In the Interest of D.T., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0007
Filed September 22, 2021
IN THE INTEREST OF D.T.,
Minor Child,
T.B., Mother,
Petitioner-Appellant,
M.T., Father,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Allamakee County, Linnea M. N.
Nicol, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the denial of her petition to terminate the parental rights
of her child’s father. AFFIRMED.
Andrew J. Casper of Putnam, Thompson & Casper, P.L.L.C, Decorah, for
appellant mother.
Whitney L. Gessner of Gessner Law Office, Monona, for appellee father.
Barry S. Mueller, Postville, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Schumacher, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
A mother of a child born in 2015 appeals the denial of her petition to
terminate the parental rights of the child’s father.
Iowa Code section 600A.8(3) (2020) authorizes termination of parental
rights where a “parent has abandoned the child.” If a child is six months or older,
“a parent is deemed to have abandoned the child unless the parent maintains
substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child as demonstrated by
contribution toward support of the child of a reasonable amount, according to the
parent’s means, and as demonstrated by any of the following”:
(1) Visiting the child at least monthly when physically and
financially able to do so and when not prevented from doing so by
the person having lawful custody of the child.
(2) Regular communication with the child or with the person
having the care or custody of the child, when physically and
financially unable to visit the child or when prevented from visiting
the child by the person having lawful custody of the child.
(3) Openly living with the child for a period of six months within
the one-year period immediately preceding the termination of
parental rights hearing and during that period openly holding himself
or herself out to be the parent of the child.
Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b). The “paramount consideration” is “[t]he best interest
of the child.” Id. § 600A.1(2); see also In re B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa
2020).
The district court concluded the father “abandoned the child.” However, the
court declined to terminate the father’s parental rights in light of the mother’s
concession that the father could not pay child support given his receipt of social
security disability benefits as well as the child’s potential eligibility for dependent
benefits. The court made the following pertinent findings:
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Mother’s Exhibit 101 and Father’s Exhibit A are the same
Default Decree . . . wherein [the mother] achieved an order for sole
custody, no child support, and the right to claim [the child] on her tax
returns through a default order. . . .
....
The mother reports the father has provided no financial
support to the child. The Court will not fault the father for failing to
provide financial support in light of the [default] order . . . . The
Petitioner has requested the Court waive child support based on the
Respondent’s income from the Social Security Administration. The
Court finds grounds to waive child support, medical support and
sharing of medical expenses. The parties report to the Court that no
one has applied for Social Security benefits for [the child]. There is
no good explanation in the record why no one applied for these
financial benefits for [the child].
On appeal, the mother contends “[m]any of [the] factors relating to the
abandonment finding[] also tend to show it is in the child’s best interest to terminate
parental rights.” She points to the father’s “current and past conduct” and, in
particular, his “extensive history of drug use,” his “sordid history of domestic
violence,” and his failure “to demonstrate a continued interest in” the child.
On our de novo review, we find support for the mother’s assertions. But, as
the district court determined, the key factor in this best interest analysis is the
child’s long-term financial interest. The mother waived receipt of child support. As
discussed below, the court’s termination of the father’s parental rights would likely
deprive the child of a significant, and cognizable, amount of federal financial
benefits over the next several years. Deprivation of these benefits is not in his best
interest.
We begin with federal law. The Social Security Act states, “Every child (as
defined in section 416(e) of this title) of an individual entitled to . . . disability
insurance benefits . . . shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit for each
month.” 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2021). Section 416(e) defines a child as “the child
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or legally adopted child of an individual.” Implementing regulations provide that a
child “may be eligible for benefits as the insured’s natural child if . . . [the child]
could inherit the insured’s personal property as his or her natural child under State
inheritance laws” or “the insured has either acknowledged in writing that [the child
is] his or her child [or] been decreed by a court to be [the child’s] father or mother.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (a)(1), (3) .
Applying 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(1), Iowa inheritance law states, “Unless
the child has been adopted, a biological child inherits from the child’s biological
father if the evidence proving paternity is available during the father’s lifetime, or if
the child has been recognized by the father as his child.” Iowa Code § 633.222.
