Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Bryan J. Humphrey

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–2062
Filed March 30, 2012
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
BRYAN J. HUMPHREY,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Grievance commission recommends respondent’s license be
suspended. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Charles L. Harrington and N. Tré Critelli, Des Moines, for
complainant.
Bryan J. Humphrey, Fort Madison, pro se.
2
MANSFIELD, Justice.
An attorney was retained on a contingent fee basis to obtain a
settlement from an insurance company. The attorney failed to put his
agreement with his clients in writing. He subsequently allowed the
matter to languish and did not respond to repeated inquiries from the
clients. He also failed to respond to inquiries from the Iowa Supreme
Court Attorney Disciplinary Board after the clients filed a complaint. We
now have to decide whether the attorney violated our ethical rules and, if
so, what the sanction should be.
This case comes before us on the report of a division of the
Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa. See Iowa Ct. R.
35.10(1). The Board alleged the respondent, Bryan J. Humphrey,
violated Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(3),
32:1.4(a)(4), 32:1.5(c) and 32:8.1(b). The commission agreed and
recommended Humphrey be suspended from the practice of law. Upon
our consideration of the commission’s findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendations, we also agree that Humphrey violated each
of these rules. Considering Humphrey’s current violations and his prior
disciplinary record, we order his license suspended indefinitely with no
possibility of reinstatement for three months.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.1
Humphrey was admitted to the Iowa bar in 1981 and practices on
his own. In July 2005, Humphrey was retained by Marty and Sheryl
Victory to represent them in negotiating an insurance settlement with
Amco Insurance Company. The Victorys’ home had suffered fire damage
1The relevant facts are not in dispute. The allegations of the Board’s complaint
are deemed admitted because Humphrey’s answer did not deny them. See Iowa Ct. R.
36.7. Furthermore, at the hearing, Humphrey acknowledged, “I do admit the
allegations made against me.”
3
following a lightning strike. Humphrey entered into an unwritten
contingent fee agreement with the Victorys under which he would receive
one third of their insurance recovery. On July 15, 2005, Humphrey sent
a letter to Amco requesting that it cover the Victorys’ hotel costs and out-
of-pocket expenses. Humphrey continued to correspond regularly with
the Amco adjuster through July 2008. The Victorys received an initial
insurance payment of approximately $6000 from which Humphrey was
paid one third.
However, beginning in October 2008, Humphrey essentially ceased
responding to inquiries from the Victorys regarding the ongoing status of
settlement discussions with Amco. From October 16, 2008, through
December 30, 2009, the Victorys sent thirty-five text messages asking
about the status of their claim. They received three text message
responses from Humphrey on September 8, 2009, November 24, 2009,
and December 2, 2009. The first of these responses came eleven months
after the first query from the Victorys.
The Victorys also attempted to contact Humphrey through a series
of certified letters. The first was sent on March 21, 2009, and stated:
We have not had any luck getting a hold of you by
phone so I thought I would try writing to you. We have a few
questions we want answered.
1) Why don’t you answer our calls or text messages?
2) When are you available to meet with us?
3) Are you still trying to get us settled?
4) What is the statute of limitation?
5) Have you filed a lawsuit against Allied? If so when?
6) Will you send copies of the lawsuit?
7) Have you tried to call Carl?
8) Have you sent a letter to Carl for him to sign?
Please answer these and get back to us as soon as
possible.
4
On April 19, 2009, and May 8, 2009, the Victorys sent two more
certified letters asking Humphrey the same questions. Although
Humphrey received all three letters, he did not reply to any of them.
On July 13, 2009, Humphrey wrote the Amco insurance adjuster
about the Victorys’ claim. On November 12, 2009, the Victorys sent a
fourth certified letter stating:
We have not heard from you in quite awhile. You do
not answer our phone or text messages so I thought I would
try writing to you. We have a few questions we want
answered.
1) Why don’t you answer our phone calls or text
messages?
