IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-1136
Filed December 23, 2015
JESSICA WILBUR, Individually and As
Parent and Next Friend of I.N.,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
vs.
PAUL LAFAUCE and CHARLES PALMER,
Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Ian K. Thornhill,
Judge.
The director of the department of human services appeals the awards of
declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney fees, and Jessica Wilbur cross-
appeals the jury’s verdicts denying her monetary and punitive damages on her
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. REVERSED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON
CROSS-APPEAL.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Solicitor
General, and Charles K. Phillips and Molly M. Weber, Assistant Attorneys
General, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Martin Diaz of Martin Diaz Law Firm, Iowa City, for appellee/cross-
appellant.
Heard by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
The director of the department of human services (DHS) appeals the
awards of declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney fees, and Jessica Wilbur
cross-appeals the jury’s verdicts denying her monetary and punitive damages on
her claims against DHS child protective worker Paul LaFauce under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Because Wilbur did not establish there had been a violation of her
constitutional rights, and she no longer lives in the state of Iowa, she lacked
standing to challenge DHS future actions by declaratory action. We reverse the
district court’s award of injunctive relief and attorney fees and costs. We affirm
on Wilbur’s cross-appeal.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This suit arose as a result of dueling child abuse allegations assigned to
DHS child protective worker Paul LaFauce concerning a child, I.N., born in 2004
to Jessica Wilbur.1 The biological father of I.N. is Robert Nino. Wilbur was
fourteen years old when she gave birth to I.N. and Nino was eighteen years old.
Due to the parents’ ages at the time of I.N.’s birth, Nino was placed on the sex
offender registry. There is no decree fixing custody, visitation, or support
between Wilbur and Nino. For all but ten months of I.N.’s life, the child has
resided with her maternal grandmother Debra. Nino has sporadically visited with
the child.
In 2009, Wilbur, her two children (I.N., and a younger half-sibling, S.F.,
born in 20082), and Wilbur’s paramour, Gilbert, were residing with Debra and
1
Wilbur has since married and is now known as Jessica Coronado.
2
S.F.’s father is no longer in the picture.
3
Wilbur’s brother (age fourteen) and sister (age nineteen) in Guernsey, Poweshiek
County, Iowa.
In early October 2009, Wilbur went to Texas with Gilbert and S.F. for an
extended period, leaving I.N. with Debra. Nino arranged with both Wilbur and
Debra to have visitation with I.N. the weekend of November 6-8.
Nino went with his sister and mother to pick up I.N. from Debra’s home in
Guernsey on November 6. He noted Debra’s home did not smell good, and I.N.
was dirty and wearing ill-fitting clothing. Nino took the child to his parents’ mobile
home in Iowa City, Johnson County, Iowa, where he was residing with his
parents and his wife and their three children.3 After arriving in Iowa City in the
evening, I.N. was preparing to shower and Nino’s wife discovered blood on I.N.’s
underwear. Nino was concerned for I.N., but also concerned about his status as
a sex offender. He contacted DHS and spoke with child protective worker
LaFauce,4 who instructed Nino to take I.N. for a physical examination. Nino
expressed concerns that I.N. was not properly supervised in Debra’s home and
that I.N. had said she had been kicked in the stomach by Wilbur’s sibling in that
home.
At about 7:30 p.m. on November 7, I.N. was examined in the emergency
room at University of Iowa Hospital and Clinics (UIHC). The examination report
noted father’s “concern of sexual assault.” The examining doctor, Gregory Bell,
3
Nino was in the process of moving to Marshalltown, Iowa, but he and his family were
residing in Iowa City.
4
LaFauce covers a five-county area, which does not include Poweshiek County. His
case load involves eleven to twenty child abuse assessments, courtesy interviews and
observations of children, and dependent adult abuse investigations per month. When
“on-call,” he responds to emergency calls from all five counties.
4
noted a reddened area around I.N.’s genitals. He consulted with Dr. Oral, the
child protection team physician. Dr. Bell wrote in his report that “blood was
evident at the vulvar area of the underwear.” Dr. Bell determined that there was
“a lack of any apparent trauma herein” to I.N., and she would be discharged with
recommended follow up with Dr. Oral on Monday at the clinic. A UIHC social
worker, Valarie Van Zee, interviewed Nino and Nino’s mother during the hospital
visit. Nino told Van Zee that I.N. said her uncle (Wilbur’s brother) had hit her and
that they slept in the same bed at times. Van Zee opined in her report,5
I feel this is abuse because there is concern about patient’s
reactions to the questions asked of her about the blood on her
underwear. Patient’s father also has concerns for denial of critical
care based upon the home environment. The ETC nurse did notice
the patient was tearful when asked about the blood.
Nino was instructed to follow up with Dr. Oral and was given her phone number
to call on Monday to make an appointment.6 He took I.N. back to his parents’
home in the early morning hours of Sunday, November 8, 2009. At 1:15 a.m.,
Van Zee informed LaFauce of the results of the medical examination, and
recommended that DHS further investigate the allegations that I.N. had been
sexually abused and denied critical care.
On November 8, Debra called Nino repeatedly, and he eventually
informed Debra that he would not be bringing I.N. back to her. At about 1:10
p.m., the Johnson County Sheriff’s Department received a call from Wilbur
complaining of Nino’s failure to return I.N. to Wilbur’s mother. Officer Hipple
5
LaFauce did not receive a copy of the UIHC emergency room visit report until
November 10, 2009.
6
Nino would testify the social worker at the hospital told him not to return I.N. to Debra’s
until he talked to LaFauce and that LaFauce told him the next day not to return her to
mom or grandma.
5
wrote, “There are no custody arrangements made and child is not in danger, just
mom wants grandma to have the child while she is in Texas. I told complainant I
could not take the child from its father on her request. Ref to her attny.”
At approximately 2:00 p.m. on November 8, Debra called the DHS child
abuse hotline in Poweshiek County and reported that Nino had taken I.N. for a
visit and was refusing to return her to her home in Guernsey. The complaint was
forwarded to LaFauce as “it is a Johnson Co. case since [I.N.] lives in Iowa City
now.” DHS recorded a report that Nino was on the sex offender registry, “runs
drugs and guns,” and that many people lived in the mobile home where I.N. was
staying. LaFauce consulted with the Poweshiek County DHS supervisor, Judy
Davidson, and then spoke with Johnson Assistant County Attorney Beth Beglin,
and Juvenile Assistant County Attorney, Kristin Parks, on Sunday, November 8
around 6:00 p.m. Attorney Parks suggested to LaFauce that he ask Nino to
voluntarily place I.N. into foster care. At about 8 p.m. on November 8, LaFauce
and a deputy sheriff went to Nino’s home and obtained Nino’s signature on a
voluntary foster care placement agreement.7 I.N. then was taken to a foster
family. Nino would later testify he believed he did the right thing by agreeing to
the voluntary placement on that Sunday.
On November 9 at 11:30 a.m., the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office
received a request from an attorney, Eric Sedig, to do a “welfare check” on I.N.
because her father “will not give her back/father is a registered sex offender.”
