Harold Youngblut v. Leonard Youngblut

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 18–1416
Filed June 12, 2020
HAROLD YOUNGBLUT,
Appellee,
vs.
LEONARD YOUNGBLUT,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Andrea J. Dryer, Judge.
A beneficiary under a will appeals a judgment entered on a jury
verdict on a claim of tortious interference with inheritance. REVERSED
AND REMANDED.
Philip A. Burian and Robert S. Hatala of Simmons Perrine Moyer
Bergman, PLC, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
David J. Dutton and Nathan J. Schroeder of Dutton, Daniels, Hines,
Kalkhoff, Cook & Swanson, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellee.
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MANSFIELD, Justice.
I. Introduction.
This case presents the question whether a disappointed heir can
decline to pursue a will contest and instead bring a later, separate lawsuit
against one or more favored heirs for wrongfully inducing the testator to
execute that will. After careful review of the Iowa Probate Code, recent
authority, and underlying policy considerations, we conclude that such a
“probate bypass” should not be permitted. Accordingly, we hold that a
claim alleging that the decedent’s will resulted from tortious interference
by a beneficiary must be joined with a timely will contest; otherwise, it is
barred. For this reason, we reverse the judgment in favor of the plaintiff
in this case and remand for further proceedings.
II. Facts and Procedural Background.
As the caption might suggest, this case involves an intrafamily
dispute. The parties are two brothers, Harold and Leonard Youngblut.
Their parents, Earl and Agnes Youngblut, were successful farmers in
Black Hawk and Tama Counties for many years until they died a day apart
from each other in 2014.
During their lifetime, Earl and Agnes accumulated approximately
385 acres of farmland in Black Hawk County. These included the 155-
acre “Peters Farm,” and another farm comprising some 230 acres that
contained the acreage where they lived. Earl and Agnes also owned about
150 acres of farmland in Tama County. In addition to the 535 acres owned
outright, Earl and Agnes also rented other land for farming purposes;
altogether their annual farming operation typically covered 1500 to 1800
acres.
Earl and Agnes parented twelve children, three of whom
predeceased them. Plaintiff Harold and defendant Leonard were the only
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two surviving sons. From a young age, both Harold and Leonard were
involved in working the family farm.
In 1980, Earl and Agnes formed a corporation, Youngblut Farmland
Ltd. (YFL) and transferred most of their farm-related assets into it. These
included the Black Hawk County farmland and their farm equipment. Earl
and Agnes retained in their own names the Tama County farmland,
dubbed the “South Farm.”
Both Harold and Leonard continued to work on the Youngblut family
farm as adults. Harold participated continuously except for about seven
or eight years during the farm crisis of the 1980s when he moved out of
state and took on other work. Upon his return to Iowa in 1992 or 1993,
he resumed farming on the family farm.
Leonard worked on the family farm through the 1980s and most of
the 1990s. In 1998, he left over a dispute with Harold. Thereafter he
turned to other employment in Black Hawk and Tama Counties and did
not return to farming.
Beginning in the 1980s, as a form of estate planning, Earl and Agnes
regularly transferred shares in YFL to their children. By 2002, Harold was
actually managing YFL and the family farming operation; he became the
president of YFL in 2006. Earl and Agnes anticipated that Harold would
ultimately control YFL, while the other children would have their shares
redeemed in cash. Meanwhile, with Harold as president, YFL pledged
assets and loaned money to support Harold’s personal business ventures,
including land development and a Gold’s Gym.
In 2010, one of Earl and Agnes’s daughters died, and her YFL shares
were redeemed by the corporation. In 2011, Earl and Agnes executed new
mirror wills. In the 2011 wills they left their property to each other, but
upon the last of them to die, their YFL shares and the South Farm passed
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to Harold, while the rest and residue of the estate would be divided equally
among Leonard and the other children. By this time, Earl was
approaching ninety years old and totally retired from farming; Harold later
recalled that 2011 or 2012 was the last time Earl drove the combine at
harvest.
In March 2013, Leonard sent an email to his siblings that he labeled,
inaptly, as a “Family Togetherness Plan.” This email criticized the manner
in which YFL had been run, accused Earl of sexism, and attacked Harold
over his religion. Leonard proposed a new distribution of the family assets
among the siblings. Under it, Harold would receive the Peters Farm,
Leonard would receive the South Farm, and the daughters would receive
everything else. Leonard’s email also threatened litigation.
Later that year, arrangements were made to redeem the YFL shares
owned by the remaining seven daughters. Accordingly, two of the
daughters were cashed out for $250,000 each; the other five received
$50,000 down with the $200,000 balance to be paid in installments over
ten years. Following these redemptions, Earl owned 30.28% of YFL, Agnes
owned 30.28%, Harold owned 15.21%, Leonard owned 13.15%, and other
relatives owned the remaining 11.08%.
In January 2014, Earl and Agnes moved into an assisted living home
with the help of Harold and Harold’s family. A scene arose when Leonard
showed up on moving day; he threatened to have Harold arrested. On
February 5, Leonard sent an email to the siblings disparaging Harold and
threatening legal action. After Earl and Agnes moved into the assisted
living home, Earl suffered a stroke. Agnes, meanwhile, was enduring the
effects of terminal cancer. Harold recalls “there were times where both of
them had difficulty understanding things.”
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On February 22, Harold had his parents sign a four-year lease for
him to rent the South Farm. On March 5, Earl and Agnes also deeded the
house they had recently vacated to Harold.
Two days later, on March 7, Earl and Agnes executed new mirror
wills. Like the 2011 mirror wills, the 2014 mirror wills provided that
Harold would receive his parents’ YFL shares. However, the South Farm
would now go to Leonard provided he tendered his YFL stock to Harold for
one dollar. The rest and residue of the estate would be divided among the
seven daughters. Finally, each of the new wills contained an in terrorem
clause:
Should any person contest the validity of this Last Will and
Testament, any provisions made for said person under the
terms of this Last Will and Testament shall lapse, and said
person shall be treated as if he or she had predeceased me,
leaving no issue him or her surviving me.
Harold found out in March that his parents were contemplating
changing their wills:
Q. Did you know what changes your parents were going
to make in that will change in March of 2014? A. The only
thing that was ever circulated was about Leonard getting the
South Farm.
Q. Did your parents ever say specifically that that was
the change they were going to make? A. And I don’t
remember if it was before or after, but yes.
Q. And tell us what you were told and by whom.
A. That, you know, the girls and Leonard all felt that he
should get the farm and that I was just a greedy SOB if I didn’t
just say “okay,” and that, you know, they just -- at one point
Mom said to me, “I just want them to shut up and go away,”
is how she phrased it.
By May, Harold was aware of the actual terms of the new will and
believed Leonard and his sisters had improperly influenced their parents.
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On June 1, Earl passed away. Agnes died the following day. Their
2014 mirror wills were probated.
The statutory deadline for contesting the will of Agnes (the last to
die) was October 20. Prior to that time, Harold consulted an attorney
about contesting the will. He decided not to, in part because of a concern
that he could end up being disinherited under the in terrorem clause if the
contest failed.
In March 2015, Leonard tendered his YFL shares to Harold for $1
and received title to the South Farm. Harold estimated that YFL at that
time might be worth between $5.6 million and $6 million and the shares
he received from Leonard were worth $400,000.
