Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Stephen Warren Newport

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 20–1004
Submitted January 20, 2021—Filed February 19, 2021
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Appellee,
vs.
STEPHEN WARREN NEWPORT,
Appellant.
On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance
Commission.
Grievance commission recommends suspension of an attorney for
violations of ethical rules in the representation of two clients.
LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all
participating justices joined. Christensen, C.J., and McDermott, J., took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Tara van Brederode and Crystal W. Rink, Des Moines, for appellee.
John O. Moeller, Davenport, for appellant.
2
MANSFIELD, Justice.
This attorney disciplinary case requires us to perform a de novo
review of critical facts that divided the grievance commission three-to-two.
An attorney was charged with violating Iowa Rule of Professional
Conduct 32:8.4(g) for sexually harassing two clients. He was also charged
with committing indecent exposure and sexual assault against one of
those clients in violation of rule 32:8.4(b). A criminal trial occurred, in
which a jury acquitted the attorney of both of those offenses; nonetheless,
the grievance commission found three-to-two that the attorney had
committed both crimes. All five of the commission members found the
attorney had engaged in sexual harassment.
After a careful review of the evidence, we find the sexual harassment
proved but the criminal conduct not proved by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence. In other words, as to the violations, we
agree with the two commission members in dissent rather than the three
in the majority. For the sanction, we suspend the attorney’s license
indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for one year based upon
the acts of sexual harassment.
I. Facts and Procedural History.
The following factual discussion contains considerable detail. We
believe it is necessary to explain why we reach our stated conclusions.
Stephen Newport is 69 years old. He has been practicing in the
Quad Cities since 1978. At the times relevant to the case, he maintained
a law office in Bettendorf.
A. Jane Doe #1. Jane Doe #1 has training as a certified nurse’s
aide and worked in that field for about ten years. Her first encounter with
Newport came when he was appointed to represent her in a child-in-need-
of-assistance matter from 2003 to 2005. Later, from 2013 to 2014,
3
Newport handled a child custody matter for her, and she paid him $500.
In 2015, Doe #1 hired Newport on a contingent fee basis to represent her
in a personal injury case against a self-storage company. Doe #1
maintained she had suffered injuries as a result of a door on a storage unit
coming down and hitting her neck and upper shoulder.
The case was scheduled to go to trial on January 28, 2018. On
January 3, the defense finished deposing Doe #1’s attending physician and
showed him records indicating that Doe #1 had been involved in a car
accident in 2011 and had been undergoing regular chiropractic treatment
for neck and shoulder pain. The physician testified that Doe #1 had not
previously disclosed this information, and in light of it, he was no longer
able to say that Doe #1’s current complaints of pain were attributable to
the self-storage accident. In Newport’s view, this weakened the case
significantly and made settlement a priority.
In the afternoon on the 18th, Doe #1 had a series of calls with
Newport. According to Doe #1, she made plans to meet with Newport the
next day. Doe #1 recalls that on the morning of the 19th, she went to his
office in Bettendorf in the morning after dropping off her children at school.
She discussed with Newport whether to settle the case or take it to trial.
Doe #1 called her mother in Arizona, who joined the discussion as a third
participant on speakerphone. During this meeting, Newport began
exchanging settlement figures with defense counsel.
Doe #1 recalls that at some point Newport got up to use the
restroom. When he returned, he closed the door to the office and sat down
in the chair next to Doe #1. Newport showed Doe #1 family pictures of
grandchildren that were on his cellphone and then talked about his
4
“pancreatic cancer.”1 He said that “the doctor put this weird device in me,
and it causes me to have erection issues.” He said that “his abdomen was
really bizarre.” He asked Doe #1 if she wanted to see it, got up and pulled
up his shirt, and showed Doe #1 a device that was protruding in the area
of his abdomen.
In Doe #1’s account, she turned back to her phone for a moment,
and when she looked again, Newport had undone his pants and dropped
his pants and underwear. Newport stated he has a hard time getting an
erection. Doe #1 saw him massaging his penis. Newport told Doe #1 she
needed to feel “this tubing that goes from the scrotum,” which is “really
weird.” She declined the offer, but Newport then grabbed her hand and
placed it on his scrotum area and guided her so she could feel the tubing.
