Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Gordon Liles

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–0799
Filed January 6, 2012
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
GORDON LILES,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa reports
respondent committed ethical misconduct and recommends attorney be
publicly reprimanded. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Charles L. Harrington and Amanda K. Robinson, Des Moines, for
complainant.
Richard L. Fehseke, Jr., Fort Madison, for respondent.
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HECHT, Justice.
In this attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Iowa Supreme Court
Attorney Disciplinary Board alleges an attorney forged the signature of a
witness on a will and later filed the document in a probate proceeding.
Upon our review of the record, we find the Board proved the attorney
violated provisions of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct by a clear
preponderance of the evidence and conclude a period of suspension is
the appropriate sanction under the circumstances.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Gordon Liles served as a part-time county attorney in Lee County
for nearly thirty years. During his tenure in that office, Liles also
represented clients in his part-time private law practice. Although he
resigned his position as prosecutor on June 2, 2008, he made
arrangements for his client, Maxine Puckett, to come to the county
attorney’s office to execute her will on June 10, 2008. The will signed
that day by Puckett named Lisa Henshaw and David Andrusyk as
witnesses of Puckett’s signature. Although Andrusyk was not present
when Puckett signed the will, Liles signed Andrusyk’s name on the
document as a subscribing witness.
After Puckett passed away in May of 2009, Liles filed the will for
probate. A vigilant employee in the clerk of court’s office doubted the
authenticity of the purported signature of witness Andrusyk. Andrusyk
acknowledged the signature was not his and reported Liles to the Board.
When Liles was confronted with the allegation of forgery, he admitted his
conduct and expressed remorse. Meanwhile, the district court held a
hearing in the Puckett probate matter which resulted in the dismissal of
the petition for small estate administration previously filed by Liles. A
subsequent petition alleging Puckett died intestate was filed by the Iowa
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Department of Human Services seeking reimbursement for a Medicaid
lien. 1
II. The Board’s Complaint.
The Board filed a complaint alleging Liles violated several
provisions of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct including rule
32:8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), rule 32:8.4(d)
(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), rule 32:3.3(a)(1)
(knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or failing
to correct such statement), and rule 32:3.3(a)(3) (knowingly offer false
evidence).
Following a hearing during which Liles admitted he forged the
witness’s attestation of Puckett’s will and expressed his remorse and
humiliation, the commission found Liles committed each of the rule
violations alleged by the Board. The commission recommended Liles be
publicly reprimanded for the misconduct.
III. Scope of Review.
The commission’s report is now before this court for review
pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.10. Our review is de novo. Iowa Ct. R.
35.10; Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Mulford, 625
N.W.2d 672, 679 (Iowa 2001). “Although we are not bound by the
commission’s findings, we give them weight, particularly when
considering the credibility of witnesses.” Id. Similarly, although we are
not bound by the commission’s recommended discipline, we give its
recommendation our respectful consideration. Id.
1Although Puckett’s testamentary intent was to transfer her modest net estate to
her grandson, the substantial lien and the costs of administration would have
precluded the intended beneficiary from taking under the will even if it had been
properly witnessed.
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IV. Violations.
Liles admits he forged Andrusyk’s signature in the attestation
clause of Puckett’s will. When he filed the document with the court, Liles
misrepresented its authenticity in a legal proceeding. The forgery of
Andrusyk’s signature constituted an act of deceit against both Puckett
and Andrusyk in violation of rule 32:8.4(c). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of
Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Rylaarsdam, 636 N.W.2d 90, 92–93 (Iowa 2001)
(finding a lawyer’s forging of signatures on court documents constituted
deceit). When he attached Puckett’s will to a petition for small estate
administration and filed it with the court, Liles knowingly misrepresented
the authenticity of Andrusyk’s signature to a tribunal in violation of rule
32:3.3(a)(1) and knowingly offered evidence of the will’s authentication
which he knew to be false in violation of rule 32:3.3(a)(3).
