Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Deborah Lynn Johnson

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 16–0625
Filed September 2, 2016
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
DEBORAH LYNN JOHNSON,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Grievance commission recommends the suspension of an
attorney’s license for thirty days for the violation of ethical rules.
LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Tara M. van Brederode and Elizabeth Quinlan, Des Moines, for
complainant.
David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for
respondent.
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MANSFIELD, Justice.
An Iowa attorney engaged in an intimate relationship with one of
her clients whom she was representing in several criminal and civil
matters. When their relationship was discovered, the attorney self-
reported her conduct and withdrew from representation of the client.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board charged her with
violations of Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j) (sexual
relationship with a client) and 32:8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice).
The parties reached a factual stipulation, agreed that the charged
violations had occurred, and jointly proposed a thirty-day suspension as
a sanction. The Grievance Commission considered the matter without a
hearing and concluded the attorney had violated both rules. The
commission recommended the attorney’s license be suspended for thirty
days. Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the attorney violated
rule 32:1.8(j). We do not find a violation of rule 32:8.4(d). We agree with
the commission’s recommended sanction and suspend the attorney’s
license to practice law for thirty days.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Deborah Lynn Johnson is a solo practitioner in Altoona. She was
admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 2001 and worked several years at
an insurance defense firm in Boston. In 2004, she moved to Iowa and
was admitted to the Iowa bar. Beginning in 2006, Johnson practiced at
a firm in Newton. When that firm closed in 2010, Johnson opened her
own law office. As a substantial part of her practice, Johnson represents
indigent defendants by court appointment.
In May 2011, Johnson was appointed to represent John Doe in a
child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) matter. Doe was incarcerated at the
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time. The matter was resolved later that year. Johnson next saw Doe at
the Jasper County Courthouse in January 2013, after Doe had been
released from prison. The two of them spoke briefly.
In the spring of 2013, Doe contacted Johnson with some
guardianship questions. Soon thereafter, Johnson was appointed to
represent Doe at his request in a criminal case. She was later appointed
to represent him in approximately eight other criminal cases.
Additionally, Johnson handled several civil matters for Doe pro bono.
In mid-January 2014, while Johnson was representing Doe on a
number of these matters, she and Doe began to have an intimate
relationship. Johnson and Doe are not married to one another. On
March 4, while the relationship was still ongoing, Doe was arrested on
federal charges. The case involved a confidential informant (CI), whose
identity was known to Doe. While being held in the Polk County Jail,
Doe asked Johnson to call Doe’s former girlfriend and tell her to “stay
away from [the CI].” Johnson did call the former girlfriend and passed
along the message. She did not furnish any other details or answer any
questions.
Doe’s detention hearing on the federal charges took place on March
7. Johnson attended the hearing. During the hearing, the CI’s name
came up several times. A Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent
testified that Doe was a member of a prison gang. Johnson had no prior
knowledge of the gang or Doe’s affiliation with it. That evening, Doe
asked Johnson to contact a friend of his and give him the CI’s name.
Johnson spoke with the friend and told him that Doe was being held on a
federal weapons charge in the Polk County Jail, but she did not pass
along the name of the CI.
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On March 6 and 9, Doe made monitored and recorded phone calls
from the jail to Johnson. A few days later, FBI agents appeared at
Johnson’s law office. They asked about her relationship with Doe.
Initially, Johnson said, “He is my client, we are friends, we go out to
lunch and to [Alcoholics Anonymous] meetings.” The FBI agents
indicated they did not believe this statement. They told Johnson that jail
personnel from the Polk County Jail had seen Johnson and Doe’s
interactions and listened to the recorded phone calls between them.
Based on these observations, the jail officials had come to believe that
Johnson and Doe maintained a personal relationship and had notified
the FBI of their suspicions. The FBI agents told Johnson they were
concerned that her relationship with Doe could threaten the safety of
their CI. Johnson then admitted that her relationship with Doe was
“more than attorney/client/friend.” The agents told Johnson she would
no longer be allowed unrestricted access to Doe at the jail. Johnson did
not object. The agents also advised Johnson that the gang to which Doe
allegedly belonged was very dangerous. Johnson agreed to inform the
FBI if she learned anything that might jeopardize the safety of their CI.
She later sent several text messages to the FBI about information she
received.
On March 12, Johnson received a letter from the Jasper County
Attorney’s office asking her to withdraw from Doe’s four pending criminal
matters because of a “personal conflict.” The letter also requested she
abstain from representing Doe in any future criminal cases. Johnson
responded by agreeing to withdraw after informing Doe. That same day
she contacted Doe and told him she would be withdrawing from his
pending criminal and civil matters. Johnson filed motions to withdraw in
all six cases. Johnson arranged for another attorney to take over Doe’s
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civil cases pro bono. The court appointed new counsel for Doe in the
criminal matters on March 24.
