Rodrigo Adolpho Amaya v. State Public Defender

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 20–1346
Submitted March 23, 2022—Filed June 24, 2022
Amended August 31, 2022
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Petitioner,
vs.
RODRIGO ADOLPHO AMAYA,
Respondent.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sarah Crane, Judge.
The State Public Defender challenges a trial court order finding Iowa Code
section 815.1 unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and granting the defendant’s request for ancillary services at state
expense. WRIT SUSTAINED.
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Waterman,
Mansfield, McDonald, and McDermott, JJ., joined. Christensen, C.J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Appel, J., joined.
Appel, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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Jeff Wright, State Public Defender, and William Bushell (argued), Assistant
State Public Defender, for the plaintiff.
Benjamin D. Bergmann (argued) and Alexander Smith of Parrish
Kruidenier Dunn Gentry Brown Bergmann & Messamer, L.L.P., Des Moines, for
the defendant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and David M. Ranscht (argued) and
Samuel P. Langholz, Assistant Attorneys General, for amicus curiae State of
Iowa.
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OXLEY, Justice.
An estimated 70%–80% of Iowa criminal defendants are indigent,1 which
means that when they are facing what may be one of the most difficult
circumstances of their lives, they get a court-appointed attorney selected by a
judge unless their family, friends, or others are able to hire a private attorney of
the defendant’s choosing. Once hired, that attorney may need to hire
investigators and experts to help with the defense, but those cost even more
money. In 2019, the Iowa General Assembly enacted Iowa Code section 815.1—
changing the process by which an indigent defendant can obtain state funding
for investigation costs when represented by privately retained counsel. 2019
Iowa Acts ch. 51, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 815.1 (2020)). This appeal requires
us to determine whether those changes unconstitutionally pit an indigent
defendant’s right to an attorney of his choosing against his right to services
needed to allow him to put on an adequate defense. We conclude they do not.
I. Factual Background & Proceedings.
Twenty-two-year-old Rodrigo Amaya faces sexual abuse and sexual
exploitation charges after police discovered him and a fifteen-year-old girl in the
backseat of his car in a secluded area of a city park and videos of the girl on his
phone. The court determined Amaya was indigent and appointed the public
defender’s office to represent him. Amaya’s mother was able to pull together
$15,000 and retained Benjamin Bergmann, a private attorney who had
1See Anjela Shutts, President’s Letter, Iowa Law., Feb. 2022, at 5, 5.
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experience in sexual abuse cases and was conversant in Spanish to better
communicate with Amaya and his family.
Bergmann wanted to hire an investigator and experts to help with Amaya’s
defense, so Amaya filed a motion with the district court requesting funds from
the state to pay for these needed services. Defendants represented by
court-appointed counsel receive reasonably necessary ancillary services such as
investigation services, the cost of transcripts for depositions, and experts as part
of the court appointment. See Iowa Code §§ 815.7 (court-appointed attorneys are
entitled to reasonable fees and expenses), .10A (providing process for court-
appointed attorneys to seek reimbursement of expenses) (2019). Before Iowa
Code section 815.1 was enacted, indigent defendants with privately retained
counsel could seek state funding for those same ancillary services as long as the
defendant showed he was indigent and the court determined the requested
services were reasonably necessary.
Effective July 1, 2019, the Iowa General Assembly passed Iowa Code
section 815.1, which provides a process for determining whether an indigent
defendant who is represented by a privately retained attorney is entitled to have
ancillary services paid by the state. 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 51, § 1 (codified at Iowa
Code § 815.1 (2020)). The district court may grant an application for state funds
for ancillary services if it finds: (1) the defendant is indigent and unable to pay
the costs, (2) the costs are reasonable and necessary for the defendant’s
representation, and (3) the funds available to the retained counsel are
insufficient to cover the requested costs. Iowa Code § 815.1(4)(a)–(c). Amaya
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challenges the process used to determine that last step—whether the funds paid
to the retained attorney are insufficient to cover the requested costs.
To support the third step of the application process, the retained attorney
must provide the court with information about the financial arrangement of his
representation, including a copy of the fee agreement, the agreed-upon hourly
rate, the amount of the retainer or other money received, the number of hours
worked in the case to date, and the expected or anticipated hours needed to
finish the case. Id. § 815.1(2)(a), (c)–(e). The court then uses a formula that
multiplies the anticipated total hours by an hourly rate. Id. § 815.1(4)(c)(1).
Instead of using the retained attorney’s agreed-upon rate, the formula uses the
statutory contract rate for court-appointed attorneys under Iowa Code section
815.7. Id. § 815.1(4)(c)(1). If that “calculated product” is greater than the amount
available to the retained attorney, the district court can authorize the requested
services at state expense. Id. § 815.1(4)(c)(2). If it is not, the application must be
denied. Id. § 815.1(4). In essence, the statute precludes state payment for
ancillary services for an indigent defendant represented by retained counsel
unless the defendant can show that payments to the retained attorney would not
cover the retained attorney’s time when calculated at the state contract-attorney
rate, regardless of the arrangement between the third party and the retained
counsel.
As a practical matter, this process would not be a big deal if the statutory
contract rate was in the ballpark of the retained attorney’s rate. In other
contexts, attorneys are used to having their rates compared to a lodestar rate.
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See, e.g., Lee v. State, 906 N.W.2d 186, 197 n.8 (Iowa 2018) (reviewing a statutory
award of fees under the Family and Medical Leave Act and explaining: “The
starting point in determining attorney fees is generally the lodestar. Courts
calculate the lodestar by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended
by a reasonable hourly rate.” (citations omitted)). At the time Bergmann was
hired, the contract rate was $63 per hour for representing a defendant charged
with Amaya’s crimes (the current rate is $68), a rate declared to be “reasonable
compensation” by the general assembly. See Iowa Code § 815.7(5)–(6).
Bergmann’s agreement with Amaya’s mother charges him out at $300 per hour,
a rate no one suggests is out of line for privately retained criminal defense
attorneys in Des Moines.
Amaya takes issue with the legislature’s characterization of its statutory
contract rates as “reasonable compensation.” In support of his argument, he
offers a recent letter authored by The Iowa State Bar Association president
discussing that it takes the average Iowa lawyer $75 per hour to breakeven, the
state rates are nearly 60% below the federal appointed-attorney contract rate of
$155, and in the last ten years the number of Iowa attorneys willing to contract
with the public defender’s office has been cut in half, from 1,200 attorneys to
now only 650. See Anjela Shutts, President’s Letter, Iowa Law., Feb. 2022, at 5,
5. But no evidence was presented to the district court (including the letter from
the February 2022 issue of The Iowa Lawyer magazine) to support a finding that
$63 per hour is an unreasonable rate. Nor was the district court asked to find
that rate unreasonable.
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Amaya’s motion for services generally sought funds to cover the costs of
an investigator and depositions but did not request specific amounts.2 Instead,
his motion challenged the constitutionality of section 815.1 under both the
Federal and Iowa Constitutions. He specifically argued that to the extent section
815.1 incorporates the contract rate from section 815.7, it requires private
attorneys to either lower their hourly rate to the $63 contract rate or forego
taking depositions, serving subpoenas, undertaking investigations, and hiring
expert witnesses. Amaya argues that this places indigent defendants who are
able to retain a private attorney through a third-party source in a Hobson’s
choice: he can either keep his counsel of choice but without the needed ancillary
services or he can forego his counsel of choice and accept a court-appointed
attorney to receive the needed services at state expense. Requiring him to give
up one or the other, argued Amaya, violated his constitutional rights.
After objection by the State Public Defender (SPD), who is part of the
application process, see Iowa Code § 815.1(3) (requiring a copy of the application
and attached documents to be submitted to the public defender), Bergmann
provided a copy of his fee agreement with Amaya’s mother, which required a
$15,000 retainer and specified an hourly rate of $300. Bergmann informed the
court he had performed 16.1 hours and estimated that Amaya’s case would
2At the district court hearing on Amaya’s application for state funding for the ancillary
services, Amaya’s counsel mentioned two doctors, one who would charge $1,500 and another
who would charge $2,000, though it is unclear if he planned to hire one or both of them. Amaya’s
counsel did not request a specific amount to cover depositions or any other type of investigators.
During the oral argument on appeal, Amaya’s counsel agreed that $5,000 would be on the high
side needed to cover typical ancillary services in a case like Amaya’s.
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require an additional 70 hours of his time through trial. At his hourly rate of
$300, counsel expected his representation to cost $25,830, thereby exceeding
the $15,000 retainer and leaving nothing left to cover the litigation costs.3
However, using the statutory contract rate of $63 per hour, Bergmann’s 86.1
projected hours4 totaled $5,424, leaving $9,576 from the retainer to cover the
requested ancillary services and making Amaya ineligible for state funding for
these costs.
The district court concluded that using the contract rate to determine
whether funds paid to a privately retained attorney were insufficient to cover
reasonable and necessary litigation costs to trigger state funding violated
Amaya’s rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The court reasoned:
Although, the Iowa legislature may determine appropriate
procedures to implement a constitutional right, those procedures
cannot serve to deny access to the constitutional right.