Newport told Doe #1 that the device was “like a pump that was to help him
get an erection.” Doe #1 grabbed her hand away. She later testified, “I’m
in shock, I’m in fear, and I feel invaded.” She told Newport he needed to
pull his pants up or someone was going to come in and catch him.
Newport laughed and said, “It’s just us, and the door’s locked.”
According to Doe #1, Newport (who has gray hair on his head) “had
mentioned about how his pubic hairs were red, and that’s where his
granddaughter had gotten her red hair from.” Newport then said, “Look,”
and tried to show her the red pubic hair he had previously told her about.
Doe #1 turned away.
At this point, according to Doe #1, Newport straightened his clothing
and told Doe #1 that opposing counsel would probably not be reaching out
again soon “because it’s around lunchtime.” Doe #1 left Newport’s office
and drove to a close friend’s house to babysit her infant. In her hearing
1It is not disputed that Newport actually had been diagnosed with prostate cancer.
5
testimony, Doe #1 identified a series of phone calls on her phone records
as coming from Newport that afternoon and concerning the subject of
settlement. A settlement was reached in the afternoon for $25,000, with
the understanding that after liens and attorneys fees, Doe #1 would receive
$7500. Newport later informed her that she would actually receive $8000
because the defendant agreed to cover a deposition cost.2 Doe #1 also
recalls that over the phone that afternoon Newport said, “Deal’s done, drop
your clothes off, and you can give me a blow job.”
Several days later, after her mother arrived in town, Doe #1 went to
the Bettendorf police with her mother and reported Newport’s conduct.
Doe #1 admitted she was unhappy with the terms of the settlement. Given
the amount of money she was receiving, she did not believe Newport
should get any fee for his work on the case. In her police report, she
informed the officer that when Newport lifted the shirt, she could see the
device coming out of his abdomen. She informed the officer that Newport
had grabbed her left hand and put it on his scrotum.3
With a detective listening in, Doe #1 made a recorded phone call to
Newport in February. The call began with issues relating to finalizing the
settlement. Newport mentioned that Doe #1 needed to come in and sign a
Medicare release to finalize the settlement. After several minutes, Doe #1
raised the subject of “sexual favors”:
[Doe #1]: Well, what about the sexual favors and stuff.
SN: Sexual favors, what do you mean? You mean . . .
2Doe #1 agreed that Newport was entitled to a 30% fee under the fee agreement.
However, Newport agreed to reduce his fee to approximately $4000 and that all of it would
go to the other attorney who had associated with him on the case. At the time of hearing,
Doe #1 was still disputing any attorney’s entitlement to a fee.
3She confirmed this in her hearing testimony, but in her deposition in the criminal
case, she said it was the right hand.
6
[Doe #1]: Well, what you were talking about. SN: You’d
give me a blow job you mean?
[Doe #1]: Yeah, that’s what you mentioned. SN: Yeah?
Don’t worry about it, we’ll figure it out.
Doe #1: Ok? Like when are we going to figure it out?
SN: I don’t know. I’m not worried about it. You’re not going
anywhere.
Doe #1 then moved to the subject of Newport allegedly having
exposed himself:
[Doe #1]: When you pulled your pants down and . . .
that shocked me. SN: That what?
[Doe #1]: When you pulled your pants down, you
showed me your . . . from your surgery? SN: Oh.
[Doe #1]: I was concerned about you and just wondering
what type of procedure that was. SN: Yeah.
[Doe #1]: It just had me confused. SN: What’s your
schedule like today?
[Doe #1]: Um, my daughters have an appointment.
They get out early today. SN: Ok. What time’s that?
After discussing scheduling some more, Doe #1 turned to Newport’s
allegedly having forced her to touch his genitals:
[Doe #1]: Well . . . you remember how you had me
touching you and stuff? SN: Huh?
[Doe #1]: Do you remember when we were talking in
your office? SN: Yeah.
[Doe #1]: And just waiting to hear from [opposing
counsel] for the settlement and stuff and you were talking
about your family and then you were talking about your
surgery you had that I didn’t know you had, and then you had
me touch you and stuff. Do you remember that? SN:
(Unintelligible). No.
