Kimberly Ann Sallee, Individually and as Next Friend of Lucas Gregory Durkop and Maria Christina Rivera, Matthew James Sallee, and James Allan Sallee v. Matthew R. Stewart and Diana Stewart D/B/A Stewartland Holsteins

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–0892
Filed February 15, 2013
KIMBERLY ANN SALLEE, Individually and as Next Friend
of LUCAS GREGORY DURKOP and MARIA CHRISTINA RIVERA,
MATTHEW JAMES SALLEE, and JAMES ALLAN SALLEE,
Appellants,
vs.
MATTHEW R. STEWART and DIANA STEWART
d/b/a STEWARTLAND HOLSTEINS,
Appellees.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County,
Margaret L. Lingreen, Judge.
The owners of a dairy farm seek further review of a decision of the
court of appeals, reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment
to them in a personal injury case based on the statutory recreational use
immunity. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED.
D. Raymond Walton of Beecher Law Offices, Waterloo, for
appellants.
Karla J. Shea of McCoy, Riley, Shea & Bevel, P.L.C., Waterloo, for
appellees.
2
Michael L. Mock of Parker, Simons & McNeill, P.L.C., West Des
Moines, for amicus curiae Iowa Farm Bureau Federation.
3
APPEL, Justice.
While accompanying kindergarten students on a field trip to a
dairy farm, a chaperone was injured when she fell through a hole in the
floor of a hayloft. The chaperone filed a negligence suit against the dairy
farm’s owners. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the owners on the basis that Iowa’s recreational use statute barred the
chaperone’s claims. The court of appeals affirmed on the issue of
whether recreational use immunity extended to the defendants as
landowners, but determined the chaperone could still maintain a suit
against the defendants as tour guides.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude the landowners may not
avail themselves of the limited protections of the recreational use statute
because the chaperone was not engaged in a recreational purpose within
the scope of the statute. We further conclude, however, that the plaintiff
has not raised a material issue of triable fact as to whether the
landowners willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against the
presence of the hole. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of
appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case
for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
A reasonable fact finder viewing the summary judgment record in
the light most favorable to Kimberly Ann Sallee, the nonmoving party,
could find the following facts. Matthew and Diana Stewart own a dairy
farm in Fayette County. Although the Stewarts do not routinely open
their farm to the public, classes or individuals wishing to view the farm
can schedule a visit. These groups are always accompanied by a
member of the Stewart family. If visitors arrive at the farm without a
4
scheduled appointment, they are only permitted to tour the farm if
accompanied by the Stewarts.1
The kindergarteners from the Sacred Heart School have been
annual visitors for a number of years. During their visit, the students
learn about the typical day on a farm. The students are usually
chaperoned by their teacher, a few parents, and at least one member of
the Stewart family. The Stewarts do not permit the students to go into
cattle pens or other places where the Stewarts believe the students might
be in danger.
On May 18, 2010, Sallee accompanied her daughter’s Sacred Heart
kindergarten class on a tour of the Stewarts’ farm. As with other visits to
the farm, the field trip was scheduled in advance. The Stewarts
accompanied the students during their visit and set up three stations for
the students. At one station, the students rode a horse in a round pen.
At another, the students could feed a calf with a bottle of milk. At the
third station, the students could view a tractor. Matthew supervised the
entire process, and adults were positioned at each station. Once they
had rotated through each station, the students saw several cows and a
bull. The Stewarts then guided the group to the barn to allow the
students to play in the hayloft.
Matthew asked Sallee and another chaperone to climb into the
hayloft ahead of the students so that they could assist the students at
the top of the ladder. After Sallee looked at the ladder, Matthew
reassured her it was stable enough to support her weight. Sallee
followed the other chaperone up the ladder and into the hayloft. The
children, another chaperone, the teacher, and Matthew followed.
1There is no indication the Stewarts posted “No Trespassing” signs.
5
Matthew advised Sallee to keep the students away from the hole in the
floor where the ladder was located and warned the students not to climb
too high on the bales of hay piled to one side of the loft. While in the
hayloft, the children ran around and climbed on the hay bales.
The Stewarts never advised Sallee as to the presence of several hay
drops, rectangular holes in the floor of the hayloft through which hay can
be thrown to the animals below. Ordinarily, the Stewarts stack bales of
hay across the holes when they are not in use to insulate the lower part
of the barn. Prior to the class’s arrival, Matthew inspected the hayloft
and stood on the bales of hay covering the holes to make sure they would
support his weight. However, while Sallee was standing on top of a bale
covering one of the holes, the bale gave way. Sallee fell through the hole,
breaking her wrist and leg.
Sallee filed suit against the Stewarts, alleging their negligence
caused her injuries. The Stewarts asserted as an affirmative defense that
Iowa Code chapter 461C (2009), Iowa’s recreational use statute, shielded
them from liability. The Stewarts later moved for summary judgment
based on the recreational use statute. In resistance to the Stewarts’
motion, Sallee argued the recreational use statute does not apply as a
matter of law because the dairy farm, barn, and hayloft did not fall under
the definition of “land” in the statute, the farm was not available to the
public, the tour of the farm was not a “recreational purpose” within the
meaning of the statute, and Sallee, as a chaperone, was not engaged in a
recreational purpose. In the alternative, Sallee argued that the Stewarts
willfully failed to guard or warn against the presence of the hay drop and
that the Stewarts were liable not as owners of the property, but rather as
tour guides.
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The district court concluded the recreational use statute barred
Sallee’s claim. The court reasoned that the Stewarts farm was land
within the meaning of the statute. It also found that, while on the farm,
the students engaged in horseback riding and nature study, defining
terms of “recreational purpose.” Thus, it concluded that Sallee was a
recreational user because she was “a chaperone of children’s activities,
which included horseback riding, nature study, and play in the Stewarts’
hayloft.” Finally, the court found that the Stewarts had not willfully
failed to guard or warn against the hay drop and that they had not acted
recklessly.
Sallee appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of
appeals. A majority agreed with the district court that the Stewarts’
property was covered by the recreational use statute. It also found that
Sallee was engaged in a recreational purpose. It reasoned that, based on
the language of the statute, the legislature intended an expansive
definition of “recreational purpose” which encompassed Sallee’s role as a
chaperone because the students had engaged in horseback riding,
nature study, and play during their visit to the farm. It also determined
the Stewarts had not willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn
against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. However, the
majority found that recreational use immunity did not extend to the
Stewarts “once they undertook responsibility for guiding the field trip
attendees.” One judge on the panel dissented from the majority’s holding
on the premises liability issue on the grounds that Sallee was not
engaged in any recreational purpose under the statute because she was
present to ensure the proper behavior of the students as a chaperone,
not to engage in any recreational activity.
We granted the Stewarts’ application for further review.
7
II. Standard of Review.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
correction of errors at law. Ranes v. Adams Labs., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 677,
685 (Iowa 2010). Summary judgment is only appropriate when the
record demonstrates “that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). “An issue is ‘material’ only when the
dispute is over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit, given the
applicable governing law.” Junkins v. Branstad, 421 N.W.2d 130, 132
(Iowa 1988). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Clinkscales v. Nelson Sec., Inc.,
697 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Iowa 2005). We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
III. Background of Recreational Use Statutes.
A. Development of Recreational Use Statutes.
1. Conflicting interests of public safety and increased access to the
Great Outdoors. At common law, the extent of a landlord’s duty to an
individual injured after entering the land typically depended upon the
injured party’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. Koenig v.
Koenig, 766 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Iowa 2009). The duty owed to a trespasser
was generally limited to avoiding willfully or wantonly careless conduct;
the duty owed to a licensee generally included refraining from willful or
wanton conduct as well as a duty to warn of hazardous conditions; and
the duty owed to an invitee generally included the duties owed to a
licensee as well as duties to make the premises safe, to inspect the
property for dangerous conditions, and to either repair or warn the
invitee of such conditions. See W.L. Church, Private Lands and Public
Recreation: A Report and Proposed New Model Act on Access, Liability and
8
Trespass 7–8 (1979) [hereinafter Church]. We have recognized these
distinctions in our cases. See Koenig, 766 N.W.2d at 638; Sheets v. Ritt,
Ritt & Ritt, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Iowa 1998), abrogated on other
grounds by Koenig, 766 N.W.2d at 643–45. Potential liability was a
disincentive for landowners to make their lands available to the public
for recreational purposes.
Following World War II, the demand for access to land for outdoor
recreational purposes was increasing, but at the same time the amount
of land for such purposes was decreasing as the public also demanded
more infrastructure, such as “subdivisions, industrial sites, highways,
schools, and airports.” Outdoor Recreation Resources Review
Commission, Outdoor Recreation for America: A Report to the President
and to the Congress by the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review
Commission 1 (1962) [hereinafter ORRRC Report]. Further, as Americans
became increasingly obese, public health advocates sought to expand the
recreational opportunities available to Americans. See Michael S. Carroll
et al., Recreational User Statutes and Landowner Immunity: A Comparison
of State Legislation, 17 J. Legal Aspects of Sport 163, 163, 178 (2007)
[hereinafter Carroll]. Legislatures responded by considering measures
that would lessen somewhat the exposure of landowners to liability to
persons entering their land for recreational purposes while still providing
a degree of protection to the public. See Comment, Wisconsin’s
Recreational Use Statute: A Critical Analysis, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 312, 316
(1983) [hereinafter Wisconsin’s Recreational Use Statute] (describing
recreational use statutes as a “ ‘tradeoff’ whereby the landowner is
relieved of certain tort liabilities when he gratuitously allows members of
the public recreational access to his land”).
9
The literature describing and supporting modification of the
common law to promote public recreational use on private land generally
focuses on the needs of sportspersons engaged in hunting, fishing,
hiking, and similar activities taking place in the Great Outdoors. See,
e.g., Tommy L. Brown, Analysis of Limited Liability Recreation Use
Statutes in the Northern Forest States 1 (Cornell Univ. Dep’t of Natural
Res., October 2006), available at http://www.dnr.cornell.edu/hdru
(noting that in addition to hunting and fishing “access to private lands
has become increasingly important . . . for trails for hiking,
snowmobiling, cross-country skiing, and use of all terrain vehicles”);
John D. Copeland, Recreational Access to Private Lands: Liability
Problems and Solutions 6 (Nat’l Agricultural Law Ctr., 2d ed. 1998)
[hereinafter Copeland] (“An increasingly urbanized population is in need
of wider access to lands providing wilderness or rural experiences.”);
Ronald A. Kaiser & Brett A. Wright, Liability and Immunity: A National
Assessment of Landowner Risk for Recreational Injuries iii (USDA Soil
Conservation Serv. 1992) (“Vast increases in the use of public lands for
recreational use have led to more frequent requests by the recreating
public to gain access to private, rural lands for purposes of hunting,
fishing, and other outdoor activities.”); Debra Wolf Goldstein, The
Recreation Use of Land and Water Act: Lory v. City of Philadelphia, 35
Duq. L. Rev. 783, 785 (1997) (pointing out that state recreational use
laws provide a means of “making open space lands available to the
public” in place of the government’s acquisition of lands); Wisconsin’s
Recreational Use Statute, 66 Marq. L. Rev. at 315 (noting that as of 1983,
forty-three states had adopted recreational use statutes to “limit the
liability of landowners whose lands are used for recreational purposes
such as hunting, fishing and sightseeing”); Note, Torts—Statutes—
10
Liability of Landowner to Persons Entering for Recreational Purposes,
1964 Wis. L. Rev. 705, 705 (1964) [hereinafter Liability of Landowner to
Persons Entering for Recreational Purposes] (noting that Wisconsin was
the tenth state to adopt a statute aimed at “encouraging public
recreational use of privately owned forest and farm lands”).
2. Early recreational use statutes in the Midwest. Michigan and
Wisconsin were the first Midwestern states to enact recreational use
statutes.2 See Liability of Landowner to Persons Entering for Recreational
Purposes, 1964 Wis. L. Rev. at 705 & n.2. These statutes were aimed at
promoting traditional outdoor recreation and limiting the liability of
landowners who opened their lands for public use. For example,
Michigan’s recreational use statute as enacted in 1953 stated,
“No cause of action shall arise for injuries to any
person who is on the lands of another without paying to
such other a valuable consideration for the purpose of
fishing, hunting or trapping, with or without permission,
against the owner, tenant or lessee of said premises unless
the injuries were caused by the gross negligence or wilful
and wanton misconduct of the owner, tenant or lessee.”
Wymer v. Homes, 412 N.W.2d 213, 217 (Mich. 1987) (quoting 1953 Mich.
Pub. Acts 201 (emphasis added)), overruled by Neal v. Wilkes, 685
N.W.2d 648 (Mich. 2004). Although the Michigan legislation as originally
proposed in 1953 applied only to hunting, the Michigan legislature
amended it to include fishing and trapping before passage later that year.
See id. The Michigan statute was further amended in 1964 to include
“camping, hiking, sightseeing, or other similar outdoor recreational use.”
Id.
2The states that had enacted recreational use statutes by 1964 were Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Note, Torts—Statutes—Liability of Landowner to Persons
Entering for Recreational Purposes, 1964 Wis. L. Rev. 705, 705 & n.2 (1964).
11
Wisconsin enacted its recreational use statute in 1963. The act
was originally promoted by owners of timberlands who wanted to invite
deer hunters onto their lands to prevent damage brought about by
excessive deer herds, but who feared tort liability stemming from injuries
suffered by the invitees. Goodson v. City of Racine, 213 N.W.2d 16, 18–
19 (Wis. 1973); see also Liability of Landowner to Persons Entering for
Recreational Purposes, 1964 Wis. L. Rev. at 709. The Wisconsin statute
applied to “hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, hiking, berry picking,
water sports, sightseeing, or recreational purposes.” Wis. Stat. § 29.68
(1963).
