Bishop v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction

McGIVERIN, Justice.

Lewis Bishop and Ronald Thompson petitioned for judicial review of the decision of the Iowa State Board of Public Instruction (BPI) authorizing the school board of the Valley Community School District (District) in its discretion to pay attorney’s fees incurred by the District superintendent, Richard Burmeister, in proceedings before the Iowa professional teaching practices commission. The district court ruled the school board had the power to make such a payment and remanded the case to the BPI for the making of a record and a decision on whether the exercise of the power under these circumstances constituted an abuse of discretion. Upon consideration of the issue raised on the appeal, we affirm and remand this case to the BPI.

On March 31, 1983, the Valley Education Association, the teacher’s “employee organization,” Iowa Code section 20.3(4), for the Valley Community School District, filed a complaint with the Iowa professional teaching practices commission charging superintendent Burmeister with unprofessional practices. Iowa Code § 272A.6 (1983); see 640 Iowa Admin.Code ch. 3, 4. The complaint emanated from the temporary suspension by Burmeister of five teachers of the school district, resulting from a drinking incident, with the apparent knowledge and implied approval of the school board.

The school board of the District approved payment of Burmeister’s attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the professional teaching practices commission proceeding. Payment of this bill for $6,374.10 was approved generally on February 13, 1984.

On March 6, Bishop and Thompson (hereafter Bishop) filed a joint affidavit of appeal with the state board of public instruction, challenging the school board’s payment of the legal expenses of Burmeister. Iowa Code § 290.1.

The school board by specific resolution on April 9 affirmed its approval of payment of Burmeister’s legal expenses. Minutes of this meeting as well as the February 13, 1984, meeting, and a December 13, 1982, meeting of the school board were submitted to the BPI. Iowa Code § 290.2.

A panel of the BPI conducted a hearing on the appeal. Iowa Code § 290.5. The panel in its decision found that the school board had the authority to pay the legal fees of its superintendent incurred in a proceeding against him before the professional teaching practices commission. See Iowa Code § 290.3. This decision was approved by the BPI on review of the record. Iowa Code §§ 290.5; 257.10(4). The decision also noted the exercise of this power by the school board was not an abuse of discretion.

Bishop petitioned for judicial review in district court of the BPI’s decision, asserting the decision was based on an error of law. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(e).

In ruling on the merits of the petition for judicial review, the court agreed with the BPI’s construction of Iowa Code section 279.37, to the effect that the school board of a local school district has the authority to pay the legal expenses of an administrator for the defense of the administrator before the professional teaching practices commission. The court, however, ruled there was no adequate record on which to review the BPI’s decision that the school board did not abuse its discretion in this exercise of power under section 279.37. The case was remanded to the BPI for the development of the record and a new determination on the issue of whether the school board abused its discretion in the present case. No appeal was taken from the remand ruling.

Petitioners appeal from a portion of the district court’s ruling on judicial review, Iowa Code section 17A.20, contending the court erred in its construction of Iowa Code section 279.37 that the school board had authority to pay Burmeister’s legal fees. The BPI, on cross-appeal, challenges a determination that Bishop and Thompson have standing to bring this proceeding. We assume, without deciding, that petitioners have standing, and therefore do not discuss the issue raised in the cross-appeal. Our consideration concentrates on the appeal.

As a preliminary matter, we determine the district court’s ruling is a final judgment for purposes of our review. Iowa Code § 17A.20; Iowa R.App.P. 1(a). In Continental Telephone Co. v. Colton, 348 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Iowa 1984), we stated, “The statute [Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)] contemplates that a final judgment may provide for remand to the agency for further proceedings.” The fact the district court remanded this case to the agency for development of the record and a new determination of the abuse of discretion issue will not bar our review.

