Roger Blasdell v. Linnhaven, Inc. and Accident Fund National Insurance Company/United Heartland

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 21–1968
Submitted January 19, 2023—Filed April 7, 2023
ROGER BLASDELL,
Appellee,
vs.
LINNHAVEN, INC. and ACCIDENT FUND NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY/UNITED HEARTLAND,
Appellants.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty,
Judge.
An employer seeks further review from a court of appeals decision that
affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of the claimant in a workers’
compensation proceeding. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Waterman,
Mansfield, and McDermott, JJ., joined. McDonald, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Oxley, J., joined. May, J., took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.
Laura Ostrander, Lansing, Michigan, for appellants.
2
Thomas M. Wertz and Mindi M. Vervaecke of Wertz Law Firm, Cedar
Rapids, for appellees.
3
CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice.
We must decide when a married couple’s separation results in spousal
desertion within the meaning of Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a) (2017). Almost two
and a half years into their marriage, the wife in this case left the marital home
in Delhi in search of employment elsewhere. She ultimately accepted a position
in Cedar Rapids and moved in with a family friend. Meanwhile, the husband and
the wife’s son from a previous relationship moved for financial reasons to
Manchester, where the husband worked. The husband and wife never lived
together again, but they remained in contact, supported each other financially,
and never sought a divorce.
A year after her move, the wife was permanently and totally disabled as a
result of a work injury and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. She
passed away from an overdose of prescription medication approximately four
years later. When the husband filed a claim for burial expenses and death
benefits as the surviving spouse, his wife’s employer and her insurer claimed he
was not entitled to those benefits under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a) because
he had willfully deserted his wife without any fault by her. The workers’
compensation commissioner agreed.
On judicial review, the district court reversed the workers’ compensation
commissioner’s decision, concluding it was not supported by substantial
evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court, and we granted the
employer’s application for further review. For the reasons explained below, we
affirm the district court decision that there was not substantial evidence to
4
support a finding that the husband deserted his wife without fault by her under
Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a).
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Roger and Heather Blasdell long held a nontraditional relationship that
dates back to at least 1998. In March 1999, Heather gave birth to their daughter,
whom Heather and Roger placed in a guardianship with a maternal relative who
they felt was better able to address their daughter’s needs, including special
health issues. They eventually married on August 23, 2008, and lived together
with Heather’s teenage son from a previous relationship until January 2011,
when they separated largely for financial reasons. Heather had just lost her job,
and Roger could not afford their rent alone in Delhi. Unable to find another job
in the area, Heather moved to Clinton for a few months with only her clothes and
vehicle. Shortly thereafter, she moved in with a family friend in Cedar Rapids
and started a position there with Linnhaven, Inc., as a direct care provider. Roger
stayed in the Delhi home with Heather’s son for three to four months after
Heather left, but he could not afford to continue paying the rent. Consequently,
Heather’s son moved with Roger to Manchester, where Roger worked.
Roger began dating another woman, Angela, in Manchester, and Heather’s
son later moved in with Heather in Cedar Rapids but continued to commute with
an uncle to attend school in Manchester. In 2011 and 2012, Roger filed his taxes
as “married filing separately.” He did not list Heather as a spouse on his 2012
Iowa return and listed himself as single on a W-4 form in 2011 and 2015.
5
On November 5, 2012, Heather sustained an injury while working at
Linnhaven, Inc., and sought workers’ compensation benefits from Linnhaven,
Inc., and its insurer, Accident Fund National Insurance Company/United
Heartland (collectively Linnhaven). Heather’s marital status was not an issue in
the workers’ compensation proceedings, but she stated during a January 21,
2014 deposition that she was legally married to Roger. However, she explained
that the pair were separated and had not divorced because of “money.” A deputy
workers’ compensation commissioner ultimately determined Heather was
permanently disabled as a result of the work injury and awarded Heather
workers’ compensation benefits for as long as she remained permanently and
totally disabled. The workers’ compensation commissioner delegated a deputy
workers’ compensation commissioner with the authority to issue a final agency
decision, which subsequently affirmed the prior decision.
