State of Iowa v. Timothy John Miller

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1109
Filed August 17, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TIMOTHY JOHN MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, Stephanie C.
Rattenborg, District Associate Judge.
Timothy Miller appeals his convictions for third-degree harassment and
interference with a judicial act. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
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PER CURIAM.
The crimes underlying this appeal arise out of multiple court filings by
Timothy J. Miller, which demanded information from Buchanan County Attorney
Shawn Harden and Magistrate Steven Ristvedt and threatened legal action
against them. A jury found Miller guilty of third-degree harassment and
interference with a judicial act. On appeal, Miller contends the evidence was
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of guilt.
The jury was instructed the State would have to prove the following
elements of third-degree harassment:
1. On or between December 30, 2013, and February 17,
2014, the Defendant, Timothy John Miller,
a. Communicated with Shawn Harden in writing,
without a legitimate purpose, in a manner likely to cause him
annoyance or harm.
2. The Defendant did so with the specific intent to intimidate,
annoy or alarm Shawn Harden.
See also Iowa Code § 708.7(1)(a)(1) (2013). The jury also was instructed the
State would have to prove the following elements of interference with a judicial
act:
On or between the 30th day of December, 2013, and
February 19, 2014:
1. The Defendant had the specific intent to intimidate, annoy
or alarm Steven Ristvedt,
2. By communication by writing,
3. Without legitimate purpose, and,
4. In a manner likely to cause Steven Ristvedt annoyance or
harm,
5. And with the specific intent to interfere with or improperly
influence or in retaliation for an official act of a judicial officer.
6. Steven Ristvedt was a “judicial officer” as defined in
Instruction No. 17.
See also id. § 720.7.
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A reasonable juror could have found the following facts. In 2012,
Magistrate Ristvedt adjudged Miller guilty of false representation of record and
imposed a fine, surcharge, and court costs. When the monetary obligation was
not paid, the State referred the matter to its collection unit and, a year later, to a
third-party collection agency. Fifteen days after the collection agency issued its
first notice, Miller began to inundate the county attorney and magistrate with
requests for information and threats of legal action.
One missive directed to Harden accused him of fraud and informed him
that if he did not provide the requested information within seventy-two hours, he
would “accept[] with full liability, without recourse, lien and levy as prescribed by
law.” Another document, styled a “Notice of Tort Claim,” informed Harden that
Miller was bringing an action against him for several alleged violations of law.
Magistrate Ristvedt received similar communications, including a “Notice
of Suit Affidavit” accusing him of various violations of law and a document
expressing an intent to have the magistrate’s immunities removed and seeking
the imposition of “pecuniary damages . . . for bad faith concealment and
trespass.”
Harden and Ristvedt testified they were annoyed by the filings. Harden
expressed concern about having liens filed against him. He cited a similar filing
against a police officer that took almost a year to clear up. When Miller, acting
pro se, asked Harden whether Miller had done anything to offend him, Harden
responded, “Repeatedly asking me for the same documents again and again
once I’ve answered, and answered in accordance with the law, and then
threatened me with lawsuits, yeah.” Magistrate Ristvedt testified the filings
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initially were “just annoying” but then “they got . . . more threatening and
harassing.” He cited Miller’s expressed intent to “come after [him] both privately
and personally” and Miller’s intent to place a lien on Ristvedt’s property.
Miller admits sending these documents but contends he lacked the
specific intent to “intimidate, annoy or alarm Shawn Harden” or “interfere with or
improperly influence or [act] in retaliation for an official act of a judicial officer.” A
reasonable juror could have found otherwise. Several witnesses testified the
filings were consistent with acts of individuals who self-identified as “sovereign
citizens” and who claimed to be above the law unless the law benefitted them.
Given the tenor of the filings—including threats—the timing of the filings relative
to collection efforts against Miller, and Miller’s refusal to acknowledge receipt of
responses to his requests for information, a reasonable juror could have found
Miller acted with the requisite specific intent. See State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d
328, 330 (Iowa 2003) (“Intent is a matter that is seldom capable of direct proof.
Consequently, we have recognized that a trier of fact may infer intent from the
normal consequences of one’s actions.” (citations omitted)).
In a similar vein, Miller argues the documents were not “without legitimate
purpose.” Suffice it to say that the evidence summarized above could have been
considered by the jury when it made a contrary finding.
Substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings of guilt. See State v.
Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828, 832-33 (Iowa 2010) (setting forth standard of
review). Accordingly, we affirm Miller’s judgment and sentences for third-degree
harassment and interference with a judicial act.
AFFIRMED.