Officer Kevin Elliot spoke with Nino at his home at about 12:20 p.m. and was told
7
Voluntary foster care placements last no more than ninety days. DHS policy at the
time was that the signature of one parent or guardian on that agreement was sufficient.
6
“LaFauce from DHS has the child, [I.N.], for an evaluation due to possible abuse
while child was at her grandparents’ house.”
On the afternoon of November 9, LaFauce communicated to Debra that
he was investigating reports of child abuse, and I.N. was in foster care. Debra
told LaFauce Nino was I.N.’s father and I.N. “loves her dad and wanted to go with
him last weekend.” She stated no legal custody had been established in Iowa
courts for custody between either parent, Debra did not have legal custody, and
nothing was arranged by Wilbur in writing in terms of Debra’s ability to seek
medical treatment for I.N. while Wilbur was in Texas. LaFauce asked Debra to
have Wilbur call him.
Wilbur learned about I.N.’s placement from Debra and Nino. At some
point thereafter she began the car trip back from Texas to return to Iowa. (Wilbur
testified it was a twenty-hour drive and she and Gilbert arrived in Iowa in the
early morning hours of Tuesday, November 10.)
LaFauce arranged to have I.N. interviewed at the area Child Protective
Center (CPC). On Tuesday afternoon, November 10, I.N. underwent a physical
and gynecological examination and was interviewed at the CPC. During the
interview, I.N. stated she lived with her grandmother, aunt, and uncle. She
stated her mother was in Texas with I.N.’s little sister and I.N.’s stepdad, Gilbert,
who “lives in Texas.” She stated her aunt and uncle sometimes babysit her; she
did not report being hurt by grandmother, aunt, or uncle.
At 4:30 p.m. on November 10, Wilbur contacted LaFauce. She told him
she just arrived in Iowa and had been in Texas the last two months, she was
engaged, and had been in Texas caring for her fiancé’s relatives. LaFauce
7
conveyed to Wilbur that I.N.’s CPC examination was completed and “updated her
on the medical evaluation and interview results.” Wilbur told LaFauce Nino was
I.N.’s father and she wants him to be in I.N.’s life. She also told him there had
been no legal custody established in court. LaFauce spoke with Wilbur “about
the importance of getting legal custody established and the importance of a more
formal custodial and visitation arrangement especially if she is going to be gone
so much and be out of the state for extended periods of time.” LaFauce told
Wilbur that Nino had voluntarily placed I.N. in foster care but had then asked that
the child now be placed with his sister Ruby until further investigation was
complete and Debra’s home could be assessed, to which Wilbur responded
“good.” LaFauce also told Wilbur that DHS was not open the next day (which
was Veterans’ Day) and that he would be unavailable that day as he was on call,
and he would be out of office Thursday evening and all day Friday, but would “try
to get a courtesy[8] observation request for her and [Debra’s] home done by the
end of this week or early next week.” His notes indicate he also told her,
[O]nce the courtesy interviews and observations were complete if
the home is safe [I.N.] could be returned as early as . . . next week.
I told her that due to the nature of the allegations I would need to
consult with the Johnson Co. Attorney on Thursday to review the
case with them.
On November 11, Attorney Natalie Cronk telephoned LaFauce and stated
she represented Wilbur, who wanted her child back. LaFauce informed her that
the child had been placed in voluntary foster care by the father. Cronk asserted
the father had no right to make such an agreement, with which LaFauce
8
“Courtesy” in this context refers to one county’s DHS seeking assistance from another
county.
8
disagreed. Cronk asked how the mother could get her child back and LaFauce
informed her of the concerns about the grandmother’s home.
On Wednesday November 11, I.N. was transferred to Nino’s sister Ruby.
Ruby signed a safety plan agreeing she would not allow contact between I.N.
and Nino, she would “assist with all visitations between I.N. and her parents,”
would comply with all DHS requests for services, and keep eye contact with the
child if she was playing outside. The safety plan was not signed by either of
I.N.’s parents.
On Friday, November 13, Cronk, on behalf of Wilbur, filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, asserting I.N.’s removal was illegal and demanding the
return of the child. Notice was served at LaFauce’s office that day. LaFauce
was working in Des Moines that day and did not return to the office until 6 or 7
p.m. A hearing on that petition was set for December 1.
At about 4:45 p.m. on Monday, November 16, LaFauce spoke with Wilbur
and informed her he would be requesting that Poweshiek County DHS make a
courtesy observation of her home, conduct courtesy interviews, and make an
assessment as to I.N.’s safety.
On Tuesday, November 17, Poweshiek County DHS worker Megan See
conducted the courtesy assessment of Debra’s home at LaFauce’s request. See
spoke with Wilbur that day; she did not speak with Debra as she was not there.
Wilbur told See she would not be comfortable having her sister watching I.N.
because she was developmentally delayed and had poor anger control. After
hearing from See at about 3 p.m., LaFauce prepared a safety plan to present to
Wilbur pursuant to which I.N. would be supervised by appropriate caretakers and
9
not Wilbur’s sister, and would provide Debra with “appropriate paperwork so that
I.N.’s medical and educational needs are met when [Wilbur] is not available.”
LaFauce contacted Wilbur and they made an appointment for her and Debra to
come to his office to discuss matters on November 18 at 4:45 p.m.
On November 18, at about 2:50 p.m., Wilbur called LaFauce and informed
him she would not sign the safety plan on advice of her attorney.
In a letter dated November 18, Cronk wrote to LaFauce and Paige Casteel
(LaFauce’s supervisor) asserting, “It is . . . my understanding you have no Order
granting authority to restrain, place, or otherwise withhold the child from her
mother. In effect, you have kidnaped her from her mother.” The letter continued,
“Unless you can provide me with documentation to the contrary today, by the
close of business, my client intends to pick up her child at the home of Ruby . . .
today where you have put [I.N.], directly following your receipt of this letter.”
Cronk’s letter was served at LaFauce’s office at 4:15 p.m.
LaFauce called Wilbur at about 5 p.m. and left a message asking if she
was still coming to his office.
Wilbur did not attend the meeting scheduled with LaFauce. Rather, she,
Debra, Cronk, and a private investigator arrived at Ruby’s home and Wilbur
stated she was there to get I.N. The private investigator was recording the
interaction.9 A chaotic situation ensued. Several members of Nino’s family lived
in the same neighborhood as Ruby. I.N., who had been shopping with another
aunt, arrived in a car. I.N. saw her mother and gave her a hug, saying something
9
The video recording of the interaction is very difficult to see as it was dark at the time of
the recording.
10
to the effect, “I didn’t think I would see you.” Nino got a call from his sister,
Becky, saying Wilbur and her mother were trying to take I.N. Nino called
LaFauce and said Wilbur was trying to take I.N. from Ruby. Ruby got a call from
LaFauce and while on the phone with him at about 5:20 p.m., Wilbur carried I.N.
to her vehicle. Ruby and Nino (who had arrived at the scene) protested, but
Wilbur and Debra drove off with I.N., leaving behind Cronk and the private
investigator. Nino attempted to follow Wilbur’s vehicle and “was thinking about
stopping them. And then I realized my daughter was in the car and I just—I got
upset.” Nino called the sheriff’s office and was told there was nothing they could
do.
