State of Iowa v. William Cory Scott

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1836
Filed August 16, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM CORY SCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jon C. Fister,
Judge.
William Cory Scott appeals from the denial of his motion to correct an
illegal sentence. WRIT DENIED.
Andrea M. Flanagan of Sporer & Flanagan, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Goodhue, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2017).
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GOODHUE, Senior Judge.
William Cory Scott appeals from the denial of his motion to correct an
illegal sentence. We deny the petitition for writ of certiorari.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Scott was convicted of first-degree murder on December 13, 1991, under
the alternative theories of specific intent and the felony-murder rule based on the
felonies of willful injury and terrorism. Scott was mandatorily sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole, as provided by Iowa Code sections 707.2 and
902.1 (1991).
The conviction was the result of Scott, a twenty-one-year-old male at the
time, shooting and killing Willie Guyton. Scott and his brother-in-law, Raymond
Birden, had a history of confrontation with Guyton. In early April 1991, Scott and
Guyton had a fight in a convenience store. Guyton slashed Scott around the
shoulders with a knife seriously wounding him. Soon thereafter, Scott purchased
a rifle, and he bragged to others his new rifle had the power to penetrate a car
and kill a party inside. Scott and Birden ran into Guyton a few days later at a bar.
Birden told Guyton he had better get his knife. Scott went home and got the rifle
he had purchased. Guyton went home, called 911, and was advised not to go
back to the bar, but Guyton ignored the advice.
Birden and Scott were outside of the bar in an automobile when Guyton
arrived. Birden was driving, and Scott was in the backseat of the car. When the
vehicles passed, Birden stopped and got out of his car and Guyton slowed down.
Scott saw Guyton pulling out a shiny object, possibly a gun. Scott got out of the
car and fired four shots in rapid succession at Guyton’s vehicle. Two of the shots
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missed the vehicle completely. One went through the driver’s door and lodged in
the steering column and the fourth went through the middle of Guyton’s vehicle
and was deflected at a sharp angle, passed through the back of the driver’s seat,
and fatally wounded Guyton.
Scott was charged with first-degree murder. At trial the jury was
instructed, as an alternative, that a verdict of guilt could be returned on the first-
degree-murder charge if the jury found that Scott was participating in the offense
of either willful injury or terrorism at the time of the shooting. Scott was convicted
of first-degree murder.
Scott filed an appeal, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction on
September 2, 1993. Later, Scott filed a postconviction proceeding based on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but his application was denied, and the
denial was affirmed by the court of appeals. Scott then filed another
postconviction application in 2006, asserting his conviction should be reversed
because the instructions used at trial were improper under State v. Heemstra,
721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006). See Scott v. State (Scott I), No. 06-2084,
2007 WL 3085629, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2007). He also contended that
the failure to make Heemstra retroactive violated his constitutional rights. Id.
The second postconviction action was dismissed, affirmed on appeal by the court
of appeals, and affirmed by a per curiam opinion of the supreme court on further
review. Scott v. State (Scott II), No. 06-2084, 2009 WL 1940568, at *1 (Iowa
Apr. 17, 2009).
Scott filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence on April 16, 2015,
contending terrorism was not a predicate felony that could be used to support a
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felony-murder conviction. The motion was summarily dismissed on the date it
was filed. Scott filed a motion to reconsider on April 29, 2015, as permitted by
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). The motion did not refer to facts the court
had not addressed or to any theory the court had missed but instead objected to
the summary dismissal and the failure to appoint an attorney, and it otherwise
rehashed legal arguments presented in the original motion. Apparently because
no new facts or concepts had been asserted, the court ignored the motion to
reconsider.
On October 8, 2015, Scott filed an amendment to the motion to correct an
illegal sentence, asserting once again that terrorism was not a forcible felony
and, under the holding in Heemstra, it could not be used as a predicate felony to
the felony-murder rule. The motion was summarily dismissed. On October 28,
2015, Scott filed a notice of appeal.
II. Jurisdiction Issue
The State asserts that we do not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal for
two reasons. The State asserts there is no right of appeal from denial of a
motion to correct an illegal sentence. Several court of appeals decisions were
cited, and our supreme court appears to have adopted that position. See State
v. Graham, 897 N.W.2d 476, 480-81 (Iowa 2017). Nevertheless, in each of those
cases, the court of appeals and our supreme court considered the merits of the
case as a petition for writ of certiorari under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure
6.107.
The State also asserts that the matter should be dismissed because the
notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days after the ruling had been entered.
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See Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(1)(b). The same time period is required for filing a
petition for a writ of certiorari. Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(1)(b). Appellate deadlines
are mandatory and jurisdictional. Bellach v. IMT Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 903, 904
(Iowa 1998). An untimely filed petition for writ of certiorari deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction. Thompson v. City of Osage, 421 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa
1988). There is an exception when a motion is timely filed requesting the
enlargement or amendment of the ruling. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2); Iowa Rs.
App. P. 6.107(1)(b), 6.101(1)(b).
Scott filed a timely motion for reconsideration, but no ruling was entered
that would retrigger the thirty-day filing requirement. See Iowa Rs. App. P.