Through section 815.1, the Defendant’s right to auxiliary
services at State expense is conditioned on whether the private
attorney will accept payment at a rate far below the customary
private market. If the defense attorney will not accept lower rates
3At oral argument to our court, Bergmann made the professional statement that in these
kinds of cases he generally does not receive compensation beyond the initial retainer, a situation
he expected to hold true in Amaya’s case.
4Bergmann also reported to the district court that one associate attorney had already
billed 53 hours at $250 per hour and another had billed 5.8 hours at $200. Combined with the
16.1 hours of time by lead counsel, the firm had already billed $19,240 and consumed the
$15,000 retainer. Counsel stated there was an outstanding balance owed for the difference. The
SPD objected to considering billings for more than the lead attorney, see Iowa Code § 815.1(2)(a)
(referring to the number of hours worked by “the attorney,” singular), and the district court and
parties considered only lead counsel’s projected total of 86.1 hours for purposes of the statutory
calculations. Amaya does not challenge on appeal the district court’s decision to disregard the
associates’ hours in determining whether funds are available from the retainer to cover ancillary
services, so we do not address whether those additional hours should have been included in the
section 815.1(4)(c) calculation.
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and the Defendant (or family member) cannot afford to pay the
private attorney their rate and also pay for auxiliary services, the
defendant has two choices: 1) abandon the privately retained
counsel and accept court-appointed counsel, at which point the
defendant could obtain auxiliary services at state expense or
2) forego the additional auxiliary services.
Additionally, the district court reasoned that using the court-appointed
hourly rate from Iowa Code section 815.7 in the statutory calculation forced
counsel to work at that lower rate, instead of the agreed-upon rate. The district
court severed that portion of the statute, used Amaya’s counsel’s agreed rate of
$300, and concluded that funds available to counsel were in fact insufficient to
cover the requested litigations costs. The district court granted in full Amaya’s
request for investigative services and depositions at state expense.
The SPD filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s order, and we
retained the case.
II. Form of Review.
The parties and the State (as amicus) dispute the proper form of our
review. The SPD argues the district court’s order was a final judgment subject to
direct appeal, relying on Iowa Code § 13B.4(4)(d)(7). The State argues the district
court’s review of an application under section 815.1 is a preclaim determination
not subject to the claim process in section 13B.4, such that the SPD’s appeal
should have been brought pursuant to a writ of certiorari. See Crowell v. State
Pub. Def., 845 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Iowa 2014). Amaya takes no position on the
proper form of review but agrees we can, and should, decide the issues raised.
Although the parties are correct that we can consider the appeal even if
the SPD was not entitled to appeal as a matter of right, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.108
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(providing that a case initiated under the wrong form of review “shall proceed as
though the proper form of review had been requested”), we nonetheless answer
the question as it will be a recurring issue.
Parties may appeal as a matter of right only from a final judgment. Id. r.
6.102(2). In 2006, the general assembly amended Iowa Code section
13B.4(4)(d)(7), declaring: “The decision of the court following a hearing on the
motion is a final judgment appealable by the state public defender or the
claimant.” 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1041, § 3 (codified at Iowa Code § 13B.4(4)(d)
(2006)). But what motion? Section 13B.4(4) provides a process for the SPD to
review specific claims for payment of indigent defense costs, providing the
parameters under which the SPD may approve, deny, or reduce the claims. Iowa
Code § 13B.4(4)(c). Paragraph (d) allows a claimant to file a motion with the
district court for review of any claim the SPD denies or reduces. Id. § 13B.4(4)(d).
The district court’s ruling on this motion is the order the general assembly
declared to be a final order immediately appealable as a matter of right in section
13B.4(4)(d)(7).
The decision at issue here is from a motion directly to the district court
under section 815.1 seeking preapproval for state funding of litigation expenses.
See id. § 815.1(1)–(2). It is not the type of decision covered by section
13B.4(4)(d)(7). Indeed, section 815.1 contemplates that once an order for
expenses is granted, the defendant will then use the process identified in section
13B.4(4) to seek payment or reimbursement by submitting a claim pursuant to
section 13B.4(4)(c). See id. § 815.1(7) (directing the retained attorney or claimant
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for state-funded expenses to “submit a claim for payment in accordance with the
rules of the state public defender”). The plain language of section 13B.4(4)(d)(7)
does not extend to the order at issue in this appeal and is therefore not a final
order.
The SPD is not a party to the underlying case, although by statute it had
a right to, and did, participate in the underlying hearing. A writ of certiorari is
“available to all persons who may show a substantial interest in the matter
challenged.” Crowell, 845 N.W.2d at 683 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hohl v. Bd.
of Educ., 94 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Iowa 1959)); see also State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist.
Ct., 594 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Iowa 1999) (“It has long been established that the proper
mode of review of a trial court’s allowance of fees . . . is by petition to this court
for an original writ of certiorari.”). Since we have concluded the district court’s
order is not a final judgment under section 13B.4, SPD was required to bring an
original action by way of a petition for writ of certiorari. See Iowa R. App. P.
6.107. We treat the notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, grant the
petition, and proceed to the merits. See id. r. 6.108.
III. Preliminary Matters.
We first address some preliminary matters before getting into the
constitutional issues.
A. Did Section 815.1 Force Amaya’s Retained Attorney to Work for
the Court-Appointed Contract Rate? Amaya brought an as-applied challenge
to the constitutionality of section 815.1, so it is important to understand how
the statutory framework applies specifically to his case. We start with some math
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to put the parties’ positions into proper context. Amaya argues section 815.1’s
use of section 815.7’s rates forces his retained counsel to work at the $63
court-appointed contract rate even though Amaya’s mother agreed to pay
Bergmann $300 per hour, a conclusion the district court also made. But taking
Bergmann at his word that he does not expect to receive more than the $15,000
retainer, Bergmann is already being paid less than $300 per hour. Bergmann
expected to work a total of 86.1 hours on Amaya’s case. Ignoring the two
associates working on the file, Bergmann’s effective rate is more like $174 per
hour ($15,000 divided by 86.1 hours). The point is that even though Bergmann
charges $300 per hour, in cases where he accepts a retainer from an indigent
defendant’s family even he does not expect to actually receive that rate.
Another math problem is needed to determine Bergmann’s effective rate if
part of the $15,000 retainer is used to cover the requested ancillary services.
Amaya did not ask for a specific amount to cover the investigation and deposition
costs, choosing instead to focus on his constitutional challenge to the statute.
Without a specific requested amount, this math may be a little fuzzy. But at oral
argument, Bergmann agreed that $5,000 would be on the high side of the
amount he would expect to spend for ancillary services in a case like Amaya’s.
Using the retainer to pay the estimated $5,000 would leave $10,000 to cover
Bergmann’s fees. And using the parties’ agreed amount of 86.1 hours as the total
estimated hours for purposes of the statutory formula, Bergmann would still
receive an effective rate of $116 per hour. The point here is that even estimating
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high, denying state funding for Amaya’s ancillary services would not force
Bergmann to work for the court-appointed contract rate of $63 per hour.
So, for purposes of discussion, the more accurate comparison is
Bergmann’s effective rate of $174 per hour if he is not required to cover ancillary
services out of the retainer and $116 per hour if he is.
B. What Funds Have Been or Are to Be Paid to Amaya’s Retained
Counsel? Amaya challenges the process used to determine the third
requirement of section 815.1, which allows the state to pay for ancillary services
only if the funds available to the retained counsel are insufficient to cover the
requested costs. Iowa Code § 815.1(4)(c). He does not argue with the underlying
premise that if funds available to the retained attorney are sufficient to cover the
ancillary services then state funds should not be used. Rather, he challenges the
process that uses the court-appointed contract rate in making that
determination.
In the fee agreement, Amaya’s mother expressly agreed to pay—either
directly or through reimbursement to Bergmann—the same ancillary services
Amaya seeks to have paid by the state, including deposition expenses, expert
witness fees, and investigators. The fee agreement identified the $15,000
payment as an “initial retainer and expense deposit” and explained that the total
fees and costs may exceed the amount of the deposit, for which Amaya’s mother
agreed to pay.
Where a third party agrees to pay the ancillary services associated with
representing an indigent defendant, the defendant can hardly claim that the
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state’s refusal to cover those same costs violates his constitutional rights. A
third-party agreement to pay those costs is no different than a third-party
agreement to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees, which the state is not
constitutionally obligated to pay. See In re Cannady, 600 A.2d 459, 463 (N.J.
1991) (“We recognize that the friends and families of indigent defendants have
the right to engage private counsel. Of course, the State is not required to pay
for counsel of the defendant’s choice at public expense.”). So if the third party
agrees to cover ancillary services as well as the attorney’s fees, there is no
constitutional basis for requiring the state to cover them.
