Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. William S. Morris

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 13–0964
Filed April 25, 2014
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
WILLIAM S. MORRIS,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Review of a report filed by the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa recommending the suspension of an attorney’s
license. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Charles L. Harrington and Elizabeth E. Quinlan, Des Moines, for
complainant.
William S. Morris, Des Moines, pro se.
2
HECHT, Justice.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board charged
William Morris with violations of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct
after a series of audits revealed trust account irregularities. After a
hearing, a division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of
Iowa found Morris’s actions violated several ethical rules and
recommended a suspension of his license to practice law. Morris has
appealed from the commission’s recommendation. After reviewing the
record, we find Morris committed ethical violations warranting a
suspension.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
Morris was first licensed to practice law in 1983. He engaged in
private practice in Des Moines with his older brother who—like their
father—was also an attorney. Morris’s early career path took an
unfortunate detour in 1988 when his license to practice was suspended
for three months for failing to file his state income tax returns for 1983
and 1984 and falsely representing in his 1985 and 1986 attorney
questionnaires that those returns were filed. See Comm. on Prof’l Ethics
& Conduct v. Morris (Morris I), 427 N.W.2d 458, 460 (Iowa 1988).
Morris’s license to practice was again suspended in 1992 when this court
found he violated several disciplinary rules in representing a client facing
deportation. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Morris, 490 N.W.2d
806, 808–10 (Iowa 1992) (imposing suspension of six months for neglect,
handling matter beyond his competence, conduct involving dishonesty,
and violation of certain advertising rules).
Morris came to the attention of the Client Security Commission
upon its receipt of several overdraft notices from the bank where Morris
kept his client trust account. The trust account experienced one
3
overdraft per year in 2005 through 2008. Two more overdrafts were
noted in late 2009, and yet another occurred in April 2010. When
auditors representing the Client Security Commission arrived at Morris’s
office in early May 2010 to review the status of the account, they
discovered obvious bookkeeping and management deficiencies impeding
an efficient and comprehensive audit.
Morris told the auditors he had no employees and revealed he
personally performed all banking functions for the trust account. The
auditors discovered Morris kept no general ledger for the account and no
separate ledger evidencing for each client the source of all funds
deposited, the names of all persons for whom the funds were held, or the
record of charges and withdrawals pertaining to each client. Morris
produced for the auditors some trust account bank statements in their
original envelopes,1 a loose-leaf checkbook with a check stub register for
the account covering the period from January 2009 through May 3,
2010, a handwritten list of clients, and two pages of “trust account
sheets” generated by Morris for the auditors.
Morris, who was cordial and helpful in his interactions with the
auditors, produced no documentary evidence for the auditors tending to
show he kept running trust balances for individual clients or that he
regularly reconciled the trust account. The bank records he made
available to the auditors evidenced numerous deposits and
disbursements that could not be attributed to specific clients and
documented several account overdrafts for the years 2008 and 2009.
1Morris failed to produce bank statements for the auditors for the months of
August and December 2009. The absence of the December statement was attributed by
Morris to the recent relocation of his office and resulting postal forwarding issues.
4
The auditors also found a shortage of $11,617.68 in examining the
trust account. Part of this shortage was the result of activity related to a
personal injury settlement Morris achieved for his clients, members of
the Schwaller family. Morris told the auditors he had disbursed net
settlement proceeds to the clients, and had written a check to himself for
his attorney fee. A portion of the settlement proceeds was retained
briefly in the trust account for the purpose of satisfying a medical
subrogation claim, but dissipated before the claim was paid.2 The
auditors attributed the remainder of the trust account shortage to
negative balances for several clients, and to the missing sum of $5686.96
that had been deposited in the account for the benefit of Morris’s
mother’s trust.3 When the auditors performed the audit in May 2010,
the total balance in the account was only $85.83, well short of the
amount owed the Schwallers’ subrogee, the amounts required to satisfy
the claims of Morris’s other clients, and the funds necessary to cover the
deposit for the benefit of Morris’s mother’s trust.
Evidence reviewed by the auditors during the audit disclosed
Morris had provided false answers on his “Iowa Supreme Court Client
Security 2010 Combined Statement.” In particular, Morris had
2Morris promptly distributed net settlement proceeds to the Schwallers and
withdrew his attorney fee from the trust account, leaving $5278.74 in the account for
the purpose of satisfying a subrogation claim. The auditors discovered, however, that
the balance of funds in the trust account was, within a month after the settlement,
insufficient to cover the unsatisfied subrogation obligation. As a consequence of the
woefully incomplete records maintained by Morris, the auditors were unable to
determine what happened to the funds intended for the Schwallers’ subrogee. On more
than one occasion, Morris wrote checks on the trust account to dissatisfied clients
refunding advance fee payments after he had withdrawn fees from the account for
himself. With no record of a running trust account balance for individual clients, this
practice likely contributed to the creation of negative trust account balances for several
clients identified by the auditors.
