In the Interest of L.S., Minor Child, S.R., Mother

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0657
Filed June 15, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF L.S.,
Minor Child,
S.R., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Karen Kaufman
Salic, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Travis M. Armbrust of Brown, Kinsey, Funkhouser & Lander P.L.C.,
Mason City, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Cynthia Schuknecht of Noah, Smith & Schuknecht, P.L.C., Charles City,
for minor child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
2
DANILSON, Chief Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights. 1 She
asserts there is not clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds of
termination (Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2015)),2 termination is not
in the child’s best interests, the department of human services (DHS) has not
made reasonable efforts to reunify her and the child, and the close bond between
mother and child should preclude termination. We affirm because there is clear
and convincing evidence to support the termination, the child needs and
deserves permanency, the mother has received more than five years of services
and has only recently made improvements in parenting, and the parent-child
bond is not sufficient to avoid termination.
1
The child’s biological father has not appealed the termination of his parental rights.
2
The pertinent provisions of section 232.116(1) allow the juvenile court to termination
parental rights if:
(g) The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The court has terminated parental rights pursuant to section
232.117 with respect to another child who is a member of the same family
or a court of competent jurisdiction in another state has entered an order
involuntarily terminating parental rights with respect to another child who
is a member of the same family.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent
continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which
would correct the situation.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional
period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.
(h) The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is three years of age or younger.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child's parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the
last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less
than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be
returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section
232.102 at the present time.
3
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The mother has been involved with the DHS, first in Alaska and then in
Iowa, beginning in 2009. She experiences ongoing substance abuse and mental
health problems, which have affected her child-rearing abilities. She has two
older children, H.S. and E.H. While involved with DHS in Iowa, L.S. was born in
August 2013.
L.S. was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) on May 15,
2014. The juvenile court noted the mother had a “profound” alcohol addiction but
allowed L.S. to stay in her mother’s care subject to DHS supervision, reasoning
the facts did not justify emergency removal. See In re L.S., Nos. 14-1026, 14-
1080, 2014 WL 5252948, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014). But the court
emphasized it would “certainly consider all placement options thought to be in the
best interest of the child” at the time of the dispositional hearing.
On June 12, 2014, in conjunction with a termination hearing concerning
her older children, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing concerning L.S.
The court issued an order that same day, in which it continued L.S.’s CINA status
and ordered the child removed from the mother’s care. The CINA adjudication
and disposition were affirmed on appeal from the juvenile court’s dispositional
order.3 Id. at *4 (“The mother’s drinking, especially since the birth of L.S., and
her tendency to minimize its negative impact, raise concern about her ability to
exercise a reasonable degree of care for L.S. The mother has demonstrated a
3
However, we reversed the order terminating the mother’s parental rights as to H.S. and
E.H. due to the juvenile court’s finding that the mother had a “severe chronic substance
abuse problem” rather than the recently amended language of section 232.116(1)(l), “a
person with a severe substance-related disorder and presents a danger to self or others
as evidenced by prior acts.” See L.S., 2014 WL 5252948, at *5-7.
4
cavalier attitude toward selecting care providers and has been unable to
recognize alcohol impairment is incompatible with safe parenting.”).
The child was returned to the mother’s care in November 2014 “based on
the circumstances believed to be true that mother was maintaining her sobriety,
meeting the expectations of the department and not having contact with B.H.[4]
Unfortunately, it would later be found out circumstances were not as had been
presented to the [juvenile] court.”
On September 3, 2015, the child was again removed from the mother’s
care due to the mother’s unresolved mental health issues, reemergence of
substance use, lack of progress in services, multiple violations of a no-contact
order between mother and B.H., unresolved anger management and mental
health issues of B.H., repeated dishonesty of mother and B.H., lack of
appropriate supervision, lack of adequate protective parenting, and lack of
appropriate parenting skills.
The mother reported having a new substance abuse evaluation at Prairie
Ridge on November 2, 2015, and reported that she had not drank since last
year’s “pub crawl” on October 31, 2014 (immediately after she “successfully”
discharged from Prairie Ridge). However, on November 20, 2015, Prairie Ridge
had no record of her being to their agency since October 2014 when she was
discharged. Jess Throndson, a substance abuse counselor at Prairie Ridge,
reported that the mother’s claims to her DHS social worker that she stops in to
talk at Prairie Ridge were untrue. The mother did have a new substance abuse
4
B.H. is the father of one of L.S.’s older siblings.
5
evaluation on December 7, the day before H.S. and E.H.’s second termination
hearing was to begin.
The mother scheduled a mental health appointment at WellSource for
November 11, 2015, but cancelled it and did not make a future appointment.
She had not been there since May 2015. She did attend two individual therapy
appointments with Alison Fox (who she saw at WellSource January through May)
at the Iowa Specialty Hospital on August 17 and 20. On August 20 the
recommendation was for her to participate in weekly individual therapy and
parent-child interactive therapy (PCIT) with L.S.
