Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. G. Brad Denton II

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–1919
Filed June 1, 2012
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
G. BRAD DENTON II,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Grievance commission recommends public reprimand for an
attorney. ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.
Charles L. Harrington and Teresa A. Vens, Des Moines, for
complainant.
G. Brad Denton II, Boulder, Colorado, pro se.
2
HECHT, Justice.
This matter comes before the court on the report of a division of
the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa. See Iowa Ct.
R. 35.10. 1 The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board alleged
an attorney violated ethical rules governing the use of trust accounts and
lawyer advertising in Iowa. The grievance commission found the attorney
committed various violations and recommended a public reprimand.
Upon our review of the record and our consideration of the commission’s
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation, we also find
the attorney violated rules, and we publicly reprimand him.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
G. Brad Denton II is an attorney licensed to practice law in
Colorado since 1994. Practicing primarily in immigration law, Denton
decided to test the market for his legal services in Iowa. 2 He entered an
agreement allowing him to use, “as needed,” office space and the services
of a receptionist in West Des Moines, Iowa. Denton also placed
advertisements for his immigration-related services in Iowa
publications. 3 Soon thereafter, and before Denton opened a trust
account for retainer fees received from clients, Manuel Castillo-Vargas
1On February 20, 2012, portions of chapters 32, 35, 36 and 45 of the Iowa
Court Rules were amended. We will refer to the rules as they existed at the time of
Denton’s hearing. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 814 N.W.2d
532, 542 n.1 (Iowa 2012).
2The Board’s complaint conceded that Denton, although not admitted to practice
law in the courts of this state, “is allowed to practice as an immigration attorney in the
State of Iowa under Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:5.5(d)(2).” See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
32:5.5(d)(2) (allowing lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction to provide
legal services in this jurisdiction that the lawyer is authorized by federal law to provide).
3The advertisements, which appeared several times per month in three Iowa
newspapers between May 2009 and May 2010, described Denton as an immigration
“specialist” with more than twenty years of experience.
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requested legal representation in connection with an immigration
matter. 4 Castillo-Vargas signed an agreement calling for payment of an
attorney fee of $1500 to Denton and providing that if the attorney–client
relationship with Denton were to be “discontinued prior to completion of
the case,” the attorney fee would be calculated at the rate of $200 per
hour and any unearned amount would be refunded to Castillo-Vargas.
Denton received a total of $1500 in two installments for his
representation of Castillo-Vargas but did not deposit the funds in a trust
account. Denton provided legal services for the client from October 20,
2009, through February 6, 2010, including written correspondence with
Castillo-Vargas and immigration authorities, telephone communications
with Castillo-Vargas and his brother, and three in-person consultations
with Castillo-Vargas in Marshalltown, Iowa. When the attorney–client
relationship broke down, Denton mailed to Castillo-Vargas a bill for his
professional services and a copy of the case file. The bill itemized 10.85
hours of professional services at the rate of $200 per hour and
documented Denton’s claim that no refund of the retainer for attorney
fees was owed to the client.
The Board received a complaint alleging Denton had violated
ethical rules governing the conduct of lawyers practicing law in Iowa.
Following an investigation, the Board filed a complaint alleging Denton
had violated several of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, including:
32:1.15(a) (requiring lawyers to hold a client’s funds in an account
separate from the lawyer’s own property); 32:1.15(c) (requiring lawyers to
deposit advance fees paid by clients in a trust account and allowing
4Castillo-Vargas requested representation to challenge a deportation order
issued by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement authorities.
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withdrawals only as fees are earned); 32:1.15(f) (providing client trust
accounts are governed by chapter 45 of the Iowa Court Rules which in
relevant part requires lawyers to deposit “flat fees” in a trust account and
allows withdrawals from the account only as fees are earned and upon
notice to the client); 32:7.4(e) (establishing prerequisites for publicly
communicating that a lawyer practices in or limits his or her practice to
certain fields of law); 32:7.4(d) (regulating lawyers’ claims of certification
as specialists in particular fields of law); and 32:7.1(a) (prohibiting false
or misleading communications about lawyers or their services). Denton
accepted service of the complaint in Colorado on May 6, 2011, but he
failed to file a timely answer.
The Board filed a motion on June 21, 2011, requesting invocation
of Iowa Court Rule 36.7 (providing if the respondent fails to file a written
answer within twenty days after completed service of a notice of a
complaint, the allegations made in the Board’s complaint shall be
considered admitted). Denton did not file a resistance to the motion.
The commission entered an order on July 14, 2011, establishing that the
allegations within the Board’s complaint were deemed admitted and
limiting the purpose of the hearing to the determination of an
appropriate sanction. After hearing Denton’s testimony and reviewing
the exhibits offered by the parties, the commission found Denton violated
the rules cited above and recommended a public reprimand as the
appropriate sanction in this case.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa
Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Bernard, 653 N.W.2d 373,
375 (Iowa 2002). Although we give respectful consideration to the
commission’s findings and recommendation, we are not bound by them.
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Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 N.W.2d 53, 55
(Iowa 2009). It is the Board’s burden to prove ethical violations by a
convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa 2010). Upon proof
of misconduct, we may impose a lesser or greater sanction than that
recommended by the commission. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Conrad, 723 N.W.2d 791, 792 (Iowa 2006).
III. Discussion.
In his response to the Board’s inquiry, Denton described the fee
received from Castillo as a “flat fee.” We have characterized such fees as
“special retainers.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Iowa 1998). Our ethical standards require
attorneys to deposit special retainers in a trust account. Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Piazza, 756 N.W.2d 690, 696 (Iowa 2008). We
find the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence
that Denton violated rules 32:1.15(a), (c), and (f) by failing to deposit the
fees received from Castillo-Vargas in a trust account and violated rules
45.7(3) and (4) by failing to withdraw such fees from the trust account
only as they were earned and upon written notice to the client together
with a complete accounting. We choose not to address the Board’s claim
that Denton violated our rules pertaining to lawyer advertising because
even if we were to find that he did, we would not impose a greater
sanction than is required for Denton’s trust account infractions detailed
above.
IV. Sanction.
In other cases presenting an isolated violation of our ethical rules
pertaining to the proper use of attorney trust accounts, we have imposed
a public reprimand. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Sobel,
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779 N.W.2d 782, 789–90 (Iowa 2010) (citing cases in which we have
imposed public reprimands for trust account violations of the type
established in this case). Our determination of the appropriate sanction
for Denton’s violations of ethical rules requiring the use of trust accounts
is influenced by mitigating circumstances. Denton cooperated with the
Board in this case and forthrightly acknowledged his failure to deposit
the Castillo-Vargas fee in a trust account. The record evidences no
history of prior ethical lapses by Denton who represents that he has
established a trust account to avoid future infractions in the
representation of Iowa clients in immigration matters. Under the
circumstances, we agree with the commission’s recommendation that a
public reprimand is the appropriate sanction for Denton’s violation of our
rules pertaining to trust accounts.
V. Conclusion.
We publicly reprimand Denton. The costs of this action shall be
taxed to Denton as provided in rule 35.26(1).
ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.