3The record offers no explanation for the deposit of funds belonging to Morris’s
mother’s trust in Morris’s client trust account.
5
untruthfully represented in his online answers that he had performed
monthly reconciliations of the trust account and that he had experienced
no trust account overdrafts during 2009. Before leaving Morris’s office,
the auditors provided him with written guidelines detailing for Iowa
lawyers the proper management of client trust accounts.
On June 4, 2010, the assistant director for boards and
commissions with the Office of Professional Regulation sent a letter to
Morris summarizing the deficiencies noted by the auditors in their May
2010 review of Morris’s trust account records. The letter directed Morris
to deposit $11,617.68 in the account to alleviate the shortage no later
than June 18. The June 4 letter also requested Morris provide the Client
Security Commission with the April 2010 bank statement for the trust
account, an amended account ledger documenting the dates of deposits
and withdrawals, photocopies of checks written on the account, and a
copy of Morris’s file for the Schwaller matter. The letter further informed
Morris the auditors would contact him within thirty to forty-five days for
the purpose of arranging another visit by the auditors with the
expectation that the record-keeping deficiencies and account arrearage
would by then be remediated.
The auditors returned to Morris’s office on August 24. During this
visit, they requested documentation of fee billings to certain clients
accounting for withdrawals from the trust account. Morris told the
auditors he had been in practice for twenty-five years, but had never
heard of a requirement that lawyers must provide clients a
contemporaneous accounting when making trust account withdrawals
for payment of the lawyer’s attorney fees and expenses. Morris informed
the auditors he did not typically provide clients a contemporaneous
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accounting when making such withdrawals, because he instead generally
prepared a bill for clients only if they requested one.
During the August 24 visit, the auditors also inquired about the fee
paid to Morris for services rendered to the Reeves estate. The decedent
Reeves had died on March 25. Morris was engaged to perform legal
services for the estate. He received and deposited the sum of $3200 in
his client trust account on April 20, as an advance payment of the fee he
expected to earn for his services. Morris then withdrew $2200 from the
trust account by writing a check payable to himself the very next day.
He wrote two more checks to himself totaling $1000, fully depleting the
trust account balance for the Reeves estate by April 26. When the
auditors asked Morris to produce court orders approving payment of his
legal fee charged to and collected from the Reeves estate, Morris told the
auditors no court approval of the fee was required because the estate
was “private engagement work.” Morris was also unable to produce a
written accounting to the client detailing any services performed for the
fee charged to the Reeves estate. He admitted to the auditors the estate
had not yet been closed on August 24.
Although the auditors confirmed during the August 2010 visit that
funds had been deposited in the trust account to cover the shortage
identified during the May 2010 audit, Morris was unable to demonstrate
he had become compliant with the requirement of regular account
reconciliation. The auditors’ requests for production of deposit slips
pertaining to the trust account again went unheeded. Consistent with
their findings from the May audit, the auditors noted in August 2010
that Morris’s trust account records still lacked documentation evidencing
a continuous running balance for each client.
7
An auditor made another follow-up visit to Morris’s office on
December 13, 2011. After reviewing records produced by Morris, the
auditor reported “more of the same” trust account management and
maintenance deficiencies discovered in May and August of 2010:
Besides permitting individual client balances to become
negative, there are inadequacies in bookkeeping, including
not maintaining individual client ledger or sub-account
records; not maintaining a computed balance or check
register balance; not performing monthly bank account
reconciliations including the required lists of individual
client balances monthly which should tie out to reconciled
checkbook balance. Also no copies of deposit tickets are
maintained and numerous bank transactions are in
currency. No accountings to clients are available for our
review, and are apparently not prepared.
The Board filed a complaint against Morris alleging he violated
Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a) (lawyer shall not charge or
collect an unreasonable fee or violate any restrictions imposed by law),
32:1.5(c) (contingent fee agreement shall be in writing signed by client
and set forth method by which fee is to be determined), 32:1.15(c) (lawyer
shall deposit fees and expenses paid in advance into a client trust
account, to be withdrawn by lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses
incurred), 32:1.15(f) (client trust accounts must be maintained in
compliance with the requirements of chapter 45 of Iowa Court Rules),
and 32:8.4(c) (engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation).