The Social Security Administration has opined that those inheritance rights survive
termination of parental rights. See PR 09-085 Inheritance Rights of a Child When
Parental Rights are Terminated in the State of Iowa, Soc. Sec. Admin. (Mar. 27,
2009), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/1501805018 (“[T]he language of
Iowa’s Probate Code indicates that a child would inherit from a biological parent
even if the parent’s parental rights were terminated, so long as the child had not
been adopted.” (emphasis added)). At the same time, the Iowa Court of Appeals
has concluded termination of a father’s parental rights “eliminates [the child’s] right
to support or any prospective inheritance, windfall, or estate from [the father].” See
In re G.A.Z., No. 01-1103, 2002 WL 575640, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2002);
Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the “Legal Orphan”: Inheritance Rights of Children
after Termination of Parental Rights, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 125, 137 (2005). Nonetheless,
we presume the Social Security Administration would follow its interpretation of its
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own statute and regulations. Accordingly, the child would appear to qualify as a
natural child under Iowa’s inheritance laws. See 20 C.F.R. 404.355(a)(1).
The child also would qualify as a natural child based on the paternity decree
and the father’s recognition of the child as his child. See 20 C.F.R. 404.355(a)(3);
see also In re Estate of Evjen, 448 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1989) (finding recognition
where father predeceased birth of child); Mohr v. Langerman, No. 13-1422, 2014
WL 5243364, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) (“[A]lthough the language of the
statute providing for inheritance of biological children from biological fathers has
always included the word ‘or’ between the paternity clause and the recognition
clause, it has also always been interpreted to require proof of both.”); cf. Beeler v.
Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding recognition requirement was not
satisfied for a child conceived after the father passed away).
42 U.S.C. section 416(e) is not the only definition of “child” in the Social
Security Act. Another provision on determination of family status states, “In
determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of a fully or currently insured
individual . . . the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would
be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the
courts of the State in which such insurance individual is domiciled . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(h)(2)(A). As noted, the Social Security Administration has opined that a child
may inherit under Iowa’s inheritance law notwithstanding termination of parental
rights.
A third provision states,
An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured
individual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured
individual under paragraph (2) of this subsection, shall nevertheless be
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deemed to be the child of such insured individual if: . . . (B) in the case of
an insured individual entitled to disability insurance benefits . . . (i) such
insured individual— . . . (II) has been decreed by a court to be the . . . father
of the applicant . . . .
Id. § 416(h)(3)(B)(i)(II). Again, it is undisputed that paternity was established and
the father recognized the child as his.
In sum, the child would appear to satisfy all three of the federal definitions
of “child” for purposes of receipt of dependent benefits. The child would qualify as
a child under section 416(e) because he was not adopted and would be eligible
under State inheritance law and pursuant to the paternity decree. He would
similarly qualify under section 416(h)(2)(A) based on state inheritance law. And
he would qualify under section 416(h)(3)(B)(i)(II) because paternity was
established. See, e.g., PR 11-144 MOS-State: Wisconsin—Effect Of Termination
Of Natural Parental Rights On Inheritance Rights Number Holder: George E., Jr. /
Claimant: Christian W., Soc. Sec. Admin. (Aug. 17, 2011),
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/1501805055 (conducting a similar analysis
under the Social Security Act and Wisconsin law) (last visited Sept. 16, 2021).
It is also undisputed that the child was a dependent of the father and was
unmarried and under the age of eighteen. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B), (C). The
only requirement yet to be satisfied was the filing of an application on the child’s
behalf. See id. § 402(d)(1)(A). There appears to be no time limit other than the
age of the child for purposes of that requirement. It is also worth noting that receipt
of dependent benefits was far from speculative, given the father’s established
eligibility for social security disability income. Cf. In re J.K.N., No. 08-2069, 2009
WL 1677000, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 17, 2009) (concluding district court’s
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reliance on “slim possibility” that parent “might” become eligible for Social Security
Disability benefits to deny termination petition was misplaced). Thus, the child was
apparently entitled to social security disability dependent benefits under federal
law, even if the father’s parental rights were terminated.
We must also consider state law. We begin with Iowa Code
section 600A.2(19), which defines “[t]ermination of parental rights” as “a complete
severance and extinguishment of a parent-child relationship between one or both
living parents and the child.” The court of appeals has stated, “[T]ermination of
parental rights [under this provision] completely severs the duties imposed by the
parent-child relationship, including the duty of support.” State ex rel. Perkins v.