On September 9, 2016, Heather died from an overdose of a mix of
prescription medications quetiapine (Seroquel) and zolpidem (Ambien).1 Roger
filed a claim for death benefits as Heather’s surviving spouse and sought
reimbursement for Heather’s burial expenses, which he had paid. Linnhaven
asserted that Roger was barred from receiving death benefits under Iowa Code
section 85.42(1)(a), which states: “When it is shown that at the time of the injury
the surviving spouse had willfully deserted the deceased without fault of the
1Whether Heather’s death was accidental or intentional is not an issue in this appeal.
6
deceased, then the surviving spouse shall not be considered as dependent in any
degree.”
In a deposition on April 3, 2018, Roger stated that Heather was listed as
his emergency contact at work, the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, and
as a driver on his car insurance for two vehicles at the time of her 2012 injury.
He described his relationship with Heather as “kind of on and off.” According to
Roger, Heather would stay with him occasionally, and they continued to see each
other “[a]lmost weekly” even though they did not have a sexual relationship.
Roger’s former girlfriend, Angela, was deposed on the same day. Angela
reported that she had dated Roger from July 2011 until July 2017 and lived with
him in a home they rented together from around 2015 until they ended their
relationship. She knew Roger was still legally married to Heather and continued
to communicate with Heather throughout her relationship with Roger. When
asked how often Roger would communicate with Heather, Angela stated, “It
didn’t come up too much, so I -- I would say maybe like once a month.” Angela
was not aware of any financial support that Roger may have provided to Heather.
Roger’s claim went to hearing on May 15, 2018. Roger’s testimony was
similar to his deposition testimony. He reiterated that he and Heather separated
in January 2011 primarily for financial reasons but remained in contact. When
asked whether he recalled providing Heather with financial assistance after her
injury, Roger testified that he “would give her money almost weekly, anywhere
from 50- to 100-dollars.” In contrast, he rarely received financial assistance from
Heather.
7
Heather’s son testified next. He lived with Heather at the time of her injury
and recalled Heather and Roger maintaining “frequent conversations throughout
the week” during that time period. He elaborated that he did not “necessarily
know what they talked about” but knew “that they were in contact with each
other.” He continued, “And throughout -- after her injury, I had been present a
few different times when they had met up with each other.” When they met up,
Heather’s son recalled, “Sometimes it was just a -- have a conversation and check
up and see how everybody was doing. Sometimes it was Roger loaning my mom
money to help out with bills.”
The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner who presided over the
hearing became unavailable before issuing a decision, so the workers’
compensation commissioner authorized another deputy to issue a proposed
decision. This deputy relied on the record and posthearing briefs in concluding
that “Roger had willfully deserted Heather without fault by Heather as of 2011—
before her underlying work-related injury”—and was thus not entitled to death
benefits under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a). Roger requested a rehearing based
on the change in deputy commissioners after his hearing, arguing witness
demeanor was a substantial factor in the case. A deputy commissioner acting
with authorization from the commissioner granted this request “in an effort to
maintain the integrity of the contested case process before the agency.”
The deputy who issued the first proposed decision presided over Roger’s
new hearing in July 2020. No new exhibits were permitted, and only Roger
testified, repeating much of what he had already stated in his deposition and the
8
first hearing. The deputy found Roger “to be a generally credible witness” but
again determined that Roger was not entitled to death benefits because he
willfully deserted Heather. On appeal, a deputy commissioner acting with the
commissioner’s authorization agreed. The deputy bolstered this final agency
decision with the following summary:
The record indicates that Roger and Heather intended to
terminate their marriage relationship in January 2011. The record
indicates Heather moved out of the house she shared with Roger at
that time. Shortly after that in early 2011, Roger began a
relationship with [Angela]. This was a relationship that lasted at
least five years and included several years of cohabitation. The
record reflects that after January 2011, Roger and Heather never
lived together or had any sexual relationship. Given this record, it is
found that Heather and Roger ended their marital relationship in
January 2011. It is also found that Roger willfully and intentionally
separated from Heather at that time.
As noted in the record, the separation between Heather and
Roger occurred due to financial reasons. Given this fact, it is found
that Roger’s willful separation from Heather was without the fault of
Heather.
Roger petitioned for judicial review before the district court. The district
court reversed the agency’s decision, noting the agency’s “finding that both
parties intended to end the marriage suggests that Heather is not without fault.”
