State of Iowa v. Shantel C. Temple

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1293
Filed September 14, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SHANTEL C. TEMPLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano,
Judge, (plea and sentencing) and Cynthia M. Moisan, District Associate Judge,
(deferred judgment revocation and sentencing).
Defendant appeals her conviction and sentence imposed after the
revocation of her probation and deferred judgment. CONVICTION AFFIRMED,
SENTENCE VACATED, AND REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli A. Huser, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
Shantel Temple appeals her conviction and sentence for criminal mischief
in the third degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 716.1 and 716.5 (2011),
following the revocation of her probation and deferred judgment for the same.
Temple contends the district court erred in finding a probation violation, erred in
revoking her probation and deferred judgment, and committed sentencing error
following the revocation of her deferred judgment. Interrelated with these claims,
she contends the district court denied her right to due process.
I.
In May 2012, Temple pleaded guilty to criminal mischief in the third degree
and proceeded to immediate sentencing. The district court granted Temple’s
request for a deferred judgment and placed Temple on probation for two years.
Temple’s probation agreement required her to, among other things, “obey all
Federal, State and Local laws” and to have a valid driver’s license and liability
insurance on any motor vehicle she owned or operated.
In April 2014, near the end of Temple’s probationary period, the
Department of Correctional Services filed a probation report of violation. The
report alleged Temple had recently been convicted of driving with her license
under suspension and charged with three other traffic offenses. The district court
set the matter for hearing. The hearing was continued on several occasions.
The district court continued the hearing to afford Temple the opportunity to obtain
a temporary driver’s license or present proof she was in a driver’s license
reinstatement program. On June 9, the district court found Temple in contempt
because, it appears, Temple failed to bring proof she obtained her temporary
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license or was in a license reinstatement program. The district court sentenced
Temple to thirty days’ incarceration but afforded Temple the opportunity to purge
the contempt citation by bringing the required documents to a hearing to be held
on July 7. Temple failed to appear at the July 7 hearing, and the district court
issued an arrest warrant.
More than one year later, on July 21, 2015, the arrest warrant was
executed. On July 22, Temple appeared before the district court. Temple
waived her right to counsel and waived reporting of the proceeding. She
stipulated to violating the terms of probation by having unpaid fines, failing to
appear at the last hearing, and having “tickets from 2014.” The district court
revoked Temple’s probation and deferred judgment, sentenced her to thirty days’
incarceration with credit for two days served, provided Temple may be
considered for electronic monitoring after seven days in jail, and converted the
civil penalty to a $625 fine with credit for any monies previously paid toward her
civil penalty. Temple timely filed her appeal.
II.
We first address our jurisdiction to consider this appeal. As a general rule,
direct appeal from a probation revocation proceeding is disallowed. See State v.
Rheuport, 225 N.W.2d 122, 123 (Iowa 1975). Postconviction-relief proceedings
are the exclusive remedy. See Iowa Code 822.2(1)(e) (2015) (providing for
postconviction relief where “[t]he person’s sentence has expired, or probation,
parole, or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked, or the person is
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint”); Rheuport, 225 N.W.2d at
123 (“We hold chapter 663A [recodified at chapter 822] provides the exclusive
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remedy for challenging revocation of probation.”). An exception to the rule exists
where, as here, the district court revokes a deferred judgment. See State v.
Farmer, 234 N.W.2d 89, 90–91 (Iowa 1975). This is because the revocation
order “inheres in the subsequent judgment [and the] defendant may attack the
revocation order . . . in [her] appeal from final judgment.” Id. at 91. We thus
have jurisdiction over this appeal.
III.
Temple first raises several challenges to the revocation of her probation.
We review the district court’s revocation decision for the correction of legal error.
See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. To the extent Temple raises constitutional
challenges, our review is de novo. See State v. Brooks, 760 N.W.2d 197, 204
(Iowa 2009).
“Probation revocation involves a two-step inquiry by the court. First, the
court must determine if a probation violation has occurred. Next, the court must
determine what should be done as a result of the violation.” State v. Allen, 402
N.W.2d 438, 443 (Iowa 1987). “Probation revocation is a civil proceeding and
not a stage of criminal prosecution. Because revocation is not a stage of criminal
prosecution, the rules of criminal procedure do not apply and ‘the proceedings
can be informal, even summary.’” State v. Lillibridge, 519 N.W.2d 82, 83 (Iowa
1994) (quoting Calvert v. State, 310 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Iowa 1981)). However,
because probation revocation results in a deprivation of liberty, the court must
afford the defendant due process. See id. Due process requires a probationer
be provided with notice of any claimed violations prior to revocation. See
Calvert, 310 N.W.2d at 188. Due process requires findings by the court showing
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the factual basis for the revocation. See id.; State v. Hughes, 200 N.W.2d 559,
562 (Iowa 1972). The court may make the required findings of fact in writing or
orally on the record. See State v. Kirby, 622 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 2001). The
revocation decision must be supported by a preponderance of evidence. See id.
at 511.