Bergmann’s fee agreement obligates Amaya’s mother to cover the litigation
expenses. Section 815.1 speaks in terms of “moneys paid or to be paid to the
privately retained attorney.” Iowa Code § 815.1(4)(c) (emphasis added). As a
matter of basic contract principles, money owed under a contract would
generally be considered “moneys . . . to be paid.” Id. A straight reading of the
statute could end this case here—Amaya’s mother agreed to cover the costs of
the services sought in Amaya’s motion for state funding so “moneys . . . to be
paid” to Bergmann under the fee agreement are sufficient to pay the requested
services, id., and the statutory requirements are not met even without
considering the challenged formula.
But that leaves some unanswered and concerning questions about what a
retained attorney requesting state funding must show. By its plain terms, the
statute requires the district court to consider all monies to be received, even if
not yet in hand. But what of monies contractually obligated but not really
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expected? What collection efforts must an attorney undertake to show that
contractually owing payments are not forthcoming, and therefore not “to be paid”
as contemplated by section 815.1(4)(c)? There are certainly ways a retained
attorney could game the system, but we do not see that as an issue here. In any
event, the district court was not presented with this issue and did not decide it.
We leave for another day the interpretation of this portion of section 815.1(4)(c)
and turn to the constitutional issues raised by this appeal.
IV. Analysis.
“We review constitutional challenges to a statute de novo.” State v.
Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Iowa 2013) (quoting State v. Seering, 701
N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2005), superseded by statute on other grounds, 2009 Iowa
Acts ch. 119, § 3 (codified at Iowa Code § 692A.103 (Supp. 2009)), as recognized
in Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., v. Reynolds, 962 N.W.2d 37, 46
(Iowa 2021)). Statutes “are cloaked with a strong presumption of
constitutionality” and any challenger must prove unconstitutionality “beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 200 (Iowa 2002).
A. What Constitutional Protections Support an Indigent Defendant’s
Right to Ancillary Services? This case involves two distinct interests: the right
to counsel of choice and the right to ancillary litigation services (e.g.,
investigators, experts, and depositions) reasonably necessary to put on a
defense. A defendant’s constitutional right to counsel under both the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the
Iowa Constitution includes the right to counsel of choice, i.e., “the counsel [the
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defendant] believes to be best,” as long as the defendant does not require counsel
appointed at state expense. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144–
46 (2006); see also State v. Smith, 761 N.W.2d 63, 69–70 (Iowa 2009) (construing
article I, section 10 consistent with the similarly worded Sixth Amendment,
which “guarantees the defendant the right to be represented by an otherwise
qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire, or who is willing to
represent the defendant even though he is without funds” (quoting Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. at 144)). But that right is not absolute. See, e.g., State v. Miller,
542 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Iowa 1995) (explaining defendant did not have the right to
be represented by unlicensed counsel). The right is more accurately described as
“grant[ing] a defendant ‘a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.’ ”
Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5, 11 (2016) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 53 (1932)).
A defendant has no right, for example, to an attorney who is not a
member of the bar, or who has a conflict of interest due to a
relationship with an opposing party. And an indigent defendant,
while entitled to adequate representation, has no right to have the
Government pay for his preferred representational choice.
Id. at 11–12 (citations omitted). But as a general matter, as long as Amaya is
able to secure counsel without state funding, he has a constitutionally protected
right to his counsel of choice, which in this case is Bergmann. Id. at 12
(recognizing the right, though limited, is still a fundamental right).
Separately, we have held that an indigent defendant has a right to
reasonably necessary ancillary services paid at state expense, even if the
defendant is represented by counsel retained by a third party. See English v.
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Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 293–94 (Iowa 1981) (holding the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel included the right to a handwriting expert
at state expense for an indigent defendant with privately retained counsel).
English v. Missildine is at the heart of the parties’ dispute and was the basis for
the district court’s ruling that part of section 815.1 is unconstitutional.
Mark English, an indigent 18-year-old, was charged with theft, and his
mother paid $900 to retain private counsel for him. Id. at 293. However, English’s
mother could not afford to pay for the services of a handwriting expert or the
costs of a court reporter to obtain a transcript of needed depositions, so English
applied for those services at state expense. Id. The parties agreed the pretrial
services were reasonably necessary for defending the case and that there were
no funds available to pay for those services. Id. We prefaced the analysis in
Missildine by explaining, “[T]his is not a case where an accused has rendered
himself impecunious by an unreasonable expenditure of funds to retain private
counsel. Nor is it a case where counsel’s fee should reasonably be expected to
cover investigative services.” Id. at 294 (emphasis added). More on that last
sentence later.
English relied solely on the Sixth Amendment to support his claimed
constitutional entitlement to a state-funded handwriting expert, and we limited
our analysis accordingly. Id. at 293. We recognized that “the right to effective
counsel [for indigent defendants] includes the right to public payment for
reasonably necessary investigative services.” Id. at 293–94 (citing State v.
Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 104–05 (Iowa 1973); State v. Hancock, 164 N.W.2d
18330, 333 (Iowa 1969)). Iowa Code section 815.7, which provided ancillary
services to indigent defendants represented by court-appointed counsel, only
“partially implement[ed] this constitutional right” because “the Constitution
independently mandates judicial recognition of an indigent’s right to necessary
investigative services.” Missildine, 311 N.W.2d at 294 (citing Williams, 207
N.W.2d at 104). We rejected the state’s argument that the defendant’s remedy
was to accept court-appointed counsel, which would entitle him to the requested
services under section 815.7. Id. This remedy merely “beg[ged] the question.” Id.If . . . the sixth amendment provides authority for furnishing
investigative services to indigents at public expense without regard
to whether the indigent is represented by counsel at public expense,
the fact that indigents represented by counsel at public expense
have the same right is not material. It would be strange if the
Constitution required the government to furnish both counsel and
investigative services in cases where the indigent needs and requests
public payment for only investigative services. The State’s theory
would impose an unreasonable and unnecessary additional burden
on the public treasury.
Id.The parties question whether Missildine remains good law in light of a
subsequent United States Supreme Court case, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68(1985). There, the Supreme Court identified the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause as the source protecting a criminal defendant’s right to state
funding for a psychiatrist deemed necessary to support his insanity defense. See
id. at 76, 86–87. The Supreme Court
has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power to
bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take
steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present
his defense. This elementary principle, grounded in significant part
on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of
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fundamental fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot be
equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding
in which his liberty is at stake.
Id. at 76. Although a state is not required to “purchase for the indigent defendant
all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might buy,” the Court held that
“fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to ‘an adequate opportunity
to present their claims fairly within the adversary system.’ ” Id. at 77 (quoting
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)). Where the defendant’s sanity was “a
significant factor at trial,” the Supreme Court made clear that its “concern is that
the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist” to help evaluate,
prepare, and present the defense. Id. at 83 (emphasis added). “[A]s in the case of
the provision of counsel,” the Supreme Court left “to the State the decision on
how to implement this right.” Id. Having relied on the Due Process Clause, the
Supreme Court “ha[d] no occasion to consider the applicability of the Equal
Protection Clause, or the Sixth Amendment, in this context.” Id. at 87 n.13.
Although our analysis in Missildine was necessarily limited to the Sixth
Amendment based on the way the case reached us, our reliance on State v.
Williams and State v. Hancock reveals that we recognized a broader
constitutional base for state-funded ancillary services for indigent defendants.
See Missildine, 311 N.W.2d at 293–94 (citing Williams, 207 N.W.2d at 104–05;
Hancock, 164 N.W.2d at 333). In Williams, we explained that an indigent
defendant represented by appointed counsel was entitled to the costs to
reasonably investigate the charges against him at state expense both as a matter
of providing effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and
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article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, and as a matter of providing a fair
trial as required by the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
and article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. See 207 N.W.2d at 104. In
Hancock, we recognized that “the denial of defendant’s request for a handwriting
analysis has overtones sounding in due process and equal protection of the
laws.” 164 N.W.2d at 333. Our reliance on Williams and Hancock reveals that an
indigent defendant’s right to state-funded ancillary litigation services is
grounded as well in fundamental fairness protected by due process. Ake does
not undermine our holding in Missildine, and we see no reason to retreat from it
here.
B. Does the Section 815.1 Framework Unconstitutionally Pit an
Indigent Defendant’s Right to Counsel of Choice Against His Right to
State-Funded Ancillary Services? Ake makes clear that the right to
state-funded ancillary services is not unconditional. Ake was concerned with
ensuring indigent defendants have an “adequate opportunity” to present their
defense, Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 612), and that they
have “access to competent” ancillary services when reasonably necessary to that
defense, id. at 83. Ake further left application of the right to ancillary services to
states to administer, id., much the way states ensure a criminal defendant’s right
to representation. So what does a state need to do to ensure an “adequate
opportunity” to present a defense and “access” to reasonably necessary ancillary
services?
21
The same way that an indigent defendant whose family or friends pay for
a private attorney cannot require the state to pay that attorney, see Cannady,
600 A.2d at 463, he likewise cannot require the state to pay for ancillary services
necessary to his defense that are also paid by family members. Recall that we
prefaced our analysis in Missildine by noting it was not “a case where counsel’s
fee should reasonably be expected to cover investigative services.” 311 N.W.2d
at 294. This case picks up where Missildine left off. And section 815.1 is the
general assembly’s answer to that question. Our role is to ensure that answer
does not violate Amaya’s constitutional rights.