Following a hearing, the grievance commission made no finding
whether Morris violated rule 32:1.5(a) when he collected a fee from the
Reeves estate in violation of restrictions imposed by Iowa law, or whether
he violated rule 32:1.5(c) by failing to memorialize the terms of
engagement in the Schwallers’ contingent fee case. Although the
commission also made no specific finding that Morris violated rule
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32:1.15(c) by withdrawing fees from the trust account only after they had
been earned, the commission did find Morris violated Iowa Court Rule
45.7(3), the corollary court rule. The commission also found Morris had
violated rule 32:1.15(f) in failing to keep records required by Iowa Court
Rule 45.2(3), in withdrawing fee and expense payments from the trust
account before the fee was earned or the expense was incurred, in
violation of Iowa Court Rule 45.7(3), and in withdrawing fees or expenses
from the trust account without giving contemporaneous notice and a
complete accounting to his clients. The commission further found,
however, that the Board failed to prove Morris had violated rule 32:8.4(c)
by engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The
commission rejected the Board’s contention that Morris’s
mismanagement of the account manifested “willful blindness,” finding
instead his serious violations of the applicable rules were a result of
sloppiness and oversight. The grievance commission recommended
Morris’s license to practice law be suspended for six months.
II. Scope of Review.
We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowe, 830 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Iowa
2013). An attorney’s ethical misconduct must be proved by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence. Id. “ ‘A convincing preponderance of the
evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Iowa 2012)). This
burden is greater than the burden in civil cases but less than the burden
in criminal matters. Id. We respectfully consider the commission’s
recommendations, but they are not binding upon us. Id.
9
III. Violations.
A. Rule 32:1.5(a). This rule provides in relevant part: “A lawyer
shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee
or an unreasonable amount for expenses, or violate any restrictions
imposed by law.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(a). Although we credit
Morris’s testimony that a court order was eventually entered approving
his attorney fee in the Reeves estate, the evidence establishes the entire
fee was withdrawn from the trust account long before the court order
approving the fee was entered. The fee was collected by Morris in
violation of clearly established temporal restrictions prescribed by a court
rule. See Iowa Ct. R. 7.2(4) (detailing when attorney fees may be
collected by attorneys handling probate matters). An attorney who takes
the entire fee in violation of rule 7.2(4) commits a violation of rule
32:1.5(a). Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kersenbrock, 821
N.W.2d 415, 420 (Iowa 2012). The district court’s order subsequently
approving Morris’s attorney fee did not excuse the impropriety of taking
the fee in violation of the court rule. Accordingly, we find the Board
proved Morris violated rule 32:1.5(a) by collecting his fee in the Reeves
estate before it was authorized under the applicable rule.4
B. Rule 32:1.5(c). Under this rule, contingent fee agreements
with clients must be in writing and signed by the client. Iowa R. Prof’l
Conduct 32:1.5(c). Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the
attorney must “provide the client with a written statement stating the
4Morris admitted during the hearing that he had similarly taken his attorney fee
for services rendered to the Glanz estate before the fee was approved by the court. This
estate, like the Reeves estate, remained open after Morris withdrew his entire fee from
the trust account. As in the Reeves estate, Morris was unable to produce for the
auditors a written accounting to the client detailing the services provided to the Glanz
estate or the fees charged for them.
10
outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance
to the client and the method of its determination.” Id. As we have noted,
the commission made no findings on this alleged violation. Although we
have some doubt about whether Morris had a written contingent fee
agreement with the Schwallers, or whether he provided them with a
written statement upon the conclusion of the matter showing the
remittance to the clients and the method of its determination, we find the
Board failed to prove a violation of this rule by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence.
C. Rule 32:1.15(c). This rule requires lawyers to deposit into a
client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in
advance, and allows withdrawal of these funds by lawyers only as the
fees are earned or the expenses are incurred. Id. r. 32:1.15(c). The
Board’s posthearing brief makes no argument contending Morris violated
this rule and we find the Board failed to prove a specific violation of it.
D. Rule 32:1.15(f). The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct
establish comprehensive rules governing the management and
maintenance of client trust accounts. See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
32:1.15. Rule 32:1.15(f) mandates that all client trust accounts “shall be
governed by chapter 45 of the Iowa Court Rules.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
32:1.15(f).
Iowa Court Rule 45.2(3) mandates that lawyers practicing in this
jurisdiction maintain and retain for a period of six years after
termination of the representation the following records:
(1) Receipt and disbursement journals containing a
record of deposits to and withdrawals from client trust
accounts, specifically identifying the date, source, and
description of each item deposited, as well as the date, payee
and purpose of each disbursement;
11
(2) Ledger records for all client trust accounts
showing, for each separate trust client or beneficiary, the
source of all funds deposited, the names of all persons for
whom the funds are or were held, the amount of such funds,
the descriptions and amounts of charges or withdrawals,
and the names of all persons or entities to whom such funds
were disbursed;
....
