Citation Numbers: 70 Iowa 198
Judges: Seevers
Filed Date: 12/8/1886
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/24/2022
By consent of parties, this cause was referred to three persons as referees, who reported to the court their
At the time the several bonds were so signed the amount of the penalty to be inserted therein had not been fixed by the board of supervisors, but it was the intention of Welsing and the sureties that the several bonds signed by them should be used as and for the bond of said Welsing, as treasurer, for the term above stated; and, when the amount of the penalty should be fixed by the board, that said Welsing should then do whatever should be necessary to make the said several bonds and papers so signed the complete official bond of said Welsing, as treasurer, for the term aforesaid.
Afterwards, Welsing was informed that the board of supervisors had fixed his bond at $100,000, whereupon he filled the blanks in the bond first above mentioned, and signed it himself. Afterwards, on the same day, Welsing offered to the board of supervisors the blank bonds, signed as above stated, together with certain papers showing that the sureties, or a portion of them, had justified as required by law, as and for his official bond, at which time none of said sureties were present. The board knew at that time that the several bonds had been signed in blank, and that the blanks in one had been filled by Welsing as above stated. When said papers were so offered, it was suggested by a member of the board that the several papers be attached together; whereupon Welsing took them into his office, and, cutting from the last three bonds
The contention of counsel is that, under the facts above stated, the appellants are not liable, for the reason that Wel-sing was not authorized to do what he did, and because what he did amounted to an alteration of the contract entered into by the sureties. It is obvious, we think, that the last reason demands but slight consideration. No contract was entered into until there was a delivery of the bond to the board, and there is no pretense that it was altered after that time. As there was no alteration of a contract, we are not required to stop and consider the authorities cited by counsel bearing on that question, among which are Dickerman v. Miner, 43 Iowa, 508, and State v. Craig, 58 Iowa, 238.
The appellants signed four several bonds, with the expectation and intent that they should be each used as the official bond of "Welsing, and authorized him to do whatever should be necessary to accomplish this purpose. This is precisely what "Welsing did. The appellants constituted him their agent, and vested him with absolute power to do all that was necessary to make and deliver a legal and binding official bond. As to the manner in -which this should be accomplished, there was no restriction. "When "Welsing acted as he did, it became the act of the appellants, to all intent and purpose, as if they, and each of them, had been personally present, and did what "Welsing did. The power conferred was
In. principle, we are unable to see any distinction between these cases and the one at bar.
AFFIRMED.