James Rehm v. Arctic Glacier West Point, Inc.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1601
Filed July 18, 2018
JAMES REHM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ARCTIC GLACIER WEST POINT, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, Michael J.
Schilling, Judge.
A plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his
employer on his disability discrimination claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.
AFFIRMED.
Erin Patrick Lyons of Dutton, Braun, Staack & Hellman, P.L.C., Waterloo,
for appellant.
Mark W. Thomas and Aaron W. Lindebak of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des
Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
James Rehm appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Arctic Glacier West Point, Inc. (Arctic Glacier) on his disability discrimination claims
under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). We find the district court did not err in
finding Rehm did not present a genuine issue of material fact on the question of
whether he was disabled within the meaning of the ICRA. We affirm the district
court’s decision granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Rehm was employed at Arctic Glacier, a company that produces bags of
ice. Rehm broke his wrist on March 27, 2015. After about six weeks, he returned
to work without restrictions but found it difficult to complete some of his work duties
due to pain in his wrist. These job duties included lifting twenty pound bags of ice
and using a sledgehammer to break up ice. On August 20, 2015, Rehm was
restricted to working forty hours per week. Rehm continued to experience pain
when performing some job duties and spoke to his supervisor. The employer
warned Rehm it believed he had engaged in insubordination because he had not
performed all of his work duties and stated he needed written documentation of
any restrictions. On November 13, 2015, he was restricted to lifting no more than
ten pounds. Rehm was terminated from his employment on November 30, 2015.
Rehm has since recovered from his broken wrist.
Rehm instituted an action with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, alleging
disability discrimination. He received an administrative release and filed an action
against Arctic Glacier on July 28, 2016. The employer filed a motion for summary
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judgment, claiming a broken wrist did not constitute a disability under the terms of
the ICRA, Iowa Code chapter 216 (2016).
The district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment,
finding Rehm had not shown he was disabled for purposes of the ICRA. The court
found there was no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether Rehm’s
broken wrist substantially limited a major life activity. The court noted the injury
was temporary and Rehm was not disqualified from a broad range of jobs due to
the impairment. Rehm appeals the district court’s decision.
II. Standard of Review
“We review district court summary judgment rulings for corrections of errors
at law.” McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 822 (Iowa 2015).
“Summary judgment is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. We view
the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Banwart v. 50th St.
Sports, L.L.C., 910 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Iowa 2018). “Even if facts are undisputed,
summary judgment is not proper if reasonable minds could draw from them
different inferences and reach different conclusions.” Goodpaster v. Schwan’s
Home Serv., Inc., 849 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2014).
III. Disability
In order to establish a claim of disability discrimination, Rehm must show
(1) he has a disability; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of his
position; and (3) the circumstances of his termination raise an inference of
discrimination. See id. The district court granted summary judgment to Arctic
Glacier based on the first element, finding Rehm’s broken wrist did not constitute
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a disability under the ICRA. Rehm claims he was disabled because he was
substantially limited in one or more major life activities. In particular, he states he
was limited from lifting more than ten pounds.
The term “disability” is defined in Iowa Code section 216.2(5) as “the
physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial disability.”
The term “substantially handicapped person” is defined in Iowa Administrative
Code rule 161-8.26(1) as “any person who has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an
impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment.” A person is considered
to be substantially limited if the person is
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform that
same major life activity.
Bearshield v. John Morrell & Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 1997) (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)). The term “major life activities” is defined as “functions such
as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-8.26(3).
In determining whether a person has been substantially limited in a major
life activity, we consider (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) the
duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) the permanent or long-
term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact, of the impairment.
Vincent v. Four M Paper Corp., 589 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Iowa 1999). A person’s
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condition may substantially limit a major life activity and be intermittent or episodic,
rather than permanent. Goodpaster, 849 N.W.2d at 12.
“A person is substantially limited in his or her ability to work when the person
is ‘significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities.’” Bearshield, 570 N.W.2d at 920 (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). “The inability to perform a single, particular job does
not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” Id. “An
impairment that interferes with an individual’s ability to do a particular job but does
not significantly decrease that individual’s ability to obtain satisfactory employment
otherwise is not substantially limiting within our statute.” Probasco v. Iowa Civil
Rights Comm’n, 420 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Iowa 1988).
The district court found Rehm “did not raise a jury issue on the question
whether he is disqualified from a broad range of jobs or from employment in other
jobs where lifting is not a job requirement.” The evidence Rehm was unable to
perform his particular job at Arctic Glacier does not show he was substantially
limited in a major life activity. See Bearshield, 570 N.W.2d at 920. Rehm did not
show he was unable to perform different jobs that would not require him to lift heavy
bags of ice or use a sledgehammer.
We find the district court did not err in finding Rehm did not present a
genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether he was disabled within
the meaning of chapter 216. We affirm the district court’s decision granting the
employer’s motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.