The benefit of these early recreational use statutes was recognized
by the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC) in its
report published in 1962. Established by Congress in 1958, the ORRRC
conducted an extensive nationwide study of outdoor recreation, which
resulted in a report entitled Outdoor Recreation for America: A Report to
the President and to the Congress. See ORRRC Report at 1–2. The report
declares, “This report is a study of outdoor recreation in America—its
history, its place in current American life, and its future. Id. at 1. The
ORRRC’s report indicated that as of 1962 Americans sought a variety of
outdoor pursuits, including pleasure driving, walking, boating,
swimming, fishing, bicycling, sightseeing, skiing, mountain climbing,
picnicking, and skindiving. Id. at 25–26. It estimated that three-
quarters of Americans would live in urban areas by the year 2000 and
noted that urban dwellers would have the greatest need for (and least
supply of) outdoor recreation facilities. Id. at 3. More importantly, the
ORRRC predicted the nation’s demand for outdoor recreation resources
would nearly triple by the turn of the century. Id. at 32. The ORRRC
12
made a number of recommendations for the federal and state
governments, one of which was the development of a national outdoor
recreation policy and the creation of a Bureau of Outdoor Recreation
within the Department of the Interior to provide leadership in meeting
the demands of outdoor recreation. Id. at 6–7, 121–26. The ORRRC
suggested the states “encourage the public use of private lands by taking
the lead in working out such arrangements as leases for hunting and
fishing, scenic easements, and providing protection for landowners who
allow the public to use their lands.”3 See id. at 9.
3. 1965 model act. A few years after publication of Outdoor
Recreation for America, the Council of State Governments proposed a
model act relating to recreational use, the suggested title of which was
“An act to encourage landowners to make land and water areas available
to the public by limiting liability in connection therewith.” See Council of
State Governments, Public Recreation on Private Lands: Limitations on
Liability, 24 Suggested State Legislation 150, 150 (1965) [hereinafter
Council of State Governments]. At the time, less than one-third of the
states had enacted recreational use statutes. Id. The Council of State
Governments recognized the lack of public outdoor recreational space
and that a solution was to encourage private landowners to open their
land to the public. Id. The preface to the 1965 model act stated:
Recent years have seen a growing awareness of the
need for additional recreational areas to serve the general
public. The acquisition and operation of outdoor
3In addition to its report, the ORRRC published a series of studies. The titles
not surprisingly demonstrate an abiding focus on outdoor recreation. The titles of the
studies include Public Outdoor Recreation Areas—Acreage, Use, Potential; List of Public
Outdoor Recreation Areas–1960; Wilderness and Recreation—A Report on Resources,
Values, and Problems; Shoreline Recreation Resources of the United States; The Quality
of Outdoor Recreation: As Evidence by User Satisfaction; and Hunting in the United
States—Its Present and Future Role.” See Charles Zinser, Outdoor Recreation: United
States National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands 37 (1995).
13
recreational facilities by governmental units is on the
increase. However, large acreages of private land could add
to the outdoor recreation resources available. Where the
owners of private land suitable for recreational use make it
available on a business basis, there may be little reason to
treat such owners and the facilities they provide in any way
different from that customary for operators of private
enterprises. However, in those instances where private
owners are willing to make their land available to members
of the general public without charge, it is possible to argue
that every reasonable encouragement should be given to
them.
In something less than one-third of the states,
legislation has been enacted limiting the liability of private
owners who make their premises available for one or more
public recreational uses. This is done on the theory that it is
not reasonable to expect such owners to undergo the risks of
liability for injury to persons and property attendant upon
the use of their land by strangers from whom the
accommodating owner receives no compensation or other
favor in return.
Id. As indicated in the preface, the need was for additional recreational
areas “to serve the general public.” While public land was being acquired
by government, “large acreages of private land could add to the outdoor
recreation resources available.” Id. Thus, the Council of State
Governments proposed that the public recreational resources of the
government should be supplemented by large acreages of private lands
for purposes of outdoor recreation.
Section 1 of the 1965 model act declared that its general purpose
was “to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available
to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward
persons entering thereon for such purposes.” Id. This first section is
consistent with the preface, emphasizing that land and water resources
should be made available to the public.
Section 2(c) of the 1965 model act defined “recreational purpose”
under the act. It provided:
14
“Recreational purpose” includes, but is not limited to, any of
the following, or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing,
swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure
driving, nature study, water skiing, winter sports, and
viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or
scientific sites.
Id. at 151 (emphasis added). Section 3 of the 1965 model act provided a
landowner owed “no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or
use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a
dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises” to
persons who entered the landowner’s land for recreational purposes. Id.
The 1965 model act did not provide complete immunity to
landowners against claims of persons entering the land for recreational
purposes. Section 6(a) provided that the statutory immunity would not
extend to injuries caused by “willful or malicious failure to guard or warn
against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.” Id. Similarly,
section 6(b) provided that protection would not extend to landowners
who charged recreational users a fee for access to their lands. Id.
4. 1979 proposed model act. After roughly a decade of experience
under the 1965 model act, advocates of outdoor recreation—the National
Association of Conservation Districts, the International Association of
Fish and Wildlife Agencies, the National Rifle Association, the National
Wildlife Federation, and the Wildlife Management Institute—
commissioned University of Wisconsin law professor William L. Church
to conduct a study of the use of private lands for recreational purposes.
See Church at 3; see also Stuart J. Ford, Comment, Wisconsin’s
Recreational Use Statute: Toward Sharpening the Picture at the Edges,
1991 Wis. L. Rev. 491, 499 & n.31 (1991) [hereinafter Ford] (referring to
the investigation’s sponsors as “a coalition of sporting and environmental
groups”). Professor Church concluded that the 1965 model act was
15
generally too protective of recreational users and that this in turn caused
landowners to refrain from opening land to the public for recreational
use. See Church at 10–13. Professor Church also found the 1965 model
act complex and unpredictable. Id. This was, in part, due to confusion
purportedly caused by the definition of “recreational purpose.” Id. at 11.
To cure these perceived deficiencies, Professor Church drafted what is
generally referred to as the 1979 proposed model act. See id. at 29–33.
Among other things, the 1979 proposed model act provided that
“ ‘[r]ecreational use’ means any activity undertaken for exercise,
education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.” Id. at 29
(section 2(3)). The 1979 proposed model act also allowed owners to
collect certain fee-like benefits from recreational users, included
government entities in the definition of “owners” under the statute, and
limited potential premises liability claims of recreational users to
malicious acts or omissions by owners. Id. at 29–30 (sections 2(2), 2(4)
and 5(1)).
5. Advocacy of outdoor recreation in the 1980s and 1990s. In the
1980s and 1990s, there were a number of important meetings related to
improving outdoor recreational access as well as a growth of literature
relating to recreational use statutes. In 1987, the President’s
Commission on Americans Outdoors issued a lengthy report emphasizing
the desirability of more outdoor recreational opportunities for Americans.
See President’s Commission on Americans Outdoors, Americans
Outdoors: The Legacy, the Challenge, with Case Studies 13–15 (Island
Press 1987). With respect to recreational use statutes, the report noted
that roughly forty-six states had statutes protecting private landowners
when they provided “free public access” to their property for recreational
use. Id. at 202. The report suggested expansion of recreational use
16
statutes to include within their scope not just recreational users but
“volunteers” apparently associated with recreational use. Id. at 213.
In 1990, a conference featuring participants from twenty-nine
states and the District of Columbia promoted the need to obtain more
public access to private land. See Proceedings from the Conference on:
Income Opportunities for the Private Landowner Through Management of
Natural Resources and Recreational Access i, 3 (William N. Grafton et al.
eds., 1990). A unifying theme of this meeting, consistent with the
available literature, is a repeated emphasis on increasing access to
outdoor recreation for members of the public. See id. at 3. The
conference sought to instruct private landowners as to the potential
profitability of opening their lands for a fee and potential liability
associated with doing so. See id. at 60, 341–80. In particular, one
commentator noted that “[r]ecreational use statutes are intended to
encourage owners of private land to allow the public to enter without
charge for recreational purposes such as hiking, exploring caves,
swimming and other such activities.” Id. at 370.
In 1999, an assessment of outdoor recreation was published
pursuant to the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning
Act of 1974. See H. Ken Cordell et al., Outdoor Recreation in America: A
National Assessment of Demand and Supply Trends vii (Susan M.
McKinney ed., 1999). In a chapter entitled “Private Lands and Outdoor
Recreation in the United States,” the report noted that “increasing
demand for outdoor recreation in America brings into play the question of
liability.” Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
B. Definitions of “Recreational Purpose” in Recreational Use
Statutes. Currently, all states have some kind of recreational use
statute. While there is considerable variety in the recreational use
17
statutes, the statutes fall into a number of general categories with
respect to the manner in which they define “recreational purpose.” These
include statutes that define “recreational purpose” using the “includes,
but is not limited to” language of the 1965 model act followed by a list of
activities. Other statutes are patterned after the 1979 proposed model
act. Some statutes are hybrids and contain expansive catchall
provisions in addition to a list of activities. Finally, others take a more
restrictive approach.
1. Recreational use statutes with a definition of recreational use
patterned after the 1965 model act. Many states have recreational use
statutes that define “recreational purpose” using a list that “includes but
is not limited to” a number of specific outdoor activities. The list of
activities specifically identified in the statutes varies from state to state,
but usually includes the activities identified in the 1965 model act with
the addition of other activities, such as spelunking, hot air ballooning,
gleaning, mushing, and hang gliding. See Ala. Code § 35–15–21(3)
(LexisNexis 1991); Ark. Code Ann. § 18–11–302(5) (Supp. 2011); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52–557f(4) (West Supp. 2012); Del. Code Ann. tit. 7,
§ 5902(4) (2011); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 375.251(5)(b) (West Supp. 2013); Ga.
Code Ann. § 51–3–21(4) (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 520–2 (2006); Idaho Code Ann. § 36–1604(b)(4) (2011); Kan. Stat. Ann
§ 58–3202(c) (2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.190(1)(c) (LexisNexis
2005); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2795(A)(3) (2009); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
14, § 159–A(1)(B) (Supp. 2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.21(5) (West
2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 89–2–3 (West 1999); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 37–729(3)
(2008); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.510(4) (2011); Okla. Stat. tit. 76 § 10.1(2)(b)
(2011); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 105.672(5) (West Supp. 2012); 68 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 477–2(3) (Supp. 2012); R.I. Gen. Laws § 32–6–2(4) (Supp.
18
2012); S.C. Code Ann. § 27–3–20(c) (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 57–14–2(3)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2012); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.210(1) (West
Supp. 2013); W. Va. Code Ann. § 19–25–5(5) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34–19–101(a)(iii) (2011); see also Cal. Civil Code § 846
(West 2007).
A number of courts have pointed to “includes, but is not limited to”
language to support expansive interpretations of recreational use
statutes. See, e.g., Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games,
Inc., 537 S.E.2d 345, 348 (Ga. 2000) (interpreting the “includes, but is
not limited to” language of the Georgia statute to mean that the statute
encompasses any recreational activity); Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum,
766 P.2d 736, 743 (Idaho 1988) (finding that a child who was “playing”
had a recreational purpose even though such activity was not expressly
listed); Richard v. La. Newpack Shrimp Co., 82 So. 3d 541, 546 (La. Ct.
App. 2011) (holding the omnibus clause incorporated loading a boat and
preparing for departure into the statute even though they were not
expressly listed). California’s statute is slightly different in that it states,
“A ‘recreational purpose,’ as used in this section, includes such activities
as . . . .” Cal. Civil Code § 846 (emphasis added). It has, however, been
interpreted expansively because it uses a term of enlargement followed
by a list of activities, see Ornelas v. Randolph, 847 P.2d 560, 563 (Cal.
1993) (holding that playing on farm equipment is a recreational purpose
within the meaning of the statute even though not specifically listed), and
is therefore similar to those statutes using the “includes, but is not
limited to” language of the 1965 model act.
2. Statutes that incorporate the expansive language of the 1979
proposed model act. Some statutes use expansive general language to
define “recreational purpose.” These statutes appear to be modeled
19
directly after the 1979 proposed model act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 38A–
2(5) (2012) (“ ‘Recreational purpose’ means any activity undertaken for
recreation, exercise, education, relaxation, refreshment, diversion, or
pleasure.”); N.D. Cent. Code § 53–08–02 (2012) (“ ‘Recreational purposes’
includes any activity engaged in for the purpose of exercise, relaxation,
pleasure, or education.”). Similarly, prior to an amendment in 2005, the
Illinois recreational use statute, which also applies to conservation
purposes, defined “ ‘recreational or conservation purpose’ ” as “ ‘any
activity undertaken for conservation, resource management, exercise,
education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.’ ”4 See Hall
v. Henn, 802 N.E.2d 797, 799 (Ill. 2003) (quoting 745 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 65/2(c) (West 2002)); see also 2005 Ill. Laws ch. 70, para. 32
(amending this definition to include only hunting and recreational
shooting).
As expected, courts have interpreted these statutes broadly. See,
e.g., Vaughn v. Barton, 933 N.E.2d 355, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (holding
the pre-2005-amendment Illinois statute applied to playing baseball and
watching baseball); Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 642
N.W.2d 864, 871 (N.D. 2002) (holding that winter sledding is a
recreational purpose under the North Dakota statute). As the Illinois
Supreme Court put it, “ ‘Exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure’
encompasses just about every purpose, absent commerce, for which a
4Prior to 1987, the Illinois definition of “recreational purpose” was markedly
different. It stated,
“ ‘Recreational purpose’ includes, and is limited to, any of the following, or
any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating,
snowmobiling, motorcycling, camping, picnicking, hiking, cave exploring,
nature study, water skiing, water sports, bicycling, horseback riding, and
viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites.”
Lane v. Titchenel, 562 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (quoting the 1985 version
of the definition).
20
person is invited onto another’s property.” Hall, 802 N.E.2d at 800.