The district court remarked that both parties and the deputy commissioner
“seem to treat the questions of whether [Roger] and Heather were married at the
time of injury and whether [Roger] abandoned Heather as one in the same[;]
[t]hey are not.” (Footnote omitted.)
In concluding Roger lacked the requisite intent to desert Heather, the
district court cited the following facts:
9
Claimant remained in the marital home with Heather’s child.
Additionally, according to unrefuted testimony, Claimant attempted
to contact Heather several times. Heather’s son testified that
Claimant was successful, while [Angela] stated Claimant was
unsuccessful in contacting Heather. Finally, while true that
Claimant listed himself as single on his 2011 W4 form, Claimant
stated on his 2011 and 2012 taxes that his marital status was
“married fil[ing] separately.”
(Citations omitted.)
The district court remanded the case to the commissioner for a ruling on
whether Heather’s death met the willful-injury exception under Iowa Code
section 85.16 to bar Roger from recovering survivor’s benefits. See Iowa Code
§ 85.16. Linnhaven appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals,
which affirmed the district court’s ruling. We subsequently granted Linnhaven’s
application for further review.
II. Standard of Review.
Iowa Code chapter 17A guides our judicial review of agency
decision-making to determine whether we reach the same result as the district
court. Chavez v. MS Tech., LLC, 972 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Iowa 2022). In this case,
we are asked to determine whether the commissioner erred in concluding that
Roger deserted Heather without fault on Heather’s part under Iowa Code section
85.42(1)(a). This issue presents a mixed question of law and fact: the operative
facts that gave rise to the desertion claim present a question of fact, while the
question of law is inherent in the commissioner’s decision on whether those facts
support a conclusion that Roger “had willfully deserted [Heather] without fault
of [Heather]” at the time of her injury. Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a); see Meyer v. IBP,
Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006).
10
We “are bound by the commissioner’s resolution of the first question—
finding the operative facts from the evidence presented—if supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218. In
contrast, “the application of the law to the facts . . . can be affected by other
grounds of error such as erroneous interpretation of law; irrational reasoning;
failure to consider relevant facts; or irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable
application of law to the facts.” Id. Accordingly, “[w]hen the agency exercises its
discretion based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, we are not bound by
those ‘legal conclusions but may correct misapplications of the law.’ ” Id. at 219(quoting Stroup v. Reno, 530 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Iowa 1995) (en banc)).
III. Analysis.
In addition to arguing the district court erred in finding Roger did not
desert Heather, Linnhaven maintains: (1) we should affirm the district court’s
conclusion that the commissioner’s designee could issue the final agency
decision, and (2) we should find the doctrine of estoppel does not bar Linnhaven
from raising the defense of spousal desertion. Neither of those requests is
properly before us. Roger did not cross-appeal the district court’s conclusion that
the commissioner’s designee could issue the final agency decision, so there is no
dispute over this matter for us to resolve. Likewise, Roger is not claiming
Linnhaven is estopped from raising the spousal desertion defense, and the
district court declined to address the issue. Accordingly, we only address
whether the district court erred by finding Roger did not desert Heather.
11
In relevant part, Iowa Code section 85.31(1)(a) states, “When death results
from the [workplace] injury, the employer shall pay the dependents who were
wholly dependent on the earnings of the employee for support at the time of the
injury.” Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a) establishes that a surviving spouse “shall
be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon the deceased employee”
unless “it is shown that at the time of the injury the surviving spouse had
willfully deserted the deceased without fault of the deceased, then the surviving
spouse shall not be considered as dependent in any degree.” Here, neither party
disputes that Roger and Heather were still legally married at the time of Heather’s
injury. Additionally, Iowa does not recognize common law divorce. See In re Est.
of Weems’, 139 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Iowa 1966) (“[W]e know of no such thing as a
common law divorce, or divorce resting on nothing more secure than bigamy.”).
See generally Iowa Code ch. 598 (governing the dissolution of marriage). So, the
only question here is whether Roger willfully deserted Heather without fault by
her. See Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a).
We have seldom had the opportunity to examine the spousal desertion
exception. In fact, the pertinent Iowa precedent analyzing spousal desertion in
workers’ compensation proceedings is from over a hundred years ago in James
Black Dry Goods Co. v. Iowa Indus. Com’r, 173 N.W. 23, 24 (Iowa 1919). There,
the husband left the marital residence after years of marriage due to “serious
financial difficulty” and traveled to find work. Id. Yet the husband and wife met
periodically, and the husband mailed money to the wife. Id. at 25.