Johnson County DHS requested courtesy welfare checks be made at
Debra’s home in Poweshiek County because DHS had not been able to speak
with Debra about concerns of Wilbur’s sister caring for I.N. Casteel later testified
those attempts were unsuccessful in speaking with Debra because they “didn’t at
any time find anybody when they went out.”
On December 9, LaFauce completed his child abuse assessment report.10
I.N. was back in Poweshiek County, not Johnson County. LaFauce later
completed an affidavit, which was used as the basis for a child-in-need-of-
assistance petition filed in Poweshiek County. The petition asserted I.N. was
likely to suffer harmful effects as a result of the failure of a parent, guardian, or
custodian or other member of the household in which the child resides to
exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child.
10
DHS is required to complete a child abuse assessment within twenty working days.
11
On January 5, 2010, Wilbur filed a “petition at law, for declaratory
judgment, for injunction and jury demand,” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging: she had sole custody of I.N. pursuant to Iowa Code section 600B.40;
Nino had no custodial rights to the child; “[a]t the time when [LaFauce] obtained
the voluntary foster care placement agreement from Mr. Nino, [he] knew that
Robert Nino did not have a court order granting him custodial or visitation rights”;
LaFauce transferred I.N. out of the foster home, “and without any legal basis,
transferred her care to the sister of Robert Nino,” who “was not a qualified foster
care provider, nor was her home a qualified foster care home”; on November 12,
LaFauce was advised by the county attorney’s office that the fact Nino was a
registered sex offender did not prevent him from having contact with his
biological children and “there was no legal basis to proceed to remove [I.N.] from
her mother’s home”; despite a writ of habeas corpus being filed on November 13,
and without legal basis, “LaFauce and IDHS continued to refuse to return” the
child to Wilbur; on November 16, LaFauce prepared and sent parental
notification of a child-abuse assessment advising Wilbur two allegations of child
abuse were being assessed, one of which was allowing access to the child by a
registered sex offender; on November 18, Wilbur advised DHS that unless it
could produce an order granting authority to restrain or otherwise withhold the
child from Wilbur, she “would take steps to pick up the child at the home of Mr.
Nino’s sister”; DHS “failed to produce any order”; Wilbur went to recover the child
from Nino’s sister and “LaFauce sought to intervene and prevent [Wilbur] from
recovering her child”; and Wilbur and her daughter had constitutionally protected
12
liberty, property, privacy, and procedural and substantive due process rights in
their continued parent-child relationship” with which LaFauce interfered.
Wilbur asked for monetary and punitive damages against LaFauce. She
also asserted:
51. Further, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [Wilbur] seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief against Charles Krogmeier,[11] in his
official capacity as the Director of the Iowa Department of Human
Services, declaring (enjoining), as a violation of Iowa law and
constitutional principles, IDHS’ policy of taking possession and
control of children by obtaining signatures on voluntary foster care
placement agreements from parents who have not yet established
custodial rights.
52. In addition, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [Wilbur] seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief against Charles Krogmeier, in his
official capacity as the Director of the Iowa Department of Human
Services, declaring (enjoining), as a violation of Iowa law and
constitutional principles, IDHS’ policy of taking possession and
control of children by obtaining signatures on voluntary foster care
placement agreements from only the non-custodial parent.
An answer was filed on behalf of LaFauce and the director in which it was
asserted, in part, Iowa Code section 600B.40 had no application in cases where
the father has acknowledged paternity and “the grandmother appears to have
been serving as the child’s custodian during much of the time prior to the
investigation.” The answer also stated, “[T]he grandmother allowed the child to
go with Nino, DHS interviewed Nino and “discussed concerns about the child,”
the child was evaluated and no evidence of physical trauma was found, but “[i]t is
denied the evaluations reached the conclusions as to the occurrence of abuse.”
Further, “LaFauce was advised that neither parent had a court order and that the
nature of their custodial arrangements was informal.” It was asserted the
placement with Nino’s sister was “with the agreement of both parents.” The
11
Charles Palmer was later substituted as defendant director of DHS.
13
answer also asserted, “It is admitted that the parent child relationship is protected
by the constitution. It is denied that the provisions cited by [Wilbur] were violated
in this matter, or that [Wilbur] has standing to raise them. . . .” A number of
affirmative defenses were raised, including that Wilbur lacked standing to assert
a Fourth Amendment claim on her own behalf, or to assert rights other than
those of the named plaintiffs, the defendants were entitled to qualified or absolute
immunity, and “[t]he issues regarding the validity of the foster placement
agreements and safety plans are moot.”
LaFauce and the director filed a motion for summary judgment. In support
of that motion, they argued, in part, that Wilbur had not stated a violation of a
clearly established federal right that would entitle her to injunctive relief, and she
had failed to show she will suffer harm if injunctive relief is not issued or to allege
a personal stake in the future of DHS’s policy regarding voluntary placement—
”She lives in Texas and does not allow the Iowa father to see the child.” The
motion stated Wilbur did not allege any ongoing threat that the challenged
practices applied to her. LaFauce also argued he was entitled to qualified
immunity. The district court ruled disputed material facts precluded summary
judgment, and the matter proceeded to trial.
Jury trial regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
Wilbur’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were tried to a jury on January 28
through February 4, 2014. Wilbur’s monetary claims against LaFauce were
rejected by the jury, which found LaFauce did not violate Wilbur or I.N.’s
constitutional rights of privacy or due process.
14
Request for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.
On February 5, 2014, while the jury was deliberating the damages claims,
the district court heard Wilbur’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. The
director objected as Wilbur now lived in Texas. The director also argued it was
not at all clear on what constitutional grounds Wilbur was seeking injunctive
relief. The court noted the objections and proceeded to receive evidence.
Cronk—having withdrawn as counsel for Wilbur—testified that prior to
November 2009 she had seen the use of a voluntary foster care placement
agreement signed by the noncustodial parent only five times. The voluntary
foster care placement agreement form (form 470-0715) used in November 2009
stated it must be signed by a parent, guardian or child age 18 or older. However,
the form was revised in December 2011, and the DHS manual in July 27, 2012,
and now requires, “Both parents’ signatures are necessary when both have
custody of the child.” Cronk testified she had not seen the revised form used
where both parents had signed, but had seen it used where only one parent had
signed.
Prior to Cronk testifying about DHS’s use of safety plans, the director
objected on relevancy grounds because the petition did not raise any claim as to
safety plans. The court noted the objection. Cronk was asked if she had seen a
safety plan used “to take a child out of their home and into another place.” Cronk
testified she has seen the use of safety plans for out-of-home placement not
involving a CINA in “a couple hundred” cases. The DHS manual states safety
plans are to be used “when it’s been determined that a child is conditionally safe
in their home.” They can be signed by a “parent/caregiver.”