Maryland, interestingly, has chosen to define “recreational purpose” as
encompassing “any recreational pursuit,” a definition that may be
broader than that of the 1979 proposed model act. See Md. Code Ann.,
Nat. Res. § 5–1101(f) (LexisNexis 2012).5
3. Recreational use statutes with a definition of “recreational
purpose” containing expansive catchall provisions. Several states have
departed from the 1965 model act by providing catchall language in the
definition of recreational purpose. These statutes are essentially hybrids
of the 1965 model act and the 1979 proposed model act in that they
define “recreational purpose” using a list of activities coupled with a
catchall provision. Some of these states simply provide that the statute
includes “other recreational activities,” an approach that may be
criticized as circular. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33–41–102(5) (2012) (“or
other recreational activity”); Ind. Code Ann. § 14–22–10–2(d) (LexisNexis
2003) (“for the purpose of swimming, camping, hiking, sightseeing, or
any other purpose”); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.73301 (West 2009)
(“or any other outdoor recreational use or trail use”); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 70–16–301 (2011) (“or other pleasure expeditions”); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:42A–2 (West 2010) (“and any other outdoor sport”); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 17–4–7 (2012) (“or any other recreational use”); Va. Code Ann. § 29.1–
509(B) (2011) (“for any other recreational use”); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 33-1551(c)(5) (Supp. 2012) (defining “recreational user” as one
who may “engage in other outdoor recreational pursuits” in addition to
other enumerated activities); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1533.18(B)
5This is in stark contrast to a former version of Maryland’s statute, which stated,
“ ‘Recreational purpose’ includes the following or any combination thereof . . .” and did
not include a catchall provision. See 1973 Md. Laws, 1st Extra. Sess., 827.
21
(LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (defining “recreational user” as one who engaged
in certain enumerated activities “or to engage in other recreational
pursuits”). In addition, the Colorado statute uses the “includes, but is
not limited to” language of the 1965 model act. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 33–
41–102(5); see also Mont. Code Ann. § 70–16–301 (indicating that the
definition “includes” certain activities).
In particular, Indiana courts have focused on the “or any other
purpose” language to hold that the Indiana statute applies when a land
user engages in certain activities that are not enumerated. See
Cunningham v. Bakker Produce, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 1002, 1006 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999) (baseball); McCormick v. State, 673 N.E.2d 829, 833–34 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996) (boating); Kelly v. Ladywood Apartments, 622 N.E.2d
1044, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (sledding). But, the Indiana Supreme
Court also held that a high school student who decorated an abandoned
grain elevator and participated in a haunted house performance was not
engaged in a recreational activity because those activities were
inconsistent with the outdoor activities specifically mentioned in the
statute, which included hunting, fishing, swimming, trapping, camping,
hiking, and sightseeing. Drake ex rel. Drake v. Mitchell Cmty. Sch., 649
N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ind. 1995).
4. Recreational use statutes that list recreational uses, but do not
include expansive language. Unlike the statutes identified above, a very
small number of states comprise a fourth category with a more restrictive
approach to defining “recreational purpose.” These states’ recreational
use statutes list outdoor activities that qualify as recreational uses, but
do not contain the “includes, but is not limited to” language of the 1965
model act or the more expansive definitional language of the 1979
proposed model act. For example, New York’s statute provides that “an
22
owner, lessee or occupant of premises . . . owes no duty to keep the
premises safe for entry or use by others for [specified recreational
activities].” N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 9–103 (McKinney’s 2010). The
New York Court of Appeals has interpreted this to mean that the land
user must be engaged in one of the enumerated activities. Bragg v.
Genesee Cnty. Agric. Soc’y, 644 N.E.2d 1013, 1016 (N.Y. 1994). As will
be explained below, Iowa’s statute takes a restrictive approach similar to
New York’s.
Illinois has taken an even more restrictive approach. Although its
recreational use statute originally defined “recreational purpose” using
the “includes, but is not limited to” language of the 1965 model act and
later included the sweeping definitional language of the 1979 proposed
model act, the Illinois legislature severely restricted the statute in 2005
by amending it to apply only to “hunting or recreational shooting.” See
2005 Ill. Laws ch. 70, para. 32.
IV. Iowa’s Recreational Use Act.
The Iowa recreational use statute was enacted in 1967, two years
after publication of the 1965 model act. See 1967 Iowa Acts ch. 149.
Although the legislature based the statute on the 1965 model act, the
legislature made important alterations prior to its enactment that are
relevant to our decision today.
The recreational use act was proposed as H.F. 151 and entitled
according to the suggestion of the 1965 model act as “[a]n Act to
encourage landowners to make land and water available to the public by
limiting liability in connection therewith.” H.F. 151, 62d G.A., Reg. Sess.
(Iowa 1967); see also Council of State Governments, 24 Suggested State
Legislation at 150. The text and explanation of H.F. 151 as originally
proposed were substantially the same as the text and preface of the 1965
23
model act. Compare H.F. 151, with Council of State Governments, 24
Suggested State Legislation at 150–52. See also City of Cedar Rapids v.
James Props., Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 2005) (“We give weight to
explanations attached to bills as indications of legislative intent.”). H.F.
151 spelled out a need to encourage private landowners to make their
lands available by defining any potential liability. H.F. 151, explanation.
As the legislature explained, “Recent years in Iowa have shown a growing
need for additional recreational areas for use by our citizenry.” Id.;
accord Scott v. Wright, 486 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Iowa 1992). It further pointed
to the roughly one-third of other states that had already passed
recreational use laws because it was unreasonable to expect private
landowners to risk liability to persons from whom they would receive no
compensation in return. H.F. 151, explanation. It stands to reason,
therefore, that the legislature modeled the recreational use statute after
the 1965 model act. Peterson v. Schwertley, 460 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa
1990).
Although the original proposed definition of “recreational purpose”
in H.F. 151 was identical to the definition in the 1965 model act,
compare H.F. 151 § 2(3), with Council of State Governments, 24
Suggested State Legislation at 151 (section 2(c)), the legislature adopted
two important amendments prior to enactment. One amendment struck
the words “includes, but is not limited to, any of” and inserted in lieu
thereof the word “means.” Another amendment added “while going to
and from or actually engaged therein” to the end of the 1965 model act’s
definition. Thus, the enacted definition of “recreational purposes” read
as follows:
“Recreational purpose” means the following or any
combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating,
camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study,
24
water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying
historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites while going
to and from or actually engaged therein.
1967 Iowa Acts ch. 149, § 2 (emphasis added). From these amendments
we can conclude the legislature considered and deliberately rejected the
expansive “includes, but is not limited to” language of the 1965 model
act defining “recreational purpose,” choosing instead a definition
consisting of a closed universe of terms. See 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D.
Shambie Singer, Statutes & Statutory Construction § 52:5, at 370 (rev.
7th ed. 2012) (noting that ordinarily “when a legislature models a statute
after a uniform act, but does not adopt particular language, courts
conclude the omission was ‘deliberate’ or ‘intentional,’ and that the
legislature rejected a particular policy of the uniform act”).
Over the years, the legislature has amended this definition various
times. In 1971, the legislature added “horseback riding,” “motorcycling,”
“snowmobiling,” and “other summer . . . sports.” 1971 Iowa Acts chs.
129–30. In 1988, the legislature amended the statute to include
“trapping.” 1988 Iowa Acts ch. 1216, § 46. Finally, in 2012, although
subsequent to the incident giving rise to the issue in this case, the
legislature amended the statute to include “all-terrain vehicle riding.”
2012 Iowa Acts ch. 1100, § 58.6
6The legislature also made Iowa’s recreational use statute applicable to activities
involving “urban deer control.” See 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1121. The legislature added
these provisions much in the same way that Arizona and Maryland made their statutes
applicable to educational activities and South Dakota made its statute applicable to
agritourism activities in addition to recreational activities. Compare Iowa Code
§ 461C.1 (2009), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33–1551(A) (Supp. 2012), Md. Code Ann.,
Nat. Res. § 5–1102(a) (LexisNexis 2012), and S.D. Codified Laws 20–9–13 (Supp. 2012).
Each of these statutes applies to limit landowner liability to persons engaged in these
activities in addition to limiting landowner liability to persons engaged in recreational
activities and provides separate definitions for each. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33–
1551(C)(1), (5); Iowa Code § 461C.2(5), (6); Md. Code Ann., Nat. Res. § 5–1101(c), (f);
S.D. Codified Laws 20–9–12(3), (4).
25
Notably, the legislature never added the “includes, but is not
limited to” language of the 1965 model act as roughly half of the other
states have done. Similarly, it never added a catchall provision, such as
those contained in the definitions of Arizona, Colorado, Indiana,
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, and Virginia.
Further, the Iowa legislature has not adopted the expansive definition of
“recreational purpose” from the 1979 proposed model act as in North
Carolina and North Dakota.
Instead, Iowa’s statute provides that “ ‘[r]ecreational purpose’
means the following or any combination thereof,” just as it has since its
enactment. Iowa Code § 461C.2(5) (2009) (emphasis added). By doing
so, the Iowa legislature created a closed universe of outdoor activities
that trigger the protections of the statute. The legislature has thus
determined that if some other activity beyond those specifically listed is
to be considered a recreational purpose, legislative action is required.
This is demonstrated by the legislature’s decision to add specific terms to
the definition over the years. Given the closed nature of the definition of
“recreational purposes” under the statute, horseback riding,
snowmobiling, other summer sports, trapping, and all-terrain vehicle
riding would not have been within the scope of Iowa’s recreational use
statute absent legislative action.
V. State Court Interpretation of Recreational Use Statutes.
A review of cases demonstrates that most state courts have
construed recreational use statutes to achieve the legislative purpose of
opening lands for outdoor recreation. See Jim Butler, Outdoor Sports
and Torts: An Analysis of Utah’s Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. Rev.
47, 65–66 (1988). The question in these cases is not so much whether
the statute should be limited to achieve its purposes, but rather what
26
kind of limitation should be adopted. Regardless of the type of limitation,
the purpose of limitation is clear: to avoid the absurd result identified by
the plaintiff in this case, namely, that the recreational use statute applies
to an urban dweller’s barbecue party or a basketball game in the
driveway of a suburban home.
A. General Limitations on the Reach of Recreational Use
Statutes.
1. Generally open to the public. One approach to limit the scope of
a recreational use statute is to require landowners to make their land
open to the public generally in order to be entitled to immunity. In the
often cited case of Gibson v. Keith, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
Delaware’s statute applied only to landowners who invite or permit
without charge the public at large to use property for recreational
purposes. 492 A.2d 241, 248 (Del. 1985); see also Herring v. Hauck, 165
S.E.2d 198, 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968); Hughes v. Quarve & Anderson, Co.,
338 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1983); Estate of Gordon-Couture v. Brown,
876 A.2d 196, 202 (N.H. 2005); Loyer v. Buchholz, 526 N.E.2d 300, 302
& n.1 (Ohio 1988); Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 713–14 (R.I. 2003);
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1996);
Cregan v. Fourth Mem’l Church, 285 P.3d 860, 863–64 (Wash. 2012);
LePoidevin v. Wilson, 330 N.W.2d 555, 562–63 (Wis. 1983).
These cases suggest the land in question must be generally
available to the public—akin to a privately owned but public park—in
order for the immunity to apply.7 See Copeland at 26 (“Recreational use
statutes protect landowners from liability claims only if land in question
7Severalstates have expressly adopted this requirement. See, e.g., Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 52–557(g)(a) (2005); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.210(1) (West Supp.
2013).
27
is made accessible to the public.”). Other cases, however, reject this
requirement. See Collins v. Martella, 17 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994)
(interpreting the New Hampshire statute); Mansion v. United States, 945
F.2d 1115, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 1991) (interpreting the California statute);
Barrett v. Pa. Gas & Water Co., 631 F. Supp. 731, 733–34 (M.D. Pa.
1985); Johnson v. Stryker Corp., 388 N.E.2d 932, 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
2. “True outdoors” test. In a number of cases, state courts have
limited the scope of recreational purpose to activities associated with the
true outdoors. For example, in Keelen v. State, the Louisiana Supreme
Court stated that based on the specified activities in the statute the
“legislature envisioned immunity for landowners who offer their property
for recreation that can be pursued in the ‘true outdoors.’ ” 463 So. 2d
1287, 1290 (La. 1985). Accordingly, even though the case involved
swimming in a pool and swimming was an enumerated activity in the
statute, the court held the statute only covered “swimming in lakes,
rivers, ponds or other similar bodies of water.” Keelen, 463 So. 2d at
1290–91. Similarly, in Wymer the Michigan Supreme Court held that
diving into a shallow pond in an urban setting was not among the
“outdoor” activities included under the statute. 412 N.W.2d at 219.
According to the Wymer court, “The commonality among all these
enumerated uses is that they generally require large tracts of open,
vacant land in a relatively natural state.” Id. In Quesenberry v.
Milwaukee County, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to grant
recreational use immunity to the owner of a golf course, noting that the
activities qualifying as recreational purpose were normally done on land
in its “natural undeveloped state as contrasted to the more structured,
landscaped and improved nature of a golf course.” 317 N.W.2d 468, 472
(Wis. 1982). In Dykes v. Scotts Bluff County Agricultural Society, Inc., the
28
Nebraska Supreme Court held that viewing livestock events at a county
fair was not a recreational purpose under Nebraska’s recreational use
statute because “the activities listed in [the statute] are more physical
than not, generally require the outdoors, and are not ‘spectator sports.’ ”
617 N.W.2d 817, 823 (Neb. 2000); see also Boileau v. De Cecco, 310 A.2d
497, 499–500 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), aff’d, 323 A.2d 449 (N.J.
1974); Matthews v. Elk Pioneer Days, 824 P.2d 541, 542–44 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992).8
Collectively, these cases stand for the proposition that recreational
use statutes are not sweeping immunity statutes that generally overturn
ordinary tort liability for all landowners, including urban residents, but
are instead more focused statutes that should be interpreted consistently
with the underlying legislative purpose of enhancing outdoor recreational
opportunities.9 Recreational use statutes are designed to cover
situations such as when a recreational user trips over a log, twists an
ankle in a ground hog burrow, or falls down a ravine hidden by brush
while they are on private property to hunt, fish, hike, or the like, not
incidents involving a backyard barbecue or a friendly game of hoops in
suburbia.
3. Causal link between injury and recreational use. As noted by
one authority, “courts have routinely ruled that persons entering land to
engage in activities outside the scope of the activities outlined in the
8There is contrary authority. See Iannotti v. Consol. Rail Corp., 542 N.E.2d 621,
623 (N.Y. 1979) (noting the New York recreational use statute “is not limited to claims
arising in wilderness, remote or undeveloped areas”).
9Some state recreational use statutes specifically refer to “outdoor recreational
purposes,” “outdoor recreational use,” or “any other outdoor sport.” See, e.g., Mich.
Comp. Laws § 324.73301 (West 2009); Miss. Code Ann. § 89–2–3 (West 1999); N.J. Stat.