To some extent, section 815.1 follows Justice Uhlenhopp’s special
concurrence in Missildine. Justice Uhlenhopp suggested that before retained
counsel was allowed to seek state funding for ancillary services he should be
required to “account for the use of his private retainer on the basis of the ordinary
and customary charges in the community.” Id. at 295–96 (Uhlenhopp, J.,
concurring specially). Section 815.1 requires counsel to account for the funds,
but in doing so, limits counsel to a statutory rate—the
court-appointed contract rate—to determine counsel’s total expected fees instead
of his agreed-upon rate. If there are funds available to the retained counsel to
cover the ancillary services under the statutory formula, the indigent defendant
has funds available for purposes of the statute and is not entitled to seek state
funding.
We are unaware of any other case involving a constitutional challenge to a
statute like Iowa’s. Some states expressly limit state funding for ancillary
22
services to state-provided attorneys. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 413 P.3d 306,
316–17 (Colo. App. 2017) (relying on Colorado Supreme Court precedent to
construe Colorado statutes governing the office of the state public defender
collectively to mean that a defendant “only [has] a right to state-funded ancillary
services if the public defender or court-appointed alternate defense counsel
represented him”); State v. Earl, 345 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Utah 2015) (explaining
that Utah’s public defender statute “generally condition[ed] an indigent
defendant’s eligibility for [ancillary services] on the retention of publicly funded
counsel”).
Other state statutes are less explicit, requiring courts to construe whether
the statute limits ancillary services to indigent defendants with court-appointed
counsel or allows payment for indigent defendants with privately retained
counsel. See, e.g., Tran v. Super. Ct., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506, 509–11 (Ct. App.
2001) (considering Cal. Penal Code § 987.9); State v. Wang, 92 A.3d 220, 237–
40 (Conn. 2014) (considering Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51–292); Duke v. State, 856
S.E.2d 250, 256–58 (Ga. 2021) (considering whether Georgia’s Indigent Defense
Act, which allowed the director to contract with outside consultants as necessary
to provide services contemplated by the chapter, applied to services requested
by pro bono counsel); State v. Brown, 134 P.3d 753, 757–60 (N.M. 2006)
(considering whether New Mexico’s Indigent Defense Act, which provides
“necessary services . . . of representation” to “needy persons” applied to pro bono
counsel (omission in original) (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31–16–3(A))). Where the
statute is not clear, some courts have interpreted their state’s statutes to allow
23
state funding for indigent defendants with retained counsel as a matter of
statutory construction. See, e.g., Cannady, 600 A.2d at 459, 462 (holding that
an indigent defendant whose family paid for a private attorney was entitled to
have the public defender agency pay for an expert witness because “New Jersey’s
policy is to provide counsel for all indigent defendants, not just for indigents
represented by the [Office of the Public Defender]”); State v. Wool, 648 A.2d 655,
658, 660 (Vt. 1994) (holding pro se defendant was entitled to payment of
investigative and expert witness services under Vermont’s Public Defender Act,
explaining that the services are distinct from the state’s obligation to provide
public representation and cannot be conditioned on accepting court-appointed
counsel). Having addressed the right as a statutory matter, these courts did not
address whether the services were required as a constitutional matter.
However, courts facing constitutional challenges to their state’s rules
about ancillary services have been divided over the issue of whether limiting the
ancillary services to only state-provided counsel violates an indigent defendant’s
constitutional rights. The divide turns on the court’s determination of whether
the constitutional right to ancillary services is tethered to, or severable from, the
right to counsel. Courts that conclude the constitutional rights are tethered hold
a state may limit access to state funding for ancillary services to indigent
defendants represented by state-provided counsel. See, e.g., Thompson, 413 P.3d
at 318 (“[A] defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s
money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are the only way
that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice.” (quoting
24
Caplin & Drysdale, Charted v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989))); Moore
v. State, 889 A.2d 325, 348 (Md. 2005) (“The State satisfied the Due Process
Clause, as interpreted in Ake, by making expert assistance available to Moore
through the [Office of the Public Defender], conditioned on representation by that
agency.”); Earl, 345 P.3d at 1157–58 (recognizing the right to
“government-funded defense resources long guaranteed [i]s an adjunct to the
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment” and concluding that a defendant
who accepts “the private counsel of her choice . . . has no constitutional right to
defense resources from a secondary source backed by government funding”). We
have already determined that the right to state-funded ancillary services is
distinct from the right to counsel under Ake and Missildine, so we disagree with
those courts’ underlying premise. In any event, Iowa’s statute allows indigent
defendants with retained counsel to receive state funding for ancillary services,
so we are faced with a different issue.
Other courts hold a state’s funding mechanism that limits ancillary
services to court-appointed attorneys is unconstitutional because the rights are
related but distinct under Ake, so bundling the ancillary services with
court-appointed counsel did not satisfy the separate constitutional right. See,
e.g., Wang, 92 A.3d at 231–32 (holding that a self-represented indigent defendant
has a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to publicly funded expert and
investigative services, reasoning that “the due process right articulated in Ake is
not tethered to the right to counsel”); Duke, 856 S.E.2d at 256–57 (holding that
a Georgia statute allowed pro bono attorneys to contract for ancillary services for
25
their indigent clients); id. at 263 (Peterson, J., concurring) (“Ake makes clear that
the availability of funding for ancillary defense services involves a right
independently rooted in the Due Process Clause.”); Brown, 134 P.3d at 759–60
(“That right [to ancillary services] is not contingent upon the appointment of
Department counsel; it is inherent under the state and federal Constitutions.”).
These cases involved pro se or pro bono representation, or cases like Missildine
where there was no question that limited funds provided to counsel would not
also cover needed expert fees. The separate issue of whether funds provided to
the retained counsel could be expected to cover ancillary services was not at
issue.
The case most directly on point that both recognized the right to ancillary
services as severable from the right to counsel as a matter of constitutional law
and also involved paid retained counsel is Tran v. Superior Ct., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d
506. There, an indigent defendant’s family retained a private attorney to defend
his capital murder case for $300,000. Id. at 507. The agreement expressly
excluded payment of ancillary services, and the retained counsel sought $17,369
in state funding for an investigation, psychological evaluation, interpreter, and
transcriber services.5 Id. at 508. The California Court of Appeal rejected the
district court’s reliance on two out-of-state opinions, including Justice
Uhlenhopp’s concurrence in Missildine, to limit state funding for ancillary
5California
Penal Code section 987.9(a) provided: “In the trial of a capital case . . . the
indigent defendant, through the defendant’s counsel, may request the court for funds for the
specific payment of investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the
defense.”
26
services based on an “ordinary and customary charges” test. Id. at 509–10.6 The
court held that “[r]ote application of an ordinary-and-customary-charges test in
cases where retained counsel seeks public funds for ancillary services is bad
policy, however, and it is contrary to at least the tone of California precedent.”
Id. at 509–12 (discussing California cases holding that access to ancillary
services is afforded to all indigent defendants, not just indigent defendants with
appointed counsel, and holding that a family member’s agreement with retained
counsel that excluded payment of ancillary services precluded the court from
considering the third-party payment of attorney’s fees in determining indigency).
Amaya makes similar arguments in his challenge to section 815.1’s use of
the rates paid to court-appointed contract attorneys to determine his eligibility
for funding, which is $63 per hour for relevant purposes. Amaya claims that this
formula pits his constitutionally protected right to his counsel of choice (when
paid by a third party) against his constitutionally protected right to receive
ancillary services at state expense, placing him in a Hobson’s choice he should
not have to make.
To the extent Amaya argues the statute requires his privately retained
attorney to adjust his compensation rate to the state contract rate if he is going
to receive state funding for his requested investigation and deposition expenses,
Amaya’s argument fails as a factual matter. Remember our math problems? The
statutory scheme reduced Mr. Bergmann’s effective rate of $174 per hour to $116
6The other case, State ex rel. Rojas v. Wilkes, 455 S.E.2d 575, 577 (W. Va. 1995), did not
involve constitutional claims but only addressed an indigent defendant’s right to state-funded
ancillary services as a statutory matter under West Virginia Code section 29–21–16(e).
27
per hour, so almost double the $63 rate paid to court-appointed contract
attorneys. While Amaya overstates the effect of the statutory scheme, we
nonetheless recognize that it does require Bergmann to work on Amaya’s case
for less than he agreed. The question is whether that statutory scheme burdens
Amaya’s competing constitutional rights to a degree that he is denied one or the
other.
To the extent Amaya argues he is forced to pick either his counsel of choice
or ancillary services needed for his defense, that would be true only if his counsel
refuses to represent Amaya if he is required to cover the ancillary expenses out
of the funds he has been paid. Again, Amaya’s claim fails as a factual matter.
There is no evidence that Bergmann has refused to cover the services out of the
$15,000 retainer. And as we have shown, requiring the ancillary services to be
paid from the retainer still leaves Bergmann with fees at an effective rate of $116
per hour.