Eight days after receiving Leonard’s YFL shares on March 25, Harold
sued Leonard and three of his sisters on April 2 in the Iowa District Court
for Black Hawk County for tortious interference with an inheritance. The
suit alleged that the defendants “engaged in conduct designed to defeat
their parents’ Estate Plan and to substitute their own plan which would
inure to their own benefit.” It alleged that they “exert[ed] undue influence
on their parents to change their Estate Plan.” It further alleged that they
“intentionally, improperly and maliciously interfered with the Wills and
bequests of their parents, Earl and Agnes Youngblut, and . . . substituted
their own testamentary plan for their own benefit.”
The three sisters reached settlements with Harold totaling $80,000
and were dismissed before trial. Meanwhile, Leonard moved for summary
judgment. He asserted that Harold was barred from seeking tortious-
interference damages based on the change of estate plan reflected in the
2014 wills because he had failed to file a timely will contest. Leonard also
asserted that Harold was estopped from claiming the 2014 wills were the
product of tortious interference after accepting the benefits thereunder,
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specifically the opportunity to obtain Leonard’s YFL shares for $1.
Leonard’s motion was denied, and the case against Leonard proceeded to
a jury trial.
At the close of evidence, Leonard moved unsuccessfully for a
directed verdict on the same grounds he had previously urged for
summary judgment. The jury was instructed that for Harold to recover,
he had to prove that Leonard “intentionally interfered with the expected
inheritance by the wrongful means of A. defamation, or B. fraud, or
C. duress, or D. undue influence for the purpose of inducing Agnes
Youngblut to make a change to her will.” The jury was also instructed that
[a] lawsuit for intentional interference with a bequest or
inheritance is not the same as an action to contest or set aside
a will. It is an independent cause of action that focuses on a
wrongdoer’s unlawful intent to prevent another from receiving
a request or inheritance rather than on the mental state of the
maker of the will.
Additionally, the jury was told that if it found for Harold on his claim, it
should award as actual damages “the loss of the inheritance that he
expected to receive, minus the value of the [YFL] stock that he received
from Leonard Youngblut.”
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Harold in the amount of
$396,086.88, plus punitive damages of $200,000. Leonard moved for a
new trial. He also asked the district court to offset the $80,000 in prior
settlements. The district court denied both motions. Leonard appealed,
and we retained the appeal.
III. Standard of Review.
“We review a denial of a motion for directed verdict for correction of
errors at law.” Fry v. Blauvelt, 818 N.W.2d 123, 134 (Iowa 2012).
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IV. Legal Analysis.
Leonard argues Harold cannot intentionally forego a timely contest
to Agnes’s 2014 will and later bring a suit for tortious interference against
a beneficiary of that will on the theory that the beneficiary exercised
improper and undue influence over the testator. Alternatively, Leonard
argues that Harold’s acceptance of benefits under the will estops him from
claiming that the will was induced by tortious interference. Finally,
Leonard argues that even if we uphold the jury verdict against him, he is
entitled to an offset for the $80,000 in settlements his sisters paid to
Harold. For purposes of this appeal, we reach only the first argument.
A. The Legal Landscape in Iowa. Iowa Code sections 633.308
through 633.320 govern actions to set aside or contest wills. Iowa Code
§§ 633.308–.320 (2015). Section 633.311 provides that a will contest is
triable at law. Id. § 633.311. Section 633.309 provides that a will contest
must be filed
within the later to occur of four months from the date of
second publication of notice of admission of the will to probate
or one month following the mailing of the notice to all heirs of
the decedent and devisees under the will whose identities are
reasonably ascertainable.
Id. § 633.309. Harold declined to bring a will contest and instead allowed
the October 20, 2014 deadline to lapse. 1
Nearly five decades ago, in Gigilos v. Stavropoulos, we held that heirs
of a decedent could not bring a separate, stand-alone fraud action against
the executor and beneficiary of a will. 204 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Iowa 1973).
1As noted, the record suggests that Harold may have been concerned about the in
terrorem clause in the will. There is Iowa precedent that such clauses have no effect
where the contest is pursued in good faith and on probable cause. See Geisinger v.
Geisinger, 241 Iowa 283, 294, 41 N.W.2d 86, 93 (1950); In re Cocklin’s Estate, 236 Iowa
98, 111–12, 17 N.W.2d 129, 135–36 (1945); see also In re Estate of Spencer, 232 N.W.2d
491, 499 (Iowa 1975).
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The heirs alleged that the will was forged and sought “damages for the
value of the estate and . . . exemplary damages against [the
executor/beneficiary] and the two attesting witnesses to the will.” Id. at
620. We reasoned,
It is clear the action is a collateral attack on the order
admitting the will to probate. A direct attack was available to
plaintiffs in the form of an action to set aside the will. It
appears such a direct attack was later separately undertaken
but the plaintiffs have not succeeded in contesting the will.
We note the will contest resulted in a verdict in favor of the
proponents and that verdict is now the subject of post-trial
motions in district court. The first question is whether
plaintiffs’ claim will be heard unless and until the order
admitting the will is set aside. The clear answer is that it will
not.
....
“The general rule is that a judgment or decree admitting
a will to probate, when made by a court having jurisdiction
thereof, may be attacked only in such direct proceedings as
are authorized by a statute, and is not open to attack or
impeachment in a collateral proceeding . . . .”
Id. at 620–21 (quoting 95 C.J.S. Wills § 578, at 687).
However, just a few years later, in Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, we
qualified the principle we had announced in Gigilos. 264 N.W.2d 792, 795
(Iowa 1978). The Frohwein case arose after the plaintiff filed a will contest,
which was dismissed on the basis of the statute of limitations. Id. at 793–
94. The plaintiff then brought a separate lawsuit alleging that “the
defendants maliciously, fraudulently, and unlawfully through deceit and
undue influence” caused the decedent to revoke her prior will and leave
her entire estate to one of the defendants. Id. at 794. We held that the
trial court erred in transferring the claim to probate and dismissing it. Id.at 795–96. We said that Gigilos was distinguishable, “since we do not view
the law action instituted by the plaintiff here as a collateral attack on the
probate order although the allegations of plaintiff’s petition in the law
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action could have been presented in a will contest.” Id. at 795. We
explained that “an independent cause of action for the wrongful
interference with a bequest does exist.” Id.Subsequently, in Huffey v. Lea, we squarely confronted the issue of
“whether the doctrine of claim preclusion prevents an action for tortious
interference with a bequest when the action is not brought with the
underlying will contest.” 491 N.W.2d 518, 519 (Iowa 1992) (en banc). In
June 1986, the decedent had executed a will providing that the family farm
would go to her nephew. Id. In July 1986, the decedent had executed
another will revoking the prior will and transferring the farm to her brother
and his children. Id. After the decedent passed away in August 1986, the
July will was admitted to probate. Id. However, the nephew was
successful in contesting the will and getting it set aside. Id. Thereafter
the nephew sued the brother and his family for tortious interference. Id.at 519–20. The district court dismissed the lawsuit based on claim
preclusion, and the nephew appealed. Id. at 520.
