State of Iowa v. Ashley Dawn Thompson

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–1433
Submitted October 14, 2020—Filed November 6, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
ASHLEY DAWN THOMPSON,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County,
Rose Anne Mefford, District Associate Judge.
Defendant who pled guilty to child endangerment appeals from an
order revoking her deferred judgment. CONVICTION AND REVOCATION
ORDER VACATED; CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.
Peter Stiefel, Victor, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, and Bart Klaver, County Attorney, for appellee.
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WATERMAN, Justice.
In this appeal, we must decide whether a defendant who pled guilty
to child endangerment can appeal an order revoking her deferred
judgment. The State contends this direct appeal is barred by the 2019
amendment to Iowa Code section 814.6, requiring “good cause” to appeal
when the defendant pled guilty. 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 28 (codified at
Iowa Code § 814.6(a)(3) (2020). In State v. Damme, we interpreted “good
cause” in that statute to mean a “legally sufficient reason.” 944 N.W.2d
98, 104 (Iowa 2020). We noted the “legislature amended section 814.6 to
curtail frivolous appeals from guilty pleas and thereby enforce their
finality.” Id. at 100. We held that a defendant who is not challenging her
guilty plea or conviction has good cause to appeal an alleged sentencing
error when the sentence was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea
bargain. Id. at 105. Today, we extend Damme to appeals from orders
revoking deferred judgments.
The State has conceded that if we reach the merits, the order
revoking this defendant’s deferred judgment must be reversed because the
district court failed to include sufficient factual findings to support
revocation. We therefore reverse that order and remand for rehearing on
the State’s motion to revoke the deferred judgment.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On May 10, 2017, Douglas Shullaw, a First Resources 1 employee,
conducted a court-ordered family safety check at Ashley Thompson’s
trailer. He saw a bong in plain view and Thompson’s four-year-old child
on the table holding two large knives. The child’s father, Jeremy Bruce,
1First
Resources is a private nonprofit agency that offers a variety of services,
including services for families and children. First Resources Corp.,
https://www.firstresources.us/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2020).
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who was prohibited from being there, ran out the back. Officer Joseph
McMillen was dispatched to the scene. He entered the trailer with
Thompson’s consent and was shown the knives and bong.
Officer McMillen stepped outside and called Megan See, a child
protection worker with the Department of Human Services, whom he knew
was working on a case involving Thompson and Bruce. Officer McMillen
expressed his concerns about child safety, and the decision was made to
remove the children. As he helped Thompson pack items for the children,
he noticed the bathroom strongly smelled of human waste and the only
bedding on the two children’s beds was a blanket on the four-year-old’s
bed.
The four-year-old was born with Short Bowel Syndrome and
required medication and nutrition through packages of Total Parenteral
Nutrition (TPN). Officer McMillen observed multiple TPN packages that
were partially full with some contents curdled. This indicated the child
was not getting the full feeding of TPN. The child was removed and taken
to the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. His TPN port, located in
his chest, required surgical removal and relocation due to infection. The
child tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine.
In an interview with See, Bruce admitted that both he and
Thompson used methamphetamine in the residence and that the child did
not receive his medication or TPN as prescribed. Thompson denied
methamphetamine use but admitted that she used marijuana and that
she did not give the child his medication as prescribed or his full feedings
of TPN. Dr. Resmiye Oral performed an assessment and found that, due
to the child’s incomplete feedings at home and multiple missed medical
appointments, the child was at risk of injury or death due to medical and
safety neglect.
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The State filed a criminal complaint alleging child endangerment,
and shortly thereafter, Thompson was arrested. The court appointed her
counsel and issued a no-contact order; Thompson contested this and other
no-contact orders throughout the proceedings. The State charged
Thompson by trial information with child endangerment causing serious
injury, a class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6(5) (2017).
Thompson pled not guilty and was released from custody subject to
pretrial supervision.
The court later revoked Thompson’s supervised release at the
recommendation of the Eighth Judicial District Department of
Correctional Services. Thompson entered into a written plea agreement in
which she pled guilty to the lesser included offense of child endangerment
in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6(7), an aggravated misdemeanor.