[Doe #1]: Yeah, when you showed me your, what was
that, tubing sticking out of your stomach. SN: Tube sticking
out of stomach? I don’t know. We’ve got to figure out when
you can come in and sign this . . .
7
More scheduling discussion ensued. After several more minutes, the call
ended.
Under the guidance of the same detective, Doe #1 also secretly
recorded several personal meetings with Newport in his office. Newport
made no incriminating admissions in those meetings.
A search warrant was served, and Newport’s genital area was
photographed. The photographs confirmed that he had red pubic hair.
However, it was clear that Newport had no device protruding out of his
abdomen.
At the hearing, Doe #1’s close friend testified as a witness for
Newport. Doe #1’s phone showed two phone calls and a large number of
texts to her on January 19, 2018. The friend said that Doe #1 arrived
midmorning to babysit on the 19th. Doe #1 made no complaints to her
close friend about sexual assault or sexually offensive conduct.
Newport himself testified at the hearing. He explained that he
suffers from Parkinson’s disease. Additionally, his wife testified that he
suffers from myasthenia gravis, an autoimmune disorder, and that he is
going through a cognitive decline.
Newport claimed not to have met with Doe #1 at all on January 19,
although he acknowledged his answer to the Board’s complaint stated that
he had.4 He acknowledged that since his prostate cancer surgery, he has
erection issues. He denied discussing those issues with Doe #1.
Newport of course did not dispute making the statements on the
recorded phone call, but he emphasized that “she kept trying to get off the
subject, and I tried to keep her back on the subject.” He said he was
focused on getting the settlement done. He told a commission member he
4Newport’s hearing testimony was that Doe #1 came in to the office on the 19th to
sign a release related to the settlement negotiations but he did not actually meet with her
that day.
8
had never before used the term “blow job” in any fashion with a female
client. He acknowledged he has a grandchild with red hair but denied
telling Doe #1 that he had red pubic hair. He denied that Doe #1 had ever
touched his scrotum.
Newport explained that the device in question was an artificial
urinary sphincter that is entirely inside the body. It is not a sexual device.
Part of the device is located within the abdomen; none of it is visible
outside. It is “possible” he discussed this device with Doe #1. Newport
does have a surgical scar on his abdomen.
In connection with his conduct toward Doe #1, the Scott County
Attorney charged Newport with third-degree sexual abuse, indecent
exposure, and prostitution. See Iowa Code §§ 709.4, 709.9, 725.1 (2019).
A jury trial occurred, and Newport was acquitted of sexual abuse and
indecent exposure; the jury hung on the prostitution charge. At a second
trial, Newport was acquitted of prostitution.
B. Jane Doe #2. The other client was Jane Doe #2. She was
represented by Newport between approximately 2012 and 2014 in a child
custody matter. She contacted the Bettendorf police after Newport’s
criminal charges reached the newspaper and she learned of them.
Doe #2 recalled several incidents of improper conduct by Newport.
On one occasion, she owed Newport around $300 and asked if it was okay
if she gave him a check. Newport responded, “Would you like me to just
shut the door?” and chuckled. Doe #2 interpreted this as a proposal to
pay him with something other than money; she gave him the check.
On a second occasion, Newport and Doe #2 were walking together
in a parking lot. Newport mentioned while walking that he had a hernia
in his groin. He asked Doe #2 if she wanted to check out the hernia, noting
9
that she was in nursing school. Newport was laughing as he said this, but
Doe #2 felt that this was “gross and degrading.”
Third, Doe #2 recalls that as they were winding up the custody
matter, they were together in Newport’s office about to speak to Doe #2’s
ex-husband on the phone. Newport came around his desk, half sat on the
desk, and said, “[S]hould I ask him if you can pay for this with sex?”
Doe #2 related that she “was lost,” looked down, and “was just so
embarrassed.”
The Board filed a complaint against Newport on October 16, 2019.