The mother’s rights to her two older children were terminated on
December 31, 2015. We affirmed the termination of her rights as to those
children pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (allowing termination where
children four years old or older who have been adjudicated CINA, have been out
of the parent’s custody for at least the last twelve months, and cannot presently
be returned to the parent). In re E.H., No. 16-0072, 2016 WL 2744765, at *1-2
(Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016).
A review hearing concerning L.S. was held on February 11, 2016, at which
point the child had been out of the mother’s care for five months. The juvenile
court found the child could not be returned to her mother’s care because of the
mother’s unresolved mental health issues, her poor parenting skills, and her
failure to cooperate consistently with services. The mother continued to have six
hours of supervised visits per week with L.S. (in two- to three-hour blocks).
A petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights was filed on February
12, 2016. At the March termination hearing, the mother had yet to make
6
significant improvements in her mental health, though she had recently begun
mental health counseling. Her parenting had improved somewhat. The family
safety, risk, and permanency (FSRP) provider, Crystal Kiroff, testified about the
mother’s progress: “I think it was mostly in this last month like after the
termination papers came I noticed that she really put an increase in her efforts to
keep [L.S.]”
On April 1, 2016, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the
mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(g) and (h). The court
also determined DHS had made reasonable efforts at reunification, listing the
following:
In this case the Department has provided FSRP services,
behavioral health services, relative, suitable person and family
foster care placements, substance abuse evaluations and inpatient
and outpatient services, Parent Partner, psychological evaluation,
Families Together, psychiatric hospitalization, drug and alcohol
testing, individual and family therapy, Family Team Meeting, No
Contact Orders, contempt sentences, supervised, semi-supervised
overnight and extended visitation, community programming and
case management.
The court also determined termination would provide L.S. with the best
opportunity for furthering the child’s long-term nurturing and growth, as well as
the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.
Finally, the juvenile court found that the parent-child bond, while
acknowledged, did not justify maintaining the mother’s parental rights.
The mother appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review termination decisions de novo. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100,
110 (Iowa 2014). We give weight to the juvenile court’s findings, particularly
7
concerning the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App.
P. 6.904(3)(g).
III. Discussion.
A. Statutory grounds exist for termination. We fully agree with the district
court’s findings:
Mother has made improvement from where she started many years
ago before [L.S.] was born, and even since [L.S.] was removed last
year. She is employed, sober, not involved with B.H., has
reinitiated mental health services, regularly attends visits, loves
[L.S.] and wants [L.S.] home. She has within the last six weeks
been able to on occasion impose timeouts and consequences for
[L.S.]
Unfortunately, there are a number of areas that remain a
barrier for her. Her past trauma—both as a child and adult—makes
it difficult for her to consistently impose discipline. As a result,
[L.S.] is a completely different child in the presence of Mother. With
others [L.S.] is emotionally stable, easily redirected and compliant,
which has not been seen for any stretch of time during even a two
hour visit with [the] mother. Even with isolated instances of
appropriate disciplining, [L.S.] continues to have lengthy screaming
fits during visits.
During the same timeframe when Mother has started to
impose discipline in some instances, her lack of appropriate
supervision has exposed [L.S.] to cutting, electrocution, poisoning
and choking hazards.[5] It seems that the demands of parenting are
too much for Mother, as if when she imposes discipline, she can’t
also identify and eliminate dangers to her child. She seems by
nature to be a very passive parent, but aside from feeding and trips
to the bathroom she seems to use almost exclusively TV and her
phone to amuse [L.S.] She frequently dozes off during visits, and
during a rare six-hour visit, slept soundly for over an hour.
Mother testifies that she is trying to be a better parent, and
the Court does not doubt that. It is clear that Mother had no
exposure to healthy parenting practices as a child that she can
5
The court referenced recent incidents during visits:
At a visit on February 18, 2016, [L.S.] managed to get a butcher knife out
of a drawer. Mother did not respond to the situation at all. Similarly, on
March 2, 2016, [L.S.] picked up Mother’s nicotine vaporizer. March 16,
2016, was a particularly troublesome visit, as [L.S.] stuck Mother’s keys
into an electrical outlet . . . . Mother did not get up to address these
issues (let alone provide enough supervision to prevent them), and didn’t
even seem to verbally intervene.
8
draw on, and saddled with her traumatic history, it has been difficult
for her to cope with the world in a productive way. Having failed for
all this time to address her underlying mental health issues, she
has piecemeal worked to resolve her substance abuse addictions
and horribly unhealthy relationships with men. Her mental health
state remains precarious . . . . For periods of time she can do okay,
but devolves quickly. This is a pattern that has been repeated over
and over during the past five years and cannot be ignored.