(4) Copies of accountings to clients or third persons
showing the disbursement of funds to them or on their
behalf;
(5) Copies of bills for legal fees and expenses rendered
to clients;
(6) Copies of records showing disbursements on
behalf of clients;
(7) The physical or electronic equivalents of all
checkbook registers, bank statement, records of deposit,
prenumbered canceled checks, and substitute checks
provided by a financial institution;
....
(9) Copies of monthly trial balances and monthly
reconciliations of the client trust accounts maintained by the
lawyer; and
(10) Copies of those portions of client files that are
reasonably related to client trust account transactions.
Iowa Ct. R. 45.2(3)(a). The record overwhelmingly documents Morris’s
failure to comply with these clearly prescribed record-keeping and
account-management requirements. His noncompliance persisted even
after the auditors supplied him with an informational roadmap in May
2010.
Iowa Court Rule 45.7(4) mandates that a lawyer accepting advance
fee or expense payments must notify the client in writing of the time,
amount, and purpose of any withdrawal of the fee or expense. The notice
and a complete accounting of the withdrawal must be transmitted to the
client no later than the date of withdrawal. Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(4). Morris
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acknowledged to the auditors his practice of ignoring this rule, admitting
he only provided his clients with an accounting if he was requested to do
so. Indeed, when confronted by the auditors with his noncompliance in
May 2010, Morris claimed he had never heard of the rule in his more
than twenty-five years of practice. We find ample evidence of Morris’s
violation of rule 45.7(4).
E. Rule 32:8.4(c). It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
“engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). To establish a
violation of this rule, “the Board must prove the attorney acted with some
level of scienter greater than negligence.” Kersenbrock, 821 N.W.2d at
421. As we have noted, the commission found Morris committed no
violation of this rule because his noncompliance with the rules
prescribing maintenance of trust account records and management of
clients’ funds held in trust was a function of sloppiness and oversight.
We respectfully disagree and find the Board proved by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence that Morris violated this rule. We find
Morris engaged in knowing dishonesty when he falsely answered the
“Iowa Supreme Court Client Security 2010 Combined Statement.” In
particular, he falsely represented that he regularly reconciled his client
trust account—something he persistently failed to do even after auditors
repeatedly reminded him he must. Morris was quite aware of the
wrongfulness and potential adverse consequences of making false
representations in answers to questions posed in annual professional
questionnaires, having been previously disciplined for such conduct. See
Morris I, 427 N.W.2d at 460.
13
IV. Discipline.
On review of the grievance commission’s report, we are free to
adopt, increase, or reduce the sanction recommended by the
commission. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Eich, 652
N.W.2d 216, 217 (Iowa 2002). “There is no standard sanction for a
particular type of misconduct, and though prior cases can be instructive,
we ultimately determine an appropriate sanction based on the particular
circumstances of each case.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Earley, 729 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Iowa 2007) (citing Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of
Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Plumb, 589 N.W.2d 746, 748–49 (Iowa 1999)).
When determining the appropriate sanction, we consider “ ‘the nature of
the alleged violations, the need for deterrence, protection of the public,
maintenance of the reputation of the [bar] as a whole, and the
respondent’s fitness to continue in the practice of law.’ ” Iowa Supreme
Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Freeman, 603 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Iowa
1999) (quoting Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Havercamp, 442
N.W.2d 67, 69 (Iowa 1989) (per curiam)). The court also considers both
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, if any, in setting the sanction.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sherman, 637 N.W.2d
183, 187 (Iowa 2001).
The range of discipline imposed for substantial failures to keep and
maintain records of trust account transactions ranges from a public
reprimand, see Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Herrera, 560 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Iowa 1997), to a suspension of several
months’ duration, see Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ricklefs,
___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2014) (imposing suspension of three months for
persistent violation of rules forbidding commingling of personal and trust
account funds and requiring record keeping and trust account
14
management, and dishonesty in reporting compliance); Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 830 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 2013)
(imposing suspension of three months following temporary suspension of
seven months’ duration for wholesale mismanagement of attorney trust
account); Kersenbrock, 821 N.W.2d at 421–22 (suspending license for
thirty days for failure to deposit advance fee payments in a trust account,
failing to keep required trust account records, taking a fee in a probate
matter before it was authorized under court rules, and falsely certifying
status of trust account procedures); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 438–40, 443 (Iowa 2012) (imposing
suspension of thirty days for pattern of billing and accounting
deficiencies in five cases, withdrawing fees before they were earned in
four cases, and neglect of one case); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 580, 586–87, 590 (Iowa 2011) (suspending
attorney’s license for sixty days for failing to timely refund unearned fees
to a client in several cases, withdrawing fees from a trust account in
several cases before they were earned and without contemporaneous
notice to clients). We conclude Morris’s violations of rules requiring trust
account management are properly placed at the long end of this range
because of several aggravating factors.