It alleged that he violated Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b) and
32:8.4(g). Newport answered, and the matter was heard by the grievance
commission on February 20 and 21, 2020. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the commission found unanimously that Newport had sexually
harassed both Doe #1 and Doe #2. Additionally, a majority of the
commission—three members—found that Newport had exposed himself to
Doe #1 and forced her to touch his scrotum. Two members dissented from
this finding. The majority concluded that Newport’s law license should be
suspended for two years; the dissenters differed between themselves as to
the appropriate sanction, with one endorsing a six-month suspension and
the other endorsing a one-year suspension.
II. Standard of Review.
“We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo.”
Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Turner, 918 N.W.2d 130, 144
(Iowa 2018) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Silich,
872 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 2015)). “The Board has the burden of proving
the attorney’s misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.”
Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lubinus, 869 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Iowa
2015). This standard “places a burden on the Board that is higher than
10
the burden in civil cases but lower than the burden in criminal matters.”
Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Eslick, 859 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa
2015) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d
466, 470 (Iowa 2014)). “We give the findings and recommendations of the
commission respectful consideration . . . .” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Lynch, 901 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Iowa 2017).
III. Ethical Violations.
A. Rule 32:8.4(g). Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(g)
makes it professional misconduct for an attorney to “engage in sexual
harassment or other unlawful discrimination in the practice of law.”
Sexual harassment is broadly defined and includes conduct that may not
give rise to civil liability. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moothart,
860 N.W.2d 598, 604 (Iowa 2015). It includes “any physical or verbal act
of a sexual nature that has no legitimate place in a legal setting.” Id.; see
also Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Pro. Ethics & Conduct v. Steffes, 588 N.W.2d 121,
124 (Iowa 1999) (en banc) (defining “sexual harassment” as including
“sexual advances” and “requests for sexual favors” (quoting Sexual
Harassment, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990))).
We agree with the commission that Newport sexually harassed both
Doe #1 and Doe #2. Doe #2’s testimony was persuasive to the commission
and is persuasive to us. Doe #2 came forward after a period of years; she
had nothing to gain by doing so. Newport points out that she owed him
money for legal services rendered, but if anything, that would make her
more reluctant to get involved unless her story were true. Newport also
testified that it would have been “suicide” for him to actually ask Doe #2’s
ex-husband if Doe #2 could pay Newport by giving him a “blow job.”
Newport’s point seems to be that he could not have made such a
suggestion seriously. But sexual harassment occurred whether the
11
suggestion was serious or not. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Watkins, 944 N.W.2d 881, 890–91 (Iowa 2020). As for Doe #1, the
recording alone confirms his sexual harassment of her.
B. Rule 32:8.4(b). Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b)
makes it an ethical violation when an attorney “commit[s] a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects.” Indecent exposure to a client and sexual
abuse of a client undoubtedly would fall within this rule. See Iowa Sup. Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Blessum, 861 N.W.2d 575, 590 (Iowa 2015) (noting
the added significance when a crime is committed against the client).
Furthermore, a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite. “It is the
commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to
practice law, not the act of getting caught committing a crime, which
constitutes a violation of this rule.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Taylor, 887 N.W.2d 369, 378 (Iowa 2016). An attorney can violate this rule
“even if the authorities never charged the attorney with a crime,” id., or (as
here) were unsuccessful in obtaining a conviction.
However, like the two dissenters on the commission, we do not find
the indecent exposure and sexual assault allegations established by a
convincing preponderance of the evidence. Our view of the record largely
tracks that of the dissenters below. Although we have concerns about
Newport’s testimony, we also have a number of concerns about Doe #1’s
testimony.
First, Doe #1 said repeatedly that she saw tubing coming out of
Newport’s abdomen. She told this to the police, she said this in the
recorded phone call quoted above, and she so testified in her deposition.
(At the commission hearing, Doe #1 testified that the device was pushing
out inside Newport’s abdomen but did not break the skin.) In fact, there
12
was no external device. Second, Doe #1 was wrong about the nature of
the device; it was implanted to address postsurgery incontinence, not
impotence. Incontinence can be an embarrassment for a man who
undergoes prostate removal; it seems odd that Newport would have wanted
someone to touch this urinary control device. Third, although Doe #1
correctly identified the color of Newport’s pubic hair, she said that Newport
had previously told her the color of his pubic hair when he showed her a
photograph of a grandchild. Thus, we cannot rely on Doe #1’s knowledge
of his pubic hair color to establish that she saw Newport expose himself.