Perkins, 325 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis added); see also
In re T.Q., 519 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (affirming denial of parent’s
petition to terminate his own parental rights on the ground that he “would have no
duty to support” that could be enforced); In re J.L.W., 496 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1992) (affirming denial of father’s termination-of-parental-rights petition
under the best interests prong on the ground “the father was merely seeking relief
from his child support obligation.”); G.A.Z., 2002 WL 575640, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App.
Feb. 20, 2002) (concluding termination of parental rights under chapter 232 was
not in the child’s best interests because it “eliminates [the child’s] right to support
or any prospective inheritance, windfall, or estate from” the father). Under Iowa
statutory law and case law, then, termination of the father’s parental rights would
foreclose the child’s receipt of social security dependent benefits.
Though the child may be entitled to dependent benefits under federal law
notwithstanding the termination of the father’s parental rights, we conclude Iowa
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Code section 600A.2(19) and our precedent support the district court’s conclusion
that the child stands to lose entitlement to social security dependent benefits if the
father’s parental rights are terminated.
The potential losses are significant. The child could lose medical as well as
monetary benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(2) (“Such child’s insurance benefit for
each month shall, if the [father] . . . has not died . . . be equal to one-half of the
primary insurance amount of such individual for such month. Such child’s
insurance benefit for each month shall, if such individual has died in or prior to
such month, be equal to three-fourths of the primary insurance amount of such
individual.”). The father is entitled to $783 per month for the remainder of his life.
The child, then, could receive $391.50 per month while the father is alive and
$587.25 per month if the father dies while the child is a minor.
In light of the potential loss of these benefits, and notwithstanding the
factors weighing in favor of terminating the father’s rights, we affirm the district
court’s conclusion that termination of the father’s parental rights was not in the
child’s best interests. See Iowa Code § 600A.1(1)–(2) (including consideration of
“the fulfillment of financial obligations” within the definition of “best interest of the
child”); B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d at 232–33 (looking to a child’s “long-range as well as
immediate interests” (citation omitted)); see also In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748
(Iowa 2011) (differentiating Iowa Code chapters 600A and 232 as to whether
courts should consider loss of financial support as part of the best interest analysis
and stating “taking child support directly into account under chapter 600A makes
sense because that is a private termination statute”); cf. In re A.H., No. 21-0180,
2021 WL 3076741, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 21, 2021) (affirming termination of
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parental rights under chapter 232 notwithstanding father’s claim he “would support
the children with future governmental benefits”); In re H.L., No. 14-1288, 2015 WL
4642424, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2015) (affirming termination under chapter
600A where the father’s only contact with the child after a certain date was a letter
informing the child’s mother of the child’s eligibility for social security disability
dependent benefits and the father failed to pay child support when those benefits
were unavailable); In re Marriage of Morrical, No. 10-1963, 2011 WL 3925687, at
*3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2011) (“Section 598.22C provides that payment of
benefits fully satisfy and substitute for the support obligations for the same period
of time for which the benefits are awarded. . . . We believe better public policy is
to leave the child support obligation in place and provide that SSD benefits paid
satisfy and substitute for the support obligation.”); In re Marriage of Wicks, No. 00-
1525, 2001 WL 1130192, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2001) (noting children of
a parent receiving social security disability benefits each received a monthly
dependent allowance).1
AFFIRMED.
Bower, C.J. concurs; Schumacher, J., dissents.
1 Our conclusion also aligns with out-of-state appellate opinions. See In re B.O.G.,
5 So. 3d 1018, 1027 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (holding termination of parental rights was
not in the child’s best interests, in part, because father was contributing social
security disability dependent benefits to children); In re Marriage of Furrow, 63
P.3d 821, 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (stating “an order terminating parental rights
does far more than merely terminate the rights of a relinquishing parent. It deprives
the children of their right to financial support from that parent . . . and their right to
social security benefits in the event of that parent’s death or disability”).
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SCHUMACHER, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which concludes termination
of the father’s parental rights is not in D.T.’s best interest. As referenced by the
majority, there is a lack of contest as to the district court determination that the
father abandoned D.T. We are left only to conduct a de novo review of the record
on whether termination of the father’s parental rights is in D.T.’s best interest. I
depart from the majority that concludes the mother did not meet her burden that
termination of the father’s parental rights was in D.T.’s best interest due only to the
possibility of the receipt of social security disability benefits by the child in the
future.
