s eligibility for a deferred
5
judgment. We quote portions of the statute that shed light on the
meaning of paragraph (c):
1. With the consent of the defendant, the court may
defer judgment and may place the defendant on probation
upon conditions as it may require. . . .
However, this subsection shall not apply if any of the
following is true:
....
c. Prior to the commission of the offense the defendant
had been granted a deferred judgment or similar relief, two or
more times anywhere in the United States.
d. Prior to the commission of the offense the
defendant had been granted a deferred judgment or similar
relief in a felony prosecution anywhere in the United States
within the preceding five years . . . .
....
g. The offense is a violation of section 321J.2 and the
person has been convicted of a violation of that section or
the person’s driver’s license has been revoked under chapter
321J, and any of the following apply:
....
(3) If the defendant has previously received a deferred
judgment or sentence for a violation of section 321J.2,
subsection 1, or for a violation of a statute in another state
substantially corresponding to section 321J.2, subsection 1.
....
h. Prior to the commission of the offense the
defendant had been granted a deferred judgment or deferred
sentence for a violation of section 708.2 or 708.2A which was
issued on a domestic abuse assault, or was granted similar
relief anywhere in the United States . . . .
Id. § 907.3(1) (emphasis added).
In another subsection of the same statute, the legislature states
the circumstances under which the court may defer sentencing. See id.
§ 907.3(2). This subsection provides that the court may not defer
sentence for a violation of section 708.2A “if the defendant has previously
received a deferred judgment or sentence for a violation of section 708.2
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or 708.2A which was issued on a domestic abuse assault, or if similar
relief was granted anywhere in the United States . . . .” Id. § 907.3(2)(a)
(emphasis added). Similarly, a deferred sentence is prohibited “[i]f the
defendant has previously received a deferred judgment or sentence for a
violation of section 321J.2, subsection 1, or for a violation of a statute in
another state substantially corresponding to section 321J.2, subsection
1.” Id. § 907.3(2)(c)(3) (emphasis added).
When the statute is considered as an integrated whole, it is
apparent that when the legislature intended to include both deferred
judgments and deferred sentences, it expressly referred to both
sentencing options. This view leads us to the conclusion that when the
legislature did not use both terms, but only “deferred judgment,” it meant
only deferred judgments and not deferred sentences. Accordingly, we
think the legislature’s use of the phrase “similar relief” in section
907.3(1)(c) was not a vague attempt to include deferred sentences within
the scope of that provision. Rather, the phrase “similar relief” was meant
to describe sentences from “anywhere in the United States” in which
“both the adjudication of guilt and the imposition of a sentence” were
deferred even though the foreign jurisdiction may refer to such relief by a
name other than “deferred judgment.”
IV. Summary and Disposition.
We hold section 907.3(1)(c) prohibits a defendant who has
previously received two or more deferred judgments from obtaining
another deferred judgment, but it does not prohibit a defendant who has
only received two or more deferred sentences for prior offenses from
receiving a deferred judgment. The district court erred in refusing to
consider the option of a deferred judgment when it sentenced the
defendant because the defendant’s prior convictions resulted in deferred
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sentences, not deferred judgments. We vacate the court of appeals’
contrary decision, vacate the defendant’s sentence, and remand this case
for resentencing.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED. SENTENCE
VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.