The statute does not put Amaya in the place of literally having to choose
between his counsel of choice and state funding for ancillary services as is the
case under statutory schemes that bundle the provision of ancillary services to
state-provided counsel. In People v. Thompson, an indigent defendant with
privately retained counsel was forced to fire his retained counsel and accept
court-appointed counsel to receive needed ancillary services because Colorado’s
system provided funding for ancillary services only for defendants represented
by court-appointed counsel. 413 P.3d at 315–17. The defendant challenged the
system as “plac[ing] [him] on the horns of a constitutional dilemma” because he
28
had to choose between his counsel of choice and the “right to present his defense,
via the ancillary services.” Id. at 316. Here, Amaya can have both his counsel of
choice and state-funded ancillary services, although with limits.
From a constitutional perspective, the real issue presented in this case is
not whether $63 per hour is a reasonable rate but whether denying state-funded
ancillary services if third-party funding could reasonably be expected to cover
both the ancillary services and the attorney’s fees violates either the right to
counsel of choice or to the ancillary services. We could follow the California
court’s lead and look only to the agreement between the attorney and the third
party. But that would not help Amaya since the fee agreement between his
mother and Bergmann included an agreement for his mother to pay for ancillary
services. So the real issue is whether Justice Uhlenhopp was correct that the
Constitution allows the state to require the attorney to account for the third-
party funds and use those funds to cover ancillary services to the extent the
funds provide the retained attorney a reasonable fee, even if that fee is below the
agreed rate.
We agree with Justice Uhlenhopp that funds available to retained counsel
by a third party are relevant to the issue of whether an indigent defendant is
entitled to state funding for ancillary services as a constitutional matter. We have
concluded that the constitutional right to needed ancillary services is distinct
from the constitutional right to counsel, but we have also recognized they are
related. The constitutional right at issue is the right to put on a defense, and the
defendant’s attorney is generally the one who is tasked with that job. Cf. State v.
29
DiFrisco, 804 A.2d 507, 536 (N.J. 2002) (citing Cannady, (which recognized the
right to ancillary services is severable from the right to counsel) but rejecting a
standalone claim for ineffective assistance of an expert because “the deficient
performance that implicates a defendant’s right in that respect is the
performance of counsel who obtained the expert’s examinations or presented the
evidence at trial”). Our holding in Missildine and the Supreme Court’s holding in
Ake recognize that when a state brings its might against a criminal defendant,
the state must provide an indigent defendant with those ancillary services
necessary to defend himself. Yet, the right to state-funded ancillary services is
not absolute, as is the right to state-funded counsel; it is limited to access to
ancillary services reasonably necessary to allow a defendant an adequate
opportunity to put on a defense. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 77, 83.
Ake left to states to determine the best way to provide ancillary services,
similar to the way it provides counsel at state expense. Id. at 83. With respect to
state-funded counsel, the Iowa General Assembly has satisfied that obligation
by creating a public defender’s office, which is supplemented by court-appointed
contract attorneys. Ake made a similar point that when ancillary services are
provided at state expense, an indigent defendant is not entitled to an expert of
his choice, but he is entitled to “access” to necessary ancillary services that give
him an “adequate opportunity” to put on his defense. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77(quoting Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 612).
To the extent Amaya takes issue with forcing his retained counsel to
reduce his agreed-upon rate to the state contract rate before the state will cover
30
ancillary services, we do not see those limits as materially different from the
limits placed on indigent defendants who receive counsel at state expense. Stated
differently, we do not see how we can declare the procedure in section 815.1 for
determining a reasonable rate unconstitutional without also declaring the use of
the $63 per hour rate unconstitutional for all contract attorneys. The general
assembly has declared that to be a “reasonable” rate. See Iowa Code § 815.7(1),
(5) (declaring that contract attorney “shall be entitled to reasonable
compensation and expenses” and setting that rate at $63 as relevant here).
Our conclusion that the state is constitutionally permitted to consider the
funds available to a retained attorney in determining whether it is required to
provide state funding for ancillary services leads us to reject the California Court
of Appeal’s approach. That court explained its reasoning as follows:
There are at least two problems if private counsel expects
every retainer agreement will be scrutinized under a reasonableness
test: (1) it would impinge on the ability of the free market economy
to set the price for legal services; and (2) it would deter many of the
best, most experienced attorneys from taking privately retained
cases without charging for ancillary services. In those cases in which
the family could not afford the attorney’s fee and the cost of ancillary
services, the public would end up paying for both instead of just the
ancillary services. Moreover, a reasonableness test would interfere
with the principle that, when possible, a defendant should be
afforded retained counsel of choice.
Tran, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510–11. But these are policy issues best left to the
general assembly, not constitutionally-grounded principles we may rely on.
Further, they focus on the attorney’s rights—rights to set their rates and whether
they would be deterred from representing defendants like Amaya. Cf. Simmons
v. State Pub. Def., 791 N.W.2d 69, 87 (Iowa 2010) (explaining, in structural
31
challenge to hard cap on appellate fees for court-appointed counsel, “we focus
not on establishing a system that provides reasonable compensation to a lawyer,
but on one that is designed to provide effective assistance of counsel”). Those
concerns are always at issue when a client seeks the services of an attorney, and
nothing about the Sixth Amendment counsel-of-choice jurisprudence requires
the state to sweeten the pot to help assure a defendant receives his attorney of
choice. See Luis, 578 U.S. at 11 (concluding the right to counsel of choice “grants
‘a defendant a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice’ ” (emphasis
added) (citation omitted) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 53)).
Section 815.1 places limits on an indigent defendant’s entitlement to state
funding for ancillary services needed for his defense, but not unconstitutionally
so, at least not on this record. To the extent Amaya relies on Simmons v. State
Public Defender, there may be a point at which the statutory scheme creates such
a chilling effect on attorneys willing to represent indigent defendants that it
inhibits a defendant’s ability to receive competent representation. See 791
N.W.2d at 87–88 (holding “the plaintiff has shown that if Iowa imposes a hard-
and-fast fee cap of $1500 in all [appellate] cases, such a fee cap would in many
cases substantially undermine the right of indigents to effective assistance of
counsel in criminal proceedings under article I, section 10 of the Iowa
Constitution” based on the detailed record made in the district court, including
a finding that the cap reduced the attorney’s effective rate to $12 per hour). The
general assembly has declared $63 per hour to be “reasonable compensation”
for state-funded contract attorneys. Unless that underlying premise is
32
satisfactorily challenged, tying state funding for ancillary services provided to
retained counsel to that same rate is not a constitutionally impermissible way
for the general assembly to determine whether funds paid to a retained attorney
could be expected to cover requested ancillary services at state expense.
We hold that the state is not constitutionally required to provide ancillary
services to an indigent defendant represented by private counsel if funds
available to the counsel can reasonably be expected to cover the services. As Ake
suggested, the general assembly came up with a process for determining when
that can be expected. That process may chill some private attorneys from
accepting cases like Amaya’s, not unlike the chill caused by paying
court-appointed attorneys only $63 (or $68 under the current rates) per hour.
But policy arguments similar to those made by Amaya and Chief Justice
Christensen’s concurrence in part and dissent in part are for the legislature. As
long as the statutory rate paid to contract attorneys is not itself unconstitutional,
we cannot say the process in section 815.1 relying on that same rate is
constitutionally prohibited.
V. Conclusion.
The district court’s ruling that severed section 815.1(4)(c) from the statute
is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
WRIT SUSTAINED.
Waterman, Mansfield, McDonald, and McDermott, JJ., join this opinion.
Christensen, C.J., files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which Appel, J., joins. Appel, J., files a dissenting opinion.
33
#20–1346, State v. Amaya
CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the case because I believe that
a district court cannot consider third-party funds used to hire an attorney for an
indigent defendant in determining whether “counsel’s fee should reasonably be
expected to cover investigative services” or ancillary services7 under English v.
Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Iowa 1981).8 I would strike the portion of Iowa
Code section 815.1(4)(c) (2019) that requires the court to consider monies paid
or to be paid “on behalf of” the indigent defendant in determining whether
investigative services should be authorized. Therefore, Rodrigo Amaya should be
entitled to the requested investigative services at state expense.
I. Section 815.1 Violates the Right to Effective Counsel Under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
A. Application of Missildine. In Missildine, we held that “authority for
the services requested by plaintiff exists under his Sixth Amendment right to
effective representation of counsel. For indigents the right to effective counsel
includes the right to public payment for reasonably necessary investigative
services.” 311 N.W.2d at 293–94. We have since reiterated this principle in
multiple cases. See, e.g., State v. Dahl, 874 N.W.2d 348, 351–52 (Iowa 2016)
7The terms “investigative services” and “ancillary services” are used interchangeably
throughout this opinion.
8I agree with the majority’s analysis in part II that the appropriate form of review is a writ
of certiorari. Like the majority, I also remain concerned that the fee agreement between
Bergmann and Amaya’s mother obligates her to pay for the investigative services requested in
this case. However, the majority proceeds with the constitutional analysis of section 815.1’s
statutory formula. Because of the majority’s decision, I also address the constitutional issues.