Johnson also telephoned an employee of the Board on March 13 or
14 and “self-reported that she had been involved in an intimate
relationship with Doe while representing him in State court matters.” On
July 9, she sent a detailed letter to the Board. In the letter, she admitted
that the relationship between her and Doe had become “personal in
nature” in January 2014. “During that time, [she] continued to
represent [Doe] on the four criminal actions . . . the two civil custody
actions and the second civil petition for relief from domestic abuse.” She
acknowledged that she should have withdrawn and self-reported her
conduct immediately upon the initiation of the intimate relationship with
Doe. Her failure to do so “was wrong.” She stated that her “professional
relationship with [Doe], and the friendship and relationship that
developed, became blurred and [she] made an error in judgment.”
Johnson began seeing a therapist in late March. She was
prescribed anti-depressants. Around that same time, Johnson notified a
district court judge that she wanted to be temporarily removed from the
list of attorneys available for court appointments. On June 26, when a
long-term client requested Johnson, she advised the court that she was
willing to accept court appointments again.
On July 8, 2015, the Board filed a complaint against Johnson
alleging that she had engaged in sexual relations with a client in violation
of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j) and conduct that was
prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of rule 32:8.4(d).
Johnson answered and initially denied she had engaged in sexual
relations with Doe. Later, the Board and Johnson submitted a joint
stipulation pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.9, waiving the required
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formal hearing. According to the stipulation, “Johnson was representing
Doe . . . pro bono when they began an intimate relationship in mid-
January 2014.” The parties agreed that Johnson had violated rules
32:1.8(j) and 32:8.4(d). As a sanction, the parties jointly proposed a
thirty-day suspension.
The matter was submitted to the commission for its consideration
without a hearing on the basis of the stipulation. The parties did not file
briefs. On April 11, 2016, the commission issued its findings and
recommendation. The commission found that both violations were
factually supported and recommended that Johnson’s license be
suspended for thirty days.
II. Standard of Review.
Our review of attorney disciplinary proceedings is de novo. Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Blessum, 861 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Iowa
2015). We respectfully consider the findings and recommendations of
the commission but are not bound by them. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Iowa 2013). The
Board must prove its allegations of attorney misconduct by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Moothart, 860 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Iowa 2015). “This standard is more
demanding than proof by preponderance of the evidence, but less
demanding than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 2014).
When the parties enter into a stipulation, as here, they are bound
by the stipulated facts, which we interpret with reference to their subject
matter and in light of the surrounding circumstances and the whole
record. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Haskovec, 869 N.W.2d
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554, 557 (Iowa 2015). We are not bound by stipulations as to ethical
violations or the appropriate sanction. Id.
III. Ethical Violations.
A. Rule 32:1.8: Sexual Relations with a Client. Iowa Rule of
Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j) provides, “A lawyer shall not have sexual
relations with a client, or a representative of a client, unless the person is
the spouse of the lawyer or the sexual relationship predates the initiation
of the client–lawyer relationship.” The rule forbids such relationships
even if the relationship is consensual. See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.8
cmt. 17 (“[T]his rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations
with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and
regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.”).
This prohibition exists for several reasons. For one thing, as the
rule comment explains, “such a relationship presents a significant
danger that, because of the lawyer’s emotional involvement, the lawyer
will be unable to represent the client without impairment of the exercise
of independent professional judgment.” Id. Our caselaw deems “a
conflict between the client’s interest and the attorney’s personal interests
[to be] inherent in such situations.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Monroe, 784 N.W.2d 784, 788–89 (Iowa 2010).
Also, the comment notes that a sexual relationship between client
and attorney “is almost always unequal” and “can involve unfair
exploitation of the lawyer’s fiduciary role.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.8
cmt. 17. We have said that “the professional relationship renders it
impossible for the vulnerable layperson to be considered ‘consenting’ ” to
the sexual relationship. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Marzen, 779 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd.
of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Furlong, 625 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 2001));
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see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morrison, 727 N.W.2d
115, 118 (Iowa 2007) (discussing the prior version of the rule in the Code
of Professional Responsibility and delineating four separate reasons for
it).