We reversed. Id. at 519. We first noted that Frohwein had
“recognized a law action for tortious interference with a bequest.” Id. at
520. We also pointed out the Restatement (Second) of Torts approved of
this action, noting that section 774B provides,
One who by fraud[, duress] or other tortious means
intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third
person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have
received is subject to liability to others for the loss of the
inheritance or gift.
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B, at 58 (Am. Law Inst.
1979)). Next we applied the “same evidence” test and found that a will
contest and an intentional-interference case involved “differences in
proof”:
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When a will is contested on grounds of undue influence
and lack of testamentary capacity, as it was here, the required
proof focuses on the testator’s mental strength and intent and
whether infirmities or undue influence have affected the
disposition of property under the will. The necessary proof in
an action for intentional interference with a bequest or devise
focuses on the fraud, duress, or other tortious means
intentionally used by the alleged wrongdoer in depriving
another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or
gift. Stated simply, in a will contest, the testator’s intent or
mental state is the key issue; in an intentional interference
case, the wrongdoer’s unlawful intent to prevent another from
receiving an inheritance is the key issue. Because of the
differences in proof, the actions are not the same nor will the
same evidence necessarily support both actions.
Id. at 521 (citations omitted).
There was a dissenting view. See id. at 523 (McGiverin, C.J.,
dissenting). The dissent argued that the tortious-interference claim
should not go forward because “[a]n adequate remedy has already been
provided.” Id. at 524 (emphasis omitted). It also maintained that “[c]laim
preclusion bars the present action.” Id. at 525 (emphasis omitted). The
dissent explained,
I believe Huffey’s action for tortious interference with a
bequest constitutes basically the same “claim” as the undue
influence claim upon which his prior will contest was
based. . . .
Although the legal elements of each claim do not parallel
one another with mathematical precision, it is apparent from
the general nature of each, and from review of the pleaded
facts in this case, that a law action for tortious interference
with a bequest necessarily must be supported by the same
facts and evidence supporting a will contest in probate based
on undue influence.
Id. The dissent added, “[T]he district court would have had jurisdiction of
both claims had they both been brought at the same time.” Id. at 527.
Also, Huffey was at odds with a decision we had rendered just the
year before reiterating the vitality of Gigilos. See Abel v. Bittner, 470
N.W.2d 348, 351 (Iowa 1991). In Abel, the beneficiaries under a will
12
brought a contest challenging three codicils to that will. Id. at 349. The
first codicil eliminated their bequest; the second and third codicils
reaffirmed the first codicil. Id. Later, the beneficiaries brought a law action
seeking damages for tortious interference with an inheritance expectancy.
Id. Still later, they dropped their challenges in the will contest to the
second and third codicils. Id. at 350. At this point, the district court
granted summary judgment to the defendant on all remaining claims. Id.
We affirmed. Id. at 351. We agreed with the district court that under
the doctrine of reaffirmation, the will contest could not proceed as to the
first codicil once the beneficiaries had withdrawn their challenges to the
second and third codicils. Id. Relying on Gigilos, we also held that the
disposition of the will contest in the defendants’ favor doomed the
plaintiffs’ tortious-interference claim. Id. We stated that the defendants
“were also entitled to judgment as a matter of law in the law action as a
result of the rule prohibiting collateral attack on testamentary
dispositions.” Id. Huffey didn’t discuss Abel despite the inconsistency
between the two decisions.
Since Huffey was decided in 1992, we have not heard on appeal
another tortious-interference-with-inheritance claim. In Turner v. Iowa
State Bank & Trust Co. of Fairfield, we did cite Huffey with approval. 743
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2007) (citing Huffey, 491 N.W.2d at 520 (majority
opinion), as “reaffirming that Iowa recognizes an independent action
outside the probate code for tortious interference with a bequest”).
B. Recent Developments in this Area of the Law. The district
court relied on Frohwein and Huffey in ruling that Leonard was not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Leonard argues there have been significant
developments in the law since those cases were decided.
13
For one thing, the Restatement (Third) of Torts has moved away from
the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that we relied upon in
Frohwein. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 19, at
160–61 (Am. Law Inst. 2020). The Third Restatement limits the ability to
pursue a claim for tortious interference with an inheritance or gift: “A claim
under this Section is not available to a plaintiff who had the right to seek
a remedy for the same claim in a probate court.” Id. § 19(2). Comment c
to this section adds,
Thus if the defendant coerced the decedent into executing a
will that excluded the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s appropriate
response is a claim to that effect in the probate court where
the will is tested. A claim in tort is not available.
....
A proceeding in probate is considered available, for
purposes of this Section, even if it offers less generous relief
than would be attainable in tort. Nor does a probate court
become unavailable because the limitations period has
expired for pursuing a claim there. If a claim falls within a
probate court’s jurisdiction, or would have if timely,
permitting a suit in tort is not appropriate.
Id. § 19 cmt. c, at 162–63. The reporter’s note states, “This Section
emphasizes the importance of limiting tort claims to avoid interference
with other mechanisms for resolving disputes about inheritances.” Id.
§ 19 reporter’s note a, at 166. The reporter’s note further states that the
“contrary view” in Huffey is being “disapproved here.” Id. § 19 reporter’s
note c, at 167.
When new iterations of the Restatement of Torts appear, we have
often cited and relied on them in our decisions. See, e.g., Ludman v.
Davenport Assumption High Sch., 895 N.W.2d 902, 910 (Iowa 2017);
Dinsdale Const., LLC v. Lumber Specialties, Ltd., 888 N.W.2d 644, 653 n.12
(Iowa 2016); Winger v. CM Holdings, L.L.C., 881 N.W.2d 433, 447 (Iowa
14
2016); Estate of McFarlin v. State, 881 N.W.2d 51, 60 (Iowa 2016); Mulhern
v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104, 114 (Iowa 2011); Van Fossen
v. MidAm. Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 697 n.8 (Iowa 2009); Thompson v.
Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 838 (Iowa 2009); Wright v. Brooke Grp. Ltd.,
652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002).
Also, a thoughtful scholarly article in the Stanford Law Review has
criticized the conceptual basis for the tort. See John C.P. Goldberg &
Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with
Inheritance, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 337 (2013) [hereinafter Goldberg &
Sitkoff] (“[W]e argue that the interference-with-inheritance tort should be
repudiated.”). The professors write,
[I]n almost any circumstance in which a prospective
beneficiary could make out a tort claim to remedy wrongful
interference with an expected inheritance, those same
interests could be vindicated through the traditional
inheritance law procedures of a probate will contest or an
action in restitution. . . .
What makes the redundancy between tort law and
inheritance law pernicious is that tort, as a general law of
wrongful injury, is ill-suited to posthumous reconstruction of
the true intent of a decedent. Such an undertaking, which is
hampered by the inability of the decedent to give testimony to
authenticate or clarify his intentions, requires the court to
distinguish between legitimate persuasion and “undue
influence” or “duress,” and to do so in the context of nuanced
family dynamics and customs that are often inaccessible to
outsiders. In contrast to tort law, inheritance law has
developed a host of specialized doctrines and procedures to
deal with these difficulties. There is thus little reason to
suppose that tort concepts and procedures, which have
developed primarily to deal with less subtle forms of injurious
misconduct, will help courts better distinguish a bona fide
claim of wrongful interference from a strike suit by a
disappointed expectant beneficiary.