Ann. 2A:42A–2 (2010); Oklahoma, § 10.1 (2012); S.D. Codified Laws sec. 20–9–13
(Supp. 2012).
29
statute are not classified as recreational users.” Carroll, 17 J. Legal
Aspects of Sport at 173. For instance, in Rintelman v. Boys & Girls Clubs
of Greater Milwaukee, Inc., a chaperone at an educational retreat who
slipped and fell on a path was found to be walking on the path in
connection with her duties as a chaperone and not for a recreational
purpose. 707 N.W.2d 897, 905–06 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005). Similarly, in
Herman v. City of Tuscon, the court found that an employee of a food
vendor who was injured while walking from the parking lot toward a
band shell to work as a concessionaire at a music festival was not a
recreational user within the meaning of the Arizona recreational use act.
4 P.3d 973, 979 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). In Hontert v. Ohio Department of
Natural Resources, the court held a plaintiff who was injured inside a
building, an historic home, located on recreational land was not a
recreational user because her activities in the building consisted of
taking a tour, viewing a movie about the premises, and shopping in the
gift shop. 572 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1990). In Harrison v.
Middlesex Water Co., the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that an
individual seeking to rescue two children who had fallen into a frozen
pond was not engaged in a recreational use. 403 A.2d 910, 915 (N.J.
1979).
Similarly, in Crichfield v. Grand Wailea Co., a land user who
asserted she was on a hotel’s property to eat lunch was injured when she
left a footpath to admire the hotel’s fishpond and statuary. 6 P.3d 349,
351, 353 (Haw. 2000). The Hawai’i Supreme Court held that while there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the land user was on
the hotel’s premises for commercial or recreational purposes, the Hawai’i
recreational use statute would not immunize the hotel if she was on the
premises for a commercial purpose. Crichfield, 6 P.3d at 359–61.
30
Finally, in Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, the court
determined that where a party was walking her bicycle over a bridge in
order to use a telephone at a nearby market and procure a candy bar,
there was a material issue of triable fact as to whether she was “hiking”
within the scope of the statute. 157 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615–16 (Ct. App.
1979). The court further noted that the “purpose of the journey” should
be considered in making this determination. Gerkin, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
616.
At the very least, these cases stand for the proposition that, even if
the injured individual is on land that might be available for recreational
use, that individual may not have been using the land in a recreational
fashion and is therefore removed from the purview of the statute. But
see Seminara v. Highland Lake Bible Conference, 492 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148
(App. Div. 1985) (holding that bicycling across property to retrieve
forgotten jacket was recreational). Therefore, while horseback riding may
have been within the scope of the statute in this case, frolicking in the
hayloft may not be. Further, if a party seeking to preserve the safety of
children engaged in outdoor recreation through rescue is not within the
scope of a recreational use statute as in Harrison, it stands to reason
that a chaperone who stands at the ready might not be within the statute
either.
Other cases hold that while a trip may have had recreational
components, a nonrecreational use of land was not covered by the
statute. For example, in Smith v. Scrap Disposal Corp., an individual
entered the property to fish, which was an activity clearly covered by the
California recreational use statute. 158 Cal. Rptr. 134, 136 (Ct. App.
1979). When leaving, however, the individual was injured when he
hopped onto a bulldozer in an attempt to stop his friend from using it.
31
Smith, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The court held that getting onto the
bulldozer was not a recreational use within the scope of the statute, even
though the injury happened while returning from a covered activity. Id.
at 137. Similarly, in James v. Metro North Commuter Railroad, the court
held that a man fishing on a railroad bank was not engaged in
recreational use when he crossed the tracks in an effort to rescue his
dog. 560 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460–61 (1990).
There are, however, contrary cases. See, e.g., Thompson v. Kyo–Ya
Co., 146 P.3d 1049, 1057–58 (Haw. 2006) (holding a scuba diving
instructor was on property for recreational purpose when she tripped on
a path while leading a group of students from the ocean to the parking
lot); Hafford v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 687 A.2d 967, 968–69 (Me. 1996)
(holding an outfitter supplying canoeing and camping enthusiasts was
engaged in activity with a recreational purpose when transporting his
staff to pick up his clients’ vehicles). Nonetheless, the individuals in
these cases were engaged in a business purpose, not a recreational
purpose, and thus the immunity should not apply to them. Further, in
both cases, the courts seemed preoccupied with the fact that the injured
persons were receiving a direct financial benefit from their activities on
the land. Such a consideration is not present here.
4. Invited guest exception. Some courts have held that the
immunity does not apply to invited guests. For instance, a Georgia
appellate court held that the immunity statute did not apply where a
neighbor invited friends to his backyard pool without charge. See
Herring, 165 S.E.2d at 199. Further, several statutes expressly contain
an invited guest exception. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 846; Ind. Code
Ann. § 14–22–10–2(f)(1)(B); Wis. Stat. Ann. 895.52(6)(d) (West Supp.
2012).
32
5. Ancillary structures associated with land. A number of cases
have considered whether injuries occurring in buildings and structures
fall within the immunity provisions of the acts. One distinction in these
cases turns on the nature of the land upon which the building sits. For
example, in Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary of St. Charles
Borromeo, Inc., the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the
words “buildings, structures and machinery or equipment when attached
to the realty” in the Pennsylvania recreational use act was limited “to
ancillary structures attached to open space lands made available for
recreation and not to an enclosed recreational facilities in urban
regions,” such as an indoor swimming pool. 507 A.2d 1, 15 (Pa. 1986).
Another distinction turns on the type of activity occurring within
the structure. See Drake ex rel. Drake, 649 N.E.2d at 1030 (holding a
student who decorated an abandoned grain elevator and participated in a
haunted house performance was not present for a recreational purpose);
Hontert, 572 N.E.2d at 872 (holding a tour of an historic home, which
included an educational movie and a stop at the gift shop, was not a
recreational use, even though the home was located on a farm). But see
Curtiss v. County of Chemung, 433 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (App. Div. 1980)
(determining the recreational use statute barred recovery where the
plaintiffs’ presence in a storage shed was incidental to their entry to and
use of the premises for hunting and hiking).
The bottom line is that while under some circumstances activities
within a building might give rise to immunity under the statute, there
must nonetheless be activity within the structure that amounts to a
recreational purpose.
B. Interpretation of Elastic Recreational Use Provisions. Even
under statutes with catchall provisions expanding the scope of the
33
definition of “recreational purpose,” courts have still required that the
land user’s activities be outdoor recreational purposes in order to trigger
immunity. For example, in Villanova v. American Federation of
Musicians, Local 16, the court held that the phrase “other outdoor sport,
game and recreational activity” did not manifest a legislative intent to
bring within the statute’s ambit recreational activities that were “forms of
play, amusement, diversion or relaxation.” 301 A.2d 467, 468 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); see also Drake ex rel. Drake, 649 N.E.2d at
1030 (decorating a grain elevator and participating in a haunted house
performance was not “any other purpose”); Keelen, 463 So. 2d at 1291
(holding a swimming pool in a state park is not the type of recreation in
the true outdoors); Eschete v. Mecom, 509 So. 2d 840, 843 (La. Ct. App.
1987) (holding the Louisiana recreational use statute did not bar
recovery by a plaintiff who suffered injuries when his boat struck a
submerged oil well cribbing in a canal because the injuries were not
caused by instrumentalities one would normally encounter in the true
outdoors and were instead a man-made trap for the unwary); Boileau,
310 A.2d at 499–500 (holding that swimming in a swimming pool was
not a “sport or recreational activity” because the New Jersey statute was
designed to cover activity conducted in the true outdoors, not in
someone’s backyard); Hontert, 572 N.E.2d at 872 (viewing a movie and
shopping in a gift shop not “other recreational pursuits”).
A federal district court took a somewhat different approach to an
elastic provision in Fisher v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 514 (D. Mont.
1982). In this case, a child died while playing on a snowplow during
lunchtime on a school field trip. Fisher, 534 F. Supp. at 515. The
question was whether the Montana statute, which provided that
recreational purposes included “picnicking” and “other pleasure
34
expeditions,” barred the suit. Id. The court concluded Montana’s list of
recreational purposes was not exclusive and that the statute should be
interpreted to include school field trips within its scope. Id. at 515–16.
Yet, Fisher has not been widely cited, is inconsistent with a California
appellate court’s decision in Scrap Disposal, and was construing a
statute containing an expansive catchall provision. The Iowa statute
does not contain such language.
C. Interface Between Tort Law and Recreational Use Statutes.
Courts have also limited application of recreational use statutes to tort
claims related to premises liability. The common thread in these cases is
that premises liability claims are separate from other negligence claims.
For example, in Klein v. United States a cyclist was struck by an
automobile driven by the landowner’s employee. 235 P.3d 42, 44 (Cal.
2010). The California Supreme Court held that the California
recreational use statute related to premises liability, not other tortious
conduct, and did not extend to acts of vehicular negligence by a
landowner or a landowner’s employee. Klein, 235 P.3d at 44, 49–50.
Similarly, in Dickinson v. Clark, a case in which a minor was injured by a
wood splitter, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held the statute
applied only to premises liability claims and not to claims of negligent
supervision or instruction. 767 A.2d 303, 305–06 (Me. 2001). Moreover,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the interface between
traditional tort law and a recreational use statute in LePoidevin. There,
the plaintiff was injured when she dove from the defendant’s pier into
shallow water. LePoidevin, 330 N.W.2d at 557. The defendant’s son and
son-in-law were allegedly ridiculing, taunting, and challenging the
plaintiff to enter the water and grabbed her towel away from her. Id. The
35
court held the active negligence on the part of the defendants took the
plaintiff’s claim outside the scope of the statute. Id. at 560.
VI. Iowa Case Law.
In Peterson, the plaintiff and his friends were swimming in a lake
near a large tree. 460 N.W.2d at 470. Land users frequently attached
ropes to the tree in order to swing out over the water. Id. at 469. The
tree also had pieces of wood nailed to its trunk, which facilitated
climbing into the tree. Id. at 469–70. The landowner had attempted to
discourage swimming on his property by occasionally removing ropes
and the pieces of wood from the tree. Id. He also posted “private
property—no trespassing” signs. Id. at 470. The plaintiff, who
apparently ignored the posted signs, was paralyzed when he reached for
a rope suspended from the tree without the landowner’s permission, lost
his balance, decided to dive into the water, and hit his head. Id. The
question was whether the landowner had an obligation to keep the
premises safe for trespassers. Id. at 471. We held that the recreational
statute extended to trespassers and immunized the landowner. Id. at
471–72.
In Scott, we considered the relationship between immunity in
Iowa’s recreational use statute and negligence claims. There, a birthday
party guest was injured when she fell from a wagon and became trapped
beneath it during a hay ride on the defendant’s property. Scott, 486
N.W.2d at 41. Because the tractor pulling the wagon was driven by the
defendants’ daughter, the guest sought to recover on a theory of
vicarious liability for the driver’s negligent operation of the tractor. Id.
After a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, claiming that the
recreational use statute prevented recovery. Id. at 41–42.
36
We declined to disturb the jury verdict. We noted that nothing in
the legislative history of the recreational use statute “suggests a
legislative intent to immunize all negligent acts of landowners, their
agents, or employees.” Id. at 42. We emphasized that the statute was
enacted to serve “ ‘a growing need for additional recreation areas for use
by our citizenry.’ ” Id. (quoting H.F. 151, 62 G.A., Reg. Sess. explanation
(Iowa 1967)). We further stated, “The public’s incentive to enter and
enjoy private agricultural land would be greatly diminished if users were
subject, without recourse, to human error as well as natural hazards.”
Id.
In reaching the conclusion that the statute was so limited, we
emphasized that the language of the recreational use statute is “couched
in terms of premises liability.” Id. (emphasis added). In short, the
inquiry after Scott is whether the claim is based upon human error or
natural hazards. If the claim is based upon natural hazards, it is barred
by the recreational use statute, which extinguishes premises liability
claims. If, however, the claim is based upon human error, the immunity
provided by the recreational use statute has no application.
VII. Analysis of Applicability of Recreational Use Statute.
A. Framework for Interpretation of Iowa’s Recreational Use
Statute. In interpreting a statute, “[w]e consider the objects sought to
be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied.”
Klinge v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Iowa 2006) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). We seek to advance, rather than defeat, the
purposes of the statute. State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa
2005).
When a statute is ambiguous, we look to extrinsic materials to aid
in interpretation. State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577, 586 (Iowa 2011). A
37
statute is ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning.
Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa
1995). Ambiguity may arise from the meaning of particular words in the
statute or from the general scope and meaning of the statute when
considered as a whole. Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996).
If a statute is ambiguous, we may consider, among other matters, “[t]he
object sought to be obtained,” “[t]he circumstances under which the
statute was enacted,” “[t]he legislative history,” “[t]he common law or
former statutory provisions,” “[t]he consequences of a particular
construction,” “[t]he administrative construction of the statute,” and
“[t]he preamble or statement of policy.” Iowa Code § 4.6.
Courts and commentators have generally noted that recreational
use statutes have many ambiguities. John C. Becker, Landowner or
Occupier Liability for Personal Injuries and Recreational Use Statutes: How
Effective is the Protection?, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 1587, 1613 (1991) (citing a
need to clarify ambiguities affecting the coverages and applications of
recreational use statutes in specific situations); Ford, 1991 Wis. L. Rev.
at 527 (noting that the concept of recreation is amorphous and difficult
to define unambiguously); Glen Rothstein, Note & Comment, Recreational
Use Statutes and Private Landowner Liability: A Critical Examination of
Ornelas v. Randolph, 15 Whittier L. Rev. 1123, 1125–26 (suggesting that
inadequate and ambiguous definitions of lands, users, and activities
covered by recreational use statutes cause disagreements over their
application). The lengthy COA and ALR annotations are testament to the
many difficulties associated with interpretation of recreational use
statutes. See generally James Lockhart, Annotation, Cause of Action for
Personal Injury or Death in Which Recreational Use Statute is Raised as a
Defense, 18 C.O.A. 613 (2012); Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Effect of
38
Statute Limiting Landowner’s Liability for Personal Injury to Recreational
User, 47 A.L.R. 4th 262 (1986). At a minimum, as the caselaw
demonstrates, reasonable minds can disagree as to whether a
recreational use must be a true outdoor activity. Reasonable minds
could also disagree as to whether terms like “nature study” or “other
summer . . . sports” apply to the facts before us. Plainly, extrinsic aids
are appropriate tools for us to use in applying the recreational use
statute to the facts of this case.