12
We borrowed from fault divorce cases in concluding that the following
elements must exist to show desertion: (1) “the cessation of the marriage
relations,” (2) “the intent to desert,” (3) “a continuance of the desertion during
the statutory period,” and (4) “the absence of consent or misconduct of the party
alleged to have been deserted.” Id. at 24. In considering these elements, we held
that the wife had not deserted her husband simply because the parties agreed
to live apart. Id. at 25. As we explained, “[S]eparation and desertion are not
synonymous.” Id. Rather,
the act [of desertion] is willful when there is a design to forsake the
other spouse willfully or without cause, and thereby break up the
marital union, deliberate intent to cease living with the other as
spouse, abnegation of all duties of the marriage relations, the actual
ceasing of cohabitation, and the intent to desert.
Id. Perhaps most importantly, we approvingly cited Iowa caselaw for the principle
that “if plaintiff consented to defendant living apart from him, there was no
desertion.” Id.; see also Day v. Day, 50 N.W. 979, 980 (Iowa 1892) (“If the
separation was by mutual agreement, there could have been no willful desertion,
and hence no divorce on that ground.”).
With that legal background in mind, the district court correctly determined
Roger did not intend to desert Heather—especially without fault on Heather’s
part—under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a). Just as the husband in James Black
Dry Goods Co. left the marital residence due to “serious financial difficulty” and
traveled to find work, Heather left the Delhi residence that she shared with Roger
and her son to find work. See James Black Dry Goods Co., 173 N.W. at 25. Like
the husband and wife in James Black Dry Goods Co., Heather and Roger, too,
13
maintained contact and helped each other financially. See id. at 24–25. Although
Roger engaged in a romantic relationship with another woman during this time,
there is no exception under the statute precluding a surviving spouse from
receiving workers’ compensation benefits for adultery. See Iowa Code § 85.42(1).
Nor is it within our authority to create such an exception. See The Federalist
No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
Gideon ed. 2001) (“[Courts] may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but
merely judgment.”). Significantly, Roger started this relationship months after
Heather chose to leave the marital home and move to Clinton and then Cedar
Rapids.
Linnhaven argues this case is distinguishable because the couple in James
Black Dry Goods Co. exchanged “a number of letters and postcards,” while Roger
“was only able to produce a single page of messages from [Heather].” It also
argues there is not substantial evidence that Roger gave Heather money. True,
Roger only produced a single page of electronic messages from Heather. But
unlike the husband and wife in the 1919 James Black Dry Goods Co. case, Roger
and Heather had various means to interact beyond paper mailing—be it by
phone, text message, social media updates, and the like. They also were able to
travel to see each other by vehicle frequently and with relative ease, which was
not the case in the early 1900s when the husband and wife in James Black Dry
Goods Co. lived apart in different regions of the country. Anyway, Linnhaven’s
criticism of Roger for not providing more documentation to support his claims
about his relationship with Heather is misplaced because Roger has the
14
statutory benefit of being presumed wholly dependent upon Heather as her
surviving spouse. See Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a).
Further, despite Linnhaven’s many attempts to cast doubt on the
credibility of Roger’s testimony in its appellate brief, the deputy commissioner’s
rehearing decision specifically addressed Roger’s credibility. As the decision
summarized,
Ultimately, given Roger’s consistent testimony throughout the
entirety of the case, I find Roger’s behavior and outward manner to
be forthcoming and straightforward. At no point on rehearing was I
given the impression that he was attempting to conceal information.
I therefore find him to be a generally credible witness and I find his
demeanor reflects positively on his case.
“It is the commissioner’s duty as the trier of fact to determine the credibility of
the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and decide the facts in issue.” Arndt v. City of
Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394–95 (Iowa 2007). The deputy commissioner was
certainly in a better position to judge Roger’s credibility by participating in the
hearing and observing Roger’s testimony live than we are in our review of the
transcript and record as a whole.
Notably, Linnhaven did not argue in its appellate brief that we should
apply a standard other than that set forth in James Black Dry Goods Co. to
determine whether Roger deserted Heather under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a).