As in Ricklefs and Powell, Morris’s record-keeping and
management deficits were severe and they persisted over a long period of
time even after the Client Security Commission intervened with an audit
and provided information that should have facilitated compliance with
the applicable rules. Like the attorneys in Ricklefs and Powell, Morris is
a seasoned attorney who has practiced more than twenty-five years. We
consider Morris’s years of experience as an aggravating factor affecting
our determination of the appropriate sanction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd.
15
of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Gallner, 621 N.W.2d 183, 188 (Iowa 2001)
(considering lawyer’s long years of experience as a factor in choice of
sanction).
An additional aggravating factor affecting our determination that
the appropriate sanction in this case must be on the long end of the
range of sanctions noted above is the fact that—unlike any of the other
attorney–respondents in the cases cited above—Morris has been
suspended on three prior occasions.5 See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. McKittrick, 683 N.W.2d 554, 563 (Iowa 2004) (noting
history of prior discipline as an aggravating circumstance).
In determining the proper sanction in this case, we must also
consider that as a consequence of Morris’s violations of our rules
mandating trust account record keeping, clients’ funds and funds
intended for the satisfaction of a subrogation interest were
misappropriated. We have recently distinguished between attorneys’
misappropriations of trust funds leading to revocation and trust account
misappropriations resulting in a lesser sanction. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2014). In Thomas,
we noted we have not chosen revocation as a sanction when attorneys
have withdrawn from their client trust account fees they had not yet
earned, provided they intended to perform the work and therefore had a
colorable interest in the funds. Id. at ____. We have imposed the
sanction of revocation, however, when attorneys have misappropriated
5In addition to the two suspensions we have already noted, Morris was
suspended in 2011 for failure to file his annual continuing legal education fee and
report.
16
funds from their client trust accounts in excess of their anticipated fees
and used the funds on personal expenses. Id. at _____.
We conclude Morris’s misappropriations from his client trust
account are more closely aligned with the cases in which we have
imposed a less severe sanction than revocation. Our conclusion here is
based in part on the Board’s failure to prove Morris used trust funds to
pay personal or business expenses. Unlike the respondent in Thomas,
Morris did not admit he withdrew client funds from a trust account to
pay a cable television bill or other personal or office expenses. We
conclude, moreover, that Morris’s misconduct is comparable to that of
the respondent in Powell whose license to practice law was suspended as
a consequence of chronic mismanagement leading to trust account
record-keeping chaos and a very substantial trust account shortfall.
Thus we conclude, as we did in Powell, that revocation is not warranted
in this case.
Morris’s violations extend beyond mere failure to observe
rudimentary trust account record-keeping rules and mismanagement,
however, as he engaged in dishonesty in representing that he regularly
reconciled his trust account as required by a court rule. See Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 656, 663
(Iowa 2013) (considering attorney’s reckless disregard for the truth in
answering questionnaire in imposing a lengthy suspension).
“Dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation by a lawyer are abhorrent
concepts to the legal profession, and can give rise to the full spectrum of
sanctions, including revocation.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Hall, 728 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 2007).
Morris urges that we consider certain mitigating circumstances as
well. In particular, he practiced law with his brother whose severe health
17
problems and eventual death were a source of great personal concern for
Morris and a cause of disruption to and relocation of the law practice.
Other family issues affecting Morris’s judgment and concentration during
the relevant period included his mother’s severe health issues which
required his attention.
Upon our consideration of the nature of the violations of
disciplinary rules established by a clear preponderance of the evidence in
this record, the purposes of lawyer discipline, and the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances affecting the determination of the appropriate
sanction in this case, we agree with the commission’s recommendation
that a suspension of six months should be imposed in this case.
V. Conclusion.
We suspend Morris’s license to practice law in the State of Iowa
with no possibility of reinstatement for a period of six months from the
date of the filing of this opinion. This suspension shall apply to all facets
of the practice of law. Iowa Ct. R. 35.13(3).
Upon application for reinstatement, Morris shall have the burden
to show he has not practiced law during the period of suspension and
that he meets the requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.14. The costs of
this proceeding are assessed against Morris pursuant to Iowa Court Rule
35.27(1).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.