B. Applicability of General Limitations to Iowa Statute.
1. Public at large. In several places, the Iowa statute, like the
1965 model act, emphasizes that its purpose is to give the public more
recreational opportunities. In short, it can be argued that the purpose of
the act itself was to establish quasi-parks on private lands where the
public would have access in exchange for qualified protection from
liability and that the statute should be so interpreted. Such an approach
is consistent with the wording of the statute, the purposes of the act, its
statutory history, and caselaw in a number of jurisdictions.
Yet, limiting Iowa’s recreational use statute to lands generally open
to the public is inconsistent with Peterson. It could be argued that the
result in Peterson is inconsistent with the statutory purpose. If the
statute applied to posted property not open to the public, as Peterson
suggests, what incentive does it give to a landowner to open his or her
lands to the public? The purpose of the statute was plainly to increase
the availability of private lands to public recreation. To extend the
statute’s protections to property not open to the public not only fails to
promote the purposes of the statute, but tends to defeat them. Further,
the language in Peterson was undercut by subsequent language in Scott,
where we emphasized that the purpose of the statute was “ ‘a growing
39
need for additional recreation areas for use by our citizenry.’ ” 486
N.W.2d at 42 (quoting H.F. 151, 62d G.A. Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1967)).
Stare decisis, of course, is a relevant consideration here. Because
this case can be resolved on other grounds, it is unnecessary to confront
the question of whether Peterson is good law.
2. Approach to interpretation of activities covered by Iowa’s
recreational use statute. There can be no question that the evil sought to
be addressed by recreational use statutes is the inadequacy of resources
for outdoor recreation. The history of the development of recreational
use statutes, the express language of the ORRRC Report, the 1965 model
act, and the 1979 proposed model act all point in that direction. The
reasoning in the cases adopting a true outdoors approach to the
interpretation of activities covered by recreational use statutes is faithful
to the language of the Iowa statute and is focused on the evil sought to
be prevented.
Nothing in the Iowa statute suggests a different approach. The list
of recreational uses strongly suggests that the statute is designed to
protect activities traditionally undertaken outdoors. While the statute
recognizes that recreational use immunity may apply to appurtenant
structures, such immunity for injuries that occur in structures is only
applicable when the structure itself is part of or incidental to the
underlying recreational use. Indeed, although there are hundreds of
cases involving recreational use immunity, almost none of them occur
within structures. For those that do, the user was actually engaged in
the recreational purpose while inside the structure.
Further, the fact that the legislature has not adopted expansive
language in its recreational purpose section provides us with a strong
reason for caution. The legislature clearly has not empowered this court
40
to expand or update the list of recreational purposes. The legislature has
declined to follow the “includes, but is not limited to” language of the
1965 model act and the even more expansive language of the 1979
proposed model act. While such an action might be supported by policy
reasons, any such action must be taken by the legislature, not by us.
As a result, we conclude that the best interpretation of Iowa’s
recreational use statute is that the closed universe of activities
specifically listed in section 461C.2(5) must be interpreted in a fashion
consistent with promoting true outdoor activity. With this concept in
mind, we now turn to the specific language of the Iowa statute to
determine whether the activity in this case falls within the scope of its
immunity provision.
C. Determination of Whether Sallee’s Activities Constitute a
Recreational Use. As noted above, the legislature has given us a closed
definition of “recreational purpose.” We thus do not add, or subtract,
from the legislative definition. See Gough v. County of Duchess, 638
N.Y.S.2d 290, 291–92 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (refusing to interpret “hiking” in
the New York recreational use statute to include an infant’s 500 to 600-
foot walk through a field); see also Brooks v. Northwood Little League,
Inc., 489 S.E.2d 647, 651 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that South
Carolina’s statute, by its express terms, “invites judicial expansion where
the plain meaning of the statute would not be distorted”). We do not
engage in innovations or improvements of the statute. Rather, we
interpret it as we find it. See State v. Spencer, 737 N.W.2d 124, 129–30
(Iowa 2007). The district court determined Sallee’s claims were barred by
the recreational use statute because she chaperoned children who
engaged in horseback riding and nature study. We disagree.
41
1. Horseback riding. Like many recreational use statutes, Iowa’s
definition of “recreational purpose” includes “horseback riding.” Iowa
Code § 461C.2(5). However, the mere fact that some of the field trip’s
activities might qualify as recreational uses does not mean that summary
judgment was properly granted to the defendant in this case. The issue
is not whether horseback riding may qualify as a recreational use. The
issue is more nuanced. Here, Sallee’s injury did not occur while she was
riding a horse. To be sure, while there was some deposition testimony
that Sallee “helped with the horse,” there is nothing in the record
clarifying what that help entailed or indicating that Sallee rode a horse.
Even assuming Sallee did ride a horse, however, her injury occurred in a
barn that had no obvious relationship to the horseback riding. There
was no claim, for instance, that Sallee’s presence in the barn was
somehow incident to horseback riding. We agree with the courts that
have concluded the relevant inquiry is what the plaintiff was doing at the
time the plaintiff was injured. See, e.g., City of Bellmead v. Torres, 89
S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. 2002); see also Smith v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 986
P.2d 247, 252 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (noting the inquiry is whether the
plaintiff was engaged in the type of activity contemplated by the statute
at the time of the injury). At a minimum, there is an issue of material
fact as to whether the presence of the plaintiff in the barn’s hayloft where
she was injured was not a necessary incident of horseback riding. In any
event, the district court erred to the extent it granted summary judgment
on the basis that Sallee was engaged in horseback riding.
2. Nature study. Like horseback riding, nature study is also
included in the laundry list of recreational purposes under the
recreational use statute. Iowa Code § 461C.2(5). The Nebraska Supreme
Court held that looking at livestock at a county fair did not amount to
42
nature study under Nebraska’s recreational use statute. Dykes, 617
N.W.2d at 823. The court observed that “nature” is defined as “ ‘[a] wild
condition, untouched by civilization’ ” or “ ‘[t]he elements of the universe,
such as mountains, plants, planets, and stars.’ ” Id. at 823 (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 1050 (7th ed. 1999)). Consistent with the history
of recreational use statutes outlined above, the term “nature study” may
well include outdoor activities such as bird watching, butterfly
observation, and the study of pond flora and fauna, but it is difficult to
characterize frolicking in a hayloft as part of a guided tour of an
improved barn on a dairy farm as nature study within the meaning of the
statute. Accordingly, the district court erred to the extent it held that
Sallee was engaged in nature study at the time of her injury.
3. Other summer sports. A number of recreational use statutes
identify “sports,” “summer sports,” or “other summer sports” as defining
terms of “recreational purpose.” Indeed, the 1965 model act included
“winter sports” as one such defining term. Though the Stewarts did not
so argue on appeal, there have been suggestions that “other summer . . .
sports,” as used in section 461C.2(5) includes frolicking in a hayloft. In
any event, there are compelling reasons as to why frolicking in a hayloft
is not within the ambit of other summer sports.
Though commonly a defining term of “recreational purpose,” many
states do not provide an independent definition of what constitutes these
sports. Alaska, however, is one state that does. Alaska’s recreational
use statute includes the phrase “sports or recreational activity” in
defining its scope. Alaska Stat. 09.65.202(f)(5) (2012). The statute
defines “sports or recreational activity” as:
a commonly understood sporting activity, whether
undertaken with or without permission, including baseball,
softball, football, soccer, basketball, hockey, bungee
43
jumping, parasailing, bicycling, hiking, swimming,
skateboarding, horseback riding and other equine activity,
dude ranching, mountain climbing, river floating, whitewater
rafting, canoeing, kayaking, hunting, fishing, backcountry
trips, mushing, backcountry or helicopter-assisted skiing,
alpine skiing, Nordic skiing, snowboarding, telemarking,
snow sliding, snowmobiling, off-road and all-terrain vehicle
use.
Id. § 09.65.290(e)(3)(A).
The Supreme Court of Montana was called upon to determine
whether a football-type game called “500” was considered to be a
recreational purpose under the Montana use statute. See Kapphan v.
Vincent, No. DA 09–0182, 2009 WL 3764109, at *2 (Mont. Nov. 10,
2009). Because the Montana statute contains a nonexhaustive list of
activities defining “recreational purpose” and because one of those
defining terms is “winter sports,” the court concluded the game was a
recreational purpose. Id. In addition to noting that outdoor hockey
played on a frozen pond was a winter sport within the ambit of the
statute, the court noted that “ ‘recreational purpose,’ as commonly
understood and used in common parlance, would clearly include games
such as soccer, Frisbee, basketball, football, ‘500,’ or a variety of other
pursuits.” Id. Similarly, a South Carolina court determined T-ball was a
“summer sport” within the meaning of the South Carolina statute. See
Brooks, 489 S.E.2d at 651.
A Wisconsin appellate court concluded that playing catch with a
football in a city park was “an outdoor sport or game” under its
recreational use statute. See Taylor v. City of Appleton, 433 N.W.2d 293,
294 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). That court specifically noted that the
Wisconsin legislature “directed a liberal interpretation of the statute,”
which states that “recreational activity” means “any outdoor activity
undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure.” Id.
44
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Wisconsin statute
then lists a number of activities, but includes in that list “any other
outdoor sport, game, or educational activity.” Id. (emphasis added)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in addition to
interpreting the legislative history to require a liberal construction of the
statute, the statute itself also included catchall language.
In a related situation, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that
persons enjoying the Atlanta Olympic Park at the 1996 Summer
Olympics were engaged in a recreational purpose because the park was
“created to celebrate the spirit of an historic athletic and cultural event
and to provide a gathering place for visitors to relax and enjoy
themselves.” Anderson, 537 S.E.2d at 348. However, the Georgia
statute broadly defines “recreational purposes” using the “includes, but
is not limited to” language of the 1965 model act. Id. at 347; see also Ga.
Code Ann. § 51–3–21(4). Thus, the court was able to broadly define
“recreational activity” as “any amusement, play or other form of
relaxation which refreshes the mind or body.” Anderson, 537 S.E.2d at
348. Further, the court seemed focused only on whether the property
was recreational in nature and not whether the user was engaged in a
recreational purpose while on the property. See id.
The common thread in these cases and definitions is that “sport,”
as it is contemplated by recreational use statutes, is narrower than a
definition meaning merely “a source of diversion” or “physical activity
engaged in for pleasure.” See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
1134 (10th ed. 2002). Even so, there are further reasons why it is not
possible to give the definition of “other summer sports” an expansive
reading outside the context of the other activities mentioned in the
statute.
45
First, when a phrase like “other summer sports” is added to a
laundry list of terms all of which relate to outdoor activity, we interpret
“other summer sports” to be similar in character to the other activities,
all of which relate to outdoor recreation. See Drake ex rel. Drake, 649
N.E.2d at 1030 (decorating an abandoned grain elevator and
participating in a haunted house performance was not within statute
because those activities are inconsistent with general class of behavior
typified by hunting, fishing, swimming, trapping, camping, hiking, and
sightseeing). The fancy term for this is ejusdem generis.
Second, if the term “other summer sports” simply meant
pleasurable activity or a source of diversion, then the existing laundry list
of activities in the statute would become meaningless. They would be
swallowed up by the new expansive phrase. Further, the amendments
subsequent to the 1971 addition of the phrase “other summer sports”
would be entirely superfluous. See Quesenberry, 317 N.W.2d at 472
(noting that the addition of “snowmobiling, wood cutting and observation
tower climbing” to the Wisconsin statute would have been superfluous if
these activities would have otherwise already been covered under a broad
interpretation of “recreational uses or purposes” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). We cannot convert the phrase “other summer sports”
into a statutory PAC-MAN that goes backward to gobble up preexisting
statutory limitations and then goes forward to consume subsequent
legislative language.
Third, an expansive reading of the term is inconsistent with the
statutory history. As noted above, the Iowa legislature, unlike the
majority of states, has refused to insert potentially expansive language in
the definition of “recreational purpose.” The legislature altered the
language of the 1965 model act and did not adopt the proposals in the
46
1979 proposed model act. Accordingly, Sallee did not engage in other
summer sports as contemplated by the statute.
4. Summary. As a result of the above analysis, the activities
which occurred in the hayloft do not constitute recreational uses under
the Iowa statute. Further, Sallee’s injuries cannot be characterized as
resulting from horseback riding, nature study, other summer sports, or
any other specifically enumerated recreational purpose. As a result, the
district court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants
based on the limited immunity provided in Iowa’s recreational use
statute.
VIII. Willful or Malicious Conduct.
Section 461C.6(1) provides that any immunity under the
recreational use statute does not extend to “willful or malicious failure to
guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.”
Iowa Code § 461C.6(1). Sallee claims the record in this case raises a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether this exception applies.
Because Sallee does not claim the Stewarts acted maliciously, the only
question is whether there is a triable issue on whether the Stewarts
acted willfully.
We considered the question of what amounted to willful failure to
guard against a dangerous condition under the recreational use statute
in a per curiam decision in Bird v. Economy Brick Homes, Inc., 498
N.W.2d 408 (Iowa 1993). In that case, the defendant erected a steel
cable across an access road to prevent vehicles from entering the
property. Bird, 498 N.W.2d at 408. While we recognized a split in
authority on the issue, we held that the placement of the steel cable,
without more, did not amount to a willful failure to guard against a
dangerous condition. Id. at 410. Because it was a per curiam decision,
47
we did not engage in extensive analysis of the meaning of “willful” and we
did not adopt a specific standard for determining precisely what kind of
conduct amounted to willful under the recreational use statute.
In any event, Bird is a dangerous condition case. There is no
suggestion in Bird that the defendant was present when the plaintiff
drove his motorcycle down the access road and failed to warn of the
cable across the road. The case might well have had a different outcome
if the defendant had an opportunity to warn Bird of the dangers posed by
a cable across the road, but failed to do so.