When considering alleged violations of this rule and its precursor,
we have repeatedly stated that “[p]rofessional responsibility involves
many gray areas, but sexual relationships between attorney and client is
not one of these. Such conduct is clearly improper.” Morrison, 727
N.W.2d at 118 (quoting Furlong, 625 N.W.2d at 714); see also Monroe,
784 N.W.2d at 790 (“There is no gray area with respect to the prohibition
of such conduct, no nuance subject to differing interpretations.”); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682, 703 (Iowa
2006).
Johnson admits she violated rule 32:1.8(j). The Board and
Johnson stipulated to the fact that Johnson and Doe began an intimate
relationship in January 2014, well after Johnson commenced her
representation of Doe in several matters. This relationship does not meet
either exception to the rule—i.e., it did not predate the initiation of the
client–lawyer relationship, and Doe is not Johnson’s spouse. See Iowa R.
Prof’l Conduct 32:1.8(j). Accordingly, we find that Johnson violated rule
32:1.8(j).
B. Rule 32:8.4(d): Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration
of Justice. Next, we must address whether Johnson engaged in conduct
that violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(d). Under this
rule, “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa R.
Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). In determining whether a violation of this rule
occurred, “[t]he dispositive inquiry is whether ‘the attorney’s act[s]
9
hampered the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary
systems upon which the courts rely.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Kingery, 871 N.W.2d 109, 121 (Iowa 2015) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Steffes, 588 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1999)). A violation of rule
32:1.8(j) does not result in a per se violation of rule 32:8.4(d). See
Monroe, 784 N.W.2d at 789.
Our decisions “have consistently held that an attorney
representing a client violates rule 32:8.4(d) when his misconduct results
in additional court proceedings or causes court proceedings to be delayed
or dismissed.” Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d at 180; see Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Silich, 872 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Iowa 2015) (“Silich’s
omissions and poor communication with his clients necessitated three
additional court hearings.”); Kingery, 871 N.W.2d at 121 (“Kingery’s
neglect of her criminal matters caused numerous delays in the judicial
process . . . .”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Baldwin, 857
N.W.2d 195, 212–13 (Iowa 2014) (noting that “wasting court resources”
was prejudicial to the administration of justice); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 463 (Iowa 2014)
(“McGinness caused the district court to schedule a completely
unnecessary hearing about a collateral matter completely unrelated to
the merits of the underlying lawsuit. . . . [H]e plainly impaired the
efficient operation of the court system and caused a waste of judicial
resources.”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 841
N.W.2d 114, 124 (Iowa 2013) (“Dolezal’s refusal to turn over the Carter
file necessitated multiple hearings between 2011 and 2013.”); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kennedy, 837 N.W.2d 659, 673
(Iowa 2013) (“Kennedy’s actions (or more accurately inactions) led to
10
protracted and otherwise unnecessary proceedings . . . .”); Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowers, 823 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Iowa 2012)
(“Stowers’s emails violated the protective order and triggered a series of
unnecessary court proceedings, including rulings by the district court,
court of appeals, and this court. This constituted conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice.” (Citation omitted.)).
The commission’s finding of a rule 32:8.4(d) violation centers on
Johnson’s withdrawal in March 2014 from her pending Doe cases and
the court’s appointment of new counsel. Yet the record indicates that
the substitutions of counsel went quickly; Johnson herself recruited pro
bono replacement counsel in the civil matters. The record does not
disclose that any prior hearings had to be redone because of the
withdrawals. Moreover, had Johnson avoided a violation of rule 32:1.8(j)
by withdrawing from all representation of Doe before having an intimate
relationship with him, the same court-supervised withdrawals would
have been required. Thus, while Johnson’s relationship with her client
involved misconduct, we cannot agree that the misconduct in and of
itself necessitated additional court proceedings. Identical withdrawals
would have been needed if Johnson had complied with rule 32:1.8(j). 1
1The commission reasoned, “Had Respondent not engaged in an intimate
relationship with Doe, she would not have had to withdraw from his criminal cases and
the district court would not have had to appoint new counsel.” This is true, but an
intimate relationship is not a violation by itself:
[I]t should be clear that there is nothing in Rule 1.8(j) that seeks to
prevent adults from commencing a sexual relationship at any time of
their choosing. The point is instead that if a client–lawyer relationship
already existed at the time that the sexual relationship began, the lawyer
would be required to withdraw from the representation.
1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law of Lawyering § 13.37, at 13-91 fn.76 (4th ed.
2015). Rather, the violation consists of “sexual relations with a client.” Iowa R. Prof’l
Conduct 32:1.8(j) (emphasis added).