6.101(1)(b), 6.107(1)(b). However, such a motion will not extend the time period
for filing an appeal, or presumably a petition or a writ of certiorari, when it does
not address an issue missed or ignored in the court’s initial ruling and the motion
to reconsider is nothing more than a rehash of legal issues previously raised and
decided. Hedlund v. State, 875 N.W.2d 720, 725-26 (Iowa 2016). Scott’s motion
for reconsideration falls squarely within the ambient of a rehash of legal issues
previously raised. Even if the State’s motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds
was granted, such a ruling would not be not dispositive as a claim of an illegal
sentence can be raised at any time and Scott could simply refile his claim of an
illegal sentence. Accordingly, the merits of his claims will be addressed.
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III. Illegal Sentence Claim
A. Preservation of Error
Because unconstitutional sentences are illegal sentences, the usual error
preservation rules are not applicable. See State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 639
(Iowa 2012).
B. Scope of Review
Illegal sentences are reviewed for correction of legal errors, but to the
extent a constitutional issue is raised, they are reviewed de novo. State v. Lyle,
854 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Iowa 2014).
C. Felony-Murder Rule
We question the use of a motion to correct an illegal sentence as to an
error that relates to the instructions and prior to the sentence itself. A motion to
correct an illegal sentence is not meant to re-examine errors occurring during the
trial or proceeding prior to the sentence. State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862,
885-86 (Iowa 2009). Willful injury can no longer be used as the predicate felony
in the felony-murder rule but the limitation is prospective only. See Goosman v.
State, 764 N.W.2d 539, 545 (Iowa 2009). Scott raised the issue previously as to
willful injury and he was denied relief because the ruling in Heemstra was limited
to prospective application. See Scott II, 2009 WL 1940568, at *1.
Scott also contends that the inclusion of terrorism as a predicate felony in
the felony-murder instruction used in the charge to his jury created an illegal
sentence. Similar to willful injury, the limitation is prospective only as to terrorism
as a predicate felony under the felony–murder rule. See Nguyen v. State, 878
N.W.2d 744, 759 (Iowa 2016).
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D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Scott also raises a claim that his sentence is illegal because it constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and article 1, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. The
contention is first asserted in Scott’s appellate brief. Lacking any record
regarding a specific claim creates difficulty for the reviewing court, but we have
the right to remand for further record or for additional briefing. See Lyle, 854
N.W.2d at 383; Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 885-86. If there is no record to
establish the illegal nature of a sentence, it would seem unusual for the
defendant to be granted relief absent a remand or, at a minimum, rebriefing.
This is not a case where either a remand or further briefing is required.
The concept of prohibited cruel and unusual punishment has been broken
down into two general categories: (1) as applied to the individual and (2)
categorical challenges. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59-60 (2010).
Scott has raised the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment as contained
both in the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Iowa.
Scott has not relied on a separate or different interpretation of the Iowa
Constitution from the United States Constitution but emphasized that, while we
accept the federal standards in Iowa, we apply a more stringent review than
would be available under the federal constitution. See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at
883.
Scott does not make it clear whether he has made an as applied-to-him or
categorical challenge to the sentence. “The concept of rationality is central to the
Eighth Amendment.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 59. A categorical challenge requires
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a comparison between the severity of the punishment to the gravity of the crime
to determine if the applicable sentence leads to an inference of disproportionality.
Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 640. If an inference of disproportionality does not exist,
the threshold step has not been met. Id. Scott has indulged in an
interjurisdictional analysis. Such an analysis is a step that is applicable only in
the rare case where the threshold comparison of the crime committed with the
statutory sentence required leads to an inference of disproportionality. Id. at 639.
Both terrorism and willful injury were defined by statute as predicate felonies
applicable to the felony-murder rule at the time of Scott’s trial and conviction.
The State has wide latitude and power in defining crimes. State v. Fuhrmann,
261 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Iowa 1978).
Given the right and power the legislature has to enact a felony-murder
rule, life imprisonment is not so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense
as to shock one’s sense of justice. State v. Rhode, 503 N.W.2d 27, 41 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1993). Few, if any, criminal acts are more deserving of the maximum
penalty that can be imposed than causing the death of another fellow human
being.1
To the extent Scott’s claim is based on cruel and unusual punishment as
applied to him, the sentence of life without parole that he received must create an
inference of gross proportionality to the criminal act or crime he perpetrated. See
Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 650. If that test is not met, it is not necessary to proceed
1
We recognize the Iowa Supreme Court may have intended to replace the first
category with “a gross proportionality challenge to [the] particular defendant’s sentence.”
See Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 840. Whether the language was intended to name the
challenge or to set out the process is not entirely clear. Regardless, the result is the
same.
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further. Id. Again, the task is to balance the gravity of the crime the defendant
committed with the severity of the sentence he received. Id. An inference of
gross proportionality is, in a sense, an application of the community standards.
Id. Substantial deference is granted to the legislature as the most reliable source
of the community in determining whether an inference of gross disproportionality
exists, and therefore, whether a sentence is cruel and unusual. Id. It is rare that
a sentence is so grossly disproportionate to the crime as to meet the threshold
inquiry. Id.
Death occurred as a result of the underlying crime. Scott obtained a rifle
only days before and bragged that he had a rifle that could penetrate a vehicle
and kill someone inside. He fired not once but four times and hit the vehicle the
victim was riding in twice. He knew the power of the rifle he was using and
intentionally fired it into a vehicle that he knew was occupied by his antagonist.
Scott fails the threshold test of gross disproportionality as to both the categorical
challenge and the as applied to him challenge, and therefore, no further analysis
is required.
WRIT DENIED.