15
It was Cronk’s opinion that DHS cannot employ and parents cannot
engage with DHS in a voluntary foster care arrangement for the best interests of
12
the child absent imminent danger. She opined, “DHS should never seek the
removal of a child under any circumstances unless the child cannot safely remain
in the home.”
Wendy Rickman, a division administrator at DHS, was asked, “What
statutory authority was there for the use of a Voluntary Foster Care Placement
Agreement such as this form back in 2009?” She responded:
The federal statutory authority comes from primarily two sections of
the Social Security Act. Title IV-E really under that Act articulates
how foster care payments are paid for or how the federal partners
share in the payment of foster care placement, so that’s more of a
fiscal section. And that section speaks to voluntary placements.
The second is Title IV-B, which lays out more of the federal
expectation around our practice with our families. So one is fiscal,
one is more practice. In the Iowa Code, we use . . . 232 of the Iowa
Code.
Rickman testified about the changes in DHS policy with regard to
voluntary foster care placement agreements; the department now seeks both
parents’ signatures. She stated that policy was a result of “moving toward more
fulsome agreement of all parties in a case over a period of time.” Plaintiff’s
counsel asked, “And did that grow out of a belief that there was a fundamental
constitutional right that each had to the relationship with the child?” Rickman
answered, “Yes.”
12
Iowa Code section 232.78 governs “temporary custody of a child pursuant to ex parte
order” of the court. Section 232.79 allows a “peace officer or juvenile court officer” to
“take a child into custody” without a court order and without the consent of a parent,
guardian or custodian if the child is in “imminent danger” and “[t]here is not enough time
to apply for an order under section 232.78.”
16
On cross, Rickman repeated there are federal and state legal authorities
for voluntary placement agreements. She also acknowledged Iowa Code
chapter 234 deals with temporary custody and section 234.35 “talks about
circumstances under which we can get voluntary placements into place.”13
Concerning the change in policy regarding parents’ signatures on
voluntary foster care placement, she explained:
Primarily the issue mostly centered around noninvolvement—our
inability to involve noncustodial fathers. So over the past several
years, there’s been a much deeper understanding of the need for
typically dads in their families and so we’ve put a much heavier
push on the idea of that both parents need to be involved. But the
issue grew initially because our primary relationship typically was
with mothers and that we were not doing the job that we should do
to involve the fathers in the case planning around their children.
Rickman expressed the opinion that requiring the signature of both parents or
even the “custodial” parent on either the voluntary foster care placement
agreement or a safety plan in all instances would be detrimental. She explained
that
our requirement for due diligence of our workers to involve both
parents and other family members in this case planning activity is
adequate. To further limit our ability to work with the family unit as
it exists or as we can ascertain would limit our ability to do good
case planning on the part of kids and their parents.
The trial judge also asked its own questions of Rickman. The court asked
what authorizes DHS to have a safety plan with a nonparent that limits contact
with the parents. Rickman said DHS would not have such authority; “it’s not
effective.” She testified Ruby had been placed in a difficult situation here.
13
Iowa Code section 234.35(c) states DHS is responsible for paying the cost of foster
care for a child “[w]hen the department has agreed to provide foster care services for the
child for a period of not more than ninety days on the basis of a signed placement
agreement between the department and the child’s parent or guardian.”
17
The trial judge also asked what authority existed for DHS to ask Wilbur to
enter into a safety plan before returning the child to her; “I’m talking about the
fact scenario we have here where, again, there’s an argument that can be made
that the child was, quote unquote, being held hostage until the safety plan was
negotiated.” Rickman explained:
Specifically to this case, I believe the mom knew and
understood and agreed with the idea that dad was a good
placement for the kid, whether it was visitation or spending time
with him. I believe she was in agreement with the placement at the
aunt’s house. I think we had a good conversation with her about
that. I think they saw that relative as an appropriate placement. A
lot of the concern that we had about [maternal sister], the sister in
the grandmother’s house, that concern actually came to us from the
mom. When we interviewed the mom, she talked about [sister]
kicking and biting and being physically aggressive and not
understanding what her actions meant and baby-sitting. So there
had been, in this particular case, a set of conversations that
conveyed to us, conveyed to that worker—and it’s a typical way
that these case progress—that she was in agreement with where
we are and was in agreement with the idea that she would remedy
the situation at Debra’s, that she intended to go back there and that
if we had concerns, she was in agreement that that should be
remedied and we’d do it in a safety plan. And that went all the way
through the afternoon until, frankly, [I.N.] was taken out of the
aunt’s house.
....
Q. [By Court] And again, I’m not trying to split hairs, but you
used the word return [the] child to her and I guess that’s what I—
one of the things I’m hanging up on here is: By saying you’re on a
path to return the child to her, that’s an admission that you were in
possession of the child, and that something else had to happen
before the child could go back to mom? A. I think—I do think that’s
true.
Q. [By Court] And if I’m reading your answer right or
understanding your answer right, you believe that mom up to that
point had consented? A. Okay.
Q. [By Court] And then is it true that after Ms. Wilbur
retrieved the child from Ruby’s house that no other action was
immediately taken to go after the child or somehow obtain custody
or an order to get this child back away from mom? A. No. I think—
We asked for a safety check at that point at the grandmother’s
house and I can’t recall exactly how that was carried out[.]
18
The court also asked that LaFauce’s supervisor, Paige Casteel, be called
back to testify. Neither party had questions for Casteel. However, the court
asked Casteel what her “impression was” as to Nino’s questions about wanting
advice on custody. After Casteel explained that Nino was informed DHS did not
give legal advice, the court then asked, “So from that conversation, were you
aware that there were no formal custody orders in place?” She stated they knew
paternity had been established and he’d had contact with the child but there was
never a formal custody or visitation arrangement. The court continued
questioning Casteel about what authority Nino had over the child; “So you are
telling me that just based upon Mr. Nino’s status as a biological parent, you felt
that he had some sort of custody rights over [I.N.]?” Casteel explained, “Yes.
And he had her at that time.”
The court asked Casteel on what authority DHS asked Wilbur to sign a
safety plan. Casteel explained a safety plan is a voluntary document and if a
parent is not agreeable “it could lead to something that we talk to the County
Attorney about if we need to further protect the child.” The court asked if Wilbur
signing the safety plan was a condition of having I.N. returned, and Casteel said,
“No. That’s not what we were thinking then.” The court continued to question
Casteel.
The district court required the parties to provide post-trial filings. From
plaintiff, the court stated, “[W]hat I want from you is, again, a summary of the
relief you’re requesting and your authority for that. Presumably you may want to
address the issues raised by the defense, the standing issues and whether it’s a
facial challenge or an as-applied challenge.” From the director, the court stated,
19
“[O]bviously what position—what you’re asking me to do or what you believe I
don’t have any authority to do given the procedural posture of the case.”
When plaintiff filed her post-trial brief, she also filed an affidavit in which
Wilbur stated she lived in Texas but two of her children returned to Iowa each
summer and resided with their grandmother and their fathers lived in Iowa.
In its June 30, 2014 ruling, the district court set out Wilbur’s assertions and
the parties’ arguments concerning the requested declaratory ruling and injunctive
relief.
