State of Iowa v. Kareem Henshaw

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0382
Filed December 21, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KAREEM HENSHAW,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Dustria A. Relph,
Judge.
A defendant appeals the imposition of judgment and sentence, following
the revocation of his deferred judgment. AFFIRMED.
Matthew R. O’Hollearn of Brick Gentry, P.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Kareem Henshaw appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, to wit: cocaine base
“crack,” in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(3) (2013). Henshaw
claims the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to incarceration,
rather than probation.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On November 6, 2014, Henshaw pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. Henshaw was granted a deferred judgment and
four years of probation. On June 17, 2015, Henshaw’s probation officer filed a
report that stated Henshaw had violated his probation by testing positive for
marijuana, missing appointments, and failing to make required payments related
to his conviction. The report requested Henshaw’s probation be revoked. After a
contested hearing, the court left the deferred judgment in place, continued
Henshaw’s probation, and ordered Henshaw to attend in-patient substance
abuse and mental-health treatment through the Veterans Administration.
On November 24, 2015, Henshaw’s probation officer filed another report
requesting Henshaw’s probation be revoked following Henshaw’s arrest for
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Henshaw stipulated to the
violation. At the hearing, the State presented evidence police were alerted to a
suspicious package by a postal inspector, a dog sniff had indicated that the
package contained narcotics, and after a search warrant was obtained, the
package was opened and discovered to contain a pound of marijuana. The
package was then delivered to the address listed, and law enforcement observed
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Henshaw accept the package. The court found that Henshaw violated his
probation; the State argued his deferred judgment and probation should be
revoked, while Henshaw argued he should be given another chance at treatment.
The court revoked Henshaw’s deferred judgment and probation and sentenced
him to prison. Henshaw appeals.
II. Standard of Review
A sentence that falls within statutory limits is reviewed for abuse of
discretion on appeal. State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2015). “An
abuse of discretion is found only when the sentencing court exercises its
discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
unreasonable.” State v. Privitt, 571 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Iowa 1997).
III. Imposition of Judgment and Sentence
Henshaw claims the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him
to incarceration, following the revocation of his deferred judgment. Specifically,
Henshaw claims the district court failed to properly consider his status as a
veteran. The State disagrees.
In applying its discretion when determining sentence, the court should
consider several factors, “including the nature of the offense, the attending
circumstances, defendant’s age, character and propensities and chances of his
reform.” State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979). Ultimately, the
court should order a sentence that “will provide maximum opportunity for the
rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from
further offenses by the defendant and others.” Iowa Code § 901.54
Here, we discern no abuse of discretion. In pronouncing its sentence, the
district court stated:
In considering what is the appropriate disposition in this
case, I have considered the nature and circumstances of the
violation that is before me today, including the statement to the
officer, which I find credible. I have no reason to doubt that, other
than what you are telling me. But his statement that you intended
to become a big drug dealer—and then your own statement that
you intended to—that you used your military skills to commit
ongoing crimes.
I’ve also considered the protection of the public from any
further offenses, if I were to continue your probation. Even though
you don’t have an extensive criminal history, you do have an
established criminal history and an established pattern of offenses
now. You do have a propensity, it appears, to commit criminal acts.
I have taken your statement into consideration and the
statutory sentencing requirements, your mental health history, your
family circumstances, your living circumstances. You don’t have a
stable home at this point. That is unfortunate. I am sympathetic to
that.
I’ve considered your need and potential for rehabilitation,
which, obviously, your need is quite extensive, and there are a
variety of places where you can get that rehabilitation. I have also
considered your employment circumstances or lack thereof.
Therefore, I find it appropriate to and it is ordered, adjudged
and decreed that your probation is revoked, and you are adjudged
to be guilty of possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to deliver cocaine-based crack, which is Count I in this case.
The district court demonstrated its familiarity with the record and used that
familiarity in considering the appropriate factors and imposing its sentence. 1
Accordingly, we find there was no abuse of discretion.
1
The district court specifically noted Henshaw’s military service and the impact that had
on its decision.
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IV. Conclusion
Because we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
judgment and sentence after revoking Henshaw’s deferred judgment, we affirm
Henshaw’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.