34
(“[T]he Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the State to
pay for reasonably necessary defense services for which indigent defendants
demonstrate a need in order to ensure such defendants receive effective
assistance of counsel.”); State v. Walters, 426 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Iowa 1988) (“An
indigent’s right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to public
payment for reasonably necessary investigative services.”). Nevertheless, an
individual’s right to reasonably necessary investigative services is not absolute
under Missildine, as an indigent defendant is not entitled to public funding for
investigative services if the “accused has rendered himself impecunious by an
unreasonable expenditure of funds to retain private counsel” or if “counsel’s fee
should reasonably be expected to cover investigative services.” Missildine, 311
N.W.2d at 294. Only the second exception is at issue in this case.
Section 815.1 is the general assembly’s attempt to determine whether
private “counsel’s fee should reasonably be expected to cover investigative
services.” Id.; see generally Iowa Code § 815.1. The statute at issue provides that
a court cannot grant an application to authorize investigative services unless
“[t]he represented person is indigent and unable to pay for the costs sought,”
“[t]he costs are reasonable and necessary for the representation of the indigent
person in a case for which counsel could have been appointed,” and “[t]he
moneys paid or to be paid to the privately retained attorney by or on behalf of the
indigent person are insufficient to pay all or a portion of the costs sought to be
paid from state funds.” Id. § 815.1(4)(a)–(c) (emphasis added).
35
The majority explains the section’s statutory formula implements Justice
Uhlenhopp’s special concurrence from Missildine. See 311 N.W.2d at 294–96
(Uhlenhopp, J., concurring specially). Justice Uhlenhopp argued that a
defendant with a private attorney retained through a third party who seeks
public funds for investigative services “must play according to the rules of the
game provided by the General Assembly.” Id. at 295. He believed that privately
retained counsel would have to become court-appointed counsel so that the
court-appointed statutory rate could substitute private counsel’s fee. At the time,
the district court determined the statutory rate based on a variety of factors, id.(citing Iowa Code § 815.7 (1981)); see Parrish v. Denato, 262 N.W.2d 281, 285
(Iowa 1978) (providing a list of factors to determine an appropriate statutory
rate), and only defendants whose attorneys exhausted the retainer fees under
the statutory rate could access investigative services at state expense, Missildine,
311 N.W.2d at 295. Today’s section 815.1’s statutory formula uses section
815.7’s current court-appointed hourly rates to determine whether an attorney
has exhausted their retainer fee instead of Justice Uhlenhopp’s advocacy for the
court to determine “ordinary and customary charges for like services in the
community” under a previous version of section 815.7. Id. (quoting Iowa Code
§ 815.7 (1981)); see Iowa Code § 815.1, .7 (2019).
But none of the other justices in Missildine joined Justice Uhlenhopp’s
argument to consider third-party funds in determining whether “counsel’s fee
should reasonably be expected to cover investigative services.” Missildine, 311
N.W.2d at 294 (majority opinion). Rather, they held that “the Constitution
36
independently mandates judicial recognition of an indigent’s right to necessary
investigative services.” Id. This is because “[t]he fact that a third person retained
private counsel for [the defendant] does not by itself affect his status as an
indigent.” Id. (citing Schmidt v. Uhlenhopp, 140 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1966)). Our
courts have historically recognized that third-party funds are irrelevant to
determining if the defendant is indigent. See Schmidt, 140 N.W.2d at 119–21
(holding that the defendant’s mother’s payment for a private attorney had no
effect as to whether the defendant is indigent); cf. State v. Van Gorder, 184 N.W.
638, 639 (Iowa 1921) (“The fact the [defendant] was able to furnish an appeal
bond, or that his wife has an interest in her father’s estate, or that the [defendant]
has brothers and sisters and other relatives in Allamakee [C]ounty, Iowa, who
had previously come to his aid, is not a sufficient reason why he should be denied
a transcript at the expense of the [state], as he has no legal way of securing any
funds from these sources with which to pay for a transcript.”); State v. Wright,
82 N.W. 1013, 1014 (Iowa 1900) (“While a moral obligation may require relatives
to assist one another in such cases, we know of no legal rule requiring it, where,
as in this case, the defendant is an adult.”).
Missildine then explained that “the sixth amendment provides authority
for furnishing investigative services to indigents at public expense without regard
to whether the indigent is represented by counsel at public expense.” 311 N.W.2d
at 294 (emphasis added). I read this holding to mean that, as a constitutional
matter, the existence of third-party funds are irrelevant in determining whether
an indigent defendant should have access to reasonably necessary investigative
37
services. This reasoning is consistent with other state courts. See State v. Jones,
707 So. 2d 975, 977 (La. 1998) (“The presence of retained counsel, be it from a
collateral source or pro bono, should not work [as] a hardship against an indigent
accused who otherwise would be entitled to State funded auxiliary services. The
determinative question is the defendant’s indigency, not whether he has derived
any assistance from collateral sources.”); State ex rel. Rojas v. Wilkes, 455 S.E.2d
575, 577 (W. Va. 1995) (“We disagree with the respondent’s contention that the
funds with which the petitioner’s family retained private counsel are relevant to
petitioner’s right as an indigent person to have necessary expert assistance
provided at the State’s expense. The petitioner’s family members have no
obligation to finance the petitioner’s defense, and any funds they provide have
no effect on his status as personally indigent.”); see also Brown v. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 415 P.3d 7, 10–11 (Nev. 2017) (collecting cases). Section 815.1’s
statutory formula has effectively conditioned an indigent’s access to reasonably
necessary services and effective assistance of counsel on irrelevant third-party
funds. That is contrary to Missildine and in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
In finding a violation has occurred under Missildine, I must determine
whether severance of section 815.1 is appropriate. See Westco Agronomy Co. v.
Wollesen, 909 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2017) (“Severance is appropriate ‘if it does
not substantially impair legislative purpose, the enactment remains capable of
fulfilling the apparent legislative intent, and the remaining portion of the
enactment can be given effect without the invalid provision.’ ” (quoting Breeden
38
v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 887 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Iowa 2016))). While the district court
correctly understood that third-party funds cannot be taken into consideration,
it severed the wrong portion of the statute. Instead of severing the portion of the
formula that required replacing the privately retained attorney fees with section
815.7 rates, I would sever the portion referring to monies paid or to be paid “on
behalf of” the indigent defendant. See Iowa Code § 815.1(4)(c); id. § 815.1(4)(c)(2).
Section 815.1(4)(c) would then logically read: “The moneys paid or to be paid to
the privately retained attorney by the indigent person are insufficient to pay all
or a portion of the costs sought to be paid from state funds.”9
Here, the record shows Amaya has not provided any money or indicated
that he will be able to pay his attorney Benjamin Bergmann or Bergmann’s firm
any money to go toward his defense. Regardless of whether we apply Bergmann’s
contracted rate or statutorily prescribed rate under section 815.7, under my
analysis the monies paid or to be paid by the indigent person are insufficient to
cover the costs. Because both parties agree that the defendant is indigent and
that the investigative services are reasonably necessary, I would have granted
those services at state expense and stopped short of determining whether section
815.7 rates can be used in calculating whether a defendant who hires private
counsel and then cannot pay for reasonably necessary investigative services.
9Subsequently, section 815.1(4)(c)(2) would also read “If the product calculated in
subparagraph (1) is greater than the monies paid or to be paid to the attorney by the indigent
person, the monies shall be considered insufficient to pay all or a portion of the costs from state
funds.”
39
B. Reevaluating the Math. In holding that the statute is constitutional
under this as-applied challenge, the majority offers mathematical illustrations
to provide some perspective on the operation of section 815.1. These illustrations
show that Bergmann does not expect to receive full payment for his contracted
$300 hourly rate with the initial retainer of $15,000. Using only Bergmann’s
projected 86.1 hours and excluding any hours by his associates, the majority
suggests he would earn $174 per hour if ancillary services are not covered from
the initial retainer and $116 per hour if ancillary services are covered from the
initial retainer.
Two other associate attorneys working for Bergmann completed 58.8
hours before the filing of the motion for investigative services. The State Public
Defender’s Office (SPD) objected to the use of any of their hours in the section
815.1 statutory formula because section 815.1 refers to a singular attorney. See
Iowa Code § 815.1(1) (referring to only “a privately retained attorney”), (2)(a)
(requiring the “number of hours of work completed by the attorney to date” as
part of the application for funds). Ultimately, the district court did not include
the associates’ hours because it determined a constitutional violation existed
without them.