Plaintiff asserts the Court should declare that permitting only
one parent to sign a child into foster care violates the constitutional
rights of the other parent, where the other parent has the right to
custody of that child, and it also violates the rights of the child, who
has a privacy interest in not being seized from the care of a
custodial parent. Plaintiff further asserts that Iowa law, under Iowa
Code § 600B.40, recognizes that when a child is born out-of-
wedlock, the mother has sole custody. Plaintiff contends that a
[Voluntary Foster Care Placement Agreement] VFCPA can never
be used with an out-of-wedlock father who has not acknowledged
paternity, or one where paternity has been established but no
custodial rights have been adjudicated by the Court. Plaintiff also
contends that, when the Court has established custodial rights to a
child, it is a violation of the custodial parent’s right to the custody of
the child to allow a non-custodial parent to separately consent to
the transfer of custody to Iowa DHS. Plaintiff requests the Court
enjoin Iowa DHS from creating policies or procedures, or carrying
out practices, that violate these requests.
With respect to Safety Plans, Plaintiff argues that using a
safety plan to remove or keep a child from her usual and customary
home, without the consent of the child’s primary custodian, is
unconstitutional. Plaintiff further argues that the use of a Safety
Plan to prevent a parent from having physical contact with her child,
without the consent of the parent, also is unconstitutional. . . .
....
Defendants’ position is that, without a constitutional violation,
there can be no relief, and once the jury determined there was no
constitutional violation, the right to any type of equitable relief
vanished. Defendants further argue that even if Plaintiff had
prevailed on the constitutional claims, Plaintiff would not be entitled
to equitable relief because Plaintiff has not proven an immediate
20
and real threat of irreparable future injury. Defendants contend it is
undisputed that Jessica and [I.N.] no longer reside in Iowa and
moved to Texas in 2011, where they have remained. Defendants
also contend there is no immediate threat to Plaintiff from Iowa
VFCPAs, and Plaintiff has no personal stake in the use of such
agreements by DHS in the future. Defendants assert Plaintiff has
not shown a real and immediate threat of irreparable harm, and
Plaintiff did not present any evidence that Plaintiff may be subject to
future placement of the child based on the child’s relationship with
her father. Defendants further assert that Plaintiff is not entitled to
declaratory relief because Plaintiff has not shown an immediate and
real future controversy with the Iowa DHS.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has not formally sought
injunctive or declaratory relief with regard to Safety Plans, which
Defendants claim is evidenced by the pleadings.
Defendants further argue that the claims for equitable relief
have been rendered moot by the DHS’s new policy of requiring the
signature of both parents on VFCPAs.
Finally, Defendants argue that VFCPAs are authorized by
the Iowa Code. Defendants assert they must seek a VFCPA prior
to seeking formal removal of the child (pursuant to Iowa Code
§ 232.78(1)(a)) and the DHS is empowered to pay for such
placements (pursuant to Iowa Code § 232.35(1)(c)). Defendants
further assert that pursuant to § 232.78(1)(a), placements may
occur for up to 90 days, or longer for mentally disabled children if
reviewed by a board or a Court.
The court concluded Wilbur
has standing to seek equitable relief, in that she has a sufficient
stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial
resolution of that controversy. [Wilbur] is a proper party to state the
equitable claims. [Wilbur] has made allegations that she and [I.N.]
were victims of unconstitutional acts, which she seeks to have
declared unconstitutional and enjoined, and her affidavit
establishes that she has continuing contact with the State of Iowa
and potentially could be at risk as to future potentially
unconstitutional acts on the part of DHS. The Court accepts
[Wilbur]’s affidavit over the objection of Defendants because it
directly relates to all of the equitable issues presented by the
parties in this litigation. The affidavit is properly considered as part
of Plaintiff’s post-trial filings because the affidavit is provided in
support of the equitable issues the parties previously were ordered
to address following trial of the other issues presented in this
action. Further, there has been a full opportunity for Defendants to
litigate all of the equitable issues, particularly given the multiple and
21
repeated references to these issues in Plaintiff’s pleadings
throughout the course of this matter.
The district court continued:
The Court finds [Wilbur] has met her burden of proof
regarding the declaratory and injunctive relief she seeks, and the
Court concludes that [Wilbur] is entitled to declaratory and
injunctive relief with respect to the equitable issues presented for
the Court’s consideration. Wendy Rickman’s testimony establishes
that the DHS has come to believe, as shown through the
development of new policy, that there is a fundamental
constitutional right that each parent has to the relationship with a
child. Ms. Rickman’s testimony also established that the 2005 audit
of DHS by the federal government triggered a process that began
in 2006 in which DHS sought to restructure its practices towards a
more “fulsome agreement” of all parties to a case. Ms. Rickman’s
testimony shows that DHS has been aware for several years that
its practice of obtaining only one signature on a [voluntary foster
care placement agreement] VFCPA was a potential violation of the
constitutional rights of a parent-child relationship. Further, DHS
has gone on to change its practices and policies with regard to
VFCPA. While the Heartland [v. Academy Community Church v.
Waddle, 427 F.3d 525, 530 (8th Cir. 2005),] case makes reference
only to federal courts having authority to issue an injunction to
prevent state officials from violating the Constitution without running
afoul of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court finds it is a logical
extension of the Heartland case to apply to state court cases,
particularly where, as here, testimony of a DHS representative
shows that the DHS was aware that its practice regarding VFCPAs
potentially was in violation of the parent-child relationship. While
DHS has relied on provisions of Iowa Code chapter 232 as
statutory authority for VFCPAs, the Court concludes DHS’s reliance
on Iowa Code § 232.78 et seq. does not provide authority for foster
care placement in the context of child abuse investigations, as
VFCPAs stem from Iowa Code § 232.175.
Thus, the Court hereby declares that it is unconstitutional for
the Iowa Department of Human Services to use Voluntary Foster
Care Placement Agreements signed by only one parent when the
use of such Agreements interferes with the custodial rights of the
other parent, and it is unconstitutional for the Iowa Department of
Human Services to use Voluntary Foster Care Placement
Agreements signed by a non-custodial parent or a parent who has
not yet established any custodial rights. Further, the Iowa
Department of Human Services hereby is enjoined from engaging
in such practices in the State of Iowa. An injunction is appropriate
given that the issues involved in this case pertain specifically to the
22
parent-child relationship, which is a fundamental liberty interest
under the United States Constitution. Interference with this
fundamental liberty interest may lead to invasion or threatened
invasion of a right; to substantial injury and/or damages; and may
cause irreparable damage.
Turning to Plaintiff’s request for relief regarding Safety Plans,
the Court concludes that Ms. Rickman’s testimony establishes that
DHS has both parents sign the Safety Plan because each parent
has a constitutional right to the parent-child relationship. Ms.
Rickman’s testimony also establishes that DHS has no authority to
utilize Safety Plans signed by third parties, or to utilize Safety Plans
that restrict access to a child by a parent who has not signed the
Safety Plan.