Because the interference-with-inheritance tort changes
the rules under which inheritance disputes are litigated and
offers different remedies than inheritance law, recognition of
the tort is in truth recognition of a rival legal regime for
addressing these same problems. The tort allows a
15
disappointed expectant beneficiary to choose his preferred
rules of procedure and potential remedies—the specialized
rules of inheritance law, or the general civil litigation rules of
tort law. This development is troubling because it has arisen
without consideration of the reasons for the specialized rules
of inheritance law. Courts have offered little justification for
the creation of this alternative regime. Some have reasoned,
incoherently, that the tort is redundant with inheritance law
yet necessary to fill gaps in that law. Other courts have
allowed interference claims to proceed under different rules
and to obtain different remedies for no other reason than the
plaintiff chose to sue in tort rather than to bring a will contest
or an action in restitution.
Id. at 338–39 (footnote omitted). Huffey is singled out for criticism in the
article: “A clearer example of the tort overriding purposeful limitations
within inheritance law could scarcely be imagined.” Id. at 379.
Another commentator has expressed misgivings about the
intentional-interference-with-inheritance claim for related reasons:
One frequently cited reason for allowing recovery for
intentional interference with inheritance is that every wrong
should have a remedy. Yet the facts giving rise to the tort are
often identical to facts giving rise to a will contest. If either
action would provide an adequate remedy, the plaintiff should
be limited to the probate action because that is the preferred
method for resolving issues related to wills.
Nita Ledford, Note, Intentional Interference with Inheritance, 30 Real Prop.,
Prob. & Tr. J. 325, 340 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
A third commentator would allow the tort even if a probate
proceeding provides a remedy—but only after exhausting the probate
remedy first:
In some cases involving direct interference with a
testator’s testamentary intent, the person injured by the
conduct could obtain relief in probate. For example, the
intestate heir who can oppose a will that the testator was
tortiously induced to execute would have probate relief
available. The claimant would have standing in probate, and
defeating the will could give the claimant the benefit he
expected, although he won’t recover punitive damages and
attorney’s fees without a trip to civil court, if such is permitted
16
in his jurisdiction. In these cases, the claimant should
exhaust probate before any resort to civil court.
Irene D. Johnson, Tortious Interference with Expectancy of Inheritance or
Gift—Suggestions for Resort to the Tort, 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. 769, 789 (2008).
Additionally, enthusiasm for the tort appears to be waning in the
most recent decisions from other jurisdictions. Recently, the South
Dakota Supreme Court, in answering a certified question, decided it would
not adopt the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance. In re
Certification of Question of Law from the U.S. Dist. Ct., 931 N.W.2d 510,
518 (S.D. 2019). Among other things, our South Dakota colleagues
observed that recognition of the tort would undermine the legislature’s
plan to have expeditious trust administration following death. Id. at 517–
18. The court elaborated,
Thomas suggests the tort action would not run afoul of this
legislative policy because the claim would lie against the
individual wrongdoer rather than the trust. However, his
suggestion, alone, does not lead us to conclude that the
expeditious administration of trusts prioritized by the
Legislature would be unaffected by recognizing the tort. Most
importantly, Thomas makes no claim that he was unable to
challenge the trust in this case because of the shortened
repose period, and he only hypothesizes that a future litigant
could be denied a remedy because of the repose period.
Id. at 518.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals also declined to recognize the tort
last year. See Dickson v. Shook, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2019 WL 1412497,
at *6 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019). The court emphasized that it “has not
hesitated, on occasion, to recognize torts for the first time.” Id. But it
observed that the legislature had already provided a remedy through the
probate system. Id.Likewise, four years ago, in Archer v. Anderson, the Texas Supreme
Court discussed the Goldberg and Sitkoff article at length, overruled
17
several Texas Court of Appeals decisions, and concluded that “[t]he tort of
intentional interference with inheritance is not recognized in Texas.” 556
S.W.3d 228, 231–32, 234–35, 239 (Tex. 2018). The court characterized
the appellants’ position as an “argument . . . for a different probate process
than the Legislature has created.” Id. at 238. A concurring opinion would
have disallowed the claim where the plaintiff had “adequate remedies
otherwise” through the probate system but left open the possibility of a
claim in other circumstances where “the tort would provide the only
avenue for relief.” Id. at 240, 245 (Johnson, J., concurring).
The year before that, in Litherland v. Jurgens, the Nebraska Supreme
Court “decline[d] to adopt the tort of intentional interference with an
inheritance.” 869 N.W.2d 92, 99 (Neb. 2015). The court observed that
“[t]he remedies available . . . in the probate court were adequate.” Id. at
97. It noted its “general preference for resolving disputes pertaining to
wills and inheritances in probate court.” Id.
Additionally, in 2016, in Villarreal v. United Fire & Casualty Co., we
embraced the view of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 24
and held that a policyholder seeking recovery of benefits from an insurer
had to bring a bad-faith claim together with the breach-of-contract claim
to avoid the potential effects of claim preclusion when both claims arose
out of the same transaction. 873 N.W.2d 714, 719–22, 728–29 (Iowa
2016). It did not matter that bad faith would require “some additional
proof.” Id. at 729. We explained, “Perfect identity of evidence is not the
standard in Iowa for whether claim preclusion applies.” Id.
A dissenting opinion in Villarreal remarked that “[t]he majority
opinion in this case essentially adopts the view espoused by the Huffey
dissent.” Id. at 737 n.8 (Appel, J., dissenting). It added, “Whether Huffey
is good law after today is unclear.” Id.
18
C. Should Tortious Interference Be Allowed to Bypass a Will
Contest? In considering what the status of Frohwein and Huffey should
be today, we are not persuaded by those courts and commentators who
see no role for the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance. The
tort has value in circumstances when a probate proceeding cannot provide
an adequate remedy. But it should not be a de facto substitute for a will
contest. There are several reasons for this.
First, probate is meant to provide a prompt, efficient, centralized way
of resolving issues relating to a decedent’s estate and getting the estate
distributed. That is one reason for the tight deadlines in probate. See,
e.g., Iowa Code §§ 633.309, .355, .410(1). For example, creditors generally
have only four months from the date of the second publication of the notice
to creditors to bring claims. Id. § 633.410(1). They can file a separate
action outside probate court, but the same deadline applies. Id.
§ 633.415(2). Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, “the
personal representative shall deliver all specifically devised property to the
devisees entitled thereto after the expiration of twelve months from the
date of appointment of the personal representative.” Id. § 633.355.
Allowing a separate, subsequent challenge to the will’s plan of distribution
based on a theory of tortious interference could defeat this purpose.
In In re Estate of Thompson, we reinforced the importance of these
deadlines by holding that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment could
not extend the time for challenging a will. 346 N.W.2d 5, 8 (Iowa 1984).
We explained, “The primary motivation for litigants in will contest
challenges is dissatisfaction with the contents of the will, a circumstance
which can ordinarily be relied upon to trigger any existing challenge within
the statutory period.”
