Julio Bonilla Vs. State Of Iowa

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 09–0993
Filed December 17, 2010
JULIO BONILLA,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T.
Schemmel, Judge.
Defendant claims sentence of life in prison without parole for a
juvenile nonhomicide offense violates the prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED
FOR RESENTENCING CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas W. Andrews, Assistant
Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Nan Horvat,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
2
STREIT, Justice.
Julio Bonilla was convicted of kidnapping in the first degree in
adult court for an offense committed at the age of sixteen. 1 He was
sentenced to mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole
pursuant to the Iowa Code. Under the recent United States Supreme
Court decision Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, ____, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2033–34, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825, 848–50 (2010), this sentence constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. The clauses of Iowa Code sections 902.1 and
906.5 (2003) that make Bonilla ineligible for parole are unconstitutional
as applied to Bonilla. These clauses are also severable. Therefore,
Bonilla’s sentence must be adjusted to life in prison with the possibility
of parole.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
In 2005, Julio Bonilla was convicted of kidnapping in the first
degree, a class “A” felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 710.1 and
710.2. Bonilla was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole
1Throughout this opinion, we proceed based on the trial court’s finding of fact
that Bonilla was sixteen at the time of his crime. The State suggests Bonilla may not
have been sixteen at the time of his crime, arguing his precise birth date was never
“verified” because Bonilla was born in El Salvador and Bonilla is “mature-looking.”
After a bench trial, the district court entered findings of fact, including finding that
Bonilla was sixteen years of age at the time of the incident. At trial, Bonilla testified he
was sixteen at the time of the crime. The State did not present any evidence to the
contrary and concedes “all parties proceeded on the assumption” that Bonilla’s age was
correct.
The State has not pointed to any evidence it could present beyond speculation.
Although the State’s conclusory speculation does not raise a material issue of fact to
support an evidentiary hearing revisiting the district court’s factual findings, because
the constitutional challenge to Bonilla’s sentence was first raised on appeal, the district
court may determine on remand whether further hearing on this issue is required. Cf.
Kyle v. State, 322 N.W.2d 299, 302–03 (Iowa 1982) (finding in a postconviction relief
action that defendant’s affidavit asserting decision to plead guilty was not voluntary,
despite previous colloquy to the contrary, raised material issue of fact necessitating an
evidentiary hearing).
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because under Iowa Code section 902.1, class “A” felonies are punishable
by a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. Bonilla
was sixteen years old at the time of the offense.
Bonilla filed an application for postconviction relief, which was
denied by the district court. Bonilla appealed this denial but does not
raise any of the issues that were before the district court. Instead,
Bonilla raises, for the first time, the argument that his sentence of life in
prison without parole violates his constitutional right against cruel and
unusual punishment.
II. Scope of Review.
We review constitutional claims de novo. Formaro v. Polk County,
773 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Iowa 2009). This court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a). A claim that a
sentence is unconstitutional because it constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment is a claim of an illegal sentence and may therefore be raised
at any time. Veal v. State, 779 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa 2010); State v.
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 871–72 (Iowa 2009).
III. Merits.
Bonilla filed a postconviction relief action. Because he complains
his sentence is illegal, however, the claim “is not a postconviction relief
action.” Veal, 779 N.W.2d at 65. In Veal, the district court had
dismissed the case under the statute of limitations. Id. at 64. This court
remanded for consideration on the merits and ordered the district court
to “treat her application for postconviction relief as a challenge to an
illegal sentence.” Id. at 65; see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a). We
remanded to provide the district court the first opportunity to assess
whether, under the facts of the case, Veal’s sentence of life in prison
without parole as a juvenile for a homicide offense constituted cruel and
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unusual punishment. Veal, 779 N.W.2d at 65. Bonilla’s postconviction
action must also be construed as a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Id. Here, however, there is no need to remand to the district court for
consideration of the legal issue because the United States Supreme
Court has already addressed the category of juveniles into which Bonilla
falls: juveniles who have committed a nonhomicide offense for which they
have been sentenced to life in prison without parole. See Graham, ___
U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2033–34, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 848–50.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Bonilla argues his sentence
of life in prison without parole constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the United States and Iowa Constitutions. He argues
that because he was a juvenile at the time of his offense and did not
commit homicide, the United States and Iowa Constitutions prohibit a
sentence of life in prison without parole.
The Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution states:
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution states, “Excessive bail shall
not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and
unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 17.
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held the United
States Constitution “prohibits the imposition of a life without parole
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” ___ U.S.
at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2034, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 850. The Court explained, “A
life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a
chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.” Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at
2029, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845.
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Graham adopted a categorical rule prohibiting the imposition of a
life-without-parole sentence for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. The
Court explained that a categorical rule “is necessary to prevent the
possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile
nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that
punishment.” Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845. The
court further held a state must provide “some meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id.
at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845–46.
Bonilla’s claim falls squarely within the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Graham. Bonilla was convicted of the nonhomicide
crime of kidnapping in the first degree, a class “A” felony. Bonilla was
sentenced to life in prison without parole pursuant to Iowa Code section
902.1, which provides that an individual convicted of a class “A” felony
will be sentenced to life and “shall not be released on parole unless the
governor commutes the sentence to a term of years.” 2 Graham applies
retroactively to Bonilla because it is a new rule of substantive law
clarifying the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52, 124 S. Ct.
2519, 2522–23, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442, 448 (2004) (“Such rules apply
retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a
defendant . . .’ faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon
him.” (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S. Ct.
1604, 1610, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828, 838–39 (1998))); Goosman v. State, 764
N.W.2d 539, 544 (Iowa 2009).
2Although Bonilla could theoretically receive a commutation from Iowa’s
governor, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the “remote possibility” of
executive clemency in the cruel and unusual punishment analysis of Graham. ___ U.S.
at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2027, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 842.
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Under Graham, Bonilla’s federal constitutional right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment was violated when he was sentenced to
life in prison without parole for the nonhomicide crime of kidnapping in
the first degree. Because Bonilla has successfully asserted a claim under
the United States Constitution, we need not address the boundaries of
the Iowa Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
B. Remedy. Graham did not specify how the states should adjust
the sentences of juveniles previously sentenced to life in prison without
parole for a nonhomicide crime. Graham held “[i]t is for the State, in the
first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.”
Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 846.
Although Bonilla was sixteen at the time of his crime, he was tried
as an adult. Under Iowa Code section 702.11(1), kidnapping is a forcible
felony. The juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over juveniles who
are sixteen or seventeen at the time of their crime and are accused of
committing a forcible felony. See Iowa Code § 232.8(1)(c). Instead, the
sixteen or seventeen year old is tried in adult court. The juvenile may
then seek a waiver from adult court to the juvenile court for good cause.
Id.
Bonilla was charged with kidnapping in the first degree. Because
kidnapping is a forcible felony, he was tried in adult court. Id.
§§ 232.8(1)(c), 702.11. When a juvenile is convicted of a forcible felony in
adult court, the juvenile is sentenced pursuant to section 902.9. Id.
§ 232.8(1)(c). Section 902.9 provides “[t]he maximum sentence for any
person convicted of a felony shall be that prescribed by statute or, if not
prescribed by statute” and a felony other than a class “A” felony, the
defendant shall be sentenced as described in section 902.9. Kidnapping
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in the first degree is a class “A” felony. Id. § 710.2. Section 902.1
provides the penalty for a class “A” felony:
Upon a plea of guilty, a verdict of guilty, or a special
verdict upon which a judgment of conviction of a class “A”
felony may be rendered, the court shall enter a judgment of
conviction and shall commit the defendant into the custody
of the director of the Iowa department of corrections for the
rest of the defendant’s life. Nothing in the Iowa corrections
code pertaining to deferred judgment, deferred sentence,
suspended sentence, or reconsideration of sentence applies
to a class “A” felony, and a person convicted of a class “A”
felony shall not be released on parole unless the governor
commutes the sentence to a term of years.
Pursuant to section 902.1, Bonilla was sentenced to life in prison and
does not have the possibility of parole other than commutation by the
governor. As described above, application of section 902.1 to Bonilla
violates the Federal Constitution.
Iowa Code section 4.12 provides:
If any provision of an Act or statute or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of
the Act or statute which can be given effect without the
invalid provision or application, and to this end the
provisions of the Act or statute are severable.
“When parts of a statute or ordinance are constitutionally valid, but
other discrete and identifiable parts are infirm, we may sever the
offending portions from the enactment and leave the remainder intact.”