Thus, the Court hereby declares that it is unconstitutional for
the Iowa Department of Human Services to utilize Safety Plans that
remove or keep a child from his or her usual and customary home,
without the consent of the custodial parent; to utilize Safety Plans to
prevent a parent from having physical contact with the child, without
the consent of that parent; and to utilize Safety Plans with third-
parties/non-parents of the child. Further, the Iowa Department of
Human Services hereby is enjoined from engaging in such
practices in the State of Iowa. The injunction is appropriate for the
same reasons the Court found fit to establish injunctive relief with
respect to the Voluntary Foster Care Placement Agreements.
The Court finds that the jury’s verdict in this case does not
preclude the Court from entering equitable relief against the DHS.
While the specific facts of Plaintiff’s case did not provide a basis for
her to prevail on her legal claims, the Court views the equitable
claims as a different matter because said claims specifically pertain
to the policies and practices of the Iowa DHS, regardless of
whether those policies and practices apply to Plaintiff or to any
other parent with DHS involvement. As Plaintiff states in her
Response to Defendants’ Brief on Equitable Relief, “the facts on
which the jury may have based its verdict may have nothing to do
with the constitutionality of the challenged practices and
procedures.” See Response, p. 2. The Court’s ordering of
declaratory and injunctive relief is intended to ensure that DHS
does not continue with what it has admitted to be an
unconstitutional practice. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim is not
rendered moot by the DHS’s 2012 policy change regarding
VFCPAs. Additionally, as Plaintiff points out, it does not appear the
2012 policy change specifically incorporates the DHS’s position
regarding Safety Plans.
The trial court assessed costs one-half to Wilbur and one-half to the director.
23
The court asked for briefs on “whether an award of attorney fees may be
appropriate under these circumstances.” Wilbur requested attorney fees and
expenses. The director objected on two grounds: (1) Wilbur was not a “prevailing
party” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (2) even if she achieved some
degree of success, the fees requested must be reduced to coincide with the
limited success achieved.
Attorney fees. The district court concluded Wilbur
was successful in obtaining equitable relief against DHS, and
without Plaintiff bringing her claims before the Court, it is unlikely
that DHS would have voluntarily made the changes to the policies
and practices that now have been enjoined by the Court.
Regardless of the outcome of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims,
Plaintiff achieved a significant victory in obtaining the equitable
relief order by the Court. The legal relationship between Plaintiff
and DHS was altered, in that DHS can no longer engage in
unconstitutional practices related to safety plans and . . . VRCPAs.
Further, to the extent that any of Plaintiff’s children are again
subject to DHS proceedings in Iowa, the fact that DHS has been
enjoined from engaging in unconstitutional practices directly
benefits Plaintiff.
The court awarded Wilbur attorney fees and expenses to be paid by DHS (not
LaFauce or the director) in the amounts of $8212.50 for attorney trial time,
$65,616 for other attorney fees, and $7138 in expenses related to the “equitable
issues” and the Martin Diaz Law Firm, and $17,990 in attorney fees and $7.84 in
expenses for Natalie Cronk’s work prior to withdrawal.
The director appeals the awards of declaratory and injunctive relief and
attorney fees, and Wilbur cross-appeals the jury’s verdicts denying her monetary
and punitive damages. Our supreme court consolidated the appeals, stayed the
injunctive relief granted by the district court, and transferred the case to us.
24
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review constitutional claims de novo. Hensler v. City of Davenport,
790 N.W.2d 569, 578 (Iowa 2010). “In doing so, we independently evaluate the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. We are not bound by the district court’s
findings of fact. Id. We do, however, give deference to those findings because
the district court had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id.III. Discussion.
A. General principles.
We begin by acknowledging the constitutional rights of parents and
children in familial association.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
a parent’s “care, custody, and control” of a child is a fundamental
liberty interest given the greatest possible protection. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 (1972). A parent’s interest in
preserving family relationships is best protected by the Due
Process Clause. Alsager v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10, 21–22
(S.D. Iowa 1975), aff’d in part, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
The Supreme Court has also recognized that a parent’s right
to the care and custody of a child is reciprocated by the child’s
liberty interest in familial association, likewise protected by the Due
Process Clause. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983)
(noting reciprocal nature of interest); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–05 (1977) (noting the private realm
of family relationships); Wallis [v. Spencer], 202 F.3d [1126,] 1136
[(9th Cir. 1999)] (“Parents and children have a well-elaborated
constitutional right to live together without governmental
interference.”).
F.K. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 801, 808 (Iowa 2001); see also In re J.L., 779
N.W.2d 481, 489 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (“A child’s liberty interest in familial
association is protected by the Due Process Clause and the State may only
interfere with this liberty interest after providing the children due process of law.”).
25
Those rights, however, are not absolute. In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d 602, 608
(Iowa 2002); see also Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365,
1371 (8th Cir. 1996).
“[T]the liberty interest in familial relations is limited by the
compelling governmental interest in the protection of minor
children, particularly in circumstances where the protection is
considered necessary as against the parents themselves.”
Moreover, as the First Circuit has correctly noted, “[t]he right to
family integrity clearly does not include a constitutional right to be
free from child abuse investigations.”
Thomason, 85 F.3d at 1371 (citations omitted); see also F.K., 630 N.W.2d at 809(stating the State “bears the heavy responsibility of assur[ing] that every child
within its borders receives proper care and treatment” and “[p]rompt attention to
the duty is demanded when the health or safety of the child is at risk” (citations
omitted)).
The jury rejected Wilbur’s claims that LaFauce and the director violated
her or I.N.’s procedural or substantive due process rights and I.N.’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Nonetheless, the district court granted injunctive relief
“intend[ing] to ensure that DHS does not continue with what it has admitted to be
an unconstitutional practice.”14
B. Director’s appeal. Here, the district court granted declaratory and
injunctive relief upon its finding Wilbur “potentially could be at risk as to future
potentially unconstitutional acts on the part of DHS.” The director argues that
14
We have reviewed this record and cannot conclude there exists an “admitted”
unconstitutional practice. As best we can discern, the district court is referring to Ms.
Rickman’s testimony, the sum and substance of which was that DHS policy with respect
to parental signatures on voluntary foster care agreements has changed as a result of
“moving toward more fulsome agreement of all parties in a case over a period of time.”
Plaintiff’s counsel asked, “And did that grow out of a belief that there was a fundamental
constitutional right that each had to the relationship with the child?” Ms. Rickman
answered, “Yes.” This is not an admission of an unconstitutional practice.
26
Wilbur lacks standing on the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and
alternatively, the standards for relief have not been met. We agree.
