Robert M. Johnson, Trustee of the Robert M. Johnson Revocable Living Trust, and Kathryn M. Zimmer v. Des Moines Metropolitan Wastewater Reclamation Authority, Acting by and Through Its Operating Contractor, the City of Des Moines

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–0444
Filed May 18, 2012
ROBERT M. JOHNSON, Trustee of the Robert M. Johnson
Revocable Living Trust, and KATHRYN M. ZIMMER,
Appellees,
vs.
DES MOINES METROPOLITAN WASTEWATER
RECLAMATION AUTHORITY, Acting by and Through its
Operating Contractor, the City of Des Moines,
Appellant.
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ROBERT M. JOHNSON, Trustee of the Robert M. Johnson
Revocable Living Trust, KATHRYN M. ZIMMER,
and RMJ FARMS, LLC,
Appellees,
vs.
POLK COUNTY AVIATION AUTHORITY,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D.
Rosenberg, Judge.
Condemners appeal the district court’s order to consolidate
separate condemnation appeals under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
1.913. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Gary D. Goudelock, Jr. and Glenna K. Frank of City of Des Moines,
for appellant Des Moines Metropolitan Wastewater Reclamation
Authority.
James E. Nervig of Brick Gentry P.C., West Des Moines for
appellant Polk County Aviation Authority.
2
Bernard L. Spaeth, Jr., Kevin M. Reynolds, and Kimberly S.
Bartosh of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
3
WATERMAN, Justice.
In this interlocutory appeal, we review the district court’s ruling
consolidating condemnation appeals from proceedings by two separate
condemning authorities taking property four months apart from the
same parent tract of farmland. The landowner, Johnson Farms, 1 moved
to consolidate its appeals pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.913,
contending they present common questions of law or fact and that
consolidation would promote judicial economy and protect against
inconsistent verdicts valuing the same land close in time. Johnson
Farms’ motion was resisted by both condemning authorities, the Polk
County Aviation Authority (PCAA) and the Des Moines Metropolitan
Wastewater Reclamation Authority (WRA).
The district court consolidated the appeals, finding common
questions of law or fact and a lack of prejudice. The district court found
consolidation would promote judicial economy and that potential
prejudice or jury confusion could be avoided through jury admonitions
and instructions. We respectfully disagree and note the dearth of
authorities supporting consolidation of condemnation appeals under
these unique circumstances. The trials will involve overlapping evidence
to ascertain just compensation for each taking from the same parent
tract. But the fact finders must determine just compensation for
different types of takings by separate condemning authorities four
months apart for unrelated projects. Certain evidence in each case is
inadmissible in the other. This creates a substantial risk of prejudice
and jury confusion. For that reason, we conclude consolidation was an
1Johnson Farms collectively refers to Robert M. Johnson, trustee of the
Robert M. Johnson Revocable Living Trust, and Kathryn M. Zimmer.
4
abuse of discretion here. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s
consolidation order and remand the cases for separate trials.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Before the condemnations at issue, Johnson Farms owned 65.93
acres of agricultural land near the growing Des Moines suburb of
Ankeny. 2 The acreage borders the east side of the Ankeny Regional
Airport along Northeast 29th Street. Johnson Farms is no stranger to
condemnation proceedings. PCAA condemned nearly sixteen acres of
land to expand the airport in 1993 and 2001. In 2009, the City of
Ankeny condemned a .5-acre easement from this same parcel to lay new
waterlines and expand a roadway.
PCAA and WRA commenced their condemnations in 2010, four
months apart. In February, PCAA filed an application to condemn 4.17
acres in fee simple to extend the Runway Protection Zone for Runway 22
and relocate Northeast 29th Street. On March 24, a six-member
condemnation commission awarded Johnson Farms $345,000 as just
compensation. Johnson Farms appealed to the district court. 3
On June 21, WRA filed an application to condemn Johnson Farms’
land adjacent to PCAA’s 4.17-acre condemnation. WRA is constructing
the Four Mile Interceptor Sewer, which would run a sanitary sewer from
the Ankeny Southeast Water Pollution Control Plant to north
Des Moines. WRA sought to condemn .92 acres for a permanent sanitary
sewer easement and 9.43 acres for a temporary construction easement.
2The City of Ankeny’s population grew sixty-nine percent over the last decade,
increasing from 27,117 in 2000 to 45,852 in 2010. City of Ankeny, Population Basics,
http://www.ankenyiowa.gov/Index.aspx?page=112 (last visited March 23, 2012).