Am. Dog Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Des Moines, 469 N.W.2d 416, 418
(Iowa 1991) (per curiam); see also State v. Aldrich, 231 N.W.2d 890, 895–
96 (Iowa 1975); State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 261–62 (Iowa 1975).
“Severance is appropriate if it does not substantially impair the
legislative purpose, if the enactment remains capable of fulfilling the
apparent legislative intent, and if the remaining portion of the enactment
can be given effect without the invalid provision.” Am. Dog Owners
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Ass’n, 469 N.W.2d at 418. Similarly, where a portion of a defendant’s
sentence is improper or invalid, if possible, this court can sever the
sentence without disturbing the balance of the sentence. State v.
Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1997).
Severance is appropriate here. The last clause of the last sentence
of section 902.1, stating “a person convicted of a class “A” felony shall
not be released on parole unless the governor commutes the sentence to
a term of years,” is unconstitutional as applied to Bonilla. This last
clause can be severed from the remainder of section 902.1. The statute,
as it applies to Bonilla, will read:
Upon a plea of guilty, a verdict of guilty, or a special
verdict upon which a judgment of conviction of a class “A”
felony may be rendered, the court shall enter a judgment of
conviction and shall commit the defendant into the custody
of the director of the Iowa department of corrections for the
rest of the defendant’s life. Nothing in the Iowa corrections
code pertaining to deferred judgment, deferred sentence,
suspended sentence, or reconsideration of sentence applies
to a class “A” felony, and a person convicted of a class “A”
felony shall not be released on parole unless the governor
commutes the sentence to a term of years.
Therefore, Bonilla continues to serve a life sentence but must be subject
to the possibility of parole.
Iowa Code section 906.5 provides the mechanism by which the
parole board considers parole case reviews. Section 906.5(1) establishes
annual case reviews for inmates. Inmates convicted of a class “A” felony,
however, are exempted from the annual case review. Iowa Code
§ 906.5(1). This exemption from consideration for parole, as applied to
Bonilla, is unconstitutional. The clause “other than a class ‘A’ felon” can
9
be severed from section 906.5. Therefore, the provisions of section 906.5
establishing parole reviews will apply to Bonilla. 3
We remand to the district court for resentencing consistent with
this opinion.
IV. Conclusion.
Bonilla was convicted of the nonhomicide crime of kidnapping in
the first degree. Because he was a juvenile at the time of the
nonhomicide offense, the mandatory sentence of life in prison without
the possibility of parole violated the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution under Graham, ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2033–
34, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 848–50. We find the clauses of Iowa Code sections
902.1 and 906.5 prohibiting parole are unconstitutional as applied to
Bonilla and severable. Therefore, Bonilla shall be sentenced to life in
prison, with the potential of parole.
3Section906.5 also prohibits parole review until inmates have served the
mandatory minimum sentence for their crime as established by statute. Because
kidnapping in the first degree carries a life sentence without parole, there is no
mandatory minimum sentence established by statute.
There is, however, a mandatory minimum sentence for kidnapping in the second
degree. See Iowa Code §§ 710.3, 902.9, 902.12. In 2003 (when the offense took place),
a defendant was required to serve eighty-five percent of the sentence for kidnapping in
the second degree. See Iowa Code §§ 902.12, 903A.2; see also State v. Ceaser, 585
N.W.2d 192, 196 n.1 (Iowa 1998) (noting the rule in section 902.12 requiring a
defendant to serve one hundred percent of the sentence is modified by section 903A.2
allowing a fifteen percent reduction of sentence for good conduct time, therefore
resulting in required service of eighty-five percent), overruled on other grounds by
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 871–72. Section 902.12 now requires those convicted of
kidnapping in the second-degree to serve seven-tenths of the maximum sentence of
twenty-five years, or seventeen-and-one-half years. Therefore, had Bonilla been
convicted in adult court of kidnapping in the second degree, he would not be eligible for
parole for a substantial portion of his sentence.
By striking the unconstitutional statutory provisions which prevent Bonilla from
ever receiving consideration for parole, Bonilla will become eligible for an annual case
review immediately. He will therefore be eligible for a parole case review before an
individual convicted of second degree kidnapping. When a portion of a statute is
unconstitutional, we sever the offending portions from the enactment and leave the
remainder intact. Am. Dog Owners Ass’n, 469 N.W.2d at 418. We leave to the
legislature whether and how to correct this apparent inconsistency.
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SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.