Here, Wilbur sought to have certain practices of the Iowa DHS declared
unconstitutional and enjoined from future use.15 To obtain declaratory relief, “[a]
plaintiff must (1) have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and
(2) be injuriously affected.” Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Iowa 2008)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To satisfy the first element, we
require the litigant to allege some type of injury different from the population in
general. To satisfy the second element, the injury cannot be ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical,’ but must be ‘concrete’ and ‘actual or imminent.’” Hawkeye
Foodservice Dist., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 606 (Iowa
2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The jury found that Wilbur’s procedural and substantive due process rights
and I.N.’s procedural and substantive due process and Fourth Amendment rights
had not been violated.16 Nonetheless, the district court—relying upon Wilbur’s
post-trial affidavit—concluded Wilbur, who asserted she lived in Texas, had
standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief because of her “continuing
contact with the State of Iowa” and that she “potentially could be at risk as to
future potentially unconstitutional acts on the part of DHS.”17 This is not sufficient
to establish a legal interest in her claims for injunctive relief.
15
As already noted above, the director objected to any assertions regarding safety plans
because such claims were not included in the petition or amended petition.
16
We will address Wilbur’s challenge to the jury findings later in this opinion.
17
Wilbur asserts in her appeal brief that standing was not properly raised as an issue
and that “the word ‘standing’ when complaining about the relief sought” was not used
prior to trial. The record belies this claim. The defendants asserted Wilbur lacked
standing in their answer and on numerous occasions thereafter.
27
Even considering Wilbur’s post-trial affidavit, her claim that she may be in
Iowa and perhaps subject to DHS action in the future is no different than the
general public, and does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that
she would again be subject to the DHS practices of which she complains.
Godfrey, 752 N.W.2d at 423.
This court discussed the injury element of standing in Banks v. Iowa
Department of Public Safety, No. 10-0683, 2010 WL 4140456, at *3-4 (Iowa Ct.
App. Oct. 20, 2010). There, the appellant sought to “vindicate a public interest”
by challenging allegedly illegal governmental action. Banks, 2010 WL 4140456,
at *3; see Godfrey, 752 N.W.2d at 420 (concluding “cases involving actions by
private persons to enforce public rights may be brought under the personal-
interest alternative to the first element” where there is a specific personal or legal
interest in the litigation). We observed that under Godfrey the challenger must
allege some type of injury different from the population in general. Banks, 2010
WL 4140456, at *3. We quoted Alons v. Iowa District Court, 698 N.W.2d 858,
867-68 (Iowa 2005):
[W]hen the asserted harm is a “generalized grievance” shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that
harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.
Thus,
a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance
about government—claiming only harm to his and
every citizen’s interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more
directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the
public at large—does not provide a basis for standing.
On appeal, Wilbur states only, “the fathers of I.N. and S.F., both of whom live in
the State of Iowa, could approach DHS and ‘consent’ to remove a child in Iowa during a
visit without [her] consent. She has standing.”
28
The claimed nonobservance of the law, “standing alone,” affects
only the generalized interest of all citizens, and such an injury is
abstract in nature, which is not sufficient for standing.
Id. at *3 (citations omitted). In Banks, we found the appellant’s past injury was
not sufficient to establish standing to challenge the government’s actions through
declaratory action. Id. at *4. Wilbur’s interest to prevent possible future injury
rises no higher than any other member of the general public. We therefore
conclude Wilbur has no standing to challenge DHS’s actions by declaratory
action.
Our self-imposed standing inquiry has two distinct prongs,
each of which a plaintiff must satisfy to proceed with a claim. “Our
cases have determined that a complaining party must (1) have a
specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be
injuriously affected.” Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of
Shenandoah, 686 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Iowa 2004); see also Alons v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858, 869 (Iowa 2005). This inquiry is
separate from, and precedes, the merits of a case. See Alons, 698
N.W.2d at 864 (“Even if the claim could be meritorious, the court
will not hear the claim if the party bringing it lacks standing.”).
Horsfield Materials, Inc. v. City of Dyersville, 834 N.W.2d 444, 452 (Iowa 2013).
We have recognized a public-policy exception where certain questions of
great public importance may provide the necessary interest for the court to
intervene. Godfrey, 752 N.W.2d at 425. However, “we become especially
hesitant to act when asked to resolve disputes that require us to decide whether
an act taken by one of the other branches of government was unconstitutional.”
Id. at 427. “Without an individual injury by the complainant under such
circumstances, we risk assuming ‘a position of authority’ over the acts of another
branch of government. We must avoid such a result.” Id. (quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574 (1992)).
29
We have often noted that “[a]n injunction is an extraordinary
remedy which should be granted with caution and only when clearly
required to avoid irreparable damage.” The party seeking the
injunction must establish: (1) an invasion or threatened invasion of
a right; (2) that substantial injury or damages will result unless the
request for an injunction is granted; and (3) that there is no
adequate legal remedy available. When considering the
appropriateness of an injunction “the court should carefully weigh
the relative hardship which would be suffered by the enjoined party
upon awarding injunctive relief.”
Sear v. Clayton Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 590 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Iowa
1999) (citations omitted); see also City of Okoboji v. Parks, 830 N.W.2d 300, 309
(Iowa 2013) (stating same requirements for injunction). We agree with the
director’s contention Wilbur has not established the necessary elements for
obtaining injunctive relief.
The district court based its declaratory relief on Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.1101, which provides, “Courts of record within their respective
jurisdictions shall declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed.” The district court also cited Bormann v.
Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 312-13 (Iowa 1998) (discussing Iowa
Rule of Civil Procedure 261 (now rule 1.1101)). Bormann states: “The purpose
of a declaratory judgment is to determine rights in advance. The essential
difference between such an action and the usual action is that no actual wrong
need have been committed or loss incurred to sustain declaratory judgment
relief.” 584 N.W.2d at 312-31. Yet, Bormann emphasizes, “there must be no
uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the right asserted will be invaded.” Id.
at 313 (emphasis added). Wilbur makes no showing of a certainty her custodial
rights will be invaded by the asserted claims of unconstitutional conduct by DHS.
30
The district court declared
it is unconstitutional for the Iowa Department of Human Services to
use Voluntary Foster Care Placement Agreements signed by only
one parent when the use of such Agreements interferes with the
custodial rights of the other parent, and it is unconstitutional for the
Iowa Department of Human Services to use Voluntary Foster Care
Placement Agreements signed by a non-custodial parent or a
parent who has not yet established any custodial rights.
The trial court’s declarations treat a “custodial” parent’s rights as absolute. They
are not. See K.M., 653 N.W.2d at 608.
Much of Wilbur’s arguments are based upon her contention that she
proved her claims of violations of constitutional rights as a matter of law. Thus,
she asserts the district court could appropriately enter declaratory and injunctive
relief. She cites Heartland Academy Community Church v. Waddle, 427 F.3d
525, 530 (8th Cir. 2005), wherein the Eighth Circuit stated: “An injunction to
prevent [a state officer] from doing that which he has no legal right to do is not an
interference with the discretion of an officer.” Waddle, 427 F.3d at 530. We,
therefore, turn to her cross-appeal.
C. Cross Appeal. Wilbur filed post-trial motions seeking judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial. She also contends on appeal
that the trial court improperly instructed the jury.
Wilbur argues Nino “could not provide valid consent” for LaFauce to place
I.N. outside of Wilbur’s care. She relies on Iowa Code section 600B.40, which
she asserts not only gives her sole custody but negates Nino’s rights to the child.
