State of Iowa v. Ryan Mark Peska

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1000
Filed June 15, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RYAN MARK PESKA,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Mark D. Cleve,
Judge.
The defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm,
contending the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements
allegedly obtained in violation of the defendant’s Miranda rights. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
Clinton police officers responded to the Peska home shortly after midnight
on the morning of April 4, 2015, in response to a call that Ryan Peska was
suicidal and may have possession of a firearm. The responding officers secured
the scene and placed a largely-compliant Peska in custody. Peska’s wife
explained to the officers what happened that evening and directed the officers to
a handgun hidden in the vent of the Peskas’ bedroom. Officer Ottens decided to
transport Peska to the hospital for examination and commitment because of
concerns for Peska’s mental health. Officer Ottens transported Peska to the
hospital and supervised Peska for approximately one hour until Peska could be
examined by a physician and, potentially, committed. During the time Ottens
was with Peska, Peska stated the handgun was his and he did not feel safe
without it. Peska was charged, tried, and convicted of having possession or
control of a firearm or offensive weapon as a felon, in violation of Iowa Code
section 724.26(1) (2013). The strongest evidence at trial was Officer Ottens’
testimony that Peska admitted ownership and possession of the gun.
On appeal, Peska contends the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress the statements Peska made to Ottens allegedly obtained in violation
of Peska’s rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). We
review do novo the ruling on the motion to suppress. See State v. Tyler, 867
N.W.2d 136, 152 (Iowa 2015). We make “an independent evaluation of the
totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record, considering both the
evidence introduced at the suppression hearing as well as the evidence
introduced at trial.” Id. (marks and citations omitted). We give deference to the
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district court’s findings of fact, but we are not bound by them. See State v.
Palmer, 791 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2010). “When the alleged error concerns
the erroneous admission of evidence in violation of a defendant’s constitutional
rights, such error is typically subject to harmless-error analysis.” Tyler, 867
N.W.2d at 153.
The general rule is that statements made while a defendant is subject to
custodial interrogation are inadmissible in the absence of the defendant being
advised of his Miranda rights and waiving the same. See State v. Davis, 446
N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa1989) (“A Miranda inquiry is not triggered, however,
unless there is both custody and interrogation.”). Custodial interrogation is
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “The Miranda safeguards come into play
whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
Interrogation encompasses “any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject.” Id. at
301.
The State concedes the defendant was in custody when the statements
were made. The disputed issue is whether the defendant was subject to
interrogation. Officer Ottens testified he transported Peska to the hospital for the
purpose of seeking mental health treatment for Peska. His intention was to keep
Peska calm until Peska could be examined by a doctor. During the course of
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Officer Ottens’ supervision of Peska, Peska did most of the speaking. Peska
discussed the personal troubles he was facing that precipitated the events of that
evening. He spoke about his military service and post traumatic stress disorder.
And he also made a statement regarding his ownership and possession of the
gun. Ottens testified he did not ask any questions about the night in question,
whether Peska owned the gun, or any other questions designed to elicit
incriminating information from Peska. Officer Ottens was adamant he mainly
listened to Peska for the purpose of keeping Peska calm so Peska could receive
medical assistance. Officer Ottens’ testimony regarding his supervision of Peska
is largely undisputed. Peska testified at trial but not the suppression hearing.
There is nothing in Peska’s testimony from which it could be inferred Ottens
interrogated Peska. Peska testified Officer Ottens told him they were at the
hospital for the purposes of seeking mental health treatment.
On de novo review, we conclude Officer Ottens did not subject Peska to
“interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda doctrine. It seems undisputed the
officer merely listened to Peska to keep Peska calm while waiting for medical
treatment and made no attempt to elicit incriminating information. See, e.g.,
State v. Betances, 828 A.2d 1248, 1257 (Conn. 2003) (“[T]he public safety
exception applies to individual members of the public, including defendants, as
well as to the public at large. . . .[W]hen a life is in danger, the law should make
no distinctions.” (citation omitted)).
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in
denying Peska’s motion to suppress evidence. The defendant’s conviction is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.