The SPD’s proposed interpretation creates practical problems. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that the associates’ hours were unnecessary to
build Amaya’s defense. If the associates could not perform that work, it would
40
have been left to Bergmann to complete that work at a much higher hourly rate.10
Section 815.1(4)(c)(1)’s statutory formula should include hours that are
reasonably necessary to building a defense for purposes of determining whether
ancillary funds are available, regardless of the number of attorneys working on
the case. See id. § 4.1(17) (“Unless otherwise specifically provided by law the
singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular.”). Otherwise,
the result is a grossly inaccurate reflection of the true legal work performed in
determining whether the attorney or law firm has exhausted the retainer, i.e.
whether “counsel’s fee should reasonably be expected to cover investigative
services.” Missildine, 311 N.W.2d at 294. Assuming all of the associates’ legal
work was necessary, I would include their hours in calculating total fees.
Based on the section 815(4)(c)(1) formula including the associates’ hours,
Bergmann and the firm could expect to receive an hourly rate of approximately
$10411 if the ancillary services were not used from the retainer and an hourly
rate of $6912 if the ancillary services were used from the retainer. This result
paints a drastically different picture than the one the majority depicts. Even if
we subtract those ancillary services on the high end from the initial retainer,
there is less than ten bucks difference between Bergmann’s calculated hourly
rate of $69 and the 2019 court-appointed hourly rate of $63. See Iowa Code §
10The fee arrangement between Amaya’s mother and Bergmann provides that as lead
attorney, Bergmann would work at an hourly rate of $300 while associates would work at an
hourly rate of $150 to $300. The district court noted that one associate worked at an hourly rate
of $250 and the other worked at an hourly rate of $200.
11$15,000 divided by 144.9 hours.
12$10,000 divided by 144.9 hours.
41
815.7(5). If Bergmann worked sixteen additional hours, his hourly rate would
be $6213, just below the court-appointed hourly rate.
Another fact pattern that could easily occur is if Amaya’s mother had
advanced $1,000 less and the retainer was used for the ancillary services. This
would also result in Bergmann’s hourly rate becoming $62,14 just below the same
court-appointed hourly rate. It is important to note that these calculations do
not consider any necessary overhead charges that must be pulled from the
retainer. Cf. Simmons v. State Pub. Def., 791 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2010). Taking
these scenarios into consideration, it is easy to assume that other privately
retained attorneys may be in a situation in which the statute does indeed force
them into a situation where they are working below the contractual rate. Aimee
Kumer, Reconsidering Ake v. Oklahoma: What Ancillary Defense Services Must
States Provide to Indigent Defendants Represented by Private or Pro Bono
Counsel?, 18 Temp. Pol. & C.R. L. Rev. 783, 786 (2009) [hereinafter Kumer]
(“Where defendants are able to retain an attorney or receive assistance from
friends and family in doing so, the likelihood that such attorneys, often
inadequately compensated, will be able to render competent representation is
substantially increased if the attorneys can access state funds for experts and
other services.”). If that is the case, an as-applied challenge would certainly look
different under a section 815.1 analysis.
13$10,000 divided by 160.9 hours.
14$9,000 divided by 144.9 hours.
42
As a policy matter, Missildine also noted that “[i]t would be strange if the
Constitution required the government to furnish both counsel and investigative
services in cases where the indigent needs and requests public payment for only
investigative services.” 311 N.W.2d at 294. Indeed, the result of this case is
strange. Bergmann and his associates have provided at least $9,12815 in legal
fees—a significant amount of money the state did not have to pay because it was
covered by a third party. The practical effect of section 815.1 is that it will likely
“impose an unreasonable and unnecessary additional burden on the public
treasury.” Id.; see State v. Punsalan, 133 P.3d 934, 936 (Wash. 2006) (en banc)
(explaining that providing state-funded investigative services to indigent criminal
defendants with privately funded counsel poses little risk of abuse, supports the
right to choice of counsel, and conserves state resources); Kumer, 18 Temp. Pol.
& C.R. L. Rev. at 786 (“[I]f a state provides funds for necessary ancillary services,
‘it will also encourage more defendants who can pay for counsel themselves or
find others to pay for counsel to access retained counsel and free up state
resources for defender services.’ ” (quoting Edward C. Monahan & James J.
Clark, Ky. Dep’t of Pub. Advoc., Funds for Resources for Indigent Defendants
Represented by Retained Counsel, in Funds for Experts and Resources Manual 45
(Edward C. Monahan ed., 6th ed. 1999–2001))).
15$63 multiplied by 144.9 hours.
43
II. Conclusion.
Using third-party funds to determine whether an indigent defendant
should have access to reasonably necessary investigative services violates the
central holding of Missildine and thus the Sixth Amendment. In determining
whether an indigent defendant with privately retained counsel should have
access to reasonably necessary investigative services, I would sever any reference
to monies paid or to be paid “on behalf of” the indigent defendant. Therefore, I
would affirm the district court.
Appel, J., joins this concurrence in part and dissent in part.
44
#20–1346, State v. Amaya
APPEL, Justice (dissenting).
I fully join Chief Justice Christensen’s opinion. I write separately to stress
that the decision of the court today does not hold that the general assembly’s
current hourly rates for court-appointed attorneys are consistent with the
protections under article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution and the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Simmons v. State Pub. Def.,
791 N.W.2d 69, 76 (Iowa 2010). The majority does not opine on the question of
whether the general assembly’s declared court-appointed hourly rates are, in
fact, “reasonable” and thus consistent with the right to counsel under article I,
section 10 or the Sixth Amendment. That question remains open.
I do note, however, that “the state has an affirmative obligation to establish
a system of indigent defense that is reasonably likely to provide for zealous
advocacy on behalf of the criminal defendant.” Id. Under this obligation, a court-
appointed attorney for an indigent defendant is entitled to reasonable attorney
fees from the state. Id. at 82. Our court has recognized this obligation since the
early 1850s. See Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473, 476 (Iowa 1850)
(“Where an act of service is performed in obedience to direct mandate of statutory
law, under the direction of a tribunal to which the enforcement of that law is
committed, reasonable compensation to the person who performs that service is
a necessary incident; otherwise, the arm of the law will be too short to accomplish
its designs.”).
45
When the “state’s method of providing counsel to indigent defendants does
not adequately ensure effective assistance of counsel[,] [it] is often referred to as
a systemic or structural challenge.” Simmons, 791 N.W.2d at 76. In such
challenges, we are typically concerned with “whether the state has provided an
adequate framework for ensuring that the right to counsel is realized in cases
involving indigent defense.” Id.
One notable theme of structural challenges to indigent defense
compensation systems is the “linkage between compensation and the provision
of effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 81–82 (collecting cases). We have noted
that the intersection between 815.7’s guarantee of a “ ‘reasonable fee’ and the
constitutional requirements of effective assistance of counsel are related but not
identical.” Id. at 87. However, the level of compensation remains an important
factor in determining whether the structure “substantially undermine[s] the right
of indigents to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings under
article I, section 10.” Id.
“Several principal methods have been used throughout the country for
valuing legal defense services: flat rates for various kinds of cases; fees set by
the court within stated limits; hourly rates; and discretionary fees set by the
courts.” Coonrad v. Van Metre, 362 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Iowa 1985) (en banc)
(Uhlenhopp, J., dissenting). A historical overview of Iowa’s statutes indicates that
46
the general assembly has used several valuation methods over the past 170
years.16
16In light of Hall v. Washington County, the Iowa General Assembly provided
compensation for court-appointed attorneys for the defense of indigent persons in 1851. State v.
Froah, 263 N.W. 525, 528 (Iowa 1935). This first statute provided flat rates for court-appointed
attorneys depending on the type of charge: $25 for the defense of a murder charge, $10 for the
defense of other felonies, and $5 for the defense of misdemeanors. Iowa Code § 2561 (1851); see
Iowa Code § 4168 (1860) (same). In cases that involved an appeal, the courts could provide an
enlarged compensation based on a graduated scale corresponding to the flat rates. Iowa Code
§ 2562 (1851); see, e.g., Baylies v. Polk County, 12 N.W. 311, 311–12 (Iowa 1882) (providing a
rate two-and-a-half times more than the appointed rate after the appeal).
In 1873, the Iowa Code was changed to allow the court to fix attorney fees for the defense
of murders and felonies but kept a rate of $5 for the defense of misdemeanors. Iowa Code § 3829(1873). But the 1880 Iowa Code reinstated the same flat rates from 1851. Iowa Code § 3829(1880); Iowa Code § 3829 (1888) (same as 1880). That flat rate scheme continued until the 1897
Iowa Code, when the general assembly modified the Iowa Code to provide $20 per day for the
defense of homicide or other crimes that could be punished by life imprisonment, $10 in total
for the defense of other felonies, and provided no provision for misdemeanors. Iowa Code § 5314(1897). No change occurred in the Iowa Code from 1897 through 1958. Iowa Code § 9375 (1919)
(same as 1897); Iowa Code § 13774 (1924) (same); Iowa Code § 13774 (1927) (same); Iowa Code
§ 13774 (1931) (same); Iowa Code § 13774 (1935) (same); Iowa Code § 13774 (1939) (same); Iowa
Code § 775.5 (1946) (same); Iowa Code § 775.5 (1950) (same); Iowa Code § 775.5 (1954) (same);
Iowa Code § 775.5 (1958) (same).