Nor does it argue that the statutory spousal desertion exception allows for the
deprivation of death benefits in cases of mutual abandonment between spouses.
Instead, Linnhaven only sought to differentiate this case factually from James
Black Dry Goods Co.
15
Now, Linnhaven tries to take a different route in its application for further
review by arguing that “the Iowa Court of Appeals erred in finding the appellee
did not abandon his spouse because the legal principles of spousal abandonment
have changed since the James Black Dry Goods Co. case was issued during a
time where at fault divorce was the legal standard in Iowa.” However, Linnhaven
does not elaborate on this claim further. In any event, it is well established that
“[w]e generally will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief in
an appeal, let alone in an application for further review.” State v. Warren,
955 N.W.2d 848, 867 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Shackford, 952 N.W.2d 141,
147–48 (Iowa 2020)).
Moreover, although our laws governing marriage have since changed, it
still generally remains the case in workers’ compensation cases that “[m]ere
separation of a husband and wife, by itself, has not affected the right of a
surviving spouse to workers’ compensation benefits.” 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers’
Compensation § 166, at 192–93 (2013). Many states continue to examine the
same elements set forth in James Black Dry Goods Co. to determine whether the
surviving spouse willfully deserted the decedent. See, e.g., Robinson Foundry,
Inc. v. Moon, 503 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (“If a wife is living apart
from her husband and if this separation is a result of the husband’s deserting
the wife, she may still be constructively living with him and entitled to benefits.”);
Morrison ex rel. Bryant v. Indus. Comm’n, No. 1 CA–IC 09–0021, 2009
WL 4547027, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2009) (“Voluntary abandonment is
based on the surviving wife’s state of mind and is a question of fact to be
16
determined by the ALJ from the wife’s ‘testimony coupled with the surrounding
circumstances and past history of the parties.’ ” (quoting Clark v. Indus. Comm’n,
460 P.2d 22, 25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969))); Midway Landfill, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n,
304 N.E.2d 607, 609 (Ill. 1973) (“Here, although the husband had knowledge of
his wife’s adultery, nonetheless he visited her, had marital relations with her,
referred to her as his wife, discussed reconciliation with her, corresponded with
her, and at no time sought to institute divorce proceedings to terminate the
marriage relationship. In addition, the [wife] had not secured a divorce, had not
remarried and was not living with [her paramour] at the time of her husband’s
death.”); In re Way v. J & J Log & Lumber Corp., 797 N.Y.S.2d 186, 186 (App.
Div. 2005) (“[A]bandonment in th[e workers’ compensation] context requires
proof that the separation was voluntary, unjustified, nonconsensual and
intended to be permanent.”); Rogers v. Univ. Motor Inn, 405 S.E.2d 770, 773
(N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (“By the time of his death, the deceased had not stopped
drinking. It would defy justice to require that the appellant endlessly subject
herself to her husband’s violent behavior and alcoholism in order to qualify as a
widow under the Workers’ Compensation Act.”); Tatum v. Tatum, 736 P.2d 506,
509 (Okla. 1982) (“Although [the wife] didn’t know why [her husband] left, she
made it clear that he was always welcome home. . . . In the meantime, she
maintained the home they previously occupied together and kept her job as a
means of providing herself with a livelihood. She had not initiated a divorce suit
nor, to her knowledge, had he brought one against her.”).
17
For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected claims that a wife lost
her statutory status as the surviving spouse and thus could not receive her
husband’s death benefits “because she failed either to pursue her husband with
a view to bringing him back home or failed to follow him in his travels” after he
left the marital home. Tatum, 736 P.2d at 508. Comparable to Heather’s moves
to establish employment in this case, the husband in Tatum “revealed a
predisposition to wandering, short-term employment, discontent with jobs and
instability.” Id. Relevantly, the court observed, “The law would indeed be both
[naïve] and unrealistic if it expected a wife to abandon her only precious
possessions in a fruitless quest after an errant husband who had given no
indication of his desire to return and stay.” Id. In holding the wife was entitled
to the deceased husband’s death benefits as his statutory surviving spouse, the
court cited facts similar to this case. Id. at 508–09.
