Citation Numbers: 184 Iowa 1324
Judges: Gaynor, Preston, Stevens, Weaver
Filed Date: 12/14/1918
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/24/2022
At the time, plaintiff was health officer, appointed by the township trustees of Sherman Township. The services were rendered at the oral request of the township clerk and the board of trustees of said Sherman Township, acting as a board of health. An itemized statement of the services rendered, and to whom rendered, was attached to plaintiff’s petition. No question is made as to the fact that services were rendered, or as to the amount charged for services rendered. The plaintiff’s account was certified to by the township clerk and the township trustees before the same was filed with the board of supervisors, in the following words:
“To the Board of' Supervisors of Monona County, Iowa.
“This is to certify that the. bill herewith attached * * * are correct, now due and no part paid. The services were rendered at our request, and under our supervision. The people served are poor and they and those liable for their support are unable to pay.. The charges are the same as we have been paying in like cases and are correct.*1326 But in view of the fact that 'some of the families visited were close neighbors, and Dr. Lacy saved some time and travel and livery bill, he will discount these bills $91.50, if promptly paid, leaving amount of bills $400, and we recommend the same be paid.
“Attest: Harry Torticill, Township Clerk,
“Local Board of Health.
“Bert Seitzinger, Trustee,
“Anton Nikolaison, Trustee,
“John R. Grapes, Trustee.”
A copy of this certificate was attached to the bills, when filed with the auditor of Monona County. The bills were not sworn to by the plaintiff at the time they were certified by the local board, but were sworn to before finally submitted to the board of supervisors. The bills were rejected by the county, and no reason given for the refusal.
The bill being disallowed by the county, this action was brought in the district court to recover the amount claimed against the county. The facts herein set out were alleged in the petition. • The defendant demurred to the petition in the following words:
“That the facts stated in the petition do not entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded, in that the petition does not show that a written order employing or designating the plaintiff to furnish supplies or perform, render, or furnish the services, as alleged by him, was ever issued to the*1327 plaintiff by the local board of health, or by any other person or persons having authority, before such alleged supplies and services were actually furnished; and no such written order issued by said local board of health is attached to said alleged bill, filed with the auditor of the county, or was attached when presented for audit and payment, all as required by Section 2571-a of the Supplement of the Code of 1913.
“2d. That the petition shows on its face that the attached bill was certified to a year after the alleged services are claimed to have been rendered, and after there was an entire change in the personnel of the local board of health or township trustees; that said bill was never audited and approved by the local board of health existing at the time the services and supplies were furnished, and that the said bill was not audited or approved at the next regular meeting or special meeting, or found correct, after said alleged services were rendered.”
' This demurrer was sustained, plaintiff’s petition dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.
This case turns upon the proper construction to be given to Section 2571-a, which, so far as material to this • case, reads:
“All services and supplies furnished to individuals or families under the provisions' of this section must be authorized by the local board of health or by the mayor or township clerk acting under standing regulations of such local board, and a written order therefor designating the person or persons employed to furnish such services or supplies, issued before said services or supplies- were actually furnished, shall be attached to the bill when the same is presented for audit and payment. * * * All bills and expenses incurred in carrying out the provisions of this section * * * shall be filed with the clerk of the local board of health. This board at its next regular meeting or
The bill, as presented by the plaintiff to the board of supervisors, and the bill on which this suit is predicated, complied with all the requirements of this statute, except that there was no written order designating the plaintiff as the person employed to furnish the services, before the services were actually furnished, and no such order was attached to the bill or account when the same was presented to the local board for audit- and payment. It is conceded that the plaintiff was not ordered, in writing, to furnish these services, either by the local board of health or by the township clerk, acting under the standing regulations of such local board. It follows, then, that there could be no written order attached to the bill when presented to the local board for audit, and there could be no written order attached when presented to the board of supervisors for audit and payment. Therefore, any objection urged, at the time, to the bill on that account, could not have been remedied by the plaintiff had his attention been called to it by the board of supervisors at the time the account was disposed of. The showing made before the board in every particular complied with the statute, except that the services for which recovery was sought were not ordered in writing, and no writing designating plaintiff as the person to perform the services was attached to the bill when the same was presented for audit and payment.
The facts upon which plaintiff relies are simply these: He is a practicing physician. He was appointed health officer under the local board of health, under the provisions of Section 2568 of the Code of 1897, which, so far as material to this matter, reads as follows:
“The town, city or township clerk shall be clerk of the local board, which board shall appoint a competent physi*1329 cian as its health officer, who shall hold office during its pleasure. It shall regulate all fees and charges of persons employed by it in the execution of health laws and its own regulations and those of the state board of health.”
This health officer’s fees or compensation are fixed by* the local board. His duties do not require him to render services to the sick. His duties are to assist the board in discharging those duties which the law imposes upon the board. There is nothing in this statute that extends to him the right to administer to the sick of the township at the expense of the county.' When he renders services to those afflicted with contagious diseases, he is governed, like-any other physician, by the provisions of Section 25717a. The liability of the county is purely statutory, and to render the county liable, the requirements 'of the statute must be observed. The township boards of health, in so far as they act in the matter., bind the county only by the observance of those conditions prerequisite to creating an obligation on the part of the county.
This brings us to consider whether or not the requirements of the statute, that the order shall be made by the township board, or its clerk, in writing, before the services are rendered, designating the person who. shall render the services, is a condition precedent to the right to bind the county for the services when rendered, — whether this is mandatory, or merely directory.
The provisions as found in Section 2571-a, hereinbefore recited, did not exist in previous statutes. The legislature undoubtedly had before its mind some evils which these provisions in the statute were intended to remedy. The words used, in their ordinary signification and in their general use, are of mandatory signification. Undoubtedly, the legislature recognized the fact that the boards of health of the several townships had been, to say the least, careless in certifying bills to the boards of supervisors for
In the instant case, the bill was held up a year, before it was presented to the local board. It was undoubtedly the thought of the legislature that, to protect the public from imposition, it was right and just that the person rendering the services be required to procure from) the local board, before the services were rendered, some written evidence of the fact that, in the judgment of the board, the services were proper and necessary to be rendered at the expense of the county, and that a written order, designating the person to render the services, should be- made by the local board, before the services were rendered: that is, that the need and advisability of rendering the services at the expense of the county should be passed upon and be evidenced in writing, together with the designation of the person by whom the services should be rendered, before they were rendered; and that this written order should be pre
We are satisfied that the board was justified in refusing this claim, on the simple ground that there was no evidence accompanying the claim, such as the statute requires. There was no written evidence that the local board of health had determined the need of the services, or had appointed plaintiff to render them. The plaintiff may suffer, in this particular case; but it is because of the application of a salutary rule, which he should have known and observed,