Citation Numbers: 182 Iowa 467
Judges: Evans, Gaynor, Ladd, Preston
Filed Date: 1/11/1918
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/24/2022
This case was before us upon a former appeal. Sievertsen v. Paxton-Eckman Chemical Co., 160 Iowa 662. The salient facts are quite fully stated in the opinion on such former appeal. At the time of the transaction in question, the plaintiff was a resident of Carroll County. Wunder and Sinderson, agents of the Paxton Company, called upon him at his home. Wunder was an old friend. All three went together to the town of Dedham, where they spent some time in a saloon and had a number of “drinks” together, which cost the plaintiff nothing (apparently). Before the parties separated,-the plaintiff had signed a contract of agency and an order for nearly $1,000 worth of stock food and a note for a like amount for the purchase price. His contention is that he did not know that he had signed anything but a contract of employment for his son, and especially that he did not know that he had signed any note or other obligation to buy the stock food or to pay therefor. His testimony was that he was unable to read anything without spectacles, and that he had none with him; and further, that he was unable to read English at all; that Wunder assumed to befriend him in the reading of the papers which he signed; and that he was deceived byWunder and Sinderson as to the contents of the papers thus signed by him. It is further claimed by him that Wunder and Sinderson intentionally caused his intoxication to a considerable degree for the purpose of being able to deceive him the more readily; and that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquors to such a degree as to ren
“Mr. Peter Sievertsen of Dedham, Iowa, was. in our office today and requests us to write you to ascertain whether or not you would discount the note given by hipa for stock food on the 12th inst., through your Mr. Sinderson. He tells us that he will take the note up if you will discount it, say five per cent. If you wish to dispose of it in this manner, kindly send the same at once to either of the banks in this town, and we will write Mm of its being here and request Mm to come in and take it up. Yours truly,
“Jones & Stephany.”
The defendant company immediately acceded to the suggestion of the letter, and sent the note to one of the banks at Carroll. The plaintiff immediately notified the defendant of his rescission of the contract, and demanded possession of the note. He made the same demand upon the local bank in whose immediate possession the note was. .This was followed immediately by the service of a writ of replevin, and possession was thereby obtained. The right of possession was predicated in his petition upon the grounds already stated. These grounds were all denied in the answer. The defendant further pleaded a ratification, waiver, and estoppel, and predicated the same upon the letter above set forth.
If the defendant was wronged by the deception, it was entitled to appropriate redress. But such redress had its own limitations, and carried no special premium. The injury into which defendant was led by such deception pertained wholly to remedy and jurisdiction, and not at all to the substantive cause of action which had fully accrued to plaintiff by reason of the fraud of defendant’s agents, if fraud there was. By means of the ruse, plaintiff was enabled to confer jurisdiction upon the Iowa court over the note Avliich he alleged to be void, and to obtain possession thereof by Avrit of replevin. His alleged cause of action Avas neither better nor worse because of these remedial
If the subsequent deception practiced by plaintiff, in the pursuit of a remedy, should be deemed to have cleansed the original fraud practiced upon him, then the defendant’s injury would be transformed into a beneficence to itself of greal magnitude. Though such transformations sometimes occur in human experience, they come by the ways of an overruling Providence, and are not the objective of judicial remedies.
Without palliating in any degree the deceptive means adopted by plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction, we think that the estoppel thereby created could reach no further than in abatement of the jurisdiction, and that it could not operate in bar of the existing cause of action. It was pleaded only in bar, and hot in abatement. If the plea had been sustained, the plaintiff could not thereafter have maintained either a defense to the note or an independent suit for damages.
In resorting to the ruse, the attorney for plaintiff (who does not appear in this case) only used the same weapon for his client which the defendant had used upon his client, without any other ultimate motive than the just protection of his client. The motive was meritorious, though the method was wrong. The method adopted ivas entitled to no aid from the court to give it success as a ruse. Neither did it deserve additional penalty. This is emphasized by the subsequent justification of plaintiff on the merits of his case.
“The degree of intoxication which would be sufficient in law to entitle a party to rescind a contract must be such that the party was so completely under the influence of intoxicants as not to have been able to understand the effect and consequences of the business transaction. In the case before you, there is no showing that plaintiff was under such degree of intoxication; but if you find that Wunder .and Sinderson, or either of them, induced plaintiff to drink intoxicating liquors for the purpose of enabling them the more readily to gain advantage over him, and enable them the more readily to obtain his signature to the note in controversy by the use of the representations alleged by plaintiff to have been made by them, or either of them, you have a right to take into consideration for what you may deem it entitled the plaintiff’s condition with respect to intoxication, if any, so induced and brought about, in connection with all the other facts and circumstances surrounding the making and signing of the note in controversy, for the purpose of determining whether or not the -plaintiff was induced to sign the note in controversy by the alleged false representations and statements of Wunder and Sinderson, or either of them.”
The complaint is that it “authorizes the jury to consider the fact that intoxicating liquors were purchased by Wunder and Sinderson, in determining whether or not plaintiff was induced to sign the note by false representations, regardless of whether the drinking of said Sievertsen of said liquors had induced intoxication or not.” We do not think
The foregoing are the principal reversal points which are argued in the brief of appellant. We see nothing in the record before us that would justify our interference with the judgment. The judgment below is, therefore, — Affirmed.