2) About a year ago you told us everything would be
done by the end of the year, what happened?
3) Are you still working for us?
4) Have you been in contact with the insurance
company at all?
5) Are you going to file a lawsuit against the insurance
company for us?
6) If you are still working for us what is going on?
7) Have we said or done something to make you not
want to help us?
....
There are 202 days left before the 5 year anniversary
of the fire.
Humphrey received this fourth letter on November 18 but still did not
respond to the Victorys, although he did write the insurance adjuster
again on their behalf on November 20, 2009.
Finally, on January 25, 2010, the Victorys mailed yet another
letter which stated:
We have not heard from you in quite a while. I wanted
to enclose some of the many text that I (we) have sent to you
with little response from you as you can see. We have sent
registered letters to you with no response. The only time we
get to talk to you anymore is when we run into you some
where. When we hired you to help us, we believed in you
and you continually let us down. Our number #1 question
at this time is “Why?”
5
....
There are 137 days left before the 5 year anniversary
of the fire.
Humphrey did not respond to this fifth letter, so on March 17,
2010, the Victorys filed a complaint with the Board. Humphrey
responded to the Board’s initial inquiry, but did not reply to a
subsequent July 15, 2010 letter asking him to “provide the Board with
copies of [his] written communications with the insurance carrier, the
complainants, and an accounting of all settlement checks received from
the insurance carrier.” He also did not reply to a second Board letter
dated October 15, 2010.
The Victorys completed their negotiations with Amco on their own.
On August 18, 2010, they agreed to a final settlement that involved an
additional payment by Amco of $13,272.54. No portion of this insurance
payment went to Humphrey. There is no evidence that the Victorys
suffered any tangible financial loss because of Humphrey’s actions or
that Humphrey unreasonably profited from his work on their behalf.
However, a substantial, multiyear delay occurred before the Victorys
received their final insurance payment.
On August 5, 2011, the Board filed a complaint against Humphrey
alleging that he had violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(3), 32:1.4(a)(4),
32:1.5(c) and 32:8.1(b). In his answer, Humphrey admitted he had
violated rule 32:1.5(c) which requires that “[a] contingent fee agreement
shall be in writing . . . .” He denied the other four alleged rule violations.
Humphrey’s answer did not respond at all to the thirty-six numbered
paragraphs of factual allegations in the Board’s complaint. Accordingly,
the Board filed a motion asking that those alleged facts be deemed
6
admitted. Humphrey did not respond to this motion; an order was
entered granting it on September 26, 2011.
The commission held a hearing on November 17, 2011. The Board
offered three exhibits in evidence showing Humphrey’s past disciplinary
history: a public reprimand in 1995, a sixty-day license suspension in
1995, and a three-year license suspension in 1996. See Iowa Supreme
Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey, 551 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa
1996); Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey, 529 N.W.2d 255(Iowa 1995).
Humphrey appeared pro se and offered no witnesses or exhibits
but did testify on his own behalf. He admitted that his fee agreement
with the Victorys was not in writing and that he had received a
contingent fee out of the first $6000 insurance payment to them.
Humphrey maintained that the Victorys had obtained other insurance
payments through his efforts, from which he did not receive a share.
Humphrey conceded he did not have anything to do with the Victorys’
obtaining the final $13,272.54 payment.
Humphrey also admitted that “there were times I did not respond
to my client.” He said he had not responded to the Board’s letters “from
fear of being here, and I’m here now.” He explained:
I have no evidence to present. I do admit the
allegations made against me. . . . I won’t try to mitigate what
happened by telling you the circumstances.
When asked, “Is there anything else in your life or in your practice
that you feel would be a mitigating circumstance you would like us to
take into account?” Humphrey answered, “Honestly, I wish there were,
but there’s not. . . . And no, I don’t—I can’t blame anything. . . . No, I
don’t have any excuses.” When asked what in hindsight he would have
7
done differently, Humphrey stated he would have withdrawn from the
case.
