Ned William Reynolds, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0402
Filed September 10, 2015
NED WILLIAM REYNOLDS,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Duane E.
Hoffmeyer, Judge.
Ned Reynolds appeals from the dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Robert E. Peterson, Carroll, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, and Ian A. McConeghey, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
Ned Reynolds, found guilty of second-degree sexual abuse, had his
judgment and sentence affirmed by this court. See State v. Reynolds, No. 09-
1208, 2009 WL 1875740, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 12, 2010). Reynolds
subsequently filed an application for postconviction relief raising several
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
The State moved for summary judgment, which Reynolds’s attorney
resisted. The district court scheduled the matter for hearing and authorized the
parties to participate by telephone hearing, if they so desired. Although a judge
was specially assigned to the case, the parties agreed to have a different judge
consider the matter.
The parties proceeded with discovery. Reynolds’s postconviction attorney
deposed his trial attorney and the State propounded interrogatories to Reynolds,
which he answered and signed.
Counsel for the State and for Reynolds attended an unreported hearing on
the motion for summary judgment. There is no indication Reynolds was informed
of the hearing or participated in it.
Following the hearing, the district court filed an order stating judicial notice
was taken of “the attachments to the motion for summary judgment,” including
the decision on direct appeal, the deposition transcript of Reynolds’s attorney,
Reynolds’s interrogatory answers, and the “entire underlying criminal file.”
Everything except the “entire criminal file” was proffered by the State. The court
denied each of Reynolds’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on the merits.
3
On appeal, Reynolds asserts his postconviction attorney was ineffective in
(1) waiving the specially-assigned judge, (2) waiving reporting of the summary
judgment hearing, and (3) failing “to inform [him] of the hearing and to ensure
that he was present.” These omissions, he argues, amounted to a denial of due
process. We find the third claim dispositive.
The Iowa Supreme Court addressed a virtually identical issue in Manning
v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 2002). There, a postconviction-relief
applicant resisted the State’s motion for summary judgment, asserting in part that
summary disposition was inappropriate. The district court dismissed the
application without an evidentiary hearing. The dismissal order stated Manning’s
postconviction counsel appeared for Manning at the unreported proceeding. On
appeal, Manning argued the district court erred in failing to afford him an
evidentiary hearing. Manning, 654 N.W.2d at 558.
The Iowa Supreme Court examined Iowa Code section 822.6, which
states:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary
disposition of [a PCR] application, when it appears from the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Iowa Code § 822.6 (2013). According to the court, the “goal” of this method of
disposition of PCR applications “‘is to provide a method of disposition once the
case has been fully developed by both sides, but before an actual trial.’”
Manning, 654 N.W.2d at 559 (quoting Hines v. State, 288 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa
1980)).
4
The court concluded “the district court should not have summarily
dismissed Manning’s application.” Id. at 562. The court reasoned, “Manning was
not properly notified that he would need to present proof on any issue other than
what was alleged in the State’s motion to dismiss,” Manning’s claims raised
genuine issues of material fact precluding entry of summary disposition, and
“when claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are properly raised in a
postconviction relief application, ‘an evidentiary hearing on the merits is ordinarily
required.’” Id. at 561-62 (citations omitted).
As in Manning, there is no indication Reynolds’s postconviction attorney
informed Reynolds of the scheduled hearing on his postconviction-relief
application or made an effort to ensure his presence at the hearing. On our de
novo review, we conclude counsel breached an essential duty in failing to take
these steps. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Iowa 1984).
In reaching this conclusion, we have considered two factual differences
between Manning and this case. First, in Manning, the State’s motion to dismiss
only raised procedural grounds for dismissal of the application. Accordingly,
Manning had no warning the court might reach the merits of his application.
Manning, 654 N.W.2d at 560. Here, the State’s motion for summary judgment
addressed the merits of Reynolds’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and
included supporting documentation in the form of trial counsel’s deposition
transcript and Reynolds’s signed answers to interrogatories. Second, the court
never scheduled a hearing in Manning, whereas here, the district court afforded
Reynolds the opportunity to participate by telephone. But these seemingly stark
differences matter little if Reynolds was unaware of the scheduled hearing and of
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his right to present evidence controverting the allegations in the State’s motion.
Indeed, one of Reynolds’s signed answers to interrogatories, in which he listed
himself as a witness, highlighted his desire to testify. While it could be said those
answers effectively placed his side of the story before the court, the questions
were prepared by the State and the answers served as a poor substitute for his
live elaboration of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
Postconviction counsel’s failure to inform Reynolds of the hearing or
inquire about his desire to participate prejudiced Reynolds. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 487. Time and again, the postconviction court’s ruling cited the absence
of evidence from Reynolds. For example, the court stated Reynolds offered “no
specific inconsistencies that he believes cross-examination of the experts could
have revealed,” “offered no specific testimony or evidence [a witness] could have
offered that might create a genuine issue of material fact for trial,” and “offered no
evidence of a ‘prior medical complaint’ beyond the medical record of the victim
created during her examination by [a medical professional].” Had Reynolds been
informed of the hearing, he may have offered evidence on these and other
subjects. We conclude he was not afforded an opportunity to “fully develop” his
case. See Manning, 654 N.W.2d at 559.1
1
The State cites Webb v. State, 555 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Iowa 1996), for the proposition
that Reynolds had “no constitutional right to be present at a postconviction-relief
hearing.” Webb does not authorize a wholesale denial of the opportunity to participate.
Webb “refused to participate by telephone” and asked to be personally present. See
Webb, 555 N.W.2d at 825. The court concluded, “Webb was not denied any due
process or statutory rights to personally attend the postconviction hearing. He was
accorded opportunities to present testimony in compliance with principles of fundamental
fairness and he waived those opportunities.” Id. at 827.
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We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on Reynolds’s
postconviction-relief application.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.