We now turn to other authorities. One leading authority states
that willful conduct may be found under a recreational use statute only
where “a known or obvious risk so great as to make it highly probable
that harm will result.” 3 Louis A. Lehr, Jr., Premises Liability 3d, § 54.41
(2012). In Mandel v. United States, the Eighth Circuit indicated that
willfulness requires knowledge or an appreciation that “danger is likely to
result.” 719 F.2d 963, 967–68 (8th Cir. 1983). In construing the related
phrase “willful and wanton,” we have stated that the actor must show
“ ‘disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it
highly probable that harm would follow.’ ” Brokaw v. Winfield–Mt. Union
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 386, 396 (Iowa 2010) (quoting McClure v.
Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2000)).
We conclude that the plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence
to allow a reasonable fact finder to find that defendants acted willfully.
The defendants knew that Sallee was a very large woman. There is
insufficient evidence in the record, however, to support a finding that
Sallee would likely sit or stand on the hay bales covering the hole in the
loft or that it was highly probable that the hay bales would almost
assuredly collapse as a consequence, thereby causing serious injury.
48
IX. Conclusion.
We hold the limited immunity provided by the recreational use
statute does not apply in this case. We further conclude, however, that
the plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of willful or malicious conduct.
As a result, the decision of the district court is reversed and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who concurs specially and
Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., who dissent.
49
#11–0892, Sallee v. Stewart
WIGGINS, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the majority opinion. I write separately, however,
because, under the facts of this case, I would find the plaintiffs were
entitled to a trial in the event the immunity provided by the recreational
use statute applied to the activity of children playing in a barn’s hayloft.
For the reasons expressed below, I believe the Sallees’ claim of negligent
supervision is outside the scope of the statute’s immunity and thus, is
an independent basis for seeking recovery from the Stewarts.
I. Relationship Between Negligent Supervision and Premises
Liability Claims.
We have one case that considers the relationship between
negligence claims and the immunity accorded in Iowa’s recreational use
statute. In Scott v. Wright, the plaintiff was injured when she fell off and
then was pinned under a hay wagon during a hayride on the defendants’
property. 486 N.W.2d 40, 41 (Iowa 1992). The plaintiff sought to recover
on a theory of vicarious liability for the driver’s negligent operation of the
tractor. Scott, 486 N.W.2d at 42. After a verdict for the plaintiff, the
defendants appealed, claiming the recreational use statute immunized
the defendants from suit and accordingly, barred the plaintiff’s recovery.
Id. at 41–42.
There, we declined to disturb the jury verdict. Id. at 42. A review
of the statute’s legislative history revealed that nothing in the language of
the recreational use statute “suggests a legislative intent to immunize all
negligent acts of landowners, their agents, or employees.” Id. We
emphasized the statute was enacted to serve “ ‘a growing need for
additional recreation areas for use by our citizenry.’ ” Id. (quoting H.F.
151 62d G.A., Reg. Sess., explanation (Iowa 1967)). Accordingly, our
50
holding was also based upon the following practicality: “The public’s
incentive to enter and enjoy private agricultural land would be greatly
diminished if users were subject, without recourse, to human error as
well as natural hazards.” Id.
In focusing the scope of the statute so narrowly, we emphasized
that the language of the recreational use statute “is couched in terms of
premises liability.” Id. (emphasis added). In short, the test announced in
Scott is whether the claim is based upon “human error” or “natural
hazards.” Id. If the claim involves natural hazards, the immunity in the
recreational use statute applies and bars the plaintiff’s claim, which
subsequently extinguishes any premises liability claims. However, if the
claim arises from human error, the recreational use statute provides no
immunity.
In addition to Scott, we have had at least one other occasion to
consider the interplay between claims involving negligent supervision
and claims for premises liability. In Sweeney v. City of Bettendorf, we
considered whether the City was liable for negligently supervising a child
who was injured by a flying bat at a city-sponsored trip to a baseball
game. 762 N.W.2d 873, 875–76 (Iowa 2009). We recognized that under
the applicable precedent, the plaintiffs had no premises liability claim
against the baseball stadium’s owner or operator. Sweeney, 762 N.W.2d
at 882–83. However, the plaintiffs still had a negligence claim against
the City. Id. at 883. To reach this conclusion, we stated that “a
negligent supervision case is fundamentally different than a case
involving premises liability.” Id. at 882. We emphasized the claim
against the City “does not relate to the instrumentality of the injury, but
instead focuses on the proper care and supervision of children in an
admittedly risky environment.” Id.
51
In Sweeney, we approvingly cited the case, Cook v. Smith, 33
S.W.3d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). See Sweeney, 762 N.W.2d at 883. In
Cook, the plaintiff was invited to the defendants’ farm for a party. 33
S.W.3d at 551. While there, the plaintiff rode an ATV and was
subsequently injured. Id. The plaintiff brought a two-count action
against the defendant landowners, alleging premises liability and
negligent supervision. Id. The court dismissed the premises liability
claim, but allowed the negligence claim to go forward, thereby
demonstrating the different theoretical bases for premises liability and
negligence. Id. at 552–55.
II. Viability of Plaintiffs’ Negligence Claim.
The question then is whether the defendants were entitled, as a
matter of law, to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ negligence claim
under the facts presented in this case.
In order to support a claim of negligence, there must be some kind
of duty owed to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Doe v. Cent. Iowa Health Sys., 766
N.W.2d 787, 792 (Iowa 2009) (recognizing a duty may arise pursuant to a
statutory enactment). The court of appeals found the Stewarts owed a
duty to Sallee, based upon the Stewarts’ affirmative action of providing a
guided barn tour.
The analytical approach used by the court of appeals in reaching
this conclusion is sound because the Stewarts wear two hats in this
case. One hat is that of landowners. The other hat is that of tour
guides. Although the Stewarts have immunity as landowners under the
recreational use statute if the activity resulting in Sallee’s injury had a
recreational purpose, the statute has no impact whatsoever on the
distinctly different question of whether the Stewarts owed a duty of care
when they guided the barn tour.
52
This is true because the immunity provided by Iowa Code section
461C.3 is limited to premises liability claims. The immunity provision
specifies that “an owner of land” has no duty “to keep the premises safe”
or warn of dangerous conditions, uses, structures, or activities “on such
premises.” Iowa Code § 461C.3 (2009). Surely we all recognize this as
classic premises liability language.
Here, however, the Sallees have a negligence claim that is
independent of premises liability. The Sallees have stated a cause of
action based upon the acts or omissions of the Stewarts as supervisors of
the barn tour. This claim differs from premises liability, which is passive
because a landowner who does nothing can be liable based on a failure
to act. Here, the Stewarts covered the hay drop and directed Sallee to
the hayloft.
The Sallees’ negligence claim is supported by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 324A (1965), which provides that one may be
liable for harm to another if he or she gratuitously undertakes “to render
services to another which he [or she] should recognize as necessary for
the protection of a third person . . . if his [or her] failure to exercise
reasonable care increases the risk of such harm.” To give the claim a
shorthand name, it is a negligent supervision claim. We have imposed
liability for such claims under the rule contained in section 324A. See,
e.g., Craven v. Oggero, 213 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Iowa 1973) (holding a
supervisor who assumes the obligation to provide a safe place for an
employee can be held liable under section 324A); Fabricius v. Montgomery
Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 1325–28, 121 N.W.2d 361, 364–66 (1963)
(imposing liability for negligent inspection gratuitously undertaken by an
insurance company).
53
The distinction I draw between premises liability and negligent
supervision claims is generally recognized in the case law. See Raburn v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 776 So. 2d 137, 139–41 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)
(noting that while an owner may not have an initial duty to prevent
injuries to business invitees as a result of criminal acts, liability may
result from negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking to
apprehend criminals); Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex.
1985) (recognizing a duty to keep a premises safe can subject a general
contractor to liability for negligence in cases “arising from a premises
defect” or “those arising from an activity or instrumentality”); see also
Sidwell v. Griggsville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 588 N.E.2d 1185, 1188–
89 (Ill. 1992) (deciding a case mirroring the facts here, where the court
found a limited immunity statute barred claims of negligent supervision
against teachers, but did not bar premises liability claims against the
school district).
Perhaps more importantly, the distinction between negligent
supervision and premises liability is widely recognized across the
jurisprudential landscape of recreational use statutes. For instance, in
LePoidevin v. Wilson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court distinguished a
premises liability claim, which was subject to an immunity defense
under Wisconsin’s recreational use statute, from a negligence claim
arising from the landowner’s son taunting the plaintiff into diving
headfirst into a three-foot-deep pond. 330 N.W.2d 555, 559–62 (Wis.
1983). Similarly, in Klein v. United States, the California Supreme Court
found that a recreational use statute did not extinguish claims arising
from the negligent acts of owners on the premises. 235 P.3d 44, 47–53
(Cal. 2010). In Dickinson v. Clark, the court noted that a recreational use
statute did not apply to a claim related to the landowner’s negligent
54
supervision of a minor operating a log splitter. 767 A.2d 303, 305–06
(Me. 2001). Finally, in Sena v. Town of Greenfield, the court found that a
city could be held liable for sledding injuries, where the city actually
supervised the activity, notwithstanding potential coverage by a
recreational use statute. 696 N.E.2d 996, 999–1000 (N.Y. 1998). Thus,
even though a recreational use statute may bar a plaintiff’s claim based
upon premises liability, the plaintiff may still have a viable claim against
the defendant under the theory of negligent supervision.
To determine whether a plaintiff has a viable claim of negligent
supervision, the court must look to the level of control the defendant
exercised over the plaintiff’s activity. In Cohen v. Heritage Motor Tours,
Inc., the court found a tour guide assumed a duty by instructing
participants to cross a stream in a particular manner. 618 N.Y.S.2d 387,
389 (App. Div. 1994). This voluntarily assumed duty, of course, was not
related to any potential premises liability claim that the plaintiff might
have asserted against the landowner. Similarly, in Gordon v. Muchnick,
the court found a jury question was raised as to whether the defendant
assumed an undertaking sufficient to give rise to a duty of care, where
the defendant guided the plaintiff across a street. 579 N.Y.S.2d 745, 745
(App. Div. 1992).
In short, the court of appeals got it right on this issue. The Sallees
have stated a claim based upon negligent supervision that is
independent of their cause of action for premises liability. As a result,
even if the immunity in the recreational use statute covered the activity
of playing in a hayloft and precluded recovery, the Stewarts’ affirmative
conduct raises another claim outside the scope of the statute and
presents a triable issue not subject to summary judgment.
55
#11–0892, Sallee v. Stewart
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).
Sometimes two acts of generosity collide and lead to an
unfortunate result. That is what happened in this case. Matthew and
Diana Stewart invited a kindergarten class to visit their dairy farm on a
field trip. Kimberly Sallee volunteered her time to serve as a chaperone
for the visit. While Sallee was accompanying the children during their
playtime in a hayloft, she fell through a chute that was covered by hay
bales and broke her wrist and ankle. Sallee sued the Stewarts for her
injuries. The Stewarts answered and asserted Iowa’s recreational use
immunity, Iowa Code §§ 461C.1–.8 (2009), which limits the liability of
landowners who allow others to use their premises without charge for
recreational purposes.
Sallee argued for several reasons that the immunity did not apply.
The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the
Stewarts. I would affirm the district court for the reasons set forth
herein.
While I believe the majority opinion displays the usual scholarship
characteristic of its author, it suffers from conceptual flaws. In
particular, it overemphasizes what other states have done and
underemphasizes what Iowa has done. As my colleagues acknowledge,
when we get to the critical provisions involved in this case, Iowa’s
recreational use law is largely sui generis. Therefore, I believe it is
important to focus on the evolution of our law. Iowa’s recreational use
statute, from the very outset, was designed to encourage farmers to offer
free recreational use of their lands and appurtenant buildings. It turns
this law upside down to hold that jumping in a hayloft during a
gratuitous field trip was not such a use.
56
I. Iowa’s Recreational Use Law.
As first enacted in 1967, Iowa’s statute was limited to private
agricultural lands and “buildings, structures and machinery or
equipment appurtenant thereto.” 1967 Iowa Acts ch. 149, § 2. Thus, the
original definition of “land” covered by the act read as follows:
“Land” means land used for agricultural purposes, including
marshlands, timber, grasslands and the privately owned
roads, water, water courses, private ways and buildings,
structures and machinery or equipment appurtenant
thereto.
Id. Accordingly, from the very beginning, our general assembly sought to
protect agricultural lands as well as “buildings, structures and
machinery or equipment” that were “appurtenant thereto,” such as a
barn. Id.
Meanwhile, the legislature’s original, unique-to-Iowa definition of
“recreational purpose” read as follows:
“Recreational purpose” means the following or any
combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating,
camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study,
water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying
historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites while going
to and from or actually engaged therein.
Id.
In 1971, the legislature added “horseback riding” to the list of
approved recreational purposes. 1971 Iowa Acts ch. 129, § 1. Later in
the same session, the legislature expanded the definition of “recreational
purpose” to include “motorcycling” and “snowmobiling,” while it
substituted the phrase “other summer and winter sports” for “winter
sports.” Id. ch. 130, § 1. Although we do not have helpful legislative
history for the second 1971 amendment, it seems logical to conclude that
the legislature wanted to obviate the need for future piecemeal
57
amendments by including some kind of a catchall—other summer and
winter sports.
In 1978, the legislature expanded the definition of “land” to include
“abandoned or inactive surface mines” and “caves,” in addition to “land
used for agricultural purposes.” 1978 Iowa Acts ch. 1066, § 1. In 1988,
the legislature added “trapping” to the list of covered “recreational
purposes.” 1988 Iowa Acts ch. 1216, § 46.
In 2006, the general assembly inserted the phrase “or urban deer
control” where it appears in the current version of the statute. See 2006
Iowa Acts ch. 1121, §§ 1, 4, 5. Simultaneously, the legislature greatly
expanded the previous definition of “land.” Id. § 2. Until then, as noted,
only certain categories of land had been covered, one of those categories
being agricultural land. The 2006 legislation inserted the phrase “private
land located in a municipality including,” essentially bringing all private
land within the scope of the statute. Id.10 A final amendment, in 2012,
added “all-terrain vehicle riding” within the definition of “recreational
purpose.” See 2012 Iowa Acts ch. 1100, § 58.