Lastly, we consider whether Liles’ conduct was prejudicial to the
administration of justice in violation of rule 32:8.4(d). Although there is
no “typical form of conduct that prejudices the administration of justice,”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Steffes, 588 N.W.2d
121, 123 (Iowa 1999), we have noted acts which violate well-understood
norms and conventions of the practice of law and hamper the efficient
and proper operation of the courts will generally constitute a violation of
this rule, Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784
N.W.2d 761, 770–71 (Iowa 2010); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Borth, 728 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Iowa 2007). We conclude Liles did violate
well-understood norms of practice when he knowingly attached an
invalid will to a petition for administration of a small estate and filed it
with the court. His actions hampered the efficient operation of the court
because they caused the court to admit the invalid will to probate, issue
letters of an executor’s appointment, schedule a hearing, and later
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rescind Liles’ appointment as executor. Accordingly, we conclude the
Board proved by a clear preponderance of the evidence Liles’ violation of
rule 32:8.4(d).
Accordingly, we find each of the violations alleged by the Board
was established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.
V. Discipline.2
When imposing discipline for violations of the rules of professional
conduct, we consider “the nature of the violations, the need for
deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the
bar as a whole, and the [attorney’s] fitness to continue in the practice of
law.” Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Blomker, 379 N.W.2d 19, 21
(Iowa 1985). Ultimately, the discipline imposed “must be tailored to the
specific facts and circumstances of each individual case.” Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Rogers, 313 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Iowa 1981). The
tailoring of appropriate discipline requires us to consider both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Ruth, 656 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Iowa 2002).
The lawyer’s duty to act honestly is a first principle underlying
each of the rules violated by Liles in this case. In calibrating the
appropriate discipline for violations of this principle in cases involving
forged signatures on court documents, we have imposed sanctions
ranging from a public reprimand for an attorney with no prior record of
discipline who forged a judge’s signature on an approved, but unsigned,
order and filed it with the court, Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
2After the Board filed a “Statement Regarding Sanction” on August 25, 2011,
Liles filed a motion to strike the statement because it was untimely. The Board
subsequently filed a “Statement Regarding Motion” acknowledging its previous
statement was untimely and stating it did not resist Liles’ motion to strike. Accordingly,
we do not consider the Board’s “Statement Regarding Sanction.”
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v. Newman, 748 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 2008), to a suspension of nine
months for an attorney with a history of discipline for similar conduct
who forged a judge’s signature on a court order, Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Thompson, 732 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Iowa 2007). We
conclude the appropriate discipline for the violations committed by Liles
falls on the continuum between the public reprimand imposed in
Newman and the lengthy suspension ordered in Thompson.
We find Liles has accepted responsibility for his actions and
expressed sincere remorse. These are mitigating circumstances affecting
our determination of the sanction. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 770–71.
Yet, our decision that a sanction more serious than a public reprimand
must be imposed here is significantly influenced by the aggravating
circumstance of a prior public reprimand imposed on Liles for
undertaking the representation of two clients under circumstances
constituting a conflict of interest. “[P]rior disciplinary action is properly
considered as an aggravating circumstance . . . .” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd.
of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Gallner, 621 N.W.2d 183, 188 (Iowa 2001).
Having considered the nature of Liles’ conduct, the need to deter
attorney conduct involving forgery, the purpose of protecting the public
from attorney misconduct, the goal of protecting the reputation of the
bar, Liles’ fitness to practice law, and the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances presented, we conclude a license suspension of sixty days
is required in this case.
VI. Conclusion.
We suspend Liles’ license to practice law in Iowa for sixty days.
This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. Iowa Ct. R.
35.12(3). Liles shall comply with the notification requirements as
provided in rule 35.22, and the costs of these proceedings are taxed to
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Liles pursuant to rule 35.26(1). Absent an objection by the Board, we
shall reinstate Liles’ license to practice law on the day after the
suspension period expires. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(2).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.