Like the contact between Heather and Roger, the husband in Tatum
“communicated with [his wife] several times. He even returned to see her on
several occasions, but never to stay.” Id. at 509. Likewise, neither of them ever
sought a divorce. Id. Nevertheless, the husband entered into a relationship with
another woman, Gloria, established a common household with Gloria and two of
her children from another marriage, had a child with Gloria, and held himself
out as Gloria’s husband despite no legal marriage. Id. at 507. Yet the court
rejected Gloria’s claim that the wife was not entitled to the deceased husband’s
death benefits as his surviving spouse and remarked that the wife’s “status as a
18
deserted spouse was not lost either by inaction or non-pursuit.” Id. at 508–09.
That is also the case here.
We acknowledge that much of the caselaw nationally analyzing the
deserted spouse exception is based on an outdated view of marital relationships.
By all appearances, Roger and Heather made a mutual decision to live apart and
had an unconventional marriage at the time of Heather’s 2012 injury. But the
statutory language of Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a) is clear that the spousal
desertion exception only applies if at the time of Heather’s injury, Roger had
willfully deserted Heather without fault by Heather. This is where the dissent is
misguided in accusing us of “go[ing] out of [our] way to defeat rather than uphold
the agency’s decision.”
The agency’s determination that Roger deserted Heather is not purely a
factual finding in which we must only decide whether that decision was
supported by substantial evidence. Rather, we must decide whether the agency
correctly applied those facts to the law, which specifically asks whether Roger,
as the surviving spouse, “willfully deserted [Heather] without fault of [Heather]”
at the time of her injury. Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a) (emphasis added). “When the
agency exercises its discretion based on an erroneous interpretation of the law,
we are not bound by those ‘legal conclusions but may correct misapplications of
the law.’ ” Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 219 (quoting Stroup, 530 N.W.2d at 443). Here,
the commissioner erroneously interpreted the law by conflating separation with
desertion and ignoring Heather’s fault in that separation. It is our job to correct
that misapplication of the law.
19
The district court aptly summarized how the statute operates, explaining,
“If Heather deserted [Roger], [Roger] would still be eligible for survivor’s benefits.
Likewise, if neither party deserted one another, [Roger] is eligible for survivor’s
benefits. If both parties deserted the marriage, then it cannot be said Heather is
without fault, so [Roger] would still collect.”
Based on the facts before us, we cannot say that Roger intended to desert
Heather or that Heather is without fault for their separation. This is especially
so considering Heather initiated the separation through her choice to leave Roger
and her son in their marital home in pursuit of work in a different part of the
state. “The law would indeed be both [naïve] and unrealistic if it expected [Roger]
to abandon” his employment and home to follow Heather through multiple cities
in her quest for work. Tatum, 736 P.2d at 508. Other facts supporting our
conclusion include Heather and Roger’s continued contact after Heather left,
Roger’s 2011 and 2012 tax filings that list his marital status as “married filing
separately,” and Roger’s continued financial support of Heather at the time of
her injury.
Accordingly, we agree with the district court that there is not substantial
evidence to support the commissioner’s finding that Roger deserted Heather
without fault by her under section 85.42(1)(a). Because the final agency ruling
concluded that Roger was not entitled to benefits under Iowa Code section
85.31(1)(a), it did not address Linnhaven’s claim that the willful injury exception
under Iowa Code section 85.16 bars Roger’s recovery of the benefits. Thus, we
20
also agree with the district court’s determination that remand is appropriate for
the commissioner to make the factual findings necessary to decide this issue.
IV. Conclusion.
We affirm the district court’s ruling and remand to the workers’
compensation commission to determine whether the willful injury exception
applies.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
Waterman, Mansfield, and McDermott, JJ., join this opinion. McDonald,
J., files a dissenting opinion, in which Oxley, J., joins. May, J., takes no part.
21
#21–1968, Blasdell v. Linnhaven, Inc.
McDONALD, Justice (dissenting).
Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA), this court “must
‘broadly and liberally’ apply the agency findings in order to uphold, rather than
defeat, the agency’s decision.” Stephenson v. Furnas Elec. Co., 522 N.W.2d 828,
831 (Iowa 1994) (quoting Ward v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 236, 237
(Iowa 1981)). Contrary to the IAPA and our longstanding precedents interpreting
the same, the majority seeks to defeat rather than uphold the agency’s decision.
