Citation Numbers: 10 Iowa 488
Judges: Baldwin
Filed Date: 6/16/1860
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/18/2024
It is claimed by the appellant, that the District Court should have arrested the judgment, for the reason that the value of the property alleged to have been stolen by the defendants, was found by the petit jury to be ten dollars and twenty-five cents, the stealing of which was not an indictable offense. By article 1, section 2, of the constitution, it is provided that “all offenses less than a felony, and in which the punishment does not exceed a fine of one hundred dollars or imprisonment for thirty days, shall be tried summarily before a justice of the peace or other officer authorized by law, on information under oath, without indictment, or the intervention of a grand jury,” &c. By an act of the legislature approved March, 1858, section 2612 of the Code was so changed as that when the value of the property stolen does not exceed twenty dollars, the punishment shall be by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days. And by virtue of the same act, passed in pursuance of the provision of the constitution, justices of the peace were invested with exclusive jurisdiction in cases where the punishment or fine does not exceed the limits above stated.
In the case now before us, the value of the property exceeded twenty dollars, as found by the grand jury. If such finding is to determine the question of jurisdiction, the motion in arrest of judgment was properly overruled. If however the
The second position assumed by the appellants, is that the Hon. JOHN E. DilloN, the judge presiding when the cause was tried, and when judgment was about to be rendered against them, was not the judge of that judicial district; that he was acting without authority of law, and that he could not render a valid judgment. It is assumed by appellants to support this assignment, that a district judge can only preside in the district in which he was elected, and that any act of the legislature which gives him power to hold court out of the district in which he was elected, contravenes those provisions of the constitution, which declare that the District Court shall consist of a single judge who shall be elected by the qualified electors of the district in which he resides; that the District Court shall be a court of law and equity, and have jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases in their respective districts, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law. Whilst the election of a district judge,
Judgment affirmed.