Temple first contends her due process rights were violated because she
was not provided notice of the violations supporting revocation. Specifically, she
argues the alleged violations set forth in the report of violation were different from
the violations to which she stipulated. There was no due process violation in this
case. The report of violations alleged, among other things, Temple was required
to obey the law. Temple violated the law by driving while her license was under
suspension and committing several traffic offenses. She stipulated to the
violations by acknowledging the tickets she received in 2014. Further, due
process rights may be waived. See Patterson v. State, 294 N.W.2d 683, 684
(Iowa 1980). Temple’s stipulation that she violated her probation in several
respects constitutes a waiver of her right to notice. See Deering v. State, No. 98-
1473, 1999 WL 775998, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1999).
Temple also contends the stipulated violations were not actually violations
of her probation agreement. This appears to be a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the district court’s findings. Temple’s probation
agreement is not part of the record. “It is the defendant’s obligation to provide
this court with a record affirmatively disclosing the error relied upon.” State v.
Mudra, 532 N.W.2d 765, 767 (Iowa 1995), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 921 (Iowa 2014). Temple made no effort to create
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a supplemental record. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.806. We will not speculate on the
issue where the defendant has failed to provide relevant record in support of her
claim. In any event, the claim is without merit. “Even though the probation
agreement is not in the record to establish that compliance with the law was a
condition of probation, we have said ‘it is a fundamental condition of any
probation, whether or not it is expressed in probation instructions, that the
probationer shall not violate the law.’” State v. Kirby, 622 N.W.2d 506, 510–11
(Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. McGinnis, 243 N.W.2d 583, 587 (Iowa 1976)).
Temple stipulated to several violations of the law, including traffic offenses and
the failure to appear for a contempt hearing.
Temple argues the revocation decision must be reversed because the
district court failed to make a record of its reason or reasons for revoking
probation at the second—or dispositional—stage of the revocation proceeding.
Temple argues her challenge to the revocation court’s failure to provide its
reasoning is analogous to a defendant challenging a void, illegal, or procedurally
defective sentence. See State v. Thomas, 520 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa Ct. App.
1994). She further argues that the failure to make such a record violates federal
due process. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (due process
requires a “written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole”). We disagree. The United States Supreme Court
has rejected this claim under federal due process standards. See Black v.
Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 616 (1985) (“The procedures required by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were afforded in this case, even
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though the state judge did not explain on the record his consideration and
rejection of alternatives to incarceration.”).
Temple argues this court should hold that the due process clause of the
Iowa Constitution requires the district court to make a record of its reasons for
revoking probation instead of some other disposition. We decline to do so.
While the district court has an obligation to make “a record of the probation
violation hearing,” State v. Van Wie, No. 13-0133, 2014 WL 69517, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2014), the obligation to make a record relates only to a record of
the findings establishing a violation, see Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489; State v.
Welsh, 245 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Iowa 1976). There is no requirement that the
district court state additional reasons in support of disposition. The requirement
that the district court make findings establishing a violation is sufficient to protect
the defendant’s limited liberty interests. See State v. Joiner, No. 09-1858, 2010
WL 3326683, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2010); see also Patterson, 294
N.W.2d at 685. Like the United States Supreme Court, “[w]e believe that a
general requirement that the factfinder elaborate upon the reasons for a course
not taken would unduly burden the revocation proceeding without significantly
advancing the interests of the probationer.” Black, 471 U.S. at 613.
In sum, we conclude the revocation proceeding was without error and not
in contravention of Temple’s right to due process under the federal and state
constitutions. She was provided with notice of the alleged violations and given
multiple opportunities to resolve the alleged violations. She failed to do so. After
failing to resolve the alleged violations, she was given an opportunity to be heard.
She stipulated to violating the terms and conditions of her probation. The district
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court made written findings supporting the violations. Under Black and
Patterson, nothing more was required.
IV.
Temple also challenges her sentence. Temple contends the district court
failed to provide her with the right of allocution and failed to make a record of the
reason or reasons for imposition of sentence. After revoking a deferred
judgment, the entry of sentence becomes “the final judgment in the criminal case
and not part of the civil revocation proceeding. Therefore, the district court had
to comply with the rules of criminal procedure.” Lillibridge, 519 N.W.2d at 83.
The State concedes the district court failed to comply with the Rules of Criminal
Procedure by failing to make a record regarding its reason or reasons for
imposition of sentence. We agree. See Thompson, 856 N.W.2d at 921 (“We
also hold if the defendant waives reporting of the sentencing hearing and the
court fails to state its reasons for the sentence in the written sentencing order,
the court has abused its discretion, and we will vacate the sentence and remand
the case for resentencing.”). Because this case must be remanded for a plenary
sentencing hearing, we need not resolve Temple’s claim regarding the denial of
her right of allocution.
V.
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction, but
we vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand this matter for resentencing.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND REMANDED.