We have previously referred to chapter 461C as “a blanket
abrogation of duty to all recreational users (except as provided in section
[461C.6]).” Peterson v. Schwertley, 460 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Iowa 1990)
(finding that the statute barred a claim brought by a young man who had
trespassed on the defendant’s property to go swimming and was
paralyzed by a fall).
10Presumably, the legislature decided to broaden the definition of “land” in 2006
when it added “urban deer control” to the protected purposes because controlling the
urban deer population would require entry onto properties that did not fit the earlier,
narrower definition of “land.” The enrolled bill was entitled, “An act allowing private
landowners limited immunity from premises liability during urban deer control hunts.”
2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1121.
58
II. Does the Immunity Apply to the Stewarts’ Barn?
The first question to be answered is whether the Stewarts’ dairy
barn is the kind of property to which the recreational use immunity can
apply. I think the answer is clear from the statute. The statutory
immunity extends to “buildings” and “structures,” see Iowa Code
§ 461C.2(3), so long as they are “appurtenant” to a category of “land” that
is covered by the statute, see id. The statute nowhere requires an
outdoor use, and indeed the reference to buildings is inconsistent with
such a restriction.
It is true that courts in other jurisdictions have reached differing
conclusions as to the kinds of properties that are covered by their
respective recreational use laws. As one court has said, “[W]e observe a
widespread conflict among the jurisdictions as to exactly what type of
land is intended to be covered by the liability limitation.” Redinger v.
Clapper’s Tree Serv. Inc., 615 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). Thus,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that an indoor swimming pool
is not covered. Rivera v. Phila. Theological Seminary, 507 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa.
1986) (stating that the legislature intended to limit buildings, structures,
machinery, or equipment to “ancillary structures attached to open space
lands made available for recreation”). The Louisiana Supreme Court
concluded that an outdoor swimming pool was not covered. Keelen v.
State, 463 So. 2d 1287, 1290 (La. 1985) (stating that “when the
instrumentality . . . is of the type usually found in someone’s backyard,
then the statutes afford no protection”). On the other hand, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has found that the immunity
applies to an indoor gymnasium. Seich v. Town of Canton, 686 N.E.2d
981, 983 n.5 (Mass. 1997). And the Ninth Circuit has held that Hawaii’s
act covers urban swimming pools. See Palmer v. United States, 945 F.2d
591134, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 1991). But see Cassio v. Creighton Univ., 446
N.W.2d 704, 711 (Neb. 1989) (holding that Nebraska’s act does not apply
to independent indoor recreational facilities, including swimming pools).
Given this divergence of views, I think it is most helpful to look at what
we did here in Iowa.
When our general assembly enacted Iowa’s recreational use
immunity law in 1967, it modified the proposed model act’s definition of
“land.” The model act stated:
“Land” means land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways
and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment
when attached to the realty.
Council of State Governments, Public Recreation on Private Lands:
Limitations on Liability, 24 Suggested State Legislation 150, 151 (1965)
[hereinafter Council of State Governments]. However, our legislature
chose the following language:
“Land” means land used for agricultural purposes, including
marshlands, timber, grasslands and the privately owned
roads, water, water courses, private ways and buildings,
structures and machinery or equipment appurtenant
thereto.
1967 Iowa Acts ch. 149, § 2.
Thus, from the outset, our legislature made a decision that Iowa
would go its own way and have an immunity directed to agricultural
properties. The general assembly stated that the immunity would cover
agricultural land “and buildings, structures and machinery or equipment
appurtenant thereto.” Id. Hence, the legislature expressly included
buildings, so long as they were appurtenant. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “appurtenant” to mean “[a]nnexed to a more important thing.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 118 (9th ed. 2009). Therefore, a barn that is part
60
of a substantial farm operation like the Stewarts’ qualifies as an
appurtenant building.
My colleagues raise the concern that Iowa’s recreational use
immunity could possibly lead to strange results, such as coverage for a
backyard barbecue. But this concern, to the extent it exists, follows
largely from the legislature’s 2006 expansion of the definition of “land” as
part of its urban deer control amendment. This is not a reason to deny
the Stewarts’ immunity for activities in an agricultural building that
always has been covered by the statute.11
Alternatively, my colleagues suggest that because the Stewarts
only allowed a few, specified groups on their farm, it was not open to the
public and the recreational use immunity does not apply. This too is a
misreading of the statute, which contains no such qualification. Section
461C.3 provides there is no duty owed to “others” who enter or use the
property for recreational purposes. Section 461C.4 covers “any person”
who is invited or allowed to use the property for recreational purposes.
Significantly, we found that Iowa’s recreational use immunity applied in
Peterson even though the landowner had posted no trespassing signs
and thus the property was not open to the general public. 460 N.W.2d at
470–71. As we explained:
That statute [what is now section 461C.3] simply refers to
recreational use by “others.” We believe the word “others”
embraces all persons other than the landowner who makes
such use of the property.
11My colleagues assert that a building, to be covered, must be appurtenant to a
recreational use in the “true outdoors.” This is the majority’s gloss on the statute. It is
not what the legislature enacted. The legislature required that the building be
appurtenant to the land, not to the recreational use, let alone to an outdoor recreational
use. See Iowa Code § 461C.2(3). As noted by the court of appeals, “The Stewarts’ dairy
farm and appurtenant buildings qualify for limited liability by this definition.”
61
Id. at 471. Although my colleagues call into question the continued
vitality of Peterson, there is no justification for doing so. This precedent
is twenty-two years old, and the legislature in 2006 made a substantial
modification of the statute without disturbing it. In any event, the case
was correctly decided.
As the Missouri Supreme Court has said, in a case holding that a
farmer who allowed two turkey hunters onto his property free of charge
could assert the same immunity:
The use of the term “public” merely reflects the fact
that the statute is designed to encourage landowners with
property suitable for certain recreational activities to allow
members of the public to participate in those activities.
Nowhere does the [Missouri statutory recreational use
immunity] require that land be opened to the entire general
public, and this Court will not add language to a statute that
is clear and unambiguous.
State ex rel. Young v. Wood, 254 S.W.3d 871, 873 (Mo. 2008); see also
Howard v. United States, 181 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The
[Hawaii recreational use immunity statute] does not contain a
requirement that a landowner allow each and every individual of the
general public access and use of the land . . .”); Holden v. Schwer, 495
N.W.2d 269, 274 (Neb. 1993) (“[I]n order to facilitate the purpose of [the
Nebraska recreational use immunity statute] a landowner need allow
only some members of the public, on a casual basis, to enter and use his
land for recreational purposes to enjoy the protection of the act.”).12
I recognize that some other jurisdictions have ruled otherwise. See
Hall v. Henn, 802 N.E.2d 797, 799–800 (Ill. 2003) (holding that Illinois’s
12Because sections 461C.3 and 461C.4 of Iowa’s act are identical to the model
act—save for Iowa’s addition of “urban deer control” and substitution of “holder of land”
for “owner of land”—I believe that out-of-state cases are more relevant here. Compare
Iowa Code §§ 461C.3, .4, with Council of State Governments, 24 Suggested State
Legislation at 151.
62
recreational use immunity statute does not apply to “landowners who
restrict the use of their property to invited guests only”); Loyer v.
Buchholz, 526 N.E.2d 300, 302 (Ohio 1988) (holding that Ohio’s statute
“does not extend to private owners of residential swimming pools whose
social guest is injured while swimming, where the premises in question
are not held open for gratuitous recreational use by the general public”);
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1996)
(holding that “to qualify for immunity under [Utah’s statute], landowners
must make their land available to all members of the general public”).
But these courts have done so on the basis that this limitation is
necessary because those state statutes would otherwise provide
immunity for homeowners from negligence claims brought by social
guests who enter for recreational purposes. See Hall, 802 N.E.2d at 800
(stating that “defendant’s reading of the Act, while textually plausible,
renders an absurd and unjust result”); Loyer, 526 N.E.2d at 302; Perrine,
911 P.2d at 1293. I do not believe we are at liberty to rewrite the statute,
at least where the result in this case is not absurd or unjust. Farmers
who allow school groups, but not every member of the general public, to
enjoy their property for recreational purposes, are still entitled to the
benefit of the statute if the other requirements of the immunity have
been met.
III. Was Sallee Engaged in a Recreational Purpose?
My colleagues conclude that the immunity should not apply
because the excursion to the hayloft was not a recreational purpose. I
disagree.
The Stewarts contended that the Sacred Heart kindergarten field
trip potentially involved three activities specifically identified in Iowa’s
statute: “horseback riding, . . . nature study, . . . other summer and
63
winter sports.” Iowa Code § 461C.2(5). I believe the third category is
dispositive of this case. As noted, this part of Iowa’s statute is
distinctive. To my knowledge, no other state’s definition of “recreational
purpose” uses the same “other summer and winter sports” terminology.
Therefore, out-of-state cases are of limited value.
The term “sport” has a number of definitions. For example,
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines sport as “a source of
diversion: RECREATION,” and “physical activity engaged in for pleasure,”
among other things. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1134
(10th ed. 2002).
In City of Marion v. Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance, we held
that the department could tax municipal swimming pool admission fees
on the theory that these were “fees paid to cities and counties for the
privilege of participating in any athletic sports.” 643 N.W.2d 205, 206–
08 (Iowa 2002). There, we upheld the department’s interpretation of
“athletic sports” as including recreational swimming. City of Marion, 643
N.W.2d at 207. The agency had specifically defined a “sport” as “any
activity or experience which involves some movement of the human body
and gives enjoyment or recreation.” Id.
On the other hand, a federal district court recently observed that
“it is not clear that snorkeling falls within the plain meaning of ‘sports,’ ”
relying on other dictionary definitions that require a “sport” to be
governed by “form,” “rules,” or “customs.” Hawaiian Isle Adventures, Inc.
v. N. Am. Capacity Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1197–98 (D. Haw.
2009).
As I have noted, the “other summer and winter sports” language
was part of a 1971 amendment where the legislature also added
“motorcycling” and “snowmobiling” to the list of covered activities. 1971
64
Iowa Acts ch. 130, § 1. I think that by doing so, the legislature opted for
a broader definition of “sports”—similar to the one we upheld in City of
Marion—rather than a definition limited to contests governed by forms,
rules, or customs. By using the word “other,” the legislature implied that
items previously listed in the definition, and particularly motorcycling
and snowmobiling which were being added, were also sports. See, e.g.,
State v. Ashland, 259 Iowa 728, 730, 145 N.W.2d 910, 911 (1966)
(stating that “[t]he naming of pistols and revolvers followed by the words
‘other dangerous weapon’ clearly designates the listed items as
dangerous weapons by statute”). Those activities would be considered
sports only under a broad definition that equated a sport with a form of
play or diversion. Snowmobiling is a sport in the sense that it is a form
of physical activity engaged in for pleasure, not in the sense that it is a
contest governed by forms, rules, or customs, like baseball or ice hockey.
This interpretation would not have led to awkward results at the
time, because in 1971 only agricultural lands and appurtenant
buildings, structures, machinery, and equipment were covered. In short,
I conclude the legislature intended in 1971 to introduce some flexibility
into the definition of “recreational purpose” that other states (which used
the model act language) already had. In short, while our general
assembly had elected not to use the model act’s broader phrasing—
“includes, but is not limited to”—in 1967, it nonetheless opened up the
definition of “recreational purpose” in 1971 by making clear that other
summer and winter sports would be covered.13
13The majority contends that construing “other summer and winter sports” as
some kind of a catchall is inconsistent with the fact that the legislature later added
trapping and all-terrain vehicle riding to the list of covered activities in section
461C.2(5). But the majority’s own construction of “other summer and winter sports” as
meaning “true outdoor sports” is subject to the same criticism. I think we should
acknowledge the reality that groups often go to the legislature seeking a specific
65
Under a dictionary definition where “sport” means “a source of
diversion: RECREATION” and “physical activity engaged in for pleasure,”
jumping in a hayloft clearly qualifies as a sport. See Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 1134 (10th ed. 2002). It is true that the activities
specifically identified in section 461C.2(5) are normally outdoor activities,
but the legislature did not say that sports would only be covered when
played outdoors. Frolicking in hay can be and frequently is an outdoor
sport. The definition of “land” covers buildings that are appurtenant to
covered land, and the inclusion of buildings would not have made sense
if the legislature did not mean some indoor activities to be covered by the
statute.14
Alternatively, my colleagues suggest that even if the children were
embarked on a recreational purpose on May 18, 2010, Sallee was not. In
other words, chaperoning a recreational activity is not itself a
recreational purpose. However, it is sufficient in my view that Sallee was
present to help with the class’s recreational activity. For example, the
Hawaii Supreme Court has found that the recreational use immunity
applied to the claim of a paid scuba instructor who was injured while
leading clients across hotel property after a dive. Thompson v. Kyo-Ya
Co., 146 P.3d 1049, 1057–58 (Haw. 2006). As the court put it, “[W]here
the plaintiff’s presence on the land is closely associated with the
presence of individuals whose purpose on the land is purely recreational,
____________________________
statutory immunity even when a more general immunity already protects them. The
important point here is that the majority’s construction of “sports” is consistent with
neither of the two common definitions of that term.
14Recognizing the fact that the statute does cover buildings, my colleagues
concede that “under some circumstances activities within a building might give rise to
immunity under the statute.” Thus, they would presumably find that horseback riding
inside a covered enclosure on a farm would be subject to the recreational use immunity.
But why not jumping in a hayloft?
66
the recreational purpose attaches to the plaintiff.” Id. at 1058. Quoting
the trial court in that case, the court concluded that the plaintiff was
“engaged in ‘an activity in pursuit of the use of the property for
recreational purposes.’ ” Id.; see also Palmer, 945 F.2d at 1137–38
(rejecting a grandparent’s argument that he was not engaged in
“recreation” because he was supervising his grandchildren who were
swimming); Ornelas v. Randolph, 847 P.2d 560, 564 (Cal. 1993) (stating
that “whether plaintiff entered the property to play on the equipment, or
merely accompanied the other children at play, is immaterial”); Hafford v.
Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 687 A.2d 967, 968–69 (Me. 1996) (holding that
Maine’s recreational use statute applied to an outfitter who was injured
while supplying canoeing and camping enthusiasts); Fetherolf v. State,
454 N.E.2d 564, 565–66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (finding as a matter of law
that the plaintiff who was injured while walking toward the beach with
his three-year-old daughter was a recreational user, even though his
shoulder injury prevented him from doing anything other than sitting
and watching while his family swam). But see Rintelman v. Boys & Girls
Clubs of Greater Milwaukee, Inc., 707 N.W.2d 897, 904–06 (Wis. Ct. App.
2005) (finding that a chaperone was not engaged in a recreational activity
when she fell moving from one building to another at a weekend
retreat).15
Iowa’s statute applies when there is an “entry or use by others for
recreational purposes.” Iowa Code § 461C.3. It applies to “persons
entering for such purposes.” Id. Simply stated, this language does not
require that each person herself be enjoying the recreational activity so
15Here again, we are interpreting provisions (relevant portions of sections 461C.3
and 461C.4) that match the model act, so I believe out-of-state authorities are entitled
to more weight than they otherwise would be. Compare Iowa Code §§ 461C.3, .4, with
Council of State Governments, 24 Suggested State Legislation at 151.
67
long as her presence on the property is in furtherance of a recreational
purpose. It would be a strange result if a farmer could let six-year-olds
on his property for fun and enjoyment but had to shoo their adult
chaperones away to avoid legal liability.
IV. Does the Record Raise an Issue of a Willful or Malicious
Failure to Guard or Warn Against a Dangerous Condition?
Section 461C.6 removes any “willful or malicious failure to guard
or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity” from
the scope of the recreational use immunity. Sallee argues that she raised
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this exception applies,
even if the Stewarts would otherwise be entitled to a recreational use
immunity. The district court and the court of appeals disagreed, as do
the majority and I.
This court has addressed this statutory provision once before. See
Bird v. Economy Brick Homes, Inc., 498 N.W.2d 408, 409 (Iowa 1993). In
Bird, a motorcyclist struck a steel cable that had been placed across an
access road. Id. at 408. “At the time of the accident, there were no
markings on the cable to keep it from blending with its surroundings.”
Id. After discussing various other cases that had interpreted similar
language, we concluded that the mere placement of an unmarked cable
across an access road “did not create an issue of material fact as to
whether Economy acted willfully or maliciously.” Id. at 410.
The Stewarts had been allowing this kindergarten class to come for
the past twenty-five years. During that entire time, the chute had been
present in the hayloft. There is no evidence there had ever been an
accident in the hayloft. “It’s never been a concern,” Matthew Stewart
testified. The Stewarts insisted on being personally present for any visits
by any groups. Matthew Stewart explained both the reason why there
68
was a chute in the loft (to allow hay to be thrown down occasionally), and
the reason why the chute was covered (to keep the animals warmer).
This case does not fit within the circumstances where a willful or
malicious failure to warn or guard has been found. In Mandel v. United
States, cited by Sallee, the plaintiff was paralyzed from diving onto a
submerged rock. 719 F.2d 963, 964–65 (8th Cir. 1983). Although the
park rangers did not know of this specific rock, they knew of submerged
rocks in the vicinity, knew that people swam there, and had brochures
which warned people to be careful about diving; yet they failed to warn
the plaintiff or post signs and instead told the plaintiff “that is where
everybody goes and that is where we recommend for you to go.” Mandel,
719 F.2d at 967. “It could reasonably be inferred and found that such
conduct is the commission of an act with knowledge or appreciation that
danger is likely to result therefrom.” Id. at 968; see also 3 Louis A. Lehr,
Jr., Premises Liability 3d § 54:41 (2012) (“Wilful conduct as an exception
to statutory recreational use tort immunity consists of intentional acts of
an unreasonable character performed in disregard of a known or obvious
risk so great as to make it highly probable that harm will result.”).16
Additionally, the phrase “willful or malicious” as used in section
461C.6 ought be interpreted in tandem with the phrase “willful and
wanton,” as used in the punitive damage statute. See Iowa Code
§ 668A.1(1)(a). The latter standard means
“[t]he actor has intentionally done an act of unreasonable
character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was
so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a
conscious indifference to the consequences.”
16Here,Iowa’s exception for a “willful or malicious failure to guard or warn”
corresponds to that in the model act. Compare Iowa Code § 461C.6, with Council of
State Governments, 24 Suggested State Legislation at 151.
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Brokaw v. Winfield-Mt. Union Cmty. Sch. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 386, 396 (Iowa
2010) (quoting McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa
2000)). That threshold has not been met here.
V. Is There a “Tour Guide” Exception?
Finally, Sallee argues that by guiding the group around the farm,
including into the hayloft, the Stewarts performed a voluntary
undertaking within the meaning of Restatement (Second) of Torts section
323 that is not covered by the recreational use immunity.17 The district
court rejected this argument. In her opening brief on appeal, Sallee
renewed her section 323 argument. In her reply brief, she recast this
argument into one based on section 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
In that form, the court of appeals accepted it and on that basis reversed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Regardless of the
Restatement box into which this argument falls, I do not believe there is
a “tour guide” exception to the recreational use immunity in this case.18
17Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323 (1965) provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the
undertaking.
18The majority does not reach this issue. The special concurrence does, stating
that Sallee in effect brought a “negligent supervision” claim. This is simply wrong. A
negligent supervision claim arises when an employer negligently supervises an
employee, whose tortious or wrongful act then harms the plaintiff. See Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Iowa 2005) (noting that negligent supervision
includes as an element an underlying tort or wrongful act committed by the person who
was not properly supervised); Estate of Harris v. Papa John’s Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673,
680 (Iowa 2004) (listing the elements of negligent supervision). Sallee does not allege
that the Stewarts negligently supervised an employee whose tortious or wrongful act
harmed her. Regardless, the proper focus should be on the language of sections 461C.3
and 461C.4(1) and whether they bar Sallee’s claim, whatever nomenclature is used.
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In Scott v. Wright, we found that the recreational use immunity did
not bar a claim against the defendants based on the negligent driving of
a tractor on their property. 486 N.W.2d 40, 42–43 (Iowa 1992). In that
case, the plaintiff was seriously injured when she fell off a hay wagon
that was being pulled by a tractor owned by the defendants and operated
by their son-in-law. Scott, 486 N.W.2d at 41. In affirming a jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiff, we reasoned that
Scott’s suit against Wrights rests—not on duties addressed
by section 111C.3 [now section 461C.3]—but on vicarious
liability for alleged negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle. We are convinced, as was the district court, that
this intervening act of negligence takes the case outside the
purview of chapter 111C.
By its terms, section 111C.3 immunizes landowners
from only two specific duties of care toward persons using
agricultural property for recreational purposes: to keep the
premises safe and to warn of dangerous conditions. Nothing
in the language of chapter 111C suggests a legislative intent
to immunize all negligent acts of landowners, their agents, or
employees. Nor do we believe such broad application of the
statute would serve the public purpose envisioned by the
legislature. Though focused on reducing landowner liability,
the statute was also enacted to serve “a growing need for
additional recreation areas for use by our citizenry.”
Explanation to H.F. 151 at 3, 62nd G.A. (Iowa 1967). The
public’s incentive to enter and enjoy private agricultural land
would be greatly diminished if users were subject, without
recourse, to human error as well as natural hazards.
Because the language of chapter 111C is couched in
terms of premises liability, and the legislative history of the
statute evinces no other motive for its passage, we are
convinced the court correctly refused to apply it in this case.
Id. at 42.
Sallee contends that Scott stands for the proposition that she can
sue over any “affirmative act” of negligence by the landowner. She also
urges that Scott allows a party to sue when the claim is for “human
error” as opposed to “natural hazards.” See id. I do not read Scott so
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broadly.19 Scott emphasized that the claim was not for premises liability,
and therefore, it was not foreclosed by the statute. Id. Scott’s focus on
the statutory language was appropriate. The statute makes clear that
except as provided in section 461C.6, a landowner “owes no duty of care
to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational
purposes . . . or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use,
structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such
purposes.” Iowa Code § 461C.3 (emphasis added). This language does
not distinguish among duties derived from different sections of the
Restatement or distinguish between active and passive negligence. So
long as the plaintiff’s contention is that the landowner failed to keep the
premises safe for entry or use, or failed to warn of a dangerous condition
or structure, the action is barred if the other requirements of chapter
461C have been met and if section 461C.6 does not apply. Scott’s claim
went forward because she was asserting negligent driving, not a failure to
keep premises safe for entry or use or a failure to warn about a
dangerous condition or structure.
Sallee’s claim, however, has to do with the condition of the
premises. She alleges either that (1) the hayloft was not safe, (2) Stewart
should have warned her about it, or (3) Stewart should not have
encouraged the group to go there. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 16
(“This required the Stewarts to exercise reasonable care, either to take
precautions to fix dangers like the hole or not take them into dangerous
areas or to warn them of any dangers like the hole.”). The first two of
these claims fall squarely within section 461C.3. I believe the third does
as well. If a landowner “owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe
19Obviously, Bird involved a case of alleged human error—stretching a cable
across an access road and not warning about it. See 498 N.W.2d at 408.
72
for entry or use by others for recreational purposes,” see Iowa Code
§ 461C.3, it follows that the landowner does not breach a duty when he
leads a group into an area whose safety he has no duty to maintain.
This conclusion is reinforced by section 461C.4, which specifically
provides that a holder of land “who either directly or indirectly invites or
permits without charge any person to use such property for recreational
purposes or urban deer control does not thereby . . . [e]xtend any
assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose.” Iowa Code
§ 461C.4(1). The essence of Sallee’s third theory is that by allegedly
inviting her into the hayloft, Matthew Stewart implicitly assured her that
it was safe for her use.
In Klepper v. City of Milford, the plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to
rely on Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323 as an exception to the
recreational use immunity. 825 F.2d 1440, 1448–50 (10th Cir. 1987).20
That case involved a serviceman on weekend leave who was paralyzed
after diving head first from a moored boat into murky but shallow water.
Klepper, 825 F.2d at 1441–42. There was a sign warning against
swimming but whether it was actually in place or had been dislodged
was subject to dispute. Id. at 1442. Invoking section 323, the plaintiff
argued the defendants had assumed a duty when they “undertook to
erect a warning sign near the boat dock” and “undertook to make
quarterly inspections.” Id. at 1448–49. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that such an
“assumed duty” negated the statutory recreational use immunity,
explaining as follows:
20Once again, this is an area where Iowa has adopted the model act language.
Compare Iowa Code § 461C.3, with Council of State Governments, 24 Suggested State
Legislation at 151.
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We agree with the district court that there is no
compulsion under Kansas law to extend sections 323 and
324A of the Restatement to the RUS [statutory recreational
use immunity] context. The RUS itself is a statutory
modification of the common law of torts and provides for no
liability for simple negligence. Instead, it provides for
liability only where conduct is willful or malicious or where
consideration is given in return for use of the recreational
facilities. If the Kansas legislature had wanted to provide for
additional exceptions, such as liability for negligent
inspections, it could have so stated. To rule otherwise would
have the effect of defeating the purpose of the RUS. As the
United States points out, “If a negligent, gratuitous
inspection results in liability, the requirement in the RUS for
the higher standard for liability, i.e., willfulness or
maliciousness, has been eliminated.”
Id. at 1450. The Tenth Circuit’s reading of the statute is logical, and the
same logic should apply here. Our general assembly, like the Kansas
legislature, provided that (subject to certain exceptions) landowners
would have no duty “to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others
for recreational purposes,” or “to give any warning of a dangerous
condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons
entering for such purposes.” Iowa Code § 461C; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58–
3203 (2005). Whether the duty is “assumed” or “preexisting” does not
factor into the analysis so long as the claimed breach of duty is
precluded from being raised by the statute.
In Palmer, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
engaged in a similar analysis in overruling an argument based on the
undertaking theory articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts section
323. See 945 F.2d at 1137–38. The plaintiff, who slipped and fell while
descending a flight of stairs at a swimming pool, urged that the
defendant voluntarily undertook a duty of reasonable care “by hiring
lifeguards, washing down the steps, and generally maintaining the pool
area.” Id. at 1137. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument:
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Application of the HRUS [Hawaii recreational use immunity
statute] precludes other theories of liability based upon mere
negligence. Nothing in the language of the statute or its
legislative history indicates that Hawaii intended the HRUS
to apply only when the landowner fails to take any
precautionary measures to ensure the safety of recreational
users.
Id.; see also Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 464 N.W.2d 654, 657–660 (Wis.
1991) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that the negligence of lifeguards took
the case outside the recreational use immunity based on a theory of
“active negligence” or “gratuitous acts” and noting that if liability were
imposed based on such a theory, “these facilities may not be provided”).21
VI. Conclusion.
To sum up: Iowa’s recreational use law has always covered
agricultural lands and appurtenant buildings, such as a barn. Jumping
in hay is a sport in the same sense that other activities listed in section
461C.2(5) are sports, and in the same sense that the term was used in
City of Marion. See 643 N.W.2d at 206–08. Jumping in hay is also an
activity frequently engaged in outdoors. Although Sallee was not
21Sena v. Town of Greenfield is not on point because New York has a special rule
for supervised municipal parks. See 696 N.E.2d 996, 999 (N.Y. 1998).
Sallee also argues that she has a claim against the Stewarts under Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 310 (1965) (“Conscious Misrepresentation Involving Risk of
Physical Harm”). That section provides:
An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another
for physical harm which results from an act done by the other or a third
person in reliance upon the truth of the representation, if the actor
(a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is
likely to induce action by the other, or a third person, which involves an
unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other, and
(b) knows
(i) that the statement is false, or
(ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes.
I agree with the Stewarts that Sallee has not shown an affirmative misrepresentation.
Accordingly, I would not reach the question whether chapter 461C would bar such a
claim in any event.
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jumping in the hay herself, she was there as a chaperone to serve the
overall recreational purpose. Finally, this is a premises liability case
where the alleged duty sought to be imposed is foreclosed by sections
461C.3 and 461C.4(1).
Notwithstanding its extensive citations to historical materials, law
review articles, and other states’ laws, I think the majority opinion
misses the essential point: Our recreational use law protects farmers
who want to open up their farm properties so others can play there for
free. At least it did so until today.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the district
court in its entirety.
Waterman, J., joins this dissent.