I. Power of school board to pay administrator’s legal expenses. Bishop challenges the legality of the school board’s decision to pay the attorney’s fees incurred by Richard Burmeister, the District superintendent, in a proceeding before the Iowa professional teaching practices commission. Bishop argues the agency erred in its construction of Iowa Code section 279.37 (1983), which provides:

A school corporation may employ an attorney to represent the school corporation as necessary for the proper conduct of the legal affairs of the school corporation.

He claims the statute authorizes payment for legal expenses for the defense of the school corporation only, not its administrators. He also argues that doubtful claims of power, such as the one presented here, are to be resolved against the school board.

The BPI asserts rules of statutory construction and prior case law in support of its position that the school board has the authority to pay the attorney’s fees incurred by the district superintendent. The BPI urges this court to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers and to give consideration to the attorney general opinions on the subject. The BPI determined the phrase “as necessary” in section 279.37 created “a strong inference of broad discretion on the part of local boards of directors in making decisions to ‘employ an attorney.’ ”

The only powers of a school district are those expressly granted or necessarily implied in the district’s governing statutes. McFarland v. Board of Education of Norwalk Community School District, 277 N.W.2d 901, 906 (Iowa 1979); see Barnett v. Durant Community School District, 249 N.W.2d 626, 627 (Iowa 1977). The express language of Iowa Code section 279.37 allows payment of legal expenses of the school corporation, making no specific mention of school administrators.

In construing section 279.37, we look for guidance in the rules of statutory construction. Iowa Code § 4.6. According to those rules, we should consider the consequences of possible constructions. Iowa Code § 4.6(5). If we construe section 279.37 as Bishop argues, no school official would ever be entitled to payment of his legal fees even though they were incurred as a result of his carrying out his duties for the school district. This would effect a drastic change in our law.

Prior to 1981, section 279.37 provided as follows:

In all cases where actions may be instituted by or against any school officer to enforce any provision of law, the board may employ counsel, for which the school corporation shall be liable.

Iowa Code § 279.37 (1979). Under the language of that statute, we have allowed the payment of legal fees for school officials by a local school board to stand in various circumstances.

In Scott v. Independent District, 91 Iowa 156, 160, 59 N.W. 15, 16 (1894), we stated:

[Sjchool directors, in the proper performance of their duties, should be provided with counsel in case of suits brought by or against them, but it was not designed that such officers should have the benefit of this statutory provision when a suit was brought against them by reason of their own corrupt or illegal acts.

The legal fees incurred in the dissolution of a consolidated school district were the focus in Rural Independent School District v. Daly, 201 Iowa 286, 207 N.W. 124 (1926). The district attempted to recover from former school officials the amount expended as legal fees for a challenge to the officials’ decision to dissolve the district. Id. at 288-92, 207 N.W. at 125-26. We determined the officials were entitled to legal representation at the expense of the district; therefore, we did not require the former officials to repay the district.

In Cowles v. Independent School District, 204 Iowa 689, 216 N.W. 83 (1927), an attorney was hired by the president and a member of the school board to represent them concerning their actions in an employment dispute. We found the board had the authority to enforce its employment decision in its defense of a suit arising out of that action. Id. at 695-96, 216 N.W. at 85-86. We approved the retention of counsel at school district expense by the president and a school board member after reviewing the purpose of the underlying litigation against them.

A general rule which ties cases in this area of the law together is that legal representation should be provided by the school district to further a proper school purpose, irrespective of whether the school officials are named individually as defendants. See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1339, 1345-47 (1961); 68 Am.Jur.2d Schools §§ 17-19 (1973). It is only if the legal representation is for the benefit principally or solely of the individual school board members or school officials that counsel should not be paid by the district. 68 Am.Jur.2d Schools § 19. These principles evolve from the construction of the statute to imply those powers necessary as an incident to the school board’s express powers. Construction of the statute as Bishop suggests would work a drastic change in these well-settled principles.