There is no doubt that [L.S.] loves [the] mother and that the
feeling is mutual; however, it is not safe for [L.S.] to return to [the]
mother’s care today or in the foreseeable future. In Ms. Kiroff’s
words, with consistent effort it isn’t “impossible” to think Mother
could make sufficient progress in a year, but it certainly is not likely.
....
Mother has been given an inordinate amount of time to
remedy her parenting deficiencies. She has had three different
DHS case managers and numerous FSRP workers during the five
and a half years of services offered Mother in Iowa. Each provider
has ultimately come to the same conclusion: she hasn’t changed,
she isn’t going to change and [L.S.] deserves better.
At the time of termination, L.S. was under the age of three, had been
adjudicated CINA, and had been out of the mother’s care for at least six months,
during which there had been no trial home placements.6 The mother had not
sufficiently progressed to provide consistent and safe parenting. There is clear
and convincing evidence supporting termination pursuant to section
232.116(1)(h).
6
The mother argues the nine-month trial home placement ending in September 2015
serves to negate the statutory requirement that “[t]he child has been removed from the
physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months,
or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than
thirty days.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(g). She argues the “any” in the phrase “and any
trial period at home has been less than thirty days” modifies the entire paragraph.
However, the paragraph is in the disjunctive: either (1) the child has been removed from
custody for at least six months of the last twelve months or (2) for the last six
consecutive months—the phrase “and any trial period” modifies only this second
alternative. In re D.M.J., 780 N.W.2d 243, 245-46 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (“Given the
presence of a comma in the statute before the word ‘or,’ we think it is reasonable to
conclude that the subsequent language ‘and any trial period at home has been less than
thirty days’ applies to and qualifies only the language after the comma.”).
9
B. Termination is in the child’s best interests. Even after we have
determined that statutory grounds for termination exist, we must still determine
whether termination is in the child’s best interests. Iowa Code § 232.116(2); In re
A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012); see also In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39
(Iowa 2010). In evaluating this issue, we “give primary consideration to the
child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and
growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and
needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). “It is simply not in the best
interests of children to continue to keep them in temporary foster homes while
the natural parents get their lives together.” A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778.
The trial court found:
Given that [the mother] cannot take care of herself
consistently, she cannot properly care for a child. She has difficulty
doing that for a two hour visit. The child has not yet been physically
injured during visits, but in the last month alone there have been
four significant chances for that to happen that Ms. Kiroff
prevented. Mother is unable to meet the child’s needs, let alone
stay awake for a two hour visit. On a fulltime basis, it would be
disastrous to leave her alone with [L.S.].
We acknowledge the mother’s recent progress. However, we cannot
ignore that the progress comes after several years of services and that her
renewed dedication to meet case-plan goals seems to come after the termination
petition was filed. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (“[C]hanges
in the two or three months before the termination hearing, in light of the
preceding eighteen months, are insufficient.”).
“Insight for the determination of the child’s long-range best interests can
be gleaned from ‘evidence of the parent’s past performance for that performance
10
may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is capable of
providing.’” A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778 (quoting C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495). The
mother’s past performance has not been one of good parenting. Her rights to her
two older children were terminated. She is beginning to work on her mental
health and appears to be abstaining from alcohol abuse. However, we agree
with the juvenile court that her ability to provide adequate parenting is not likely to
come soon enough for L.S. Thus, we agree that the child’s best opportunity for
permanency and safety is with termination of the mother’s parental rights.
C. Reasonable efforts at reunification were made. The mother challenges
the efforts made to reunify her with her child. However, these complaints were
not raised until the termination proceeding, which is too late. See In re T.S., 868
N.W.2d 425, 442 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (“Complaints regarding services are
properly raised ‘at removal, when the case permanency plan is entered, or at
later review hearings.’ Where a parent ‘fails to request other services at the
proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at the
termination proceeding.’ Similarly, we will not review a reasonable efforts claim
unless it is raised prior to the termination hearing.” (citations omitted)).
In this case, DHS has provided numerous services to the mother over a
period exceeding the child’s lifetime. Reasonable efforts were made toward
reunification.
D. Section 232.116(3)(c) does not preclude termination. Finally, the
mother contends that the mother-child bond should preclude termination. Iowa
Code section 232.116(3)(c) does provide a basis for avoiding termination. “A
strong bond between parent and child is a special circumstance which militates
11
against termination when the statutory grounds have been satisfied. However,
this is not an overriding consideration, but merely a factor to consider.” In re
Z.H., 740 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). The juvenile court observed:
[L.S.] and [the] mother do share an undeniable bond. [L.S.] clearly
likes spending time with [the] mother, but long-term mother does
not have the capability to meet the needs she must have met. It
has taken her over two years to successfully implement a time out.
[L.S.] is emotionally out of control with [the] mother because there
have not been consistent rules and discipline, which is equally
important—if not more so—than cuddling together on the couch.
On our de novo review, we agree that the circumstances presented here do not
preclude termination.
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to L.S.
AFFIRMED.