State of Iowa v. Jeffrey K. Ragland

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 10–1770
Filed March 30, 2012
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JEFFREY K. RAGLAND,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County,
James M. Richardson, Judge.
An offender seeks further review of a court of appeals decision
affirming the dismissal of his postconviction relief action. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED.
Jon M. Kinnamon, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant
Attorney General, Matthew D. Wilber, County Attorney, and Margaret
Jane Popp Reyes, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
A juvenile offender, who the State tried as an adult, brought a
postconviction relief action1 claiming that his conviction for first-degree
murder should be overturned and that his sentence is illegal because it
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the State and Federal
Constitutions. The district court dismissed both claims and the court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the offender has made the same claims in
the past and that the law of the case doctrine precludes the court from
revisiting them. On appeal, we find the law of the case doctrine
precludes the offender from attacking his conviction for first-degree
murder. We also find, however, the doctrine does not preclude him from
attacking his sentence as illegal because the controlling authority
regarding cruel and unusual punishment has changed since his original
appeal regarding this issue and the three-year limitation period for
bringing a postconviction relief action does not prohibit a challenge to an
illegal sentence. Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of
appeals, affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the district
court, and remand this case for further proceedings on the illegal
sentence issue.
1Although Ragland’s application was labeled, “Application for Correction of [an
Illegal] Sentence Pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(5)(a) and Iowa
Supreme Court Case, Veal v. State,” the basis of Ragland’s claim was that his conviction
and sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. A correction of a
“conviction or sentence [that] was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or
the Constitution or laws of this state” is required to be brought as a postconviction relief
action pursuant to section 822.2(1)(a). Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(a) (2009); see also Veal v.
State, 779 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa 2010) (allowing an applicant to challenge her sentence
as an illegal sentence based on cruel and unusual punishment in a postconviction relief
action). Thus, we will refer to Ragland’s application as an application for postconviction
relief.
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I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In 1986, a jury convicted seventeen-year-old Jeffrey K. Ragland of
first-degree murder for his participation in a fight resulting in the death
of Timothy Sieff. Sieff died after Ragland’s codefendant, Matthew Gill,
struck Sieff once in the head with a tire iron. The State formally charged
Ragland under two alternate first-degree murder theories—willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder and felony murder, with willful
injury serving as the predicate felony. The jury convicted Ragland under
the felony-murder rule. Ragland received a sentence of life in prison
without the possibility of parole, as required by statute.
On direct appeal, we affirmed Ragland’s conviction in State v.
Ragland, 420 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1988), overruled by State v. Heemstra,
721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006). In challenging his conviction, Ragland
argued the predicate felony of willful injury merged into the offense of
murder and could not be used to support his conviction under the
felony-murder rule. Ragland, 420 N.W.2d at 793. He also argued his
conviction violated his right to due process because what would
otherwise have amounted to second-degree murder, at most, should not
have been enhanced to first-degree murder because the same act
constituted the felonious act and the fatal act. Id. Ragland further
contended that his sentence was cruel and unusual because it was
disproportionate to the offense charged and that it violated his right to
equal protection. Id. at 794. We rejected all of Ragland’s contentions.
Id. at 795.
Ragland subsequently filed several state and federal actions, all of
which were unsuccessful. In 1991, the court of appeals affirmed
Ragland’s conviction and sentence in a postconviction action in which he
contended his attorney rendered ineffective assistance during the 1986
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criminal proceedings. Ragland v. State, No. 1–116, 478 N.W.2d 642(Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 1991) (unpublished table opinion). On appeal to
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals after a federal district court denied
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Ragland argued his conviction
violated his rights to due process and against double jeopardy because
the felony and murder resulted from the same act. Ragland v. Hundley,
79 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1996). He also argued the jury instructions
deprived him of due process because they were inadequate. Id. at 705.
Finally, he argued our limitation of the statutory merger doctrine in
felony-murder cases violated his right to equal protection. Id. at 706.
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. Id. at
707.
In 2005, Ragland filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(5)(a), arguing the trial court lacked
power to convict and sentence him for first-degree murder. Again,
underlying all of Ragland’s arguments was his contention the district
court could not rely upon a single act as the evidentiary basis for both
the homicide and the alleged participation in a forcible felony. The
district court denied the motion, holding the law of the case doctrine
barred reconsideration of Ragland’s case. We affirmed the decision of the
district court in an order.
Finally, in 2007, Ragland filed a postconviction relief action
claiming our 2006 decision in Heemstra afforded him relief. In
Heemstra, we ruled an act causing willful injury that causes the victim’s
death could not serve as the predicate felony for felony-murder purposes.
721 N.W.2d at 558. In an order, we summarily affirmed the dismissal of
this action on the grounds that our ruling in Heemstra was not
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retroactive. See Goosman v. State, 764 N.W.2d 539, 545 (Iowa 2009)
(holding Heemstra is not retroactive).
On March 17, 2010, Ragland filed an application for correction of
sentence. On April 7, Ragland amended his application. In his amended
application, he raises two arguments. The first argument is that his
conviction is improper after our decision in Heemstra. The second is that
his sentence, life in prison without the possibility of parole, is illegal
because it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of
the Iowa Constitution. He relies on our decision in Veal v. State, 779
N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 2010), to support this argument.
In denying his application, the district court characterized
Ragland’s argument as a rehashing of the same errors he alleged in
previous actions concerning the felony-murder rule. Because the court
characterized Ragland’s application as another challenge to an allegedly
erroneous conviction and not as a challenge to an illegal sentence, the
court dismissed his application as barred under the doctrines of res
judicata and the law of the case. After deciding Ragland’s action was
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and the law of the case, the
district court went on to state that, if it had reached the merits,
Ragland’s claim would have failed.
