State of Iowa v. Kenneth Owen Barry

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0055
Filed August 17, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KENNETH OWEN BARRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano,
Judge.
Kenneth Barry appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal
sentence. AFFIRMED.
Kevin Hobbs, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
2
DOYLE, Judge.
Kenneth Barry appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal
sentence, which he brought pursuant to State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403
(Iowa 2014).1 Barry, a minor at the time he committed the offenses for which he
was sentenced, argues his sentence is illegal because it contains a mandatory
minimum term. He asserts Lyle requires his resentencing.
Barry was charged with two counts of robbery in the second degree and
one count of conspiracy to commit robbery. Barry was sixteen years and eight
months old at the time he committed the criminal offenses. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Barry pled guilty to all three counts and was sentenced to a period of
imprisonment not to exceed ten years for each count, with the robbery counts
running concurrent to each other but consecutive to the conspiracy count, for a
total period of imprisonment not to exceed twenty years. He was required to
serve a minimum sentence of seven years on the robbery counts. See Iowa
Code § 902.12(1) (2013) (requiring those convicted of certain felonies to serve a
minimum of seven-tenths of the maximum sentence). More than a year after
sentencing, Barry moved to correct his sentence, alleging Lyle required the court
to reconsider imposing the mandatory minimum sentence. The district court
denied the motion, and Barry now appeals.
1
In Lyle, the Iowa Supreme Court held that
article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution forbids a mandatory minimum
sentencing schema for juvenile offenders that deprives the district court of
the discretion to consider youth and its attendant circumstances as a
mitigating factor and to impose a lighter punishment by eliminating the
minimum period of incarceration without parole.
854 N.W.2d at 404.
3
Barry’s argument is premised on a faulty foundation. The fact that his
sentence imposes a mandatory minimum period of time he must serve before
being eligible for parole does not make his sentence illegal per se. As our
supreme court noted, the Lyle holding “does not prohibit judges from sentencing
juveniles to prison for the length of time identified by the legislature for the crime
committed, nor does it prohibit the legislature from imposing a minimum time that
youthful offenders must serve in prison before being eligible for parole.” Lyle,
854 N.W.2d at 403. The section 902.12 schema
requiring a juvenile to serve seventy percent of the period of
incarceration before parole eligibility may not be imposed without a
prior determination by the [sentencing] court that the minimum
period of incarceration without parole is warranted under the factors
identified in Miller [v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012),] and
further explained in [State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 74-75 (Iowa
2013)].
Id. at 404 n.10. The factors to be used by a court sentencing a juvenile include:
(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful behavior,
such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences”; (2) the particular “family and home environment”
that surround the youth; (3) the circumstances of the particular
crime and all circumstances relating to youth that may have played
a role in the commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for
youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal process; and
(5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.
Id. (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74-75; and State v.
Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 95-96 (Iowa 2013); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107,
115 n.6 (Iowa 2013)). If the court finds the mandatory minimum sentence is
warranted, the sentencing court may impose the sentence provided for under the
statute. See id. That is what occurred here.
4
At the sentencing hearing, the court detailed the reasons for the sentence
it imposed upon Barry. It considered that Barry was a “young person,”2 and that
he had committed the crimes when he was sixteen years old. The court
discussed at length the nature of the offenses and role of other accomplices,
Barry’s level of responsibility, his cooperation with law enforcement, his attempts
at and prospects for future rehabilitation, his history in juvenile court, his ability to
understand his behavior, his difficulties at the State Training School, the impact
of the offenses on the victims, and the plea agreement. It summarized its
reasons in the written sentencing order, in which the court indicated it considered
Barry’s age, the nature of the offenses committed, the plea agreement, and
“other factors as follows”:
[Barry] was sixteen years of age at the time these offenses
were committed. The court has conducted an individualized
sentencing hearing and has considered all factors required
pursuant to [Miller, Null, Pearson, Ragland,] Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
This court’s specific findings set forth on the record are
incorporated herein as though fully set forth. In summary, the court
recognizes the United States Supreme Court and the Iowa
Supreme Court [have determined] that children are different, they
have less developed judgment, [they] are susceptible to peer
pressure, and their character is not fully formed. [Barry]’s
diminished culpability is a factor in this criminal sentencing. The
appellate courts require this court to recognize that a juvenile is
more capable of change than an adult and that a juvenile’s actions
are less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depraved character. A
lengthy prison sentence without a meaningful opportunity for parole
should be a rare or uncommon occurrence. The typical
characteristics of youth—immaturity, impetuosity, and poor risk
assessment—are to be considered mitigating, not aggravating,
factors. However, the court still considers the protection of public
safety in its determination. The appellate cases on juvenile
sentencing do not guarantee a youth a specific length of sentence
or even eventual release, only that he be given a meaningful
2
Barry was two days shy of being eighteen years old at the time of sentencing.
5
opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation and fitness to return to
society.
In considering the facts and circumstances of this case, the
court finds that [Barry] had prior contact with juvenile authorities,
spent time in a youth shelter, and was provided an opportunity for
substance abuse treatment and probation through the juvenile
court. [Barry]’s behavior while under the supervision of the juvenile
court did not improve but deteriorated. While [Barry]’s youth,
immaturity, underdeveloped judgment, and vulnerability to peer
pressure are taken into account, the court finds that return to the
community at this time is not appropriate. The court has also
considered the seriousness of the offenses, the use of a weapon,
and the impact on the victims.
After considering all appropriate sentencing factors to be applied to a juvenile
offender, the court concluded that imposition of the mandatory minimum
sentence was warranted.
In denying Barry’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, the district court
pointed out:
At [Barry]’s sentencing hearing, the court discussed at length
on the record and/or in the sentencing order each of the five factors
set forth in Lyle. The transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects a
lengthy discussion of [Barry]’s age and features of youthful
behavior; his particular upbringing and services through the juvenile
court; the circumstances of the crime and his role (bringing the gun
into the situation), including his truthfulness with authorities and his
testimony at the trial of a co-defendant; and the possibility of
rehabilitation and capacity for change. There was no specific
discussion of his challenges in navigating the criminal process, but
it is clear he was always represented by counsel, who worked
diligently to negotiate a plea deal for him. The court referenced the
presentence investigation and all of the attachments thereto, which
included records of [Barry]’s family history, treatment services,
evaluations, and juvenile court records. The court did consider all
of the factors set forth in Lyle and the earlier juvenile sentencing
cases.
We agree with the district court that it did not impose an illegal sentence.
Barry makes no assertion the sentencing process was deficient in any
way. Instead, because he was sentenced before Lyle was filed, he argues he is
6
entitled to an automatic resentencing as Lyle “appears to require” the
resentencing of all juveniles serving mandatory minimum sentences at the time
Lyle was filed. Indeed, Lyle states that its holding “will require all juvenile
offenders who are in prison under a mandatory minimum sentence to be returned
to court for resentencing.” 854 N.W.2d at 403. However, we believe Barry reads
Lyle too broadly, and we wholeheartedly agree with the district court’s response
to Barry’s argument:
Although Lyle appears to require resentencing of all juvenile
offenders with a mandatory minimum sentence, the supreme court
surely meant all juvenile offenders who have not had an
individualized sentencing hearing where the five Lyle factors were
considered. Here, if a new sentencing hearing is held, the court will
be considering the exact same factors that it already considered on
June 23, 2014, as those are the same factors now set forth in Lyle.
To “re-do” a sentencing hearing which is not constitutionally
defective serves no purpose.
We affirm the district court’s denial of Barry’s motion to correct his sentence.
AFFIRMED.