In 1959, the general assembly finally increased the longstanding flat rates for court-
appointed counsel. Furey v. Crawford County, 208 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Iowa 1973) (citing 1959 Iowa
Acts ch. 376, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 775.5 (1960))). The general assembly increased the flat
rate to $50 per day for homicide and life imprisonment cases and $25 in total for other felony
cases. Id. It also added a section for $15 in total for indicatable misdemeanors. Id. An exception
for each rate existed where the court could provide additional sums if they were “necessary in
the interest of justice.” Id. at 19; see 1959 Iowa Acts ch. 376, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 775.5(1960)).
“Then in 1965 the legislature enacted . . . [section] 755.5 placing determination of
reasonable compensation totally within trial court’s discretion, free from legislative strictures.”
Furey, 208 N.W.2d at 19 (citing 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 449, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 775.5(1966))). That system remained in place until 1997. Iowa Code § 775.5 (1971) (same as 1966);
Iowa Code § 775.5 (1973) (same); Iowa Code § 775.5 (1975) (same); Iowa Code § 775.5 (1977)
(same); 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 1507 (codified at Iowa Code § 815.7 (1979)) (adding the
requirement that “reasonable compensation which shall be the ordinary and customary charges
for like services in the community”); Iowa Code § 815.7 (1981) (same as 1979); Iowa Code § 815.7(1983) (same); Iowa Code § 815.7 (1985) (same); Iowa Code § 815.7 (1987) (same); Iowa Code
§ 815.7 (1989) (same); Iowa Code § 815.7 (1991) (same); Iowa Code § 815.7 (1993) (same); Iowa
Code § 815.7 (1995) (same). In 1997, the general assembly changed the statute so that the
reasonable fee of a court-appointed attorney was capped to what a contract attorney under
section 13B.4 would receive, but the determination of a reasonable fee remained with the courts.
See Iowa Code § 815.7 (1997); Iowa Code § 815.7 (1999) (same as 1997).
In 2000, the general assembly once again took control of the fees for court-appointed
attorneys by setting a “reasonable” hourly rate. See 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1115, § 10 (codified at
Iowa Code § 815.7 (2001)). Instead of a flat rate or a daily rate, the general assembly opted for
an hourly rate across different categories of crimes. Id. Class “A” felonies received $60 an hour,
47
We have previously raised concerns about the strict adherence to a fixed
hourly rate when our district courts defaulted to suggested hourly rates between
1965 to 1997. “Adherence to a fixed hourly rate, especially if it is low, is a step
backwards and defeats the purpose of section 815.7.” Id. at 201 (Schultz, J.,
concurring specially).
Although we recognize the convenience of a fixed rate of
compensation based on time expended, a rigid adherence to that
method of valuation ignores the other factors which must be
considered in determining reasonable compensation. True
uniformity in compensation can be achieved only when all of the
variables affecting reasonableness are considered.
Hulse v. Wifvat, 306 N.W.2d 707, 712 (Iowa 1981) (en banc). “Flat hourly rates
do not take into account such factors as the difficulty of issues, the responsibility
assumed, and the experience of the attorney.” Coonrad, 362 N.W.2d at 201.
These variations include “the nature and extent of the service, the amount
involved (or, as here, the possible punishment involved), the difficulty of handling
and importance of issues, responsibility assumed and the results obtained, as
well as the standing and experience of the attorney in the profession should be
class “B” felonies received $55 an hour, and all other cases were at $50 an hour. Id. That rate
has slowly crawled upward over the past twenty years. 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1166, § 9 (codified at
Iowa Code § 815.7 (2007)) (providing for appointments made after July 1, 2006, $65 an hour for
class “A” felonies, $60 an hour for all other felonies and misdemeanors, $55 an hour for all other
cases); 2007 Iowa Acts ch. 213, § 25 (codified at Iowa Code § 815.7(4) (2008)) (providing for
appointments made after July 1, 2007, $70 an hour for class “A” felonies, $65 an hour for class
“B” felonies, $60 an hour for all other cases); 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 163, § 35 (codified at Iowa Code
§ 815.7(5) (2020)) (providing for appointments made after July 1, 2019, $73 an hour for class “A”
felonies, $68 an hour for class “B” felonies, $63 an hour for all other cases); 2021 Iowa Acts ch.
166, § 24 (codified at Iowa Code § 815.7(6) (2022)) (providing for appointments made after July
1, 2021, $76 an hour for class “A” felonies, $71 an hour for class “B” felonies, $66 an hour for
all other cases). On June 17, 2022, shortly before this opinion was filed, House Bill 2559 was
signed into law by the Governor. H.F. 2559, 89th G.A., Reg. Sess. § 21 (Iowa 2022). This bill
minimally increases the hourly rates for court-appointed attorneys yet again (raising rates by
two dollars in each category). See id.
48
considered.” Parrish v. Denato, 262 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Iowa 1978) (quoting Gabel
v. Gabel, 117 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Iowa 1962)). These variations are particularly
true in evaluating the going rates for privately retained criminal counsel such as
the defense counsel for Rodrigo Amaya in this case.
Moreover, statutorily imposed hourly rates typically do not adjust for the
basic principle of inflation. For example, for class “A” felonies, the general
assembly declared $60 as a reasonable hourly rate in 1999,17 and $76 as a
reasonable hourly rate in 2022.18 But $60 in 1999 is worth around $105 in
2022.19 The current hourly rate of $76 does not come close to that amount. So,
assuming that the general assembly’s declaration of hourly rates for 1999 was
reasonable in 1999, one might question whether the general assembly’s current
hourly rates are reasonable for 2022. See Smith v. State, 394 A.2d 834, 838 (N.H.
1978) (“Yet, inflation alone has reduced the hourly rates . . . . There can be no
question that by limiting an attorney’s compensation . . . the State has
transferred a major part of its own burden onto the shoulders of the New
Hampshire bar” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
The general assembly can set rates for court-appointed attorneys
representing indigent defendants. Samuels v. County of Dubuque, 13 Iowa 536,
171999 Iowa Acts ch. 135, § 26 (codified at Iowa Code § 815.7 (2001)) (“For appointments
made on or after July 1, 1999, the reasonable compensation shall be calculated on the basis of
sixty dollars per hour for class ‘A’ felonies . . . .”).
182021 Iowa Acts ch. 166, § 24 (codified at Iowa Code § 815.7(6) (2022)) (“For
appointments made on or after July 1, 2021, the reasonable compensation shall be calculated
on the basis of seventy-six dollars per hour for class ‘A’ felonies . . . .”).
19See $60 in 1999 is Worth $105.27 Today, CPI Inflation Calculator,
https://www.officialdata.org/us/inflation/1999?amount=60 [https://perma.cc/SV7A-W7ZA]
(last visited June 21, 2022).
49
537–38 (1862). But what these fee-setting statutes cannot do is “have a
substantial chilling effect on the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.”
Simmons, 791 N.W.2d at 85. We mapped out the negative effects of a hard cap
for court-appointed attorneys in Simmons v. State Public Defender. Id. at 87–88.
These negative effects included restricting the pool of attorneys willing to
represent indigent defendants, the level of quality of attorneys, and pitting the
attorney’s economic interests against the client’s interest. Id. at 88. These
concerns apply just as much to fixed hourly rates.
But as the majority properly observed, we are not currently in a position
to analyze whether the hourly rate is low enough to create a structural violation
of article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, or the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Any claim that fee payments amount to a structural
error must await a direct attack supported by a detailed record which could
include, among other things, the current caseloads of court-appointed attorneys,
recommended ethical standards for court-appointed attorneys, relevant
overhead charges (including mileage), the effect of the hourly cap under Iowa
Administrative Code rule 493—12.6(4) (2021), the performance of attorneys
engaging in representation through court appointment, and reasonable rates
among criminal attorneys practicing in Iowa.
In my view, the judiciary has the responsibility to ensure that criminal
defendants are adequately represented. Adhering to that premise, some courts
have indicated that courts could order increased funding or increased
compensation for indigent defense in lieu of legislative actions. See State v.
50
Quitman County, 807 So. 2d 401, 409–10 (Miss. 2001) (en banc) (“Though
questions of [allocating funds for indigent defense] are traditionally legislative
affairs, this Court has recognized that where the Legislature fails to act, the
courts have the authority and the duty to intervene.”); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d
1150, 1161 (Okla. 1990) (“Although we invite legislative attention to this
problem, in the interim, we must establish guides which will apply uniformly
without either violating due process rights or granting constitutional
immunites.”). A significant body of academic commentary has arisen supporting
structural litigation. See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent
Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 427, 432–39 (2009)
(describing efforts made on the state level to employ a new model of structural
litigation to address the issue of indigent defense representation); see generally
Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 2062 (2000) (same); Rodger Citron, (Un)Luckey v.
Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense Services,
101 Yale L.J. 481 (1991) (same). And, as experts, we know that the fee levels for
indigent defense are very low. See State v. See, 387 N.W.2d 583, 586 (Iowa 1986).
But because of the narrow nature of the claim and the facts presented, this case
is not the vehicle to consider structural reform.