The BPI has continued to imply the school board’s power to pay legal expenses of an administrator in BPI proceedings since the amendment of the statute. As a general rule, we give deference to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers. Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, 368 N.W.2d 74, 82 (Iowa), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 594, 88 L.Ed.2d 574 (1985); West Des Moines Education Association v. Public Employment Relations Board, 266 N.W.2d 118, 124-25 (Iowa 1978); Iowa Code § 4.6(6). Also, we stated in Kent v. Polk County Board of Supervisors, 391 N.W.2d 220, 223-24 (Iowa 1986):

Although generally we give the ordinary meaning to the words in a statute, we will not permit the literal meaning to prevail over or frustrate the legislative intent.... A workable and practical construction must be given to the language.

The BPI looked to the language of section 279.37 in issuing its final decision in the present case. The BPI determined the "as necessary” language of section 279.37 gave the Valley school board broad discretion to “employ an attorney” for Burmeis-ter’s defense.

Construing section 279.37 to allow the school board to pay the legal expenses of its superintendent for proper school purposes also is in line with the principle that we will give respectful consideration to the opinion of the Iowa attorney general on the construction of a statute. Unification Church v. Clay Central School District, 253 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 1977). The attorney general issued an opinion on employment of legal counsel by a school board on behalf of its administrators in 1980, the year Iowa Code section 279.37 was amended. 1980 Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 722. The opinion specifically stated “[a] school board has discretionary power to employ legal counsel to represent a superintendent or principal before the Professional Teaching Practices Commission” under the authority of Iowa Code section 279.37 (1979) and as amended by Senate File 426, Iowa Acts chapter 1084, 68 G.A. 352 (1980). The latter contains the language in section 279.37 that applies to the present case.

The attorney general determined it is within the discretion of the school board to employ counsel for an administrator when a complaint has been filed against him before the professional teaching practices commission. 1980 Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 722. This discretion may be exercised when the superintendent is carrying out his official duties. 1936 Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 373.

We adopt the conclusion of the attorney general on this issue. The result reached by the attorney general is in line with the agency’s interpretation of the statutory provision. The consequences of construing section 279.37 as recommended by the BPI and the attorney general are reasonable and natural. We are to avoid “placing upon statutory language a strained, impractical or absurd construction.” Doe v. Ray, 251 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Iowa 1977). That result could occur if the administrator, although carrying out school board desires, was left to defend all actions against him at his own expense.

Considering Iowa Code section 279.37 in light of these principles, we are persuaded that the legislature did not intend to preclude the employment of legal counsel for the benefit of school officials in its 1980 amendment. We believe the statutory language of section 279.37 necessarily implies the power of the school corporation to pay the attorney fees for a school official involved in a legal proceeding as a result of carrying out the policies and desires of the school corporation. A superintendent could not be expected to incur personal legal expenses in defending every challenge to his official actions by a disgruntled teacher or parent who may bring proceedings and name him individually as a defendant or respondent.

The superintendent is the alter ego and the executive director of the school board. A superintendent, to function for and on behalf of the school district, must be free from the threat that his actions might offend someone and make him suffer in the form of legal expenses of defending proceedings. It is well within the school district’s interests to incur those expenses itself.

In this case, Burmeister was impliedly carrying out the desires of the school corporation and its board in suspending the five teachers. It was for his official action on behalf of the school district that a complaint was filed against him with the professional teaching practices commission. The BPI interpreted section 279.37 to imply the power for the Valley school board to pay Burmeister’s legal expenses. There is no error of law which requires a change from the agency’s interpretation.

Therefore we affirm the district court’s ruling that is the subject of the appeal.

II. Disposition. In summary, we (a) affirm the district court’s ruling, upholding the agency’s determination that a school board has discretionary authority to pay the legal expenses of its superintendent arising out of a challenge to his official actions; and (b) remand the case to the agency for evidence, findings and conclusions as to the validity of the school board’s exercise of discretion in the present case.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

All Justices concur except WOLLE, J., who dissents.