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As previously noted, we rejected in Monroe “the proposition that a
sexual relationship between client and attorney is a per se violation of
rule 32:8.4(d).” 784 N.W.2d at 788. We did add that “a client–attorney
relationship compromised by a concurrent intimate relationship could
prompt acts or omissions by the attorney or client that would impede the
proper functioning of the court system for purposes of the client’s case.”
Id. at 789. Still, based on the record before us, Johnson’s compromised
attorney–client relationship did not cause any court delays. Instead, the
alleged rule 32:8.4(d) violation was based only on Johnson’s appropriate
and necessary attempts to remedy her rule 32:1.8(j) violation. That is
not enough. A different situation might well be presented if Johnson had
not withdrawn promptly and with minimal disruption or if Johnson’s
continuing representation of Doe while in an intimate relationship with
him had resulted in a wasteful duplication of court proceedings to a
significant degree.
For these reasons, we conclude that Johnson did not violate rule
32:8.4(d).
IV. Sanction.
Having found that Johnson violated rule 32:1.8(j), we must now
determine the appropriate sanction. “There is no standard sanction for a
particular type of misconduct, and though prior cases can be instructive,
we ultimately determine an appropriate sanction based on the particular
circumstances of each case.” Blessum, 861 N.W.2d at 591 (quoting Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morris, 847 N.W.2d 428, 435 (Iowa
2014)). We take into account
[t]he nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to
continue in the practice of law, the protection of society from
those unfit to practice law, the need to uphold public
confidence in the justice system, deterrence, maintenance of
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the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.
Moothart, 860 N.W.2d at 615 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 108 (Iowa 2012)). We respectfully
consider the commission’s recommended sanction, but we remain free to
impose a greater or lesser sanction. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d at 463–64.
“Our past cases reveal a broad range of discipline for attorneys
who engage in sexual relations with a client. This range is between a
public reprimand and a lengthy period of suspension from the practice of
law.” Marzen, 779 N.W.2d at 767. The presence of aggravating
circumstances in a case will merit the imposition of a more substantial
sanction. See id.
We have levied more severe sanctions in cases involving multiple
clients or clients who were particularly vulnerable. See Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bowles, 794 N.W.2d 1, 3–4, 7–8 (Iowa 2011)
(imposing a suspension of at least eighteen months on an attorney who
had engaged in a sexual relationship with a client who had recently been
discharged from a mental health facility and relied on a false affidavit in
the disciplinary proceedings); Marzen, 779 N.W.2d at 768–69 (imposing a
suspension of at least six months on an attorney who had a sexual
relationship with a vulnerable client he represented in an involuntary
commitment proceeding); Furlong, 625 N.W.2d at 712, 714 (suspending
an attorney’s license for at least eighteen months where the attorney’s
sexual advances were “uninvited and unwelcome” and he had sexually
harassed two other clients); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Hill, 540 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Iowa 1995) (suspending for no less
than twelve months the license of an attorney who made “unwelcome
sexual advances” towards a client and who had previously been
13
disciplined with a three-month suspension for having sexual relations
with a client). 2
In a recent case, we suspended an attorney for a minimum of
thirty months when his “actions show[ed] a specific pattern of conduct
with respect to a number of victims.” Moothart, 860 N.W.2d at 617. The
attorney not only had had sexual relations with two clients; he had
sexually harassed five women including four clients. Id. at 607–14, 616
(“The pattern and extent of Moothart’s conduct is an unprecedented set
of facts . . . .”). We also noted that the client–victims were all in “difficult,
stressful situations,” rendering them particularly vulnerable. Id. at 617.
Other aggravating circumstances that have led to the imposition of
greater sanctions include sex-for-fees arrangements or sexual
relationships accompanied by sexual harassment or physical abuse. See
Blessum, 861 N.W.2d at 580, 595 (suspending for at least eighteen
months the license of an attorney who had engaged in sexual
relationship with client and then physically assaulted her, causing her
physical and emotional harm); McGrath, 713 N.W.2d at 703–04 (imposing
a suspension of at least three years on an attorney who established a
sex-for-fees arrangement with a dissolution client and attempted to get
another client to agree to the same arrangement).
2We first adopted an attorney disciplinary rule prohibiting sexual relations with
a client in 1995 as part of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. See
Iowa Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 5—101(B) & EC 5-25 (1995). In 2005, the Iowa
Rules of Professional Conduct, including rule 32:1.8(j), went into effect and replaced the
former Code. We therefore focus our attention on cases decided since 1995. Prior to
that time, sexual relationships with clients were not directly prohibited under our rules.
Cf. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d
280, 282, 285 (Iowa 1979) (examining whether an attorney’s sexual contact with a
client at prison amounted to conduct that reflected adversely on her fitness to practice
law in violation of previous ethical rules).