Ragland appealed, making two arguments. First, he made the
same arguments he made in his prior appeals and actions—that he
cannot be guilty of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule.
Second, he argued the district court erred in denying his state and
federal constitutional claims based on an illegal, unusual, and cruel
punishment.
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We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court. It agreed Ragland’s application was
merely “a reformulation of arguments raised and decided in prior
proceedings.” Therefore, the court of appeals determined, the law of the
case doctrine barred the court’s consideration of Ragland’s application
because the issues had already been litigated and decided. The court of
appeals did not address the merits of Ragland’s application.
We granted further review to determine whether the law of the case
doctrine precluded Ragland’s claims.
II. Scope of Review.
As explained later in this opinion, the only viable issue raised by
Ragland is whether his sentence as a minor to life in prison without
parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the State and
Federal Constitutions. We review constitutional claims de novo. Bonilla
v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Iowa 2010).
III. Discussion and Analysis.
The law of the case doctrine “represents the practice of courts to
refuse to reconsider what has once been decided.” State v. Grosvenor,
402 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 1987). It stems from “a public policy against
reopening matters which have already been decided.” Bahl v. City of
Asbury, 725 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Iowa 2006). Under the law of the case
doctrine, “the legal principles announced and the views expressed by a
reviewing court in an opinion, right or wrong, are binding throughout
further progress of the case upon the litigants, the trial court and this
court in later appeals.” Grosvenor, 402 N.W.2d at 405. Therefore, under
the doctrine, “ ‘an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is
controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the
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same case.’ ” Bahl, 725 N.W.2d at 321 (quoting United Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 612 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa 2000)).
However, the law of the case doctrine is not without exceptions.
For instance, when the controlling authority has been clarified by
subsequent judicial decisions, the doctrine does not apply. United Fire &
Cas. Co., 612 N.W.2d at 103. This exception is applicable to Ragland.
Subsequent to most of Ragland’s appeals and postconviction relief
actions, we decided Heemstra. There, we decided, “[I]f the act causing
willful injury is the same act that causes the victim’s death, the former is
merged into the murder and therefore cannot serve as the predicate
felony for felony-murder purposes.” Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 558.
Ragland raised the arguments contained in Heemstra in the
postconviction relief action he filed after our decision in Heemstra. In the
postconviction relief action, we determined our ruling in Heemstra was
not retroactive as decided in Goosman. See Goosman, 764 N.W.2d at
545.
Thus, we dismissed Ragland’s postconviction relief action based on
his claim that Heemstra provided him with some relief. Because we
considered Ragland’s claims both before and after our decision in
Heemstra, the law of the case doctrine bars rehearing of any claims he
made attacking his conviction based on Heemstra. Accordingly, the
district court correctly refused to revisit Ragland’s claims attacking his
conviction for first-degree murder.2
We believe a different result should apply to Ragland’s claim that
the district court erred in denying his state and federal constitutional
2Because we have denied Ragland’s claim concerning this issue, we need not
determine if the claim is also barred by the limitation period contained in Iowa Code
section 822.3.
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claims that his sentence was illegal because it amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment. After Ragland last raised his cruel and unusual
punishment argument, we decided Veal and State v. Bruegger, 773
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009), which both involved cruel and unusual
punishment and juvenile offenders. In Veal and Bruegger, we
determined a challenge to a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole as cruel and unusual punishment under the State
and Federal Constitutions is a challenge to an illegal sentence and not
subject to the three-year limitation period for postconviction relief
actions. Veal, 779 N.W.2d at 64–65; Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 871–72.
Additionally, in Bruegger, we held, under the Iowa Constitution, we
would now allow a defendant to challenge his or her sentence as cruel
and unusual punishment as applied.3 Id. at 884; see also State v. Oliver,
___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2012) (applying the principles involving a cruel
and unusual punishment challenge to a sentence under the Iowa
Constitution).
Accordingly, the court should not have dismissed Ragland’s
postconviction relief action concerning his claim that his sentence
3There is a question as to whether the controlling federal authority regarding
juvenile offenders sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole has
changed since Ragland last raised this issue. In Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130
S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), the United States Supreme Court revisited the
standards to use when deciding whether a juvenile offender’s sentence of life in prison
without the possibility of parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Federal Constitution. In Graham, the Court stated a defendant’s challenge must be
made under the “categorical approach” or made as a “gross proportionality challenge to
[the] particular defendant’s sentence.” ___ U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23, 176 L.
Ed. 2d at 837. The Court ruled courts cannot sentence a juvenile offender to life in
prison without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct.
at 2034, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 850. To further complicate the status of the law, the Supreme
Court is presently considering two Eighth Amendment challenges to a sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders who commit homicide. See
Jackson v. Hobbs, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 548, 181 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2011) (granting
certiorari); Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 548, 181 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2011)
(same).
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amounted to cruel and unusual punishment because the controlling
authority has changed since Ragland challenged his sentence as cruel
and unusual punishment in his original appeal. Therefore, the district
court should have allowed Ragland to proceed with his cruel and
unusual punishment challenges to his sentence based on the State and
Federal Constitutions.
IV. Disposition.
We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, affirm in part and
reverse in part the judgment of the district court, and remand this case
for further proceedings. On remand, the district court shall not consider
any challenge to Ragland’s conviction for first-degree murder based upon
the application of felony-murder rule or our decision in Heemstra. The
only issue the court should consider is whether Ragland’s sentence
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the State or Federal
Constitution.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
CASE REMANDED.