Fourth, as noted by the dissenters, Doe #1 had
a long-time, close, female friend. The two regularly
communicate[d] many times per day, by text message, by
voice calls, and in person. [Doe #1] visited this friend at the
friend’s home later the same day as the purported incident.
[Doe #1] was upset, but only about the settlement to which
she had agreed. She said nothing to her confidant about any
purported sexual assault or sexually offensive behavior.
Fifth, although Newport’s responses on the recorded phone call are
consistent with his having previously proposed an exchange of fees for sex,
he said “no” when Doe #1 asked if he remembered having her touch him.
Finally, Doe #1 could have had a motive to overstate the extent of
Newport’s misconduct. It is undisputed that Doe #1 was very disappointed
in the outcome of her personal injury case; her lack of candor with her
own physician had damaged that case. Doe #1 wanted to have everything
remaining after the payment of liens go to her, with no share going even to
the other attorney who worked on the case.
We are not saying we found Newport’s testimony credible. His
sweeping denials did not ring true to the commission and do not ring true
to us. His mental condition gives us added reason to question those
denials.
13
In sum, on our de novo review of the record, we are unable to
conclude by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Newport
exposed himself to Doe #1 and forced her hand to his scrotum. Yet even
if Newport only discussed a series of highly inappropriate topics, including
his implanted device, his sex drive, and the color of his pubic hair, those
discussions violated rule 32:8.4(g). Newport repeatedly subjected female
clients to sexual harassment.5
IV. Sanction.
“There is no standard sanction warranted by any particular type of
misconduct. Though prior cases can be instructive, the sanction
warranted in a particular case must be based on the circumstances of that
case.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hier, 937 N.W.2d 309, 317
(Iowa 2020) (citation omitted) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Cannon, 821 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Iowa 2012)). Nevertheless, “[w]e seek to
‘achieve consistency with prior cases when determining the proper
sanction.’ ” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Crotty, 891 N.W.2d 455,
466 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton,
784 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Iowa 2010)). “Our primary purpose for imposing
sanctions [is] not to punish the lawyer but to protect the public.” Hier,
5The dissenters in the commission concluded that the rule 32:8.4(b) charge had
not been proved based on the Board’s failure to establish indecent exposure or sexual
abuse by the required convincing preponderance of the evidence. There is no indication
below that the commission viewed Newport’s discussions of sexual favors as sufficient to
establish the crime of prostitution for rule 32:8.4(b) purposes. The Board argues on
appeal that Newport committed prostitution in violation of Iowa Code section 725.1(2)(a)
when he allegedly told Doe #1 on the phone, “Deal’s done, drop your clothes off, and you
can give me a blow job.” On our de novo review, although we have no difficulty finding
that Newport made repeated, harassing comments of a sexual nature, we do not find by
the required convincing preponderance of evidence that Newport made statements
sufficiently direct and concrete to constitute the crime of prostitution, defined as
“purchas[ing] or offer[ing] to purchase another person’s services as a partner in a sex
act.” See Iowa Code § 725.1(2)(a).
14
937 N.W.2d at 317 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson,
838 N.W.2d 528, 542 (Iowa 2013)).
Our recent sexual harassment cases have involved sanctions
ranging from six months to three years.
In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v.
Steffes, we suspended an attorney indefinitely with no possibility of
reinstatement for two years after he engaged in sexual harassment by
taking nude photographs of a client to satisfy his prurient interests.
588 N.W.2d at 124–25. There were a number of aggravating factors,
including that the attorney “tried to get his client to destroy the
photographs—uncontrovertible evidence of his professional impropriety.”
Id. at 125.
In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v.
Furlong, we imposed an eighteen-month suspension on an attorney who
sexually harassed three clients. 625 N.W.2d 711, 712, 714 (Iowa 2001)
(en banc). The conduct was egregious and included uninvited and
unwelcome digital penetration of a client’s vagina, uninvited kisses,
uninvited back rubs and inappropriate comments. Id. at 712. The
attorney also had a lengthy consensual relationship with one of the clients
and tried to dissuade that client from following through on her complaint
with the disciplinary authorities. Id. In addition, this attorney had paid a
settlement to one of the clients to fend off a sexual harassment lawsuit.