3This appeal was consolidated with another PCAA condemnation appeal
concerning land south of Johnson Farms, located on RMJ Farms. PCAA and RMJ
Farms have since settled the RMJ proceeding.
5
The temporary construction easement is adjacent to the eastern edge of
the PCAA taking. A different six-member commission compensated
Johnson Farms $87,000 for the easements on August 2. Johnson Farms
also appealed this commission’s damage award to the district court.
Johnson Farms moved to consolidate the two appeals into a single
district court proceeding under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.913.
Johnson Farms argued the appeals require the juries to hear similar
valuation evidence and make similar valuation determinations.
Consolidation, therefore, would protect against inconsistent jury
compensation verdicts. Johnson Farms indicated it planned to argue the
condemning authorities’ multiple takings of adjacent land close in time
had a “combined effect” of reducing the value of their remaining land.
PCAA and WRA argued there were no common questions of fact because
the appeals involved different land, property interests, and condemning
authorities. The authorities also argued consolidation would prejudice
them by permitting the jury to hear inadmissible and confusing evidence
and improperly measure the damages.
The district court granted Johnson Farms’ motion to consolidate.
It found “the cases raise similar legal issues and that the evidence would
be substantially the same in both actions.” The district court also
determined consolidation “would not cause jury confusion but would
rather provide a complete picture of the allegations.” Further, any
dissimilar issues could be “remedied by proper jury instructions and
admonitions to the jury.” The district court concluded consolidation
“would promote judicial economy and save costs to all parties.”
WRA and PCAA filed an application for an interlocutory appeal of
the district court’s consolidation order. We granted the application and
retained the appeal.
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II. Scope of Review.
We review the district court’s consolidation ruling for abuse of
discretion. Kent Feeds, Inc. v. Manthei, 646 N.W.2d 87, 90 (Iowa 2002).
“[T]he question as to whether actions should be consolidated for trial
rests largely within the discretion of the trial court.” Schupbach v.
Schuknecht, 204 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Iowa 1973). We will find the district
court abused its discretion when it exercises “ ‘discretion on grounds or
for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’ ”
Everly v. Knoxville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 774 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 2009)
(quoting Schettler v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 509 N.W.2d 459, 464 (Iowa 1993)). “A
ground or reason is untenable . . . when it is based on an erroneous
application of the law.” Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638
(Iowa 2000). “Although our review is for an abuse of discretion, we will
correct erroneous applications of law.” Everly, 774 N.W.2d at 492.
III. Analysis.
A. The Consolidation Rule. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.913
permits the district court to consolidate separate actions. Rule 1.913
provides:
Unless a party shows the party will be prejudiced thereby the
court may consolidate separate actions which involve
common questions of law or fact or order a single trial of any
or all issues therein. In such cases it may make such orders
concerning the proceedings as tend to avoid unnecessary
cost or delay.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.913. The rule is modeled after Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(a). 4 Accordingly, federal cases applying that Rule provide
4Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides:
(a) Consolidation. If actions before the court involve a common
question of law or fact, the court may:
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guidance here. Miller v. Lauridsen Foods, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 417, 419–20
(Iowa 1994) (citing with approval the interpretation of Federal Rule 42 as
expressed in Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977)).
Like its federal counterpart, rule 1.913 “ ‘is a procedural device designed
to promote judicial economy, and consolidation cannot effect a merger of
the actions or the defenses of the separate parties.’ ” Id. at 420 (Iowa
1994) (quoting Cole, 563 F.2d at 38). Thus, while “cases may be
consolidated for trial, the cases generally preserve their separate
identity.” Id. Our consolidation rule embraces “[t]he modern trend . . . to
combine in one litigation all actions arising out of one transaction,” and
the rule should be “liberally construed to [achieve] this end.” Liberty
Loan Corp. of Des Moines v. Williams, 201 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Iowa 1972).
Consolidation rulings are discretionary. Kent Feeds, Inc., 646
N.W.2d at 90. The district court must exercise its discretion to
determine whether the separate actions “ ‘involve common questions of
law or fact’ ” and whether any party can “ ‘show[]’ ” prejudice. Williams,
201 N.W.2d at 464 (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 185, now rule 1.913). Our
rule was amended in 1955 to require the party claiming prejudice to
“show,” rather than merely allege, prejudice. Id. The advisory committee
added the showing requirement to take away the nonmoving party’s
de facto power to veto consolidation:
The effect of the change, as indicated in the previous
paragraph, was to require a showing of prejudice rather than
merely a claim thereof. It is now for the Court to determine
whether a claim of prejudice is well founded. When the rule
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(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the
actions;
(2) consolidate the actions; or
(3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.