19
Id. The same basic point applies here. When a tortious-interference claim
is based on “dissatisfaction with the contents of the will,” there is no
reason it cannot be joined with and brought at the same time as the
challenge to the will itself. Efficiency favors this outcome. There is a
benefit in knowing that if the statutory deadline passes without event, the
testamentary plan of distribution will not be disturbed either by a will
contest or by an action that seeks equivalent damages on equivalent
grounds.
Second, undue influence is a well-developed probate concept. We
have discussed its elements in depth in many cases. See, e.g., Burkhalter
v. Burkhalter, 841 N.W.2d 93 (Iowa 2013). For example, in Burkhalter, we
reiterated prior law that causation must be “clearly” established in an
undue-influence case. Id. at 105–06. We elaborated as to why this was
so:
A heightened causation element in undue influence cases
makes sense. In cases involving challenges to wills based
upon undue influence, the central issue is whether the acts of
the testator were a product of free will or coercion. The
testator, however, is not available to testify and, as a result, a
speculative element is necessarily introduced into the claim.
As colorfully noted in the commentary, will contests
necessarily apply a “worst evidence” rule.
Further, it is not always easy to distinguish ordinary
permissible influences on a testator from improper coercion.
The injection of the word “clearly” into the fourth element of
undue influence is designed to add a measure of protection to
the free will of a testator, filter out claims that are unduly
speculative, and to prevent the doctrine from expanding
beyond its limited scope.
Id. (citation omitted). Allowing a disappointed heir to pursue a separate
tortious-interference claim in lieu of an undue-influence claim would cut
against this reasoning. After all, the same issues are present in both
cases—the testator who is “not available to testify” and the difficulty of
20
“distinguish[ing] ordinary permissible influences . . . from improper
coercion.” See id. at 105.
Third, as discussed above, Huffey’s foundation has been eroded
somewhat. Huffey relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts section 774B,
but the Third Restatement disavows this approach. See Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 19 reporter’s note a, at 166–67
(explaining the differences between section 19 and section 744B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts). We have already quoted the following
language from Huffey:
Stated simply, in a will contest, the testator’s intent or mental
state is the key issue; in an intentional interference case, the
wrongdoer’s unlawful intent to prevent another from receiving
an inheritance is the key issue. Because of the differences in
proof, the actions are not the same nor will the same evidence
necessarily support both actions.
491 N.W.2d at 521. On further reflection, we are not sure this language
is correct. To prevail either on an undue influence claim or a tortious-
interference claim where the plaintiff is challenging conduct leading to a
new will, the plaintiff must prove an outsider overcame the testator’s
independent will. See Burkhalter, 841 N.W.2d at 106 (“[U]ndue influence
must dominate the motives of the testator in executing his will.” (quoting
In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Iowa 1984))); In re Estate
of Bayer, 574 N.W.2d 667, 671 (Iowa 1998) (“Undue influence must be
such as to substitute the will of the person exercising the influence for that
of the testator, thereby making the writing express, not the purpose and
intent of the testator, but that of the person exercising the influence.”
(quoting In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d at 531–32)). If the will
reflects the true wishes of the testator, then no claim should lie, either for
undue influence or tortious interference. In short, the two claims involve
“ ‘a substantial overlap’ of proofs and witnesses” because a central issue
21
is common to both claims. See Villarreal, 873 N.W.2d at 729 (majority
opinion) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. b, at 199
(Am. Law Inst. 1982)).
Fourth, we question how an action for tortious interference with an
inheritance—brought later as a belated substitute for a will contest—fits
into Iowa’s legislative scheme. The legislature has provided that a will
contest will be tried as a law action, so a jury trial is available anyway. See
Iowa Code § 633.311. And when a will contest is brought, interested
parties, such as alleged wrongdoing beneficiaries, “shall be joined with
proponents [of the will] as defendants. Id. § 633.312. Furthermore, Iowa
Code section 633.487 is intended to give preclusive effect to the
“distribution” and “the list of heirs” as to all persons with notice upon court
approval of the final report. See id. § 633.487. The final probate decree,
in other words, has res judicata effect on everyone who has been given
notice. See In re Estate of Sampson, 838 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Iowa 2013)
(“[S]ection 633.487 essentially cuts off the rights of persons who received
notice of the final report to contest distribution or prior acts of
administration, except in the case of fraud.”). The section does not appear
to contemplate separate actions that would have the effect of overturning
the distribution carried out by a will. The majority opinions in Frohwein
and Huffey did not consider these points.
For these reasons, we now hold that a party alleging a decedent’s
will was procured in whole or in part by tortious interference must join
such claim together with a timely will contest under Iowa Code
section 633.308. In doing so, we honor the legislature’s goal of prompt
and effective estate administration. We also adhere to the burden of proof
22
considerations we discussed in depth in Burkhalter. 2 Additionally, we
acknowledge the persuasiveness of some recent scholarly views including
that of the Third Restatement. Lastly, we respect the directive in Iowa
Code section 633.487 that the distribution coming out of probate should
be a final and conclusive distribution unless a specific exception such as
reopening applies. See Iowa Code §§ 633.308., .487, .488, .489. To the
extent that Frohwein and Huffey are to the contrary, we overrule them.
We emphasize what today’s decision does and does not hold.
Today’s decision is limited to claims that a party tortiously interfered with
an inheritance by inducing the decedent to execute a will through wrongful
means. 3 Also, today’s decision does not foreclose a plaintiff from pursuing
additional remedies via a tortious-interference claim. 4 It simply holds that
the claim of tortious interference must be joined with a timely will contest.
That was the position taken by the Huffey dissent. See 491 N.W.2d at 527(McGiverin, C.J., dissenting).
The Huffey dissent would have disallowed the tortious-interference
claim for “two main reasons”: it was unavailable under the facts of the case
and it was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. Id. at 524–27. Now
persuaded that the Huffey dissent was correct, we hold that the common
law and principles of claim preclusion do not permit a tortious-
2To ensure that this burden of proof is not diluted, a jury hearing both a will
contest and a tortious-interference-with-an-inheritance claim should be instructed not
to reach the tortious-interference claim if they uphold the will. It would not make sense
to have a carefully calibrated burden of proof for undue influence, as we discussed in
Burkhalter, while allowing that burden to be circumvented through a tortious-
interference action.
3Generally speaking, we agree with the authors of the Third Restatement that
where no claim is available in probate court for the conduct in question, then the claim
cannot be precluded by failure to bring the claim in probate court. See Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 19 cmt. c.
4Thus, in an appropriate case, punitive damages could be available.
23
interference-with-inheritance claim alleging an improperly obtained will to
go forward outside normal probate deadlines and proceedings.
D. Deciding this Case. Applying this holding to the present case,
it is clear that Harold could have brought a will contest by the October 20,
2014 deadline. He consulted an attorney about doing so but did not go
forward. Harold argues that he didn’t know until February 2015 whether
Leonard intended to exercise his option under Agnes’s 2014 will to tender
his YFL stock to Harold and receive the South Farm. “[I]f Leonard did not
exercise the option, Harold’s inheritance would have been the same as it
was under Agnes’s 2011 will,” Harold contends.
Harold’s argument does not persuade us for two reasons—one
factual and one legal. The factual reason is that Harold has not offered
competent proof he postponed bringing suit for this reason. Did Harold
really believe Leonard would use improper influence specifically to get
rights to the South Farm and then not exercise those rights? That runs
contrary to Harold’s entire theory of the case.
