In the Interest of W.P. and O.P., Minor Children, B.P., Father

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1915
Filed January 27, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF W.P. AND O.P.,
Minor Children,
B.P., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour,
District Associate Judge.
A father appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his children.
AFFIRMED.
Michael A. Horn of Kuntz, Laughlin & Horn, Des Moines, for appellant
father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Charles Fuson of the Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
A father appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his children
born in 2006 and 2009.1 He asserts that termination of his parental rights was
not in the children’s best interests and that termination would be detrimental due
to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. Reviewing his claims de novo,
see In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014), we affirm.
In determining whether parental rights should be terminated under Iowa
Code chapter 232 (2015), the juvenile court “follows a three-step analysis.” See
In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). Step one requires the court to
“determine if a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
established” by the State. Id. If the juvenile court finds grounds for termination,
the court moves to the second step of the analysis: deciding if the grounds for
termination should result in a termination of parental rights under the best-
interest framework set out in section 232.116(2). Id. at 706-07. In making this
determination, the primary considerations are the children’s safety, their best
placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth, and their physical,
mental, and emotional conditions and needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Even if
the juvenile court finds “the statutory best-interest framework supports
termination of parental rights,” the court must proceed to the third and final step:
considering “if any statutory exceptions set out in section 232.116(3) should
serve to preclude termination of parental rights.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707.
The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to
section 232.116(1)(e) and (f). When the juvenile court terminates parental rights
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The children’s mother is deceased.
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on more than one ground, we may affirm the order on any ground we find
supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. D.W., 791 N.W.2d at
707. The father concedes that his incarceration prevents the return of the
children to his care at the present time and that his parental rights could be
terminated pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f).
The father contends termination of his parental rights is not in the
children’s best interests because the children were not, at the time of the hearing,
placed in a pre-adoptive home. On the issue of best interests, the juvenile court
concluded:
These children need a long-term commitment from a parent to be
appropriately nurturing, supportive of their growth and
development, and who can meet their physical, mental, emotional
and safety needs. Unfortunately, [the father] has a long history of
not being the parent these children need. It is not in the children’s
best interest to continue to wait in limbo for [the father] to
demonstrate an ability or willingness to appropriately parent. These
children deserve to have a safe, stable, drug-free home where their
emotional and physical needs will consistently be met. . . . [W]hen
a parent is incapable of changing to allow the children to return
home, termination is necessary. In re T.T., 541 N.W.2d 552, 557
(Iowa Ct. App. 1995). While these children are not currently placed
in a pre-adoptive home, they have thrived in their current home and
have shown the ability to attach to a family. They deserve an
opportunity to have a permanent, stable, loving home, and there is
no reason to believe that such a family will not be found for them.
Upon our de novo review of the record, we agree.
The father contends termination would be detrimental to the children due
to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c).
We have no doubt a bond exists between the father and his children, but our
“consideration must center on whether the child[ren] will be disadvantaged by
termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the parent’s] inability to
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provide for [the children’s] developing needs.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709. The
juvenile court concluded:
These children are young; [the father] was only their primary care
taker for one year of their lives, and their bond with [the father]
would have naturally diminished due to lack of contact due to his
incarceration. They are not placed with relatives and most
importantly are able to attach and be adopted into a permanent
home.
Upon our de novo review of the record, we find no clear and convincing evidence
that termination would be detrimental to the children due to the parent-child bond.
Termination of the father’s parental rights without further delay is in the children’s
best interests, even if a bond exists.
Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the father’s
parental rights.
AFFIRMED.