We believe Wilbur reads the provision too broadly.
Iowa Code section 600B.40 provides,
31
The mother of a child born out of wedlock whose paternity
has not been acknowledged and who has not been adopted has
sole custody of the child unless the court orders otherwise. If a
judgment of paternity is entered, the father may petition for rights of
visitation or custody in the same paternity action or in an equity
proceeding separate from any action to establish paternity.
(Emphasis added.)
It has been said that paternity is acknowledged
[i]f in his intercourse with neighbors, associates, and friends he
makes no attempt to conceal the relationship he bears to the child,
but acknowledges it openly whenever any reference to the subject
is made, and this recognition is so often repeated to different
people as to evince his willingness that all who care to know the
truth may understand that he admits himself the father of the child,
we regard it as sufficiently general for the purposes of the statutory
rule, although many of his acquaintances may never have heard
him mention the matter.
In re Estate of Wise, 221 N.W. 567, 568 (Iowa 1928).
There is no dispute Nino is the child’s biological father and he openly
acknowledged his paternity of the child. Wilbur agreed to allow Nino to exercise
visitation with I.N. the weekend of November 6 to 8. Wilbur at the time was in
Texas. While the child was in Nino’s care and custody, and while Wilbur was out
of state, concerns about possible sexual abuse arose. Under these
circumstances, we are not willing to rule as a matter of law that a biological
parent cannot consent to placing the child in a safe setting such as voluntary
foster care until investigation could be completed. We find no error in the trial
court’s allowing the jury to consider whether a “parent” consented to voluntary
placement in foster care.
Our standard of review on motions JNOV was recently summarized by our
supreme court:
32
We review a ruling denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict for correction of errors at law. Royal Indem. Co. v.
Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 786 N.W.2d 839, 846 (Iowa 2010). On
review, we “determine whether sufficient evidence existed to justify
submitting the case to the jury at the conclusion of the trial.” Lee v.
State, 815 N.W.2d 731, 736 (Iowa 2012). To justify submitting the
case to the jury, substantial evidence must support each element of
the plaintiff’s claim. Van Sickle Constr. Co. v. Wachovia
Commercial Mortg., Inc., 783 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Iowa 2010).
“Evidence is substantial when reasonable minds would accept the
evidence as adequate to reach the same findings.” Doe v. Cent.
Iowa Health Sys., 766 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Iowa 2009). We view “the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.Garr v. City of Ottumwa, 846 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Iowa 2014).
“To prevail under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that one of his or her
federal rights has been violated.” Swipies v. Kofka, 419 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir.
2005). Wilbur contends the district court erred in instructing the jury her
substantive due process claim required a finding by the jury that “actions of Paul
LaFauce were so egregious as to shock the conscience.” She contends there is
a dispute among the federal circuit courts as to the proper standard. However,
we agree with the trial court that the Eighth Circuit, which includes Iowa, requires
such a showing. See Schmidt v. Des Moines Pub. Schools, 655 F.3d 811, 816
(8th Cir. 2011) (“To establish a violation [of substantive due process], a plaintiff
‘must demonstrate both that the official’s conduct was conscience-shocking, and
that the official violated one or more fundamental rights that are deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”
(underlining added)).
With respect to whether substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings,
we adopt the district court’s ruling:
33
There was substantial evidence presented at trial that [I.N.]
suffered little to no long term harm. While [I.N.] spent two or three
days in foster care and another week with [Nino]’s sister, Jana
Brown’s testimony provided substantial evidence that [I.N.] was not
subject to abuse during this time period and did not suffer
significant medical trauma. [Wilbur] was not in Iowa when the
process of placing [I.N.] in foster care and with [Nino]’s sister
began, and it is unclear exactly when [Wilbur] would have returned
had these events not occurred. DHS is charged with protecting
children within Iowa. When all of the facts are considered, there
was substantial evidence presented at trial for the jury to conclude
that there was no “shock the conscience” type harm in this case.
While there undoubtedly was anxiety and stress caused by the
situation, there was little to no evidence that there was any long
term effect that was harmful to [I.N.] Plaintiff’s Motion should be
denied as to the substantive due process claims.
Turning to the procedural due process claims, the Court
finds there was substantial evidence presented at trial that Mr.
LaFauce was investigating a complex case involving separated
parents and other relative caretakers in a multi-county and multi-
state context, all while considering the implications of [Nino]’s
placement on the Sex Offender Registry. [Nino]’s testimony
regarding [I.N.]’s condition at the time he picked her up for the
weekend visit, coupled with the fact that blood was found in her
underpants, is substantial evidence to support Mr. LaFauce’s
reasonable suspicion of child abuse, such that it was reasonable for
Mr. LaFauce to monitor and investigate the situation. The consent
process undertaken by Mr. LaFauce was not ideal, but given the
complexity of the circumstances, Mr. LaFauce obtaining written
consent from [Nino] for the placement of [I.N.] into foster care was
an exercise of the State’s legitimate interest in protecting children in
emergency situations. Further, there was substantial evidence that
[Wilbur] consented to placement of [I.N.] with Ruby. Plaintiff’s
Motion should be denied as to the procedural due process claims.
With respect to the claim of a violation of I.N.’s Fourth Amendment rights,
the district court stated:
[T]here was substantial evidence presented at trial to support a
finding that [I.N.] did not suffer a violation of her right to privacy.
[I.N.] was placed into foster care and then into her aunt’s home
based on a [voluntary foster care placement agreement] obtained
by Mr. LaFauce. If there was a seizure, there is substantial
evidence that the seizure was reasonable due to the consent
provided by [Nino] and because of the safety concerns presented
by [I.N.]’s physical condition when she arrived at [Nino]’s parents’
34
home for the weekend visit, as well as the continuing investigation
of the abuse and neglect allegations and [Wilbur]’s presence out of
state. Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied as to [I.N.]’s right to
privacy claim.
We affirm on the cross-appeal.
D. Attorney fees for prevailing party. The trial court awarded Wilbur
attorney fee’s fees as a “prevailing party.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (allowing “[i]n
any action or proceeding to enforce” the provisions of § 1983 “the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”). Because we have reversed the
declaratory and injunctive relief upon which the trial court based the award of
attorney fees and costs, we reverse the award of attorney fees and costs.
REVERSED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSS-APPEAL.
Doyle, J., concurs; McDonald, J., concurs specially.
35
MCDONALD, Judge. (concurring specially)
I concur in the majority’s resolution of the parties’ respective appeals. I
write separately to note our adoption of the shock-the-conscience standard, ante
at 32, is correct on the merits and not required merely because the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has adopted the standard. As explained
by Justice Thomas:
The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law,
but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law
requires that a state court’s interpretation of federal law give way to
a (lower) federal court’s interpretation. In our federal system, a
state trial court’s interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative
than that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial
court is located. An Arkansas trial court is bound by this Court’s
(and by the Arkansas Supreme Court’s and Arkansas Court of
Appeals’) interpretation of federal law, but if it follows the Eighth
Circuit’s interpretation of federal law, it does so only because it
chooses to and not because it must.
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).