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We have imposed shorter suspensions of three months or less in
cases when the conduct is less egregious. See Morrison, 727 N.W.2d at
118, 120 (suspending an attorney’s license for a minimum of three
months when attorney engaged in sexual relations with one client in
dissolution proceedings). We agree with the commission that Johnson’s
violation “did not encompass the more egregious conduct that has
accompanied” many of our past cases under rule 32:8.1(j) or its
predecessor. Morrison had, as an aggravating factor, the fact that the
attorney had previously been admonished for making a sexual advance
toward another client. Id. at 120. In Monroe, which did not have this
aggravating factor, we suspended an attorney’s license for thirty days.
784 N.W.2d at 792.
The facts here are most comparable to those of Monroe. See id. at
791. Monroe had engaged in a relationship with his client that spanned
several weeks, but “the misconduct appear[ed] to be an isolated
occurrence, there being no evidence that Monroe had engaged in similar
transgressions in the past.” Id. Additionally, the commission observed
in that case “that Monroe ‘genuinely wanted to assist Ms. Doe, [but] lost
sight of the ethical boundaries’ governing his relationship with his
client.” Id. (alteration in original). The client did not harbor any ill will
toward Monroe and testified at the hearing that the relationship was not
coerced and she felt it was her decision to be in or out of the
relationship. Id. at 787. As noted, we suspended Monroe’s license for
thirty days. Id. at 792.
In addition to reviewing our precedents, we also consider the
relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The fact that
Johnson represented Doe in family and criminal matters is an
aggravating circumstance. See id. at 790. “[C]lients are particularly
15
vulnerable under these circumstances, and the possibility of harm,
especially when child custody matters are at stake, is high.” Id. The
same aggravating circumstance was present in Monroe, where the
attorney was representing his client in a dissolution matter. See id. at
787.
As mitigating factors, we note that Johnson has no prior history of
discipline and there have been no prior reports of similar or related
misconduct on her part. See Kingery, 871 N.W.2d at 122 (considering an
attorney’s “unblemished disciplinary record” as a mitigating factor).
Johnson did self-report her conduct and has expressed sincere remorse
for her actions. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bartley,
860 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Iowa 2015) (noting that self-reporting misconduct
“is normally a mitigating factor”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Eslick, 859 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 2015) (“[R]emorse and cooperation
generally mitigate our sanction.”). However, our consideration of
Johnson’s self-reporting must be tempered by the fact that Johnson self-
reported only after the FBI confronted her with evidence of the sexual
relationship, a relationship she initially denied. See, e.g., Bartley, 860
N.W.2d at 339 (“[M]itigation is lessened somewhat when the self-
reporting is at least in part motivated by knowledge that the law firm
would otherwise be reporting the violation.”). Like Monroe, Johnson
performs a significant amount of pro bono work. See Monroe, 784
N.W.2d at 791; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles,
808 N.W.2d 431, 442 (Iowa 2012) (“Another significant mitigating factor
in this case is Boles’ admirable record of volunteer community service to
local youth programs and his extensive pro bono practice.”). Johnson
also handles a substantial amount of reduced-fee work. Johnson
submitted many letters into the record from former clients and fellow
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attorneys uniformly praising her competence and her dedication to her
clients.
Johnson has sought counseling to address certain mental health
issues that may have contributed to her misconduct. See Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stoller, 879 N.W.2d 199, 221 (Iowa 2016)
(“[We] consistently recognize seeking mental health or other substance
abuse treatment as a mitigating factor.”). And although the facts of this
case illustrate the potential dangers that can arise when a criminal
defense attorney develops too close a relationship with an incarcerated
client who is charged with serious crimes, there is no evidence here that
anyone suffered harm as a result. See Monroe, 784 N.W.2d at 791
(noting the same mitigating circumstance); cf. Blessum, 861 N.W.2d at
595 (noting as an aggravating factor the physical and emotional harm
that the client suffered).
After considering all of these points, we agree with the commission
that the appropriate sanction is the suspension of Johnson’s license to
practice law for thirty days.
V. Conclusion.
We suspend Johnson from the practice of law with no possibility of
reinstatement for thirty days. This suspension applies to all facets of the
practice of law. See Iowa Ct. R. 34.23(3). Johnson must notify her
clients in compliance with Iowa Court Rule 34.24. The costs of this
action are taxed to Johnson. See id. r. 36.24(1). Unless the Board
objects, Johnson shall be automatically reinstated at the conclusion of
the suspension period provided she has paid all costs. See id.
r. 34.23(2).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.