Following the hearing, the commission issued a report finding that
Humphrey had violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(3), 32:1.4(a)(4), 32:1.5(c)
and 32:8.1(b). The commission recommended a five-year suspension of
Humphrey’s license to practice law.
II. Scope of Review.
We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Ct. R.
35.10(1); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d
791, 793 (Iowa 2010). We give respectful consideration to the
commission’s findings and recommendations but are not bound by them.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 864
(Iowa 2010). “The board has the burden of proving attorney misconduct
by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “This burden is less
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the preponderance
standard required in the usual civil case.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004). It is also a
less stringent burden than clear and convincing evidence which is “the
highest civil law standard of proof.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics
& Conduct v. Ronwin, 557 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1996). If a violation is
proven, we “may impose a lesser or greater sanction than recommended
by the [grievance] commission.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Murphy, 800 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Iowa 2011); Iowa Ct. R. 35.10(1).
III. Review of Alleged Ethical Violations.
The Board alleged, and the commission found, that Humphrey
violated five separate provisions of the Iowa Rules of Professional
Conduct. Upon our review, we agree with those findings.
8
In the twenty-month period between July 2008 and the filing of the
Victorys’ complaint in March 2010, the only action Humphrey took to
represent his clients was to send two letters to the claim adjuster. The
first letter Humphrey sent was on July 13, 2009, nine months after the
Victorys had sent Humphrey their first text message, four months after
Humphrey received the first certified letter from them, and two months
after he received the third certified letter. Humphrey did not dispatch his
second letter to Amco until November 20, 2009, after he had received his
fourth certified letter from the Victorys. These incomplete and severely
delayed actions do not comply with the rule 32:1.3 standard requiring a
lawyer to act with “reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, __ N.W.2d __, __, (Iowa 2012) (holding that
an attorney’s omissions and delays in handling an estate amounted to a
“consistent failure” to perform the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney and therefore violated rule 32:1.3).
Also, between October 2008 (when the Victorys began sending text
messages to their attorney) and March 2010 (when they filed their
complaint), Humphrey contacted his clients only three times, and each of
these communications was by text. Although his lack of action on their
behalf gave him little to report, he apparently did not even inform them
about the two letters he had written to the adjuster. This lack of
communication violated rule 32:1.4(a)(3), requiring an attorney to “keep
the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.” Iowa R.
Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(3); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Cunningham, __ N.W.2d __, __, (Iowa 2012) (finding a violation of
rule 32:1.4(a)(3) when attorney failed to keep his client informed about
the status of her divorce case).
9
In addition to being obligated to take the initiative to keep his
clients informed, Humphrey was also required to follow rule 32:1.4(a)(4)
by “promptly comply[ing] with reasonable requests for information.” Iowa
R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(4); see also Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d at 868
(finding an attorney in violation of rule 32:1.4(a)(4) for not keeping his
probate clients informed and not responding to their attempts to reach
him). The Victorys’ informational requests were numerous, explicit, and
reasonable, yet Humphrey ignored nearly all of them for at least
seventeen months. Thus, he violated rule 32:1.4(a)(4) as well.
The commission also found that Humphrey did not respond to the
Board’s correspondence, thereby violating rule 32:8.1(b) requiring that a
lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not “knowingly fail
to respond to a lawful demand for information from a[] . . . disciplinary
authority.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.1(b). We agree with this finding
as well. It is undisputed that Humphrey disregarded the Board’s July
15, 2010 letter asking him to provide “copies of your written
communications with the insurance carrier, the complainants, and an
accounting of all settlement checks received from the insurance carrier.”
He also failed to reply to a second Board letter sent three months later
seeking the same discovery information. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 799 N.W.2d 524, 534 (Iowa 2011) (finding a
violation of rule 32:8.1(b) when an attorney failed to respond to the
Board’s discovery requests for documentation concerning his fee
agreement and the scope of his representation).