8
covering consolidation was first under consideration there
was great opposition to requiring a party to submit to
compulsory consolidation and the rule was deliberately set
up to merely provide authorization and to encourage
consideration of its advantages, but left practically an
absolute power of veto in any party. However, the greater
experience under the Federal Rules and under the restricted
Iowa rule indicated that the apprehension which existed
earlier was largely illusory. Hence, the veto power was
eliminated in favor of the exercise of judicial discretion.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.913 official cmt.
The Fourth Circuit summarized the district court’s role in
determining whether consolidation should be granted:
The critical question for the district court in the final
analysis was whether the specific risks of prejudice and
possible confusion were overborne by the risk of inconsistent
adjudications of common factual and legal issues, the
burden on parties, witnesses and available judicial resources
posed by multiple lawsuits, the length of time required to
conclude multiple suits as against a single one, and the
relative expense to all concerned of the single-trial, multiple-
trial alternatives.
Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1982); accord
Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1011 (6th Cir. 1993); Johnson v.
Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1285 (2d Cir. 1990); Hendrix v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1495 (11th Cir. 1985). These same
considerations guide the district court’s decision under Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.913.
The parties cite several Iowa cases involving consolidation of
condemnation appeals. See Van Horn v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 182 N.W.2d
365, 367–68 (Iowa 1970); Iowa Dev. Co. v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n,
252 Iowa 978, 981, 108 N.W.2d 487, 489 (1961); Strange Bros. Hide Co.
v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 250 Iowa 450, 452, 93 N.W.2d 99, 100
(1958). Each of these cases, however, merely consolidated proceedings
commenced by a single condemning agency for one project taking
9
property simultaneously from multiple neighboring landowners.
Consolidation was resisted only in Iowa Development Co., 252 Iowa at
983, 108 N.W.2d at 490–91. We held consolidation was within the
district court’s discretion under the circumstances of that case:
It is clear the two cases involve common questions of
law and fact. As stated, the Murphy tract is bounded by the
development company’s land on three sides. On the fourth
side Delaware Avenue is the west boundary of the Murphy
tract and much of the development company’s land. The
same commissioners assessed the damages to both tracts on
the same day. Much testimony in the district court relates
to both cases. Most of the witnesses on valuations
expressed their opinions as to both tracts. Separate trials
would have resulted in a good deal of repetition of testimony.
Defendant’s resistance to plaintiffs’ motion to
consolidate alleges a consolidation would be prejudicial to
defendant and that different factors affect the value of the
two tracts. The motion was evidently submitted on the
pleadings without any showing of prejudice except such as
might be apparent therefrom. We are not prepared to hold
this was a showing of prejudice which warrants a reversal.
Iowa Dev. Co., 252 Iowa at 983, 108 N.W.2d at 190–91 (emphasis added).
As the foregoing discussion shows, consolidation of condemnation
appeals may well be appropriate for the routine cases involving serial
takings from neighboring properties by a single condemner for the same
project. Here, we are faced with quite different circumstances: two
condemning authorities taking different interests from the landowner for
different projects valued by separate compensation commissions months
apart. We have not previously adjudicated the propriety of consolidation
in this unique situation. We must take a closer look at the particular
issues presented here to decide whether consolidation of Johnson Farms’
appeals fell within the district court’s discretion.
B. Factual and Legal Questions Raised in Condemnation
Appeals. A condemnation appeal is an appeal to the district court of the
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six-member compensation commission’s damage assessment contained
in its appraisement report. Iowa Code § 6B.18 (2009). Any interested
party may appeal the commission’s assessment. Id. The sole issue in a
condemnation appeal is damages. Id. § 6B.23 (“On the trial of the
appeal, no judgment shall be rendered except for costs and allocation of
interest earned pursuant to section 6B.25, but the amount of damages
shall be ascertained and entered of record.”).