The majority applies the incorrect standard of review and then compounds the
error by incorrectly applying the incorrect standard of review. I respectfully
dissent. I would vacate the decisions of the court of appeals and the district court
and would affirm the agency’s decision.
I.
The majority’s first error is that it applies the wrong standard of review.
See generally Ripperger v. Iowa Pub. Info. Bd., 967 N.W.2d 540, 555 (Iowa 2021)
(Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting on ground
that “[t]he majority has applied the wrong standard of review”). The majority
states that desertion is a mixed question of law and fact, but the majority cites
no authority for that proposition. There is a good reason for the majority’s
omission: the majority’s statement regarding the standard of review is directly
contrary to controlling and persuasive authority holding that desertion is solely
a question of fact left to the finder of fact.
22
In the controlling case of James Black Dry Goods Co. v. Iowa Industrial
Com’r, which the majority discusses at length, this court stated desertion is a
“question[] of fact.” 173 N.W. 23, 24 (Iowa 1919). James Black Dry Goods Co.
went on to explain that in reviewing an administrative proceeding, this court
does “not pass upon questions of fact,” and if “the commissioner could have
found, under the evidence, even though there was a conflict therein,” desertion
or no desertion, “then there is no question for this court to pass upon.” Id.The conclusion that desertion is a question of fact makes sense because
desertion is a question of intent. “Desertion consists in the actual ceasing of
cohabitation and the intent in the mind of the offending party to desert the
other.” Nelson v. Nelson, 68 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1955) (quoting Parker v.
Parker, 55 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Iowa 1952)). Desertion can be shown by “intent to
cease living with the other as spouse,” “abnegation of all duties of the marriage
relation,” and an intent “not to return.” Parker, 55 N.W.2d at 185 (quoting
Tipton v. Tipton, 151 N.W. 90, 92 (Iowa 1915)). As a question of intent, desertion
“is a question of fact.” Conlin v. Conlin, 144 N.W. 1005, 1008 (Iowa 1914).
James Black Dry Goods Co., Nelson, Parker, and Conlin are not outliers.
Other courts also hold desertion is a question of fact left to the discretion of the
agency or the finder of fact. See, e.g., Blache v. Blache, 160 P.2d 136, 144 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (stating desertion “is entirely a question of fact”); Casale v.
Casale, 86 A.2d 568, 570 (Conn. 1952) (stating desertion is intent to cease
cohabitation with no mind to renew and “the question of intent is always a
question of fact” (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 43 Conn. 313, 318 (1876))); Stark v.
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State Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 204 P. 151, 158 (Or. 1922) (stating question of
desertion for compensation benefits “was a question of fact”); Roanoke Belt,
Inc. v. Mroczkowski, 455 S.E.2d 267, 271 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Kelly v.
Pendleton Constr. Co., 28 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Va. 1944), for the proposition that
“determination of wife’s desertion of marriage abrogating dependency . . . was
question of fact”); Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis. 367, 376 (1871) (stating desertion
“was a question of fact”).
Because desertion is a question of fact, the correct standard of review
under the IAPA is substantial evidence review. The legislature has “vested the
commissioner with the discretion to make factual determinations.” Mike Brooks,
Inc. v. House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2014). Courts are bound by these
factual determinations “if they are supported by ‘substantial evidence in the
record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa
Code § 17A.19(10)(f) (2009)). Substantial evidence is “the quantity and quality of
evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable
person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the
establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.”