Finally, as we have noted, Humphrey admitted he had entered into
an unwritten contingent fee agreement with the Victorys providing that
he would be paid one third of the insurance recovery. As Humphrey
admitted, this action violated rule 32:1.5(c) requiring that “[a] contingent
10
fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state
the method by which the fee is to be determined.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
32:1.5(c); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797
N.W.2d 591, 598–99 (Iowa 2011) (finding that an attorney violated rule
32:1.5(c) by failing to execute a written contingent fee agreement with a
client).
Based upon our de novo evaluation of the record we conclude the
Board has shown by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that
Humphrey has violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(3), 32:1.4(a)(4), 32:1.5(c)
and 32:8.1(b).
IV. Consideration of Appropriate Sanction.
Having determined that Humphrey violated these five rules as
charged, we must now consider the appropriate sanction.
“We have repeatedly held that the goal of our ethical rules is to
maintain public confidence in the legal profession as well as to provide a
policing mechanism for poor lawyering.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Knopf, 793 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Iowa 2011) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “Important considerations include
the nature of the violations, protection of the public, deterrence of similar
misconduct by others, the lawyer’s fitness to practice, and our duty to
uphold the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Fleming, 602 N.W.2d 340,
342 (Iowa 1999). “In fashioning the appropriate sanction, we look to
prior similar cases while remaining cognizant of their limited usefulness
due to the variations in their facts.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Wagner, 768 N.W.2d 279, 288 (Iowa 2009) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Often, the distinction between the
punishment imposed depends upon the existence of multiple instances
11
of neglect, past disciplinary problems, and other companion violations,
including uncooperativeness in the disciplinary investigation.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lesyshen, 712 N.W.2d 101,
106 (Iowa 2006). Aggravating and mitigating circumstances are also
important. Knopf, 793 N.W.2d at 531.
The core violation committed by Humphrey was the neglect of a
single client matter.2 Although neglect is not defined in our rules of
professional conduct “it has generally been recognized to involve
indifference and a consistent failure to perform those obligations that a
lawyer has assumed, or a conscious disregard for the responsibilities a
lawyer owes to a client.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct
v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Iowa 2004). Neglect goes beyond
ordinary negligence and “is a form of professional incompetence that
often involves procrastination, such as a lawyer doing little or nothing to
advance the interests of a client after agreeing to represent the client.”
Id. at 552.
Our past sanctions in cases where neglect was the principal
violation have generally ranged from a public reprimand to a six-month
suspension. Id. at 553. “We consider any harm to the client caused by
the neglect in determining the proper sanction. Additionally, neglect
compounded by misrepresentation will warrant a more severe sanction
because of the critical importance of honesty in our profession.” Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 794 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa
2011) (internal citation omitted). We concur with the commission’s
recognition that “generally speaking, absent other serious concerns or
aggravating factors, cases involving primarily neglect or communication
2We do not minimize, of course, the violation of rule 32:1.5(c).
12
issues have been viewed as less egregious than cases in which the
actions of the attorney have involved deceit or dishonesty, or have caused
financial harm to a client.”
Where neglect is the primary violation, we have often chosen a
public reprimand as the appropriate sanction. See Van Ginkel, __
N.W.2d at __; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey,
761 N.W.2d 53, 62 (Iowa 2009) (stating that “if the neglect evinced by
Casey constituted his only misconduct, under the circumstances, we
would be inclined to order a public reprimand”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d 661, 670 (Iowa 2007) (ordering
a public reprimand for an attorney who neglected two matters and failed
to respond to the Board, where the attorney had a prior disciplinary
record including a public reprimand for neglect and also citing other
neglect cases where a public reprimand was imposed); Dunahoo, 730
N.W.2d at 205–07 (reprimanding an attorney for failing to account to a
client and waiting four years to close an estate); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of
Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Parker, 558 N.W.2d 183, 184–86 (Iowa 1997)
(imposing a reprimand for delaying the closure of two estates for seven
and eleven years respectively); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Sather, 534 N.W.2d 428, 429–31 (Iowa 1995) (reprimanding
an attorney for failure to respond to the Board and neglecting an estate
closure for eighteen years).