When the condemner seeks a partial taking of a parcel, as here,
the jury calculates damages by using a before-and-after formula. Jones
v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 185 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Iowa 1971). The
before-and-after formula requires the jury to ascertain the difference in
the fair market value of the entire land parcel immediately before and
immediately after the taking, without concern for any benefit caused by
the public condemnation project. Id. The jury determines damages as of
the day the compensation commission viewed the land. Heldenbrand v.
Exec. Council, 218 N.W.2d 628, 634 (Iowa 1974).
C. The District Court Erred By Consolidating the
Condemnation Appeals. A threshold requirement for consolidation is
the existence of a common question of law or fact. Williams, 201 N.W.2d
at 464; accord Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.913. If that requirement is satisfied, the
court must determine whether the benefits of consolidation are
outweighed by the risk of prejudice and confusion. We address these
factors in turn.
1. Common questions of law or fact. Johnson Farms asserts the
appeals present common questions of law and fact because “the same
Iowa substantive law regarding condemnation will apply to both cases”
and the appeals involve “similar parties, the same parcel of land, and
likely the same fact and expert witnesses.” The existence of common
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substantive law alone, however, does not justify consolidation. See, e.g.,
Comeaux v. Mackwani, 124 F. App’x 909, 911 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding no
common question of fact or law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(a) merely because the plaintiff alleged Eighth Amendment violations
in two otherwise unrelated civil rights claims). In other words, two
factually unrelated tort actions are not ripe for consolidation simply
because the same substantive law applies to each. Id. Innumerable
unrelated cases could be consolidated if all that was required is the
application of the same substantive law. The ultimate inquiry is not
whether the same substantive law applies, but whether the separate
actions require determinations of common questions of law or fact.
The fact both appeals involve takings from the same parent tract is
not determinative. Each trial turns on a different valuation issue. PCAA
condemned 4.17 acres in fee simple from Johnson Farms’ 65.93-acre
parcel. WRA condemned a .92-acre permanent easement and a 9.43-
acre temporary construction easement from Johnson Farms’ remaining
61.76-acre parcel. The before-and-after calculation is different in each
appeal. The PCAA jury must determine the value of the 65.93-acre
parcel before and after its 4.17-acre taking as of March 24. WRA did not
even file its condemnation petition until nearly three months later.
Accordingly, the WRA taking is not relevant to the PCAA damages
calculation. See Heldenbrand, 218 N.W.2d at 634 (Iowa 1974) (holding
damages are determined as of the day compensation commission
appraised the property). By contrast, the WRA jury must determine the
value of the 61.76-acre parcel before and after the WRA easements are
imposed as of August 2 (the date the compensation commission viewed
the property). Thus, the ultimate issue differs in each case.
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We are not persuaded by Johnson Farms’ characterization that the
appeals involve condemnations by “similar parties.” If “[a]ctions
involving the same parties are apt candidates for consolidation,” then it
follows that actions involving different parties are less likely to present
common questions. 9A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2384, at 52 (3d ed. 2008). WRA and PCAA are “similar” only
in that each has condemnation authority. The entities are distinct in
operation, funding, and purpose. PCAA is organized under Iowa Code
chapter 28E, owns and operates the Ankeny Regional Airport, and
receives project funding through the Federal Aviation Authority. WRA is
organized under Iowa Code chapters 28E and 28F, it administers
regional collection and treatment of sewage, and its board consists of
representatives of seventeen Des Moines area communities. The record
contains no evidence these authorities acted as each other’s agent or
colluded to lower damage awards to Johnson Farms.
Johnson Farms contends consolidation is needed to protect
against inconsistent jury awards on the common question of the value of
the parent tract. Specifically, Johnson Farms fears separate juries will
find a high “after” value to its land on March 24 and a low “before” value
to the same land on August 2, thereby reducing its compensation for
both takings. Johnson Farms’ concern is speculative—indeed, it could
benefit from inconsistent verdicts. Separate juries may find a low “after”
value on March 24 and a high “before” value on August 2, thereby
increasing the combined compensation awarded to Johnson Farms.
Separate juries could well find the same interim value for the parent
tract based on the testimony of Johnson Farms’ expert. On the other
hand, the City of Ankeny’s rapid growth or evidence of other intervening
factors may justify different valuations of the parent track four months
13
apart. The concern over the risk of inconsistent verdicts is less
compelling here because the juries are deciding different ultimate issues.
We conclude the potential commonality in the questions of fact (the
value of the parent tract between the two takings) is insufficient to
support consolidation in light of the risk of prejudice and confusion,
particularly when the benefits of consolidation are slight.