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1) (2017). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely
because different conclusions may be drawn from the evidence.” Cedar Rapids
Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 845 (Iowa 2011). So long as there is
some evidence to support the finding actually made, a reviewing court must
affirm the agency’s finding of fact “even though [the court] may have drawn a
different conclusion as fact finder.” Id.24
The agency’s finding that Roger deserted Heather is supported by
substantial evidence and should be affirmed. The agency found that Heather
moved and Roger did not follow her. After Roger decided to not move with
Heather, Roger began a relationship with another woman “that lasted at least
five years and included several years of cohabitation.” Roger and Heather never
had a sexual relationship after they ceased living together, and there is no
evidence in the record of his intent to resume a marital relationship with
Heather. It is well established that a person who ceases cohabitation with his or
her spouse and cohabits with another has objectively demonstrated an intent to
desert the marital relationship. See, e.g., Redditt v. McDonald’s Rest., 990 P.2d
759, 762 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (“[C]ohabitation with another may be indicative of
a changed character in the spousal relationship.” (quoting Tatum v. Tatum, 736
P.2d 506, 509 (Okla. 1982))); Tatum, 736 P.2d at 509 (stating “cohabitation with
another” is “outward recognition that the marriage relationship had come to an
end”); In re Est. of Talerico, 137 A.3d 577, 582 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (recognizing
state supreme court had held wife’s cohabitation with another man constituted
“open disregard” of marital relationship and thus constituted desertion) (quoting
In re Crater’s Est., 93 A.2d 475, 477 (Pa. 1953)); Petachenko v. Petachenko, 350
S.E.2d 600, 602 (Va. 1986) (discussing lack of cohabitation and desertion).
II.
The majority’s second error is that it incorrectly applies the incorrect
standard of review. Even if desertion constituted an application of law to facts,
as the majority contends, this court is still required to afford the agency great
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deference in reviewing its application of law to facts. But the majority affords the
agency no such deference here.
“The legislature clearly vested the agency with the application of the law
to the facts.” Drake Univ. v. Davis, 769 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Iowa 2009) (citing Iowa
Code §§ 86.14–.24 (2003)). Our review of an agency’s application of law to facts
is thus incredibly deferential. “We are required to give the agency appropriate
deference.” Id. (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(11)(c)). When a party “challenges the
agency’s application of law to facts, we will not disrupt the agency’s decision
unless it is ‘irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.’ ” Neal v. Annett Holdings,
Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512, 526 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 763
N.W.2d 842, 857 (Iowa 2009)).
A decision is “irrational” when it is “not governed by or
according to reason.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
1195. A decision is “illogical” when it is “contrary to or devoid of
logic.” Id. at 1127. A decision is “unjustifiable” when it has no
foundation in fact or reason. See id. at 2502 (defining “unjustifiable”
as “lacking in . . . justice”); id. at 1228 (defining “justice” as “the
quality or characteristic of being just, impartial or fair”); id. (defining
“just” as “conforming to fact and reason”).
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 432 (Iowa 2010).
The drafter and leading expert on the IAPA, Professor Bonfield, explained that
this standard of review is essentially an arbitrary-and-capricious standard of
review. Id.; cf. Iowa Farm Bureau v. Env’t Prot. Comm’n, 850 N.W.2d 403, 432
(Iowa 2014) (discussing Professor Bonfield’s work in this area and describing him
as the “leading authority on administrative procedure law”).
The agency’s determination that Roger deserted Heather and was not
entitled to death benefits was not wholly arbitrary and capricious. The limits of
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reasoned judgment are determined by the purpose of the statute at issue. This
statute was intended to provide death benefits to “dependents who were wholly
dependent” upon the wage earner. Iowa Code § 85.31(1)(a) (2017). Included
among these wholly dependent persons is the nondeserting “surviving spouse”
of the wage earner. Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a). The agency’s determination that
Roger—a working man, who was in no way financially dependent on his spouse,
who was not cohabiting with his spouse, and who was instead living with another
woman—was not a wholly dependent spouse entitled to spousal death benefits
is rational and reasonable. Indeed, the agency’s determination that a financially
independent man who was living with another woman was not a wholly
dependent spouse is better reasoned and better supported by the controlling and
persuasive precedents than the majority’s contrary conclusion.
III.
“The administrative process presupposes judgment calls are to be left to
the agency. Nearly all disputes are won or lost there.” Sellers v. Emp. Appeal Bd.,
531 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). This court is “not
free to interfere with any agency finding where there is a conflict in the evidence
or when reasonable minds might disagree about the inference to be drawn from
the evidence, whether it is disputed or not.” Stephenson, 522 N.W.2d at 831.
Instead, this court “must ‘broadly and liberally’ apply the agency findings in
order to uphold, rather than defeat, the agency’s decision.” Id. (quoting Ward,
304 N.W.2d at 237). The majority goes out of its way to defeat rather than uphold
27
the agency’s decision. The majority’s approach is contrary to statute, controlling
precedents, and persuasive precedents. I respectfully dissent.
Oxley, J., joins this dissent.