In Van Ginkel, we recently reviewed our prior neglect cases that
involved additional violations or aggravating circumstances and therefore
merited license suspensions of up to six months. ___ N.W.2d at ___. We
categorized those cases as follows:
In cases involving multiple instances of neglect, other
additional violations, or a history of past disciplinary
problems, however, the sanction has typically involved a
13
suspension for some length of time. In cases involving
neglect in one or two cases and other misconduct such as
misrepresentations associated with the neglect, the
suspensions have been in the range of three months. See
[Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.] Ackerman, 786
N.W.2d at 497–98 (holding neglect in two estates,
accompanying multiple misrepresentations, and early receipt
of fee required a ninety-day suspension); Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 N.W.2d 53, 61–62 (Iowa
2009) (holding neglect in two cases, multiple
misrepresentations, and the early collection of fee required a
three-month suspension); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Adams, 749 N.W.2d 666, 669–70 (Iowa
2008) (holding neglect in three cases, misrepresentation
associated with neglect, failure to account to a client, and
failure to respond to Board required a four-month
suspension). In other cases where the pattern of misconduct
has been more extensive, suspensions have typically been for
a longer period of time. See Wagner, 768 N.W.2d at 288–89
(concluding neglect in multiple cases, improper withdrawal
of fees in probate, failure to return unearned fees,
misrepresentations to court and clients required a six-month
suspension); [Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.]
Humphrey, 738 N.W.2d at 620–21 (holding neglect in six
estates, with accompanying misrepresentations to court, and
three instances of depositing unearned fees in business
accounts required a six-month suspension).
Id. The neglect in Van Ginkel involved a single probate matter without
financial harm to the estate, but the attorney had received two prior
private admonitions, had collected fees prematurely, and most
significantly had made a false statement to the tribunal, one of the most
serious aggravating factors. Id. at __. For this combination of
circumstances, Van Ginkel received a sixty-day suspension. Id. at __.
We also imposed a sixty-day suspension in Thomas. 794 N.W.2d
at 295. Thomas had a history of discipline and admonitions including
several probate delinquencies and a public reprimand for client neglect,
and had frequently failed to cooperate fully with Board investigations in
the past. Id. Thomas’s inaction seriously harmed his client whose auto
accident claim was dismissed because of his neglect. Id. at 292.
14
Thomas compounded this violation by deceiving his client about the
status of the claim. Id. at 294.
In Lickiss, we suspended an attorney’s license for a minimum of
three months after he neglected four probate matters, failed to respond
to clients’ inquiries for information, took probate fees without prior court
approval, and failed to notify his clients that he would no longer be
representing them. 786 N.W.2d at 872. Lickiss had an important
aggravating circumstance in that he had recently been publicly
reprimanded for identical occurrences of neglect, although his voluntary
remedial efforts constituted a mitigating circumstance. Id. at 869–71.
In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Cohrt, we
imposed a similar three-month suspension where the attorney had
engaged in two separate instances of neglect, misrepresented to his
clients the reason why their claim had been dismissed, had a prior
private admonition for neglect, and also made misrepresentations to the
Board. 784 N.W.2d 777, 783 (Iowa 2010).