2. The benefits of consolidation are not great. Consolidation will
not significantly promote judicial economy in this litigation. At oral
argument, counsel for Johnson Farms indicated each condemnation
appeal is likely to require a two- or three-day trial. A consolidated trial
would presumably run longer, perhaps three or four days, saving the
court and Johnson Farms at most a day or two. Yet PCAA and WRA
each would face a longer consolidated trial in place of a shorter separate
trial. The downside for Johnson Farms—more total days in court—is
ameliorated by its ability to recover its costs and attorney fees if its
appeals are successful. Iowa Code § 6B.33. While the trials will include
some overlapping evidence such as testimony of the same expert for
Johnson Farms, there also will be significant independent evidence.
PCAA and WRA will present separate expert testimony specific to their
respective takings. The benefit of the time saved by a combined trial is
offset by the increased complexity and risk of error requiring retrial.
3. Risk of prejudice. Johnson Farms argued that PCAA and WRA’s
multiple takings of adjacent land within a short period of time has a
combined effect of reducing the value of its remaining parcel. The
condemning authorities respond that the combined-effects theory
distorts the proper before-and-after damages calculation. See Jones, 185
N.W.2d at 750.
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PCAA argues consolidation will force the jury to hear evidence
irrelevant to its case concerning the value of Johnson Farms’ property
after March 24. We agree. See Heldenbrand, 218 N.W.2d at 634 (Iowa
1974) (holding damages are determined as of the day compensation
commission appraised the property). PCAA questions whether a jury
instruction or admonition can cure this problem. At the very least, PCAA
contends such a jury instruction or admonition will confuse the jury.
WRA in turn claims consolidation will require the jury to hear
inadmissible comparable-sale evidence. Our precedent does not allow a
party to introduce evidence of the price a condemner paid to another
condemnee for the same project to establish damages in a condemnation
appeal. Jones v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 259 Iowa 616, 619, 144
N.W.2d 277, 279 (1966); Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 728, 31
N.W.2d 393, 398 (1948). This is because a condemnation award is not
an arms-length transaction negotiated in the relevant market. Jones,
259 Iowa at 619, 144 N.W.2d at 279. WRA points out that in a
consolidated trial the jury will hear evidence and make factual
determinations to resolve the PCAA appeal. This creates a risk the jury
will improperly use its PCAA award as a comparable to value the
remaining tract before and after WRA’s easements are taken.
We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that these
concerns can be effectively answered through admonitions or
instructions to the jury. We recently recognized a jury may have
difficulty faithfully applying instructions that require it to use evidence
for some purposes and ignore it for others. See State v. Redmond, 803
N.W.2d 112, 124 (Iowa 2011) (cautioning a jury may have difficulty
compartmentalizing prior bad-act evidence as going only toward the
witness’s testimonial credibility). If the condemnation appeals are tried
15
separately, those difficulties are avoided. We conclude the district court
misapplied the law by concluding these actions could be consolidated
without prejudice to WRA and PCAA. This erroneous application of law
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Graber, 616 N.W.2d at 638.
No party cited any case from any jurisdiction consolidating
condemnation actions commenced by different condemning authorities
for different projects and different types of takings months apart in which
the consolidation was resisted. 5 Our own research found no such cases.
A leading treatise cautions against consolidating condemnation appeals
when damages arise from separate takings: “As a general rule, all
persons whose property is taken or injured may be joined in one
proceeding. Where, however, the damages arise from separate takings,
or from injuries which are not part of one project, such joinder is
improper.” 6 Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 24.09[1],
at 24–103 to 24–107 (3d ed. 2008). We see no persuasive policy reason
in this case to become the first appellate court to affirm an order
granting the landowner’s motion to consolidate over the objection of
separate condemning authorities taking different property interests from
the same parent tract for separate projects months apart.
For these reasons, we hold the district court abused its discretion
by consolidating the two condemnation appeals.
5At oral argument, Johnson Farms cited to Floyd County v. Clements, 150
S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), as an example of a court that consolidated
condemnation proceedings commenced by separate condemners. Consolidation was
not contested on appeal, however, and the appellant’s principal complaint concerned
whether the jury was improperly instructed to permit the appellee a double recovery.
Clements, 150 S.W.2d at 449.
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IV. Disposition.
We reverse the district court’s order consolidating the PCAA and
WRA condemnation appeals, and we remand the case for separate
proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.