The legal reason is that any challenge to a will may require the
challenger to act before contingencies under the estate plan are resolved.
See Iowa Code § 633.309. Suppose Harold’s theory was a lack of
testamentary capacity with respect to the 2014 wills, rather than improper
and undue influence. In that event, there is no dispute he would have had
to initiate litigation by October 20, even though several months remained
for Leonard to exercise his option. Obviously, if Leonard declined to
exercise the option, the litigation could be dropped.
In sum, Harold’s tortious-interference claim was a de facto
substitute for a will contest based on undue influence. One of the
“wrongful means” alleged was undue influence itself. Another was its
cousin, duress. A third was fraud based on Leonard’s false threats to the
24
family and false statements he had been promised the South Farm. And
the final was defamation, based on derogatory statements Leonard made
about Harold. As Harold’s attorney put it in closing,
[W]e can tell whether or not the actions, the interference,
which is caused by the defamation, the fraud, duress, and
undue influence, produced the result that Leonard Youngblut
wanted, and it did. He accomplished his goal by getting his
parents to change their will, to give him the South Farm.
Harold’s attorney referred to a “one-year rant and campaign that Leonard
had, to try to convince and force his mother and his father to change their
wills.”
It is possible that a defamation claim could have been asserted
against Leonard that would have been legally and factually distinct from
his alleged undue influence over the terms of Earl’s and Agnes’s 2014 wills.
But here, defamation was merely one of the wrongful means allegedly
deployed by Leonard to induce Earl and Agnes to execute the 2014 wills
and thereby deprive Harold of the South Farm.
The petition alleged a single damages claim of tortious interference
with inheritance, coupled with an equitable claim seeking to impose a
constructive trust on the South Farm on the same grounds. The petition
alleged Leonard (and his siblings who settled) “intentionally, improperly
and maliciously interfered with the Wills and bequests of their parents,
Earl and Agnes Youngblut, and . . . substituted their own testamentary
plan for their own benefit.”
At trial, Jury Instruction No. 28 made clear that the only actual
damages sought by Harold consisted of the “loss of the inheritance that he
expected to receive.” There was only one verdict form on liability: “Did
Harold Youngblut prove that Leonard Youngblut intentionally interfered
with Harold Youngblut’s expected bequest or inheritance under Agnes
25
Youngblut’s will? Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ ” In sum, this tortious-interference
claim challenged the will and nothing but the will.
Whenever we overrule a precedent, it can affect litigants’ and
lawyers’ expectations. Harold may have relied on Frohwein and Huffey
when he decided not to bring a will contest. The Villarreal decision that
arguably presaged today’s outcome did not appear until 2016—after the
deadline to contest Agnes’s 2014 will had passed. But some other points
are worth noting.
One is that Harold, unlike the plaintiffs in Frohwein and Huffey,
deliberately bypassed challenging the will in probate proceedings. In fact,
Harold accepted that will in the probate proceedings. When asked why he
tendered $1 for Leonard’s YFL stock, a concession he received in the 2014
will, he testified that he “was just following the will.” We need not decide
whether Harold’s acceptance of benefits under the 2014 will qualifies as a
legal estoppel against his later bringing a tortious-interference claim. See,
e.g., Hainer v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 78 Iowa 245, 252, 43 N.W. 185, 187
(1889) (“One who has taken a beneficial interest under a will is thereby
held to have confirmed and ratified every other part of the same, and he
will not be permitted to set up any right or claim of his own, however legal
and well founded it may otherwise have been, which would defeat or in
any way prevent the full operation of the will.” (quoting Bigelow, Estop.
642)). It is sufficient for present purposes to note that Frohwein and
Huffey are distinguishable from the present case on their facts, and one
should not assume they would have controlled the outcome here.
Also, the year before Huffey, another decision of ours had expressed
the view that a tortious-interference claim operates as an impermissible
collateral attack on a probate proceeding. See Abel, 470 N.W.2d at 351.
26
And the contrary view set forth in Huffey, as noted, has been roundly
criticized. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, 65 Stan. L. Rev. at 379.
Furthermore, Frohwein and Huffey did not involve interpretation of
a statute or a rule, the areas where historically we have been most
reluctant to disturb precedent. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 902 N.W.2d 811,
817–18 (Iowa 2017); Papillon v. Jones, 892 N.W.2d 763, 773 (Iowa 2017);
Bd. of Water Works Trs. of Des Moines v. Sac Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 890
N.W.2d 50, 60–61 (Iowa 2017); Hedlund v. State, 875 N.W.2d 720, 725–27
(Iowa 2016); Doe v. New London Cmty. Sch. Dist., 848 N.W.2d 347, 355–
56, 356 (Iowa 2014); Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d
678, 688 (Iowa 2013); Welch v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 801 N.W.2d 590,
599–600 (Iowa 2011); In re Estate of Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa
2011). Instead, Frohwein and Huffey were based on principles of common
law and judicial administration, areas where the law can evolve as courts
learn from experience. Our customary reluctance to overturn precedent
remains, but may have less force when we conclude the precedent was
erroneous and leads to undesirable results. See, e.g., Winger, 881 N.W.2d
at 448 (common law); Peoples Trust & Sav. Bank v. Sec. Sav. Bank, 815
N.W.2d 744, 754 (Iowa 2012) (judicial administration). As we said in
Barreca v. Nickolas,
We remain mindful of the importance of stare decisis as a force
of stability and predictability in the law. Where persuasive
reasons no longer support a discrete common law rule,
however, we are not required to fetter ourselves to that rule
simply for the sake of preserving past decisions.
683 N.W.2d 111, 122–23 (Iowa 2004). “The genius of the common law is
its flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation.” Bearbower v. Merry,
266 N.W.2d 128, 129 (Iowa 1978) (en banc); see also Tyler J. Buller & Kelli
A. Huser, Stare Decisis in Iowa, 67 Drake L. Rev. 317, 322 (2019)
(“Common law cases tend to invoke moderately flexible or somewhat weak
27
stare decisis because ‘judges are more akin to lawmakers’ in this context,
deciding policy questions with limited or no legislative direction.”). 5
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Harold’s claim for
interference with inheritance is barred because it was not brought in
conjunction with a timely will contest. Leonard’s motion for directed
verdict should have been granted. We do not reach Leonard’s arguments
that Harold’s claim was barred by some form of estoppel or that the district
court should have offset the value of his three sisters’ settlements against
the actual damages award.
V. Conclusion.
We reverse the judgment entered below and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Appel and McDonald, JJ., who dissent in
separate dissenting opinions.
5Also, as already noted, it would be inaccurate to say that we have had “forty
years” of continuous recognition of tortious interference with an inheritance as a valid
claim independent of probate proceedings. In 1991, Abel said otherwise. See Abel, 470
N.W.2d at 351.
28
#18–1416, Youngblut v. Youngblut
APPEL, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the principles enunciated forty
years ago in Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1978), and
twenty years ago in Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1992) (en banc),
should control the outcome in this case.
I. Forty Years of Iowa Caselaw: Tortious Interference with
Expectancy in Inheritance as Claim Independent of and not Precluded
by Probate.