Although suspensions for neglect generally do not exceed six
months, see Moorman, 683 N.W. 2d at 553, longer suspensions of up to
two years have been imposed for neglect in combination with much more
serious violations or aggravating circumstances. See Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Joy, 728 N.W.2d 806, 815–16 (Iowa 2007)
(collecting cases); see also Cunningham, __ N.W.2d at __ (suspending
license for eighteen months where two clients suffered significant
financial harm due to neglect, and the attorney made multiple
misrepresentations to both the clients and the court and never
responded to the disciplinary proceedings against him); Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 271 (Iowa 2010)
(imposing a two-year suspension for an attorney’s “misconduct in
15
seventeen client matters, including neglect, failure to communicate, and
failure to safeguard his clients’ interests upon termination of
representation, in addition to his trust account violations and conviction
of two traffic offenses”); Joy, 728 N.W.2d at 812–16 (Iowa 2007)
(suspending an attorney’s license for eighteen months where the attorney
neglected four clients’ matters, failed to comply with court orders, made
several misrepresentations, failed to turn over client papers, and refused
to cooperate with the Board’s investigation); Moorman, 683 N.W.2d at
551–55 (imposing a two-year suspension where there were “numerous
incidents of profuse and pervasive neglect,” five clients were affected
including one that was greatly harmed, there was absolutely no
cooperation with the Board, the attorney offered to engage in fraudulent
conduct and was described as the “worst violator of the time
requirements of the rules of appellate practice in the state”); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sullins, 613 N.W.2d 656,
657 (Iowa 2000) (suspending license for one year where an attorney had
three previous reprimands for neglect, harmed clients financially,
consistently ignored the Board’s requests, failed to return client
documents, and failed to return unearned fees).
Taken on their own, Humphrey’s current violations might merit no
more than a reprimand. Only one client has been affected, and the
Victorys ultimately did not suffer financial harm because of the neglect,
although they were forced to undergo a substantial delay before receiving
their final insurance payment. See Casey, 761 N.W.2d at 61 (“An
important consideration in determining the appropriate sanction is the
harm caused by the neglect.”). Humphrey did not profit from his actions
(or inaction) and did not engage in deceit or misrepresentation to either
his clients or the court. Also, although he did not respond to two letters
16
from the Board, he did answer the complaint, did testify at the committee
hearing, and did ultimately admit to the violations he was charged with.
However, Humphrey’s three earlier violations must be considered
relevant aggravating factors. See Van Ginkel, __ N.W.2d at ___, ___
(holding that prior reprimands, though “somewhat dated,” were an
aggravating factor when the violations under consideration took place
starting in 2007 while the admonitions had been issued in 1987 and
1994). In 1994, Humphrey was publicly reprimanded for failing to
respond to inquiries from the Committee on Professional Ethics and
Conduct. In 1995, we suspended Humphrey’s license for sixty days after
finding he had neglected three probate matters and a postconviction
relief matter, and had “stonewalled two judges, as well as the [Committee
on Professional Ethics and Conduct].” See Humphrey, 529 N.W.2d at
256–59. A year later, in 1996, we suspended Humphrey’s license
indefinitely with no possible reinstatement for three years. See
Humphrey, 551 N.W.2d at 308–09. At that point, Humphrey not only
had neglected several matters and been nonresponsive to courts, clients,
and the Board, but also had misled a client about an error he had made
and instructed another client not to inform the court of a fact that would
have meant the court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 307–08.
Although some time has lapsed from these violations, it is
disheartening that Humphrey has resumed some of the habits that led to
his difficulties and our imposition of severe sanctions in the 1990s.
While the current violations do not involve fraud or dishonesty, and are
limited to a single client matter, the earlier pattern of neglect and
nonresponsiveness has reemerged. Therefore, despite the passage of
time, and the somewhat narrower scope of the present violations as
compared to those we addressed in 1995 and 1996, a substantial
17
suspension is appropriate to protect the public and uphold the integrity
of the profession.
V. Disposition.
Considering all the circumstances of this case, we suspend
Humphrey’s license to practice law in this state indefinitely with no
possibility of reinstatement for three months. This suspension applies to
all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(3). Humphrey
must comply with rule 35.22 dealing with the notification of clients and
counsel, and meet all the requirements of reinstatement provided in rule
35.13. The costs of this action are taxed to Humphrey pursuant to rule
35.26(1).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.