Id.In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. McGrath, we
suspended an attorney for at least three years who had actually exchanged
sex for fees with one client and attempted to exchange sex for fees with
another. 713 N.W.2d 682, 703–04 (Iowa 2006). Both clients were
15
extremely vulnerable; they were involved in child custody and visitation
matters with their children at stake and no financial means. Id. at 703.
In Moothart, we suspended an attorney for thirty months (two and a
half years) who had sexually harassed four clients and an employee.
860 N.W.2d at 608–09, 611, 613, 617. The attorney made crude
comments about all the women, requested that the four clients show him
their breasts, and groped the employee’s breast. Id. at 607–14. The
attorney plied two of the women with alcohol, one of whom was a college
student, before making sexual advances. Id. at 607–08, 610. The attorney
also had sex with two of the clients, paying one of them for doing so. Id. at
610, 612.
In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Stansberry, we
sanctioned an assistant county attorney with a one-year suspension after
he engaged in sexual harassment and other misconduct by secretly
photographing female coworkers’ underwear in the office and
photographing and stealing underwear from one coworker’s home.
922 N.W.2d 591, 594–95, 601 (Iowa 2019). The attorney used false
pretenses to get into the home of this coworker, whom he supervised; he
lied to law enforcement when confronted with his actions; he was convicted
of theft and criminal trespass; and his misconduct forced the coworker to
have to quit and relocate to a different county. Id. at 594.
Most recently, in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v.
Watkins, we imposed a six-month suspension on an attorney who engaged
in sexual harassment of two women employees by making numerous
demeaning sexual remarks and showing them naked photographs of his
wife. 944 N.W.2d at 884–85, 888, 894.
In our view, the misconduct in this case does not reach the level of
the misconduct in Furlong, McGrath, or Moothart. Those cases involved
16
additional predatory conduct. On the other hand, unlike in Watkins, the
victims here were clients, and the misconduct went beyond degrading the
victims to proposing fees for sex. Comparisons to the other cases are more
difficult because the conduct is different in kind.
We agree with the commission that Newport’s pending application
for retirement is a mitigating factor. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Goedken, 939 N.W.2d 97, 109 (Iowa 2020).6 So is his general
cooperation. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Jacobsma, 920
N.W.2d 813, 821 (Iowa 2018). We also agree with the commission that
Newport’s pattern of misconduct—involving similar harassment years
apart—is an aggravating factor. See Moothart, 860 N.W.2d at 617. An
additional aggravating factor is the vulnerability of Doe #2. Id. When
asked why she did not fire Newport after he sexually harassed her, Doe #2
explained,
Well, I had no money. It was really important to finish up my
child custody case. You know, I could hardly afford rent, let
alone hire another attorney with a huge deposit. The idea of
that was just impossible.
Yet another aggravating factor is Newport’s experience. See Goedken,
939 N.W.2d at 108.
Weighing the attorney misconduct in this case, our precedents, the
aggravating and mitigating factors, and other relevant considerations, we
conclude that a suspension of not less than one year is warranted. As
between the two dissenters, this was the more severe sanction
recommended.
6The Board argues that Newport’s retirement should be discounted because the
application was filed shortly before the hearing in this case. We disagree. See Goedken,
939 N.W.2d at 109 (finding it to be a mitigating factor that an attorney was “currently
seeking to retire after a lengthy legal career” and had “taken steps toward
this retirement by closing estates or withdrawing from matters”).
17
V. Disposition.
Newport’s license to practice law in the State of Iowa is suspended
with no possibility of reinstatement for one year from the filing of this
opinion. This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. See
Iowa Ct. R. 34.23(3). Newport must comply with all notification
requirements of Iowa Court Rule 34.24. Should he desire to resume
practicing law, Newport must file a written application for reinstatement
of his license. See id. r. 34.23(1). Newport must comply with all applicable
requirements of Iowa Court Rule 34.25 for reinstatement and establish he
has not practiced law during the suspension period. The costs of the
proceeding are taxed to Newport pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 36.24(1).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.
All justices concur except Christensen, C.J., and McDermott, J.,
who take no part.