The Iowa legislature requires the best interest of the child to “be the
paramount consideration in interpreting” the private termination of parental rights.
Iowa Code § 600A.1 (emphasis added). Private termination proceedings under
Iowa Code chapter 600A are a two-step process. See id. §§ 600A.1, .8. First, the
moving parent must first prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds for
ordering termination of parental rights. See id. § 600A.8. Here, the district court
determined that the father had abandoned D.T. by clear and convincing evidence.
A second step, however, is required. The mother must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of D.T. In re B.H.A.,
938 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2020). On this record, the mother has met her burden
of proof.
Our supreme court has borrowed from the statutory best-interest framework
outlined in Iowa Code chapter 232. In re A.H.B., 791 N.W.2d 687, 690–91 (Iowa
2010). That framework directs this court to “give primary consideration to the
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child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and
growth of the child[.]” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Of importance is the child’s
emotional and psychological health, see id., and the closeness of the parent-child
bond, see id. 232.116(3)(c). Finally, our supreme court has said, “It is well-settled
law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the [petitioner] has proved
a ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent
and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” A.H.B., 791 N.W.2d at 691
(alteration in original) (quoting In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010)).
“The best-interest-of-the-child framework has backward-looking and
forward-looking components.” B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d at 232. In determining best
interests,
We look to the child’s long-range, as well as immediate, interests.
We consider what the future holds for the child if returned to his or
her parents. Insight for this determination can be gained from
evidence of the parent’s past performance, for that performance may
be indicative of the quality of the future care the parent is capable of
providing.
R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1998) (borrowing backward-looking and
forward-looking components from chapter 232 to fill in chapter 600A’s analytical
framework); see also In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981) (citation
omitted).
As further noted by our supreme court, whether the best interests of a child
will be served by the termination of parental rights must be decided case by case.
Our supreme court has determined that “caselaw has limited utility” when
considering the best-interest-of-the-child framework. In re Q.G., 911 N.W.2d 761,
771 (Iowa 2018). The court in Q.G. recognized our long-held refusal to adopt a
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formulaic or rule-bound approach. Id. While caselaw demonstrates how chapter
600A factors weigh in the balance of the best-interest determination, we expressly
stated that “[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts.” Id.; see In re B.L.A.,
357 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Iowa 1984) (stating matters under chapter 600A are cases in
equity); B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d at 232–33.
Armed with this guidance from our supreme court, a de novo review of the
record reveals these facts. D.T.’s father has not requested visitation for at least
the last six months, offered financial support, or been involved in D.T.’s schooling.
D.T. has behavioral struggles and has an independent education plan (IEP) at
school. The father has not attended any of the IEP meetings. The father has a
conviction for domestic abuse assault against D.T.’s mother as well as another
former paramour. D.T.’s father has a history of use of illegal drugs. One week
before the termination hearing, he was required to move from his parents’ home
where he had been staying due to the discovery of drugs in the home by his
parents. He acknowledges his lack of involvement in his son’s life even though
distance has not separated him from his son’s residence. At one point, the father
lived only a block from his son, yet made no efforts to exercise visitation. The
father has provided zero financial assistance. He has failed to provide any gifts on
special occasions or birthday cards. The father’s statement in isolation that “I want
to be a father in his life” rings hollow.2 While many of these factors are of
2 Our supreme court determined in 2018 a lack of proof existed that termination
was in the children’s best interest when the father who had a prior bond with the
children was released from prison, had employment lined up, had addressed his
substance abuse concerns while in prison, and had obtained appropriate housing.
In re Q.C., 911 N.W.2d 761, 774 (Iowa 2018). These mitigating factors are not
present in the instant record. Quite the opposite is apparent.
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appropriate consideration for whether the child was abandoned by his father, they
are also appropriate elements of our best interest consideration.3
Contrasting, the mother has provided all the daily care for D.T. and D.T.’s
younger sibling. She is employed and plans to pursue a degree in social work.
Without a court order, she has allowed continued involvement of paternal relatives
with D.T. Under the facts of this case, the possibility of future financial support
does not tip the scale given other proven factors. Termination of the father’s
parental rights is in D.T.’s best interest. Accordingly, the denial of the mother’s
petition for termination should be reversed.
3The closeness of the parent-child bond and the father’s efforts to address his
substance abuse issues were considered in determining best interest.