The agreement stated that the parties jointly recommended a deferred
judgment, unsupervised probation not to exceed one year, and a civil
penalty assessed by the court. The court released Thompson based on her
promise to appear at all further proceedings.
On July 5, 2018, the court accepted Thompson’s guilty plea and
ordered the judgment deferred and Thompson to pay a civil penalty of
$625, court costs of $212, sheriff correctional fees, and court-appointed
attorney fees not to exceed $1800, plus attorney expenses, or the amount
actually submitted to the State Public Defender’s Office, whichever was
less. The court found the defendant was reasonably able to pay the
attorney fees and was required to pay them in full on or before
September 15. The day after the deferred judgment, a statement of costs
was filed, stating a balance due of $837. This statement said that attorney
fees would be added later. The court set a status hearing in a year to
assess the defendant’s compliance and required Thompson’s personal
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appearance “in the event the defendant has not complied with the terms
imposed.” The court never held this hearing. 2
On July 8, 2019, a year after the court’s acceptance of the guilty
plea, the State filed an application to revoke deferred judgment and
pronounce sentence. It alleged that the defendant had only paid $200 of
the costs and had an outstanding balance of $2167.40. The docket does
not indicate that the defendant was mailed a copy. The court ordered a
status hearing and stated, “Defendant should be given an opportunity to
be heard on any matter relevant to whether the Court should withdraw
Defendant from the deferred judgment program, pronounce judgment and
impose a sentence authorized by law.” It also said that failure to appear
could result in withdrawal of the deferred judgment, pronouncement of
judgment, and imposition of sentence against defendant in accordance
with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23. While the docket does not
show the defendant received a copy of the State’s application, it does
indicate that the defendant was mailed a copy of the order setting the
hearing.
The hearing was held, as ordered, on July 18. Thompson did not
personally appear at the compliance hearing, but her newly appointed
attorney 3 did. The court found that Thompson had violated the terms of
her probation and revoked the deferred judgment. It found Thompson
guilty of child endangerment in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6(7) and
2On August 31, the defendant filed a motion to rescind the no-contact order or set
aside the parties’ plea agreement. The court denied this motion on September 6, and
Thompson appealed this decision on October 8. On July 5, 2019, we denied the
defendant’s application for discretionary review and denied as moot the State’s motion to
dismiss.
3On July 11, two days after the status hearing was set, the court allowed
Thompson’s attorney to withdraw and appointed a new attorney.
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imposed a $625 fine, a suspended sentence of incarceration of two years,
and two years of informal probation.
Thompson appealed, and we retained the case.
II. Standard of Review.
“Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed for correction of
errors at law.” State v. Wilson, 941 N.W.2d 579, 584 (Iowa 2020). “We will
overturn a revocation of probation only if there has been an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2019). “An abuse
of discretion occurs when the court exercises its discretion on grounds or
for reasons that are clearly untenable or unreasonable. We may find
grounds untenable when based on an erroneous application of the law.”
Id. (citation omitted). “We review restitution orders for correction of errors
at law.” State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144, 158 (Iowa 2019).
III. Analysis.
We first address whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
The State argues that the 2019 amendment to Iowa Code section 814.6
bars Thompson’s appeal. The State concedes that if we are able to reach
the merits, we should reverse the revocation order.
A. Whether Iowa Code Section 814.6 Bars This Appeal. The
2019 amendment to Iowa Code section 814.6, effective July 1, 2019, limits
the right of a defendant to appeal from “[a] conviction where the defendant
has pled guilty.” 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 28 (codified at Iowa Code
§ 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2020)). In Damme, we noted that “[t]he determinative
date” of the statute’s applicability is “the date of the judgment of sentence
that is appealed.” 944 N.W.2d at 103 n.1. Thompson pled guilty in
June 2018, but this appeal is from the district court’s July 18, 2019 order
revoking her deferred judgment, entering a judgment of conviction, and
imposing a sentence. The order and sentence under review were entered
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after amended section 814.6 became effective July 1, 2019. We conclude
that section 814.6 as amended applies to this appeal.
