Citation Numbers: 186 Iowa 1133
Judges: Evans, Gavnor, Ladd, Preston, Sadinger, Stevens, Weaver
Filed Date: 12/14/1918
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/24/2022
The strip of land in controversy lies immediately west of defendant’s right of way fence, and at its widest place is approximately 4 feet and 8 inches in width. On June 3, 1914, defendant’s employees entered and cut the trees upon the disputed strip, and plaintiff claims that they also cut a
Plaintiff’s claim to the disputed tract is based upon adverse possession and acquiescence by defendant in the right of way fence for more than ten years, as the true boundary line between its right of way and plaintiff’s premises.
.It was stipulated by the parties upon the trial that the right of way fence at the point nearest the highway crossing was 20 feet and 1 inches from the center of defendant’s road, and, at a point 6 rail lengths south thereof, 21 feet and 8 inches from the center of the track, thus leaving a narrow strip of defendant’s original right of way of approximately á feet in width outside of its right of way fence. The stipulation further provided that plaintiff and her grantors had cultivated the ground up to the fence, and had gathered the fruit growing thereon, and that they had been in possession thereof during all the time since the fence was erected, many years ago.
Testimony was offered by plaintiff to the effect that, about 15 years before this controversy arose, and while Miles owned the same, defendant’s employees attempted to change the right of way fence at the place in question, and dug a string of post holes on her premises 50 feet west of the center of defendant’s track, but that, upon investigation, it was found that the right of way deed conveyed a strip to defendant of only 25 feet in width on each side of the center
Defendant’s track approaches the premises of plaintiff from the south in a northwesterly direction; but, before reaching the same, curves farther to the northwest, and continues to curve until the crossing over the Waterloo and LaBorte City highway is passed. There was a large number of trees standing on the north end of plaintiff’s premises, which extended from the railroad right of way to the highway fence. The reason assigned by defendant for removing the trees from the disputed strip is that they were thick, and the longer branches extended over the right of way so far that they touched the cab of a passing engine, thereby obstructing the view of travelers approaching the highway crossing from the south, so that they could not see a northbound train until the crossing was reached. It was claimed by defendant that the obstruction caused by the trees rendered the crossing dangerous, and that several fatal accidents had occurred there. The evidence does not, however, show that they were due to the presence of the trees; but the crossing was doubtless rendered more dangerous by them, and same were a menace to the safety of travelers upon the highway.
The contention of counsel for appellant is that it never abandoned the strip in controversy, and that, in so far as the same was occupied and used by plaintiff and her grantors, the use was permissive only, and that possession thereof by appellant was not taken until it became necessary, in the operation of its road; that the doctrine of adverse possession and acquiescence are not applicable to the facts; that plaintiff did not hold possession of the disputed strip adverse to the defendant; that the right of way fence was not on the line, nor was it ever so treated; and that plaintiff acquired no right or title to said strip by reason of the
Both parties rely upon former decisions of this court to sustain their respective theories, and we will, therefore, briefly review a few of the cited cases. There is considerable lack of harmony in the decisions of other jurisdictions; but this court announced, the rule applicable to the facts of this case in Barlow v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 29 Iowa 276, which has been followed up to the present time, as appears from.what follows. In that case, it was held that the statute of limitations does not apply, where the easement was acquired by deed; and that no length of mere non-user will operate to impair or defeat the right of way; and that the use of the premises under consideration by the plaintiff, as shown in that case, for the statutory period, was not adverse to the rights of defendant.
“The plaintiff’s possession was not adverse to, nor inconsistent with, the right of defendant to occupy the whole right of way, whenever it became necessary or desirable for it to do so.”
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Hanken, 140 Iowa 372,
The court, in Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Hanken, supra, discusses the conflict in the authorities in other jurisdictions, but re-affirms the doctrine of Slocumb v. C., B. & Q. R. Co., supra. We quote the following from the opinion:
“The line of decisions last referred to declares that possession by the abutting owner not inconsistent with the existence of the easement is permissive only, and cannot bar the claim by the company when the property is required for the prosecution of the company’s business. Southern Pac. Co. v. Hyatt, 130 Cal. 240 (64 Pac. 272, 54 L. R. A. 522); Railroad v. French, 100 Tenn. 200 (43 S. W. 771, 66 Am. St. 752); Spottiswoode v. Railway, 61 N. J. L. 322 ( 40 Atl. 505). See Warvelle on Equity, Section 471. The point was not determined in Chicago, S. & St. P. R. Co. v. Snyder, 120 Iowa 532; but in Slocumb v. Railway, 57 Iowa 675, the doctrine that property taken for the public use cannot be encroached on by the abutting owner so as to deprive the railroad company of title, save by appropriation absolutely inconsistent with such use when needed, finds approval. This doctrine is quite as applicable to depot ground as right of way where condemned for such use or actually occupied for that purpose. The difference to be noted is this: The statute determines the width of a right of way, while the extent of depot ground depends on the necessities of the company.”
The court emphasized the fact that the land in controversy had never been devoted to public use, and it was not shown that same would ever be needed by the plaintiff in the transaction of its business, and, therefore, the doctrine of the Slocumb case was not applicable.
The court, in Iowa Cent. R. Co. v. Homan, supra, said: “In the case at bar, as already indicated, the company
The decision in the above case was by a divided court, the division, however, turning upon the question whether the doctrine of the Slocmnb and other cases was applicable to the facts under consideration, and not upon a difference in opinion as to the soundness of the holding in the Slommb case. The decision of the court in the Hehnich case is not inconsistent with the doctrine of the above cases. It must be read and analyzed with reference to the peculiar facts involved. The conclusion reached by the court is entirely sound.
There is little controversy in the facts in the case at bar, but it is vigorously insisted by counsel for appellee that the evidence offered to show the alleged dangerous character of the crossing and that the disputed strip was necessary in the operation of appellant’s road is wholly immaterial. The deed in Barlow v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., supra, contained provisions similar to those in the deed conveying the right of way to defendant. The court in that case held that the legal effect of the instrument was to convey only a right of way. The trees, consisting of cherry, plum, and maple, were planted in 1898. For several years, the defendant’s employees eut the overhanging branches, so as to remove the obstruction, so far as possible, without cutting the trees. That the trees materially obstructed the
So far as the evidence discloses, the attempt upon the part of the employees of defendant to erect a right of way fence' 50 -feet west of the center of its track, while Miles owned the land, was made upon the belief that the right of
It appears from the evidence that one of the fruit trees destroyed was upon premises belonging to plaintiff. The evidence relates to the damages claimed by plaintiff on account of the removal of the tree in question, and the large number of trees from the disputed strip. We are, therefore, unable to determine the extent of plaintiff’s damages on account of the removal of the tree from her premises. The decree of the court below, for the reasons above pointed out, must be reversed, but the cause will be remanded to the district court for further proceedings in harmony with this opinion, to determine plaintiff’s damages. — Reversed and remanded.