In Frohwein, this court considered a case where the plaintiff claimed
that the defendant conspired to defraud him by tortiously causing the
testator to execute a will. 264 N.W.2d at 793. The district court
transferred the case to the probate docket and granted summary judgment
to the defendant. Id. at 794.
We reversed the district court. We recognized that collateral attacks
on an order admitting a will to probate are usually not permitted. Id. at
794–95. But we found this principle inapplicable under the facts. We
declared,
[W]e do not view the law action instituted by the plaintiff here
as a collateral attack on the probate order although the
allegations of plaintiff’s petition in the law action could have
been presented in a will contest. The plaintiff in this case
based his law action on a claimed tortious interference with a
bequest in his favor provided him in the prior will of the
decedent . . . .
Id. at 795. The court in Frohwein further stated that we had recognized
the tort of wrongful interference with business advantage and that there
was “no compelling reason to decline to extend this concept to a non-
commercial context.” Id.We built on the Frohwein precedent in Huffey, where this court
considered whether claim preclusion prevented an action for tortious
29
interference with a bequest when the action is not brought with the
underlying will contest. 491 N.W.2d at 519. In Huffey, the plaintiff had
already been successful in a will contest. Id. The plaintiff then filed the
tortious-interference action to obtain additional remedies against the
alleged tortfeasor. Id. at 519–20. The defendant argued that the plaintiff
was precluded from bringing the claim. Id. at 520.
The Huffey court held that claim preclusion did not apply.
Stated simply, in a will contest, the testator’s intent or mental
state is the key issue; in an intentional interference case, the
wrongdoer’s unlawful intent to prevent another from receiving
an inheritance is the key issue. Because of the differences in
proof, the actions are not the same nor will the same evidence
necessarily support both actions.
Id. at 521.
In addition to differences in proof, the Huffey court stressed
differences in remedies. The Huffey court noted that the plaintiff sought
attorney fees, the value of lost time, mental anguish incurred in contesting
a will, and punitive damages. Id. None of these remedies were available
in a will contest. Id. Among other things, we stated that “[w]e are strongly
committed to the rule that attorney fees are proper consequential damages
when a person, through the tort of another, was required to act in
protection of his or her interest by bringing or defending an action against
a third party.” Id. at 522.
Importantly, the Huffey court examined cases that came to a
different result. The Huffey court recognized that some states did not
permit a claim outside of probate proceedings and explicitly rejected those
precedents. Id. at 521.
The fact that Huffey involved a thorough airing of the issues is
further reflected in a dissent. Id. at 523 (McGiverin, C.J., dissenting). The
dissent challenged the two main propositions of the majority, namely, that
30
the remedies in probate were not adequate and that claim preclusion was
not applicable. Id. at 524–27. The dissent further presented caselaw from
other jurisdictions supporting the view that the plaintiff’s claim should not
be permitted. Id.In addition, it is important to note that in Huffey, the court
considered the issue en banc. Thus, clearly, the court identified the
questions presented as important and desired to provide an authoritative
precedent on the issues presented.
II. Caselaw in Other Jurisdictions.
As the majority correctly points out, there are cases in a number of
jurisdictions that are contrary to Frohwein and Huffey. Some states, like
the majority in this case, hold that probate provides the only avenue of
relief, while others require “exhaustion” of “adequate” probate remedies
before bringing a claim, and others still, like Huffey, allow a tortious-
interference claim after probate in order to provide a complete remedy. See
Irene D. Johnson, Tortious Interference with Expectancy of Inheritance or
Gift—Suggestions for Resort to the Tort, 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. 769, 775–76
n.60–63 (2008) (outlining extant caselaw on probate) [hereinafter Johnson,
Tortious Interference].
But the approach in Frohwein and Huffey are not lone rangers. For
example, in Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1982), the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized the tort as independent of
the probate process. Id. at 411. In Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882 (Me.
1995), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recognized the tort and
specifically held that Maine neither imposes an exhaustion requirement or
a requirement that the plaintiff show that the probate court remedy was
inadequate. Id. at 886–87. In Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199 (Or. 1999) (en
banc), the Oregon Supreme Court, in recognizing the tort, stated,
31
If, as alleged here, a party has obtained the benefit of the
testamentary intent rule by committing a tort against a third
party, the policy of the law should be to provide an avenue for
relief from the tortious act. To do so here still would give
defendants all the benefits that the testamentary intent rule
calls for them to receive. Once possessed of those benefits,
however, defendants would be liable to respond in damages
for torts that they may have committed—a separate legal
inquiry with its own societal justifications.
Id. at 203.
III. Remedial Differences Between Probate and Tort.
There are major differences between a probate contest and the tort
of interference with an expectation of inheritance. A tort action is designed
to remedy a third-party wrong, while probate is intended to carry out the
testator’s intent. See Johnson, Tortious Interference, 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. at
771. In other words, the tort action is against an individual person, while
a probate proceeding is in rem. Id. at 772. The action for tortious
interference provides the remedy of damages against the wrongdoer and
not from the estate. Id. Further, the allocation of the costs of litigation is
materially different, with the estate bearing the cost of defense in a probate
proceeding while the potential wrongdoer bears the costs in a tort action.
Id. As emphatically pointed out in Huffey, recovery of plaintiff’s attorney
fees are available in the tort and not in probate. 491 N.W.2d at 522.
Punitive damages are also available in tort and not in probate proceedings.
Johnson, Tortious Interference, 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. at 772. As a result of the
potential of compensatory and punitive damages against the tortfeasor,
the tort has deterrent value which cannot be obtained in probate, where
the wrongdoer is a passive observer and bears no costs. Jury trial is also
available in tort and not in probate. Id. at 774. Importantly, the time for
making a claim in probate is much shorter than the statute of limitations
for intentional interference. Id.
32
The bottom line here is that the tort of interference with the
expectation of inheritance is materially different than a will contest, with
different structure, different purposes, and different remedies. Further,
while this case is postured as procedural, it has real substantive
implications. By significantly reducing the available remedies and altering
the decision-making process, the substance of the tort of intentional
interference with the expectation of inheritance has been undermined.
Clearly, the majority has less respect for the tort than the en banc Huffey
court.
IV. Impact of Innovations of Restatement (Third) on Iowa Law.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 774B provided that
[o]ne who by fraud, duress or other tortious means
intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third
person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have
received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the
inheritance or gift.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B, at 58 (Am. Law Inst. 1979). The
Frohwein and Huffey cases were consistent with the provisions of the
Restatement (Second). As the majority correctly points out, however, the
Restatement (Third) recognizes the tort but with a new wrinkle. Under the
Restatement (Third), the tort does not lie where a plaintiff “had the right
to seek a remedy for the same claim in a probate court.” Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 19(2), at 161 (Am. Law Inst. 2020).
