State of Iowa v. William Emmette Stark

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1666
Filed January 12, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM EMMETTE STARK,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Heather Lauber, Judge.
A defendant appeals the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment regarding
his guilty plea, asserting it lacked a factual basis. He additionally argues his
counsel was ineffective. AFFIRMED.
Eric W. Manning of Manning Law Office, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Doyle, S.J.*
*Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2022).
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.
William Stark appeals the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment
regarding his guilty plea, asserting it lacked a factual basis. He also claims his
counsel was ineffective in relation to his guilty pleas. We grant discretionary review
of the denial of Stark’s motion in arrest of judgment but find no abuse of discretion
in the denial. As to Stark’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, because Iowa
Code section 814.7 (2020) prohibits a direct appeal for a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, we are unable to address this issue. Thus, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Sharon Robb owned a 1985 Goldwing motorcycle and kept it at her home.
William Stark and Trudie Holbert, Robb’s daughter, were residing at Robb’s home.
Robb later became the subject of a guardianship and a conservatorship, and Stark
and Trudie were enjoined from residing at Robb’s property and from the use or
control of Robb’s property. Both Stark and Trudie were served with notice of the
enjoinment on March 4, 2020.1 Despite the receipt of notice, Stark entered Robb’s
garage through a back window on May 28, 2020, and took the motorcycle.
Stark was charged with burglary in the third degree, a class D felony, and
theft in the second degree, a class D felony. Stark pled guilty to both charges on
September 1, 2020, agreeing to serve a prison sentence as part of the plea
agreement. Subsequently, on October 7, 2020, Stark filed a letter setting forth an
alternate version of events. He claimed he only took the motorcycle because
Robb’s will devised her property to Trudie. As such, he believed the motorcycle
1 We have not been provided a copy of the probate file as part of the instant appeal.
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belonged to Trudie. He also claimed he had no knowledge of the guardianship
and conservatorship.
Stark filed a motion in arrest of judgment on October 16, 2020, arguing he
did not understand the consequences of his plea and that he did not enter into the
plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. He further alleged his plea lacked a
factual basis for the reasons he set out in his letter. He also filed a motion for new
counsel. The court denied both motions. Stark was sentenced on November 16,
2020.2 He appeals the district court’s orders regarding the denial of his motion in
arrest of judgment and also alleges his counsel was ineffective.
II. Standard of Review
The court reviews denials of motions in arrest of judgment for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Petty, 925 N.W.2d 190, 194 (Iowa 2019). A court abuses its
discretion when it exercises its discretion “on clearly untenable or unreasonable
grounds.” Id.III. Discussion
On appeal, Stark’s arguments are limited to an alleged lack of a factual
basis for his guilty plea and a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to investigate the ownership of the motorcycle and challenging the factual basis of
the plea.
2 The court rejected the plea agreement that required a prison term and instead
placed Stark on probation and ordered Stark’s placement at a residential treatment
facility.
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A. Good Cause for Direct Appeal
Stark claims his guilty plea lacked a factual basis because he believed
Trudie owned the motorcycle, therefore depriving him of the requisite intent for
theft. Stark’s appellate briefing lacks any mention of good cause for a direct appeal
of his guilty plea under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) or any argument as to
whether we should consider Stark’s claim under discretionary review.
As to the direct appeal of his guilty plea, our supreme court has held that a
defendant whose sentence is imposed after July 1, 2019, “bears the burden of
establishing good cause to pursue an appeal of [their] conviction based on a guilty
plea.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020); accord State v. Macke,
933 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 2019) (finding section 814.6 does not apply to appeals
from a judgment and sentence entered prior to July 1, 2019). As the State
highlights, Stark does not attempt to address good cause.
However, a defendant may seek discretionary review of an order denying a
motion in arrest of judgment. See Iowa Code § 814.6(2)(f) (effective July 1, 2019).
While, Stark has not done so, we may treat his notice of appeal as an application
for discretionary review. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.108. We elect to grant
discretionary review of the denial of Stark’s motion in arrest of judgment and
address the merits of his claim.
B. Stark’s Guilty Plea
We turn first to Stark’s claim that there was not a factual basis for his plea.
The guilty-plea record provided to this court belies Stark’s claim. The district court
engaged in a proper colloquy and set forth the elements of the offenses the State
was required to prove. See Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 30 (Iowa 2014)
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(“Although we do not require a detailed factual basis, we do require the defendant
to acknowledge facts that are consistent with the elements of the crime.”). Further,
“on a claim that a plea bargain is invalid because of a lack of accuracy on the
factual-basis issue, the entire record before the district court may be examined.”
State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 62 (Iowa 2013).
Stark acknowledged the date of the offense, that the offense occurred in
Polk County, Iowa, that he entered the garage without any right, license, or
privilege to do so, that he so entered with the intent to commit a theft of property
he did not own, and that he had no intentions of returning the property to the
guardian who was managing the ward’s property. The minutes also support the
elements, which highlight a video of Stark entering the garage through a back
window and driving off with the motorcycle.
Stark admitted to all the factual elements and expressed his desire to plead
guilty, even after the court advised him of his right to withdraw his plea. The record
reflects a factual basis for the guilty plea and the court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Stark’s motion in arrest of judgment.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Stark contends his counsel was ineffective due to the failure to adequately
investigate the issue of ownership of the motorcycle and for failing to advise him
of his rights as they related to the factual basis. However, “an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case shall be determined by filing an
application for postconviction relief pursuant to chapter 822.” Iowa Code § 814.7.
“[T]he claim shall not be decided on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.”
Id. Section 814.7 went into effect July 1, 2019. See Macke, 933 N.W.2d at 231.
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Because Stark’s sentence was imposed on November 16, 2020, his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised in postconviction proceedings,
and we cannot consider it.
AFFIRMED.