State of Iowa v. Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–0488
Filed March 9, 2012
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR
BLACK HAWK COUNTY,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Nathan A. Callahan, District Associate Judge.
On petition for writ of certiorari, the State contends the district
court misinterpreted Iowa Code section 124.401(5) when sentencing a
defendant for a marijuana accommodation offense. WRIT ANNULLED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant
Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad P.
Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for plaintiff.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer,
Assistant Appellate Defender, Andrew Craig, Student Legal Intern, for
Marcus Coleman, defendant below.
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HECHT, Justice.
In this petition for writ of certiorari we are asked to interpret Iowa
Code sections 124.410 and 124.401(5) (2009) to determine whether a
defendant convicted of possession of marijuana as an accommodation
offense who has previously been convicted of simple possession of
marijuana should be sentenced for a serious misdemeanor or an
aggravated misdemeanor. We conclude the district court correctly
sentenced the defendant for a serious misdemeanor and annul the writ of
certiorari.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In June 2010, Marcus Coleman was charged with possession of
marijuana with intent to deliver as an accommodation offense. The trial
information alleged Coleman was subject to an enhanced sentence
because he had a previous conviction for possession of marijuana. On
October 25, 2010, Coleman submitted a written Alford plea admitting he
“knowingly or intentionally possessed ½ oz. or less of marijuana with the
intent to share some of it. The marijuana was not offered for sale.”
Coleman requested a sentencing hearing to determine whether he should
be sentenced for a serious misdemeanor or an aggravated misdemeanor.
At the hearing on January 10, 2011, the court heard arguments
regarding the sentencing issue. Coleman contended the plain language
of sections 124.410 and 124.401(5) controlled and he should be
sentenced for a serious misdemeanor. The State argued Coleman was
not eligible for the ameliorative provisions of section 124.401(5) under
our holding in State v. Rankin, 666 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 2003), and he
should be sentenced for an aggravated misdemeanor. The court issued a
written ruling on January 13, 2011, concluding the plain language of the
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relevant statutes provided Coleman be sentenced for a serious
misdemeanor.1
On March 14, 2011, Coleman was sentenced to a suspended
sentence of 365 days in the county jail. The State sought certiorari from
the sentencing order, contending the sentence imposed is illegal because
the district court misapplied section 124.401(5).
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Our review is for errors at law in certiorari cases. Weissenburger v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 740 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 2007). We look to whether the
district court “has exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Illegality exists
“when the court has not properly applied the law.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Discussion.
This case presents a narrow issue of statutory interpretation. A
person who possesses fifty kilograms or less of marijuana with intent to
deliver is guilty of a class D felony. Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d). However,
“[i]n a prosecution for unlawful delivery or possession with intent to
deliver marijuana,” if the defendant delivered or possessed with intent to
deliver one-half ounce or less of marijuana which was not intended for
sale, “the defendant is guilty of an accommodation offense.” Id.
§ 124.410. Rather than being sentenced for a conviction under section
1Because of the disagreement over which sentencing provision applied to
Coleman’s case, the court treated the hearing on January 10 as a hearing on a motion
to adjudicate law points and set another hearing for sentencing. No one objected to this
procedure, but the State asserts in its petition for writ of certiorari that “a motion to
adjudicate law points no longer exists under the rules though it still appears to be used
commonly.” As we noted in State v. Meadows, 696 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Iowa 2005),
“[a]pplications for separate adjudication of points of law are no longer recognized by rule
in civil proceedings but continue to be available in criminal prosecutions by virtue of
the provisions of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(2).”
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124.401(1)(d), the defendant shall be sentenced “as if” convicted for a
violation of 124.401(5). Id.
The first paragraph of section 124.401(5) prohibits simple
possession of controlled substances (not possession with intent to
deliver). A first offense is a serious misdemeanor. Id. § 124.401(5). A
second offense for someone with a previous conviction for violating
chapter 124, 124A, 124B, or 453B is an aggravated misdemeanor. Id. A
third or subsequent offense is a class D felony. Id. However, the second
paragraph of subsection (5) specifically addresses the sentences imposed
for marijuana offenses:
If the controlled substance is marijuana, the
punishment shall be by imprisonment in the county jail for
not more than six months or by a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment for
a first offense. If the controlled substance is marijuana and
the person has been previously convicted of a violation of
this subsection in which the controlled substance was
marijuana, the punishment shall be as provided in section
903.1, subsection 1, paragraph “b” [a serious misdemeanor].
If the controlled substance is marijuana and the person has
been previously convicted two or more times of a violation of
this subsection in which the controlled substance was
marijuana, the person is guilty of an aggravated
misdemeanor.
Id.
As Coleman was convicted of an accommodation offense, not
simple possession of marijuana, the State contends he should have been
sentenced for an aggravated misdemeanor (under the first paragraph of
subsection (5)) and not a serious misdemeanor (as provided in the
second paragraph of subsection (5)).
Coleman contends a plain reading of sections 124.410 and
124.401(5) demonstrate the district court correctly sentenced him for a
serious misdemeanor. He pled guilty to a marijuana accommodation
offense under section 124.410 which required that he be sentenced “as
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if” convicted of violating 124.401(5). Section 124.401(5) states that “[i]f
the controlled substance is marijuana” the defendant shall be sentenced
for a serious misdemeanor if he has a previous conviction for possession
of marijuana, which Coleman did.
The State, however, contends the application of the plain language
of the statutes to Coleman’s case directly conflicts with our decision in
Rankin. The facts in Rankin were the inverse of the facts of this case.
Rankin had a previous conviction for the accommodation offense and
was later charged with simple possession of marijuana. Rankin, 666
N.W.2d at 609. When he was being sentenced for the possession
conviction, he argued he should be sentenced under the second
paragraph of section 124.401(5) because his possession offense involved
marijuana. Id. at 609–10. He contended that although his prior
accommodation conviction was not actually a possession conviction,
because he had been sentenced “as if” convicted of possession of
marijuana, the legislature must have intended his prior conviction be
considered a prior possession conviction for sentencing purposes and he
should receive the more lenient sentencing in the second paragraph of
subsection (5). Id. at 610. We, however, concluded the second
paragraph did not apply because his first conviction was under section
124.401(1), not 124.401(5), and he should be sentenced for an
aggravated misdemeanor as provided in the first paragraph of section
124.401(5). Id.
The State argues that our interpretation of section 124.401(5) in
Rankin controls the result in this case because, like Rankin, Coleman
has a total of two convictions—one for possession and one for
accommodation. The only difference is the order in which the
convictions were received. The State argues the legislature must have
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intended Coleman and Rankin receive the same sentence, despite the
plain language of the statutes.
Our goal, when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the
legislature’s intent. In re Det. of Fowler, 784 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa
2010). Usually, this intent is determined from the language of the
statute. Id. “We do not search for meaning beyond the express terms of
the statute when the statute is plain and its meaning is clear.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude the language of the statutes is clear and
unambiguous: the second paragraph of section 124.401(5) controls
Coleman’s sentencing, and he should be sentenced for a serious
misdemeanor. While this outcome may seem unfair to one standing in
Rankin’s shoes, we are bound to derive legislative intent from the words
chosen by the legislature rather than from what the legislature should or
might have said.
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude the district court did not misinterpret or misapply
sections 124.401(5) and 124.410 when it sentenced Coleman for a
serious misdemeanor under the circumstances presented here.
WRIT ANNULLED.