The restatements of the American Law Institute (ALI) are often a
helpful resource in the fashioning of Iowa law. The ALI, however, is not an
Iowa court or the Iowa legislature. Here, the approach in Frohwein has
been part of the Iowa legal landscape for forty years and was reinforced in
Huffey twenty years ago. The Huffey case involved consideration by the
court en banc and thoroughly explored the issue and the caselaw. The
33
legislature has had over forty years to correct any error if it so chose. It
has not acted. While not binding, we ordinarily give weight to legislative
inaction. See State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 902 N.W.2d 811, 818 (Iowa 2017)
(finding legislative acquiescence with statute in effect for ten years without
legislative change); Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678,
688 (Iowa 2013) (“When many years pass following such a case without a
legislative response, we assume the legislature has acquiesced in our
interpretation.”). I regard legislative inaction as a more powerful factor in
this case than the revisions to the Restatement of Torts by ALI.
V. Impact of Villarreal.
In Villarreal v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 873 N.W.2d 714 (Iowa
2016), a majority of this court, wrongly in my view, reinvented our claim-
preclusion doctrine and held that a first-party bad-faith action against an
insurance carrier must be joined with the underlying breach-of-contract
action. Id. at 730. I need not repeat the views I expressed in the dissent
in Villarreal, which I incorporate here in full. Id. at 731–41 (Appel, J.,
dissenting).
The approach in Villarreal casts a shadow over this case. But this
case is distinguishable from Villarreal. In Villarreal, the plaintiff was
simply required to bring a bad-faith action in the same proceeding as the
underlying breach-of-contract claim. Id. at 730 (majority opinion). The
substance of the bad-faith claim was not affected at all. Here, however,
the nature of the litigation changes significantly if a plaintiff alleging
intentional interference with an expectation of inheritance is forced to
bring the claim in probate. As noted above, the remedies are less
favorable, the costs of defense are allocated differently, and the deterrence
function of the tort is undermined. I would limit Villarreal to cases where
34
claims can be joined without undermining the purposes of the tort, altering
the burdens of defense, and limiting the remedies available to the plaintiff.
VI. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, I would follow our precedent in Frohwein and
Huffey and affirm the ruling of the district court.
35
#18–1416, Youngblut v. Youngblut
McDONALD, Justice (dissenting).
Stare decisis et non quieta movere: “to stand by the thing decided
and not disturb the calm.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___, ___, 140
S. Ct. 1390, 1411 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). The doctrine
of stare decisis holds that courts should defer to precedent. The doctrine
has much to commend it. See State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 39–40 (Iowa
2015) (Waterman, J., dissenting) (summarizing “values fostered by stare
decisis”). Among other things, stare decisis advances stability and
consistency in the law. See Miller v. Westfield Ins., 606 N.W.2d 301, 310
(Iowa 2000) (Cady, J., dissenting). It increases efficiency in the decision-
making process. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
Process 145 (Dover Publ’ns 2005) (1921) (“[T]he labor of judges would be
increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be
reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks
on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before
him.”). It promotes respect for the judiciary as a neutral decision-maker
and advances the rule of law. See Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 40.
That being said, the doctrine of “stare decisis is ‘not an inexorable
command.’ ” Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
585 U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816 (2009)). There are
instances in which a court should overrule a precedent. In
nonconstitutional cases, the fact that a later court thinks a precedent was
wrongly decided is not, in and of itself, sufficient reason to overrule a
precedent. As a rule of decision, the doctrine of stare decisis does real
work only when a later court thinks a precedent was wrongly decided. If
a later court thinks a precedent was rightly decided, the doctrine of stare
36
decisis is largely unnecessary to justify continued adherence to a
precedent. The real power of the doctrine of stare decisis then is its power
to enshrine wrong decisions. The doctrine “reflects ‘a policy judgment that
“in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right.” ’ ” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
20, 118 S. Ct. 275, 284 (1997) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
235, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2016 (1997)).
To overrule a nonconstitutional precedent it is not enough a
precedent be wrong, instead a precedent must be wrong enough. Wrong
enough means, among other things, a precedent has proved unworkable
in practice, does violence to legal doctrine, or has been so undermined by
subsequent factual and legal developments that continued adherence to
the precedent is no longer tenable. See, e.g., Janus, 585 U.S. at ___, 138
S. Ct. at 2478–79 (identifying factors relevant in determining whether to
overrule precedent, including the quality of the reasoning in the decision,
“the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related
decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and reliance
on the decision”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
854–55, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808–09 (1992) (identifying relevant
considerations for stare decisis inquiry).
This is a high standard. This court has said, “Stare decisis alone
dictates continued adherence to our precedent absent a compelling reason
to change the law.” Book v. Doublestar Dongfeng Tyre Co., 860 N.W.2d
576, 594 (Iowa 2015). A compelling reason to change the law “require[s]
the highest possible showing that a precedent should be overruled before
taking such a step.” Brewer-Strong v. HNI Corp., 913 N.W.2d 235, 249
(Iowa 2018) (quoting McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394 (Iowa 2005)).
37
The demanding standard for overruling our precedents has not been
met in this case. “In Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa
1978), we recognized a law action for tortious interference with a bequest.”
Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa 1992). The tort was not and is
not well-founded as a matter of theory or doctrine. See generally John
C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful
Interference with Inheritance, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 337 (2013). That being
said, the tort has been the law of this state for forty-two years. The tort is
recognized in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic
Harm. See § 19, at 160 (Am. Law Inst. 2020). And the cause of action
“has been recognized in courts of about half the states, including most of
those that have considered the issue.” Id. § 19 reporter’s note a, at 166.
These considerations lead me to conclude Frohwein should not be
overruled.
Similarly, Huffey strikes me as wrong but not wrong enough to be
overruled. Huffey has not proved to be unworkable in practice. In the
twenty-eight years since Huffey was decided, this court has not considered
another case involving a claim for tortious interference with inheritance or
bequest. The absence of litigation regarding the issue is strong evidence
the Huffey rule has been administered without much difficulty in the
district courts for almost three decades despite its dubious logic.
There have been few developments in the law that would make
continued adherence to Huffey untenable. The majority cites several
considerations that favor overruling Huffey, but none of the cited
considerations present anything new. The majority notes, “First, probate
is meant to provide a prompt, efficient, centralized way of resolving issues
relating to a decedent’s estate and getting the estate distributed.” This
was true at the time Huffey was decided. The majority states, “Second,
38
undue influence is a well-developed probate concept.” This was true at
the time Huffey was decided. The majority explains, “Fourth, we question
how an action for tortious interference with an inheritance . . . fits into
Iowa’s legislative scheme.” The majority then discusses the legislative
scheme. It is the same legislative scheme in place at the time Huffey was
decided.
The majority’s third rationale for overruling Huffey is simply
disagreement with Huffey. The majority notes that the rationale of Huffey
was not correct. The rationale the majority presents today is largely the
same rationale offered by Chief Justice McGiverin in Huffey. See 491
N.W.2d at 523–27 (McGiverin, C.J., dissenting). The fact that a precedent
was wrongly decided is not, in and of itself, sufficient reason to overrule
the precedent. Stare decisis, as a rule of decision, only has force when a
later court thinks a precedent was wrongly decided. Stare decisis thus
demands something more. Huffey may have been wrongly decided, but
there are no compelling additional reasons to overrule it now.
The district court relied on long-standing precedents in instructing
the jury and ruling on the motion for directed verdict. I would adhere to
these precedents under the doctrine of stare decisis. I would affirm the
judgment of the district court on this ground alone. See Book, 860 N.W.2d
at 594.