Section 814.6 bars appeals from “[a] conviction where the defendant
has pled guilty,” with two exceptions: a guilty plea to a class “A” felony or
“where the defendant establishes good cause.” Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3)
(2020). In Damme, we determined that “good cause” means a “legally
sufficient reason.” 944 N.W.2d at 104. “[The defendant] bears the burden
of establishing good cause to pursue an appeal of her conviction based on
a guilty plea.” Id. (citing Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3)). “Because what
constitutes good cause is context-specific, we must determine when a
defendant who pled guilty has a legally sufficient reason to appeal.” Id.
While we noted in Damme that the purpose of the 2019 amendment
is to “curtail frivolous appeals” by enforcing the finality of guilty pleas, the
defendant in that case appealed sentencing errors without challenging her
guilty plea or conviction. Id. at 100, 105. Her sentence was neither
mandatory nor agreed to in her plea bargain. Id. at 105. We stated that
“[w]e readily distinguish appeals challenging the guilty plea itself from
appeals challenging the sentence imposed after the plea is accepted.” Id.
(footnote omitted). Based on this distinction, we held Damme had good
cause to appeal. Id. In doing so, we noted, “A sentencing error invariably
arises after the court has accepted the guilty plea. This timing provides a
legally sufficient reason to appeal notwithstanding the guilty plea.” Id.
Thompson likewise is not challenging her guilty plea. Rather,
Thompson challenges the order revoking her deferred judgment and
entering a judgment of conviction and sentence. As in Damme, the alleged
error arose after the court accepted Thompson’s guilty plea. We reach the
same conclusion and hold Thompson has good cause to appeal under
section 814.6.
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B. The State Concedes Error. The revocation hearing was
unreported. The district court’s written revocation order merely stated:
The Court FINDS by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Defendant has violated the terms of his/her probation under
the terms of the Deferred Judgment. The Defendant is hereby
withdrawn from the Deferred Judgment Program, and the
Deferred Judgment granted to the Defendant on August 16,
2018, is hereby REVOKED.
In State v. Lillibridge, we observed that “revocation involves a serious loss
of liberty” and “due process requires written findings by the court showing
the factual basis for the revocation.” 519 N.W.2d 82, 83 (Iowa 1994)
(per curiam). Those findings can be made orally on the record or in the
written order. State v. Kirby, 622 N.W.2d 506, 509–10 (Iowa 2001)
(en banc). Here, the requisite factual findings are missing altogether. The
State “concedes that the factual findings were insufficient and the
revocation should be reversed.”
We accept the State’s concession of error and vacate the district
court’s order finding Thompson violated her probation and revoking her
deferred judgment. We do so without reaching Thompson’s due process
challenges to that order alleging her lack of notice and opportunity to
present witnesses. We remand the case for a new hearing on the State’s
application to revoke Thompson’s deferred judgment.
C. Restitution. Thompson argues the district court erred in its
2018 deferred judgment by ordering her to pay restitution for court-
appointed attorney fees and correctional fees and finding she had the
reasonable ability to pay without knowing the amounts. See Albright, 925
N.W.2d at 162 (“Once the court has all the items of restitution before it,
then and only then shall the court make an assessment as to the offender’s
reasonable ability to pay.”). The State responds by arguing she waived any
challenge by failing to seek discretionary review of that order within thirty
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days. Thompson replies by arguing that the order revoking her deferred
judgment and imposing a judgment of conviction gave her a fresh
opportunity to challenge the restitution order subsumed in the new
judgment. We have now reversed that order, and it remains to be seen
whether the district court will again revoke her deferred judgment.
Restitution challenges should be directed to the district court on remand.
IV. Disposition.
For those reasons, we vacate Thompson’s conviction and the district
court’s order finding Thompson violated her probation and remand the
case to the district court for a new hearing on the State’s application to
revoke Thompson’s deferred judgment.
CONVICTION AND REVOCATION ORDER VACATED; CASE
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.