State of Iowa v. Deantay Darelle Williams

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0793
Filed January 13, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEANTAY DARELLE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bradley J.
Harris, Judge.
The defendant appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss for violation of the speedy indictment rule. REVERSED AND
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Cory Goldensoph, Cedar Rapids, and James M. Metcalf, Waterloo, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Alexandra Link, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Tabor, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
Our original opinion in this case was vacated when we granted Williams’
petition for rehearing. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1204(5).
Deantay Willliams appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss for violation of the speedy indictment rule. Williams maintains the district
court erred in its determination that he was not under arrest for purposes of
speedy indictment when he was handcuffed and taken into custody on June 10,
2012. This case is a companion case to State v. Washington, No. 14-0792 and
State v. Smith, No. 14-0812. All cases involve the same general facts and same
joint hearing.
Because the circumstances surrounding Williams’ interaction with law
enforcement would cause a reasonable person in his position to believe an arrest
occurred, Williams was arrested for speedy indictment purposes on June 10,
2012. Although he was seventeen years old at the time, we find that the speedy
indictment rule applies to Williams, and any trial informations filed more than
forty-five days after June 10, 2012, were untimely. Thus, the district court erred
by denying Williams’ motions to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the district
court’s rulings and remand for entry of dismissal of the charges.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On June 10, 2012, Williams was seventeen years old.
On that day, at approximately 5:30 a.m., the Waterloo Police Department
received a call reporting a sexual assault. When officers responded, they met
with L.M., a fifteen-year-old girl. L.M. advised officers that she and her friend,
3
J.K., had voluntarily entered a home and began drinking with the occupants but
she believed they had later been drugged. L.M. woke up in the basement to one
of the males having forcible intercourse with her and remembered two other
males also having forcible intercourse with her. She was able to escape, but she
left one of her sandals and her leggings. She advised officers that she believed
J.K., also fifteen years old, was still in the basement of the home.
L.M. was able to direct the officers to the residence before she was taken
to an area hospital for evaluation. During the course of investigation, the officers
learned the house was a known gang residence. At approximately 7:30 a.m., the
officers forced entry into the residence with a tactical team of eight officers—
some armed with assault rifles. All persons in the residence were ordered to the
floor at gunpoint.
Williams had been seen by other officers leaving the residence
approximately fifteen minutes prior to their entry. He was detained by officers,
handcuffed, and placed in a Waterloo Police Department squad car.
The officers located J.K. in the basement of the residence. They also
found several dirty mattresses and used condoms, as well as the leggings and
sandal L.M. had described.
Williams was transported to the Waterloo Police Department in a squad
car. Once there, he was placed in an individual interrogation room, and his
handcuffs were removed. He was read his Miranda rights. Williams admitted to
having intercourse with the juveniles but maintained it was consensual. He
consented to buccal and penile swabs.
4
After the swabs were obtained, Williams was released. No charges were
filed at the time, and no bonds or conditions were placed upon his release.
On November 1, 2013, Williams was charged by trial information with two
counts of sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation of Iowa Code section
709.3(3) (2011). The offenses were alleged to have been committed against
L.M. and J.K. on June 10, 2012. Williams was eighteen years old at the time the
trial information was filed.
Williams and his codefendants, Smith and Washington, each filed a
motion to dismiss the charges against him. A combined hearing was held on
March 27, 2014.
On April 14, 2014, the district court denied each of the defendants’
motions to dismiss. The court stated, “Given the circumstances involving the
defendants herein, the court determines that a reasonable person would have
believed an arrest occurred on the morning of June 10, 2012.” The court
determined “[t]he arrests of the defendants by the Waterloo Police Department
. . . triggered all rights and protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” However, the district
court held that “no arrest for a public offense occurred which would have
triggered the speedy indictment requirement of rule 2.33(2)(a).” In addition, the
court stated:
The court further notes that June 10, 2012, defendant Williams was
under the age of 18 years. Due to the court’s determination that
the defendants were not arrested for commission of a public
offense, the fact that defendant Williams was a juvenile on June 10,
2012, does not affect the court’s ruling herein.
5
On May 22, 2014, the State filed a second trial information, charging Williams
with one count of kidnapping in the first degree, two counts of conspiracy to
commit sexual abuse in the second degree, and two counts of sexual abuse in
the third degree. Williams filed a second motion to dismiss, which the district
court denied.
Williams filed an application for discretionary review for each of the district
court’s denials of his motions to dismiss. He asked that the appeals be
consolidated. Our supreme court granted the applications, consolidated the
cases, and transferred them to us.
II. Standard of Review.
“We review a district court’s decision regarding a motion to dismiss for
lack of speedy indictment for correction of errors at law.” State v. Wing, 791
N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 2010). “We are bound by the findings of fact of the
district court if they are supported by substantial evidence.” Id.
III. Discussion.
“Iowa’s speedy indictment rule ensures the enforcement of the United
States and Iowa Constitutions’ speedy trial guarantees, which assure the prompt
administration of justice while allowing an accused to timely prepare and present
his or her defense.” State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Iowa 2011). Iowa’s
speedy indictment rule is codified in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(a),
which provides:
When an adult is arrested for the commission of a public offense,
or, in the case of a child, when the juvenile court enters an order
waiving jurisdiction pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.45, and an
indictment is not found against the defendant within 45 days, the
6
court must order the prosecution to be dismissed, unless good
cause to the contrary is shown or the defendant waives the
defendant’s right thereto.
The term indictment, as used in the rule, includes a trial information. Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.5(5); see also State v. Schuessler, 561 N.W.2d 40, 41 (Iowa 1997).
Unlike his codefendants, Williams was a minor on June 10, 2012. At
seventeen years old, he was not an “adult” and generally would not be
considered “arrested for the commission of a public offense.” See Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.33(2)(a). However, because the defendant was sixteen or older and
allegedly committed a forcible felony, the violations were excluded from juvenile
court jurisdiction. See Iowa Code § 232.8(1)(c) (“Violations by a child, aged
sixteen or older, which . . . constitute a forcible felony are excluded from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court and shall be prosecuted as otherwise provided by
law unless the district court transfers jurisdiction of the child to the juvenile court
upon motion and for good cause pursuant to section 803.6.”); see also id.
§ 702.11(1) (“A ‘forcible felony’ is any felonious child endangerment, assault,
murder, sexual abuse, kidnapping, robbery, arson in the first degree, or burglary
in the first degree.”). In other words, “the juvenile court” did not “enter an order
waiving jurisdiction pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.45.” See Iowa R. Crim. P.
2.33(2)(a).
This case is similar to State v. Harriman, 513 N.W.2d 725, 726 (Iowa
1994). In Harriman, the defendant was seventeen years old when he was
arrested for operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. 513 N.W.2d
at 726. Fifty days after his arrest, the defendant—who had since turned
7
eighteen—was charged in “adult court.” Id. The defendant maintained the trial
information was filed in violation of the speedy indictment rule,1 and the district
court dismissed the case. Id. Our supreme court found that the district court
erred, stating:
By its plain language, rule [2.33(2)(a)] is not applicable in this case.
Harriman was never arrested as an adult and the juvenile court
never entered an order waiving jurisdiction. The forty-five-day
period for indictment never started running. The district court erred
in holding an indictment had to be found within forty-five days of
Harriman’s arrest as a juvenile.
Id. Based on this application of the principles in Harriman, juveniles whose
violations are excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court are not afforded
the protection of the speedy indictment rule.
However, six years after Harriman, our legislature amended Iowa Code
section 232.8 to include paragraph (1)(c) which provides, in part, that juveniles
facing a forcible felony “shall be prosecuted as otherwise provided by law unless
the court transfers jurisdiction of the child to the juvenile court upon motion and
for good cause.” Although Harriman remains authoritative as the law then
existed, the 2000 legislative amendment clearly imposed the same law and
procedures upon minors who are sixteen years of age or older as adults. We
conclude since a minor is subject to the adult penalties, the “same law and
procedures” must reasonably be interpreted to include the speedy indictment
rule. Accordingly, we are compelled to apply the law as it now exists and
conclude the speedy indictment rule applies to Williams.
1
At the time, the speedy indictment rule was codified as Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 27(2)(a). Although the number of the rule has since changed, the language
of the rule is the same.
8
As it did with his codefendants, the State concedes that the circumstances
surrounding the officers’ seizure of Williams “appear to compel a finding of arrest”
that triggers speedy indictment protection under Wing. We agree. The
circumstances surrounding Williams’ interaction with law enforcement would
cause a reasonable person in his position to believe an arrest for a forcible felony
occurred, triggering the protections of the speedy indictment rule.
IV. Conclusion.
Because the circumstances surrounding Williams’ interaction with law
enforcement would cause a reasonable person in his position to believe an arrest
occurred, Williams was arrested for speedy indictment purposes on June 10,
2012. Although he was seventeen years old at the time, we find the speedy
indictment rule applies to Williams, and any trial informations filed more than
forty-five days after June 10, 2012, were untimely. Thus, the district court erred
by denying Williams’ motions to dismiss. According, we reverse